What is the difference between hardware tokens and face-based authentication for shared workstations?

Hardware tokens authenticate possession of a device, which can fail when the device is left at a terminal. Face-based authentication binds the login to the individual, so the credential travels with the person across shared workstations. That reduces handoffs, avoids token sharing, and better fits environments where workers move between registers, stockrooms, and devices.

Why This Matters for Security Teams

On shared workstations, the authentication method is not just a login choice. It shapes who can move fastest, whether access follows the person or the terminal, and how easy it is to misuse a credential left behind. Hardware tokens are strong for possession, but they can create friction when workers swap stations. Face-based authentication reduces that handoff problem by binding access to the individual instead of the device.

The tradeoff matters most in retail, healthcare, logistics, and other high-turnover environments where staff cycle between registers, kiosks, scanners, and back-office systems. In those settings, the wrong design can encourage workarounds such as shared tokens, unattended logins, or “just leave it plugged in” habits. Guidance from NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Security and Privacy Controls still points to least privilege, authentication assurance, and controlled session handling, but implementation depends on the environment.

NHIMG research shows why identity continuity matters: in the Guide to the Secret Sprawl Challenge, exposed credentials often persist because operational teams optimise for speed over lifecycle control. In practice, many security teams encounter auth failures only after someone has already borrowed a token, shared a badge, or reused a terminal session to keep work moving.

How It Works in Practice

Hardware tokens and face-based authentication solve different parts of the same problem. A hardware token proves possession of a physical object, which is useful when the workstation should only accept a known second factor. Face-based authentication proves the presence of the person, which is more suitable when workers move across many shared endpoints and should not have to carry or hand off a device at every station.

In practice, the best model is often a layered one. A token can still be used during enrollment, recovery, or higher-risk actions, while face-based authentication can streamline routine workstation unlocks. The decision should consider privacy, spoof resistance, fallback paths, and whether the system can reliably distinguish one authorised worker from another under poor lighting or busy floor conditions. For baseline control design, teams should map the workflow to NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Security and Privacy Controls and align identity handling with policy and audit requirements.

• Use hardware tokens when the workstation is fixed to a person or when phishing-resistant possession factors are required.
• Use face-based authentication when the user must move quickly between shared terminals and session continuity matters more than device continuity.
• Require session timeout, re-authentication for sensitive actions, and a clean handoff process so the terminal does not become the trust anchor.
• Keep fallback methods tightly controlled, because backup workflows are often where abuse and bypass happen.

NHIMG’s 2025 State of NHIs and Secrets in Cybersecurity reports that 44% of NHI tokens are exposed in the wild, a reminder that any credential that lingers too long, or is shared too freely, becomes an operational liability. These controls tend to break down when shared workstations lack fast session resets, because staff will preserve access rather than re-authenticate repeatedly.

Common Variations and Edge Cases

Tighter authentication often increases friction, so organisations must balance speed against assurance, especially where dozens of people use the same terminals per shift. There is no universal standard for whether face-based authentication should replace hardware tokens entirely in these environments; current guidance suggests choosing based on risk, usability, and local privacy constraints.

Some environments should keep hardware tokens in the loop. If workers wear masks, gloves, face coverings, or safety gear, face matching may be less reliable and may need a backup factor. If the workstation sits in a noisy public area or if privacy law limits biometric collection, a token plus short session lifetime may be the safer path. Conversely, where shared access creates constant handoff friction, face-based auth can reduce unauthorized reuse better than a token that gets left in a drawer or plugged into a terminal. For broader controls on credentials and reuse patterns, NHIMG’s Guide to the Secret Sprawl Challenge is useful context, and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information Security Management helps frame governance and accountability.

Practical teams should test the full failure path, not just the happy path: what happens when face matching fails, when the token is forgotten, when a shift change is rushed, or when an employee needs emergency access. The right answer is the one that keeps identity tied to the current person without creating a workaround culture that weakens the control.

Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group

• What common vulnerabilities do cloud applications face with OAuth tokens?
• What is the difference between short-lived tokens and CAEP-based enforcement?
• What is the difference between push-based MFA and phishing-resistant authentication?
• What is the difference between passwordless authentication and password-based access?