Teams should separate entitlement from actual usage. License counts, SSO membership, and app activity should be reviewed together so dormant accounts do not remain provisioned by default. That reduces wasted spend and narrows the access surface. A practical control is to identify inactive users, validate business need, and remove or reassign access on a scheduled basis.
Why This Matters for Security Teams
When licensed users are inactive, the real risk is not just wasted spend. Dormant SaaS access often becomes standing access that no one is actively reviewing, especially when app ownership is split between IT, finance, and the business. That creates a blind spot for privilege creep, orphaned accounts, and overexposed integrations. NHI Mgmt Group notes that only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts in the Ultimate Guide to NHIs, which is a useful reminder that visibility problems are usually larger than teams assume.
Security teams should treat inactive SaaS users as an access governance problem, not a license cleanup task. The same discipline used for OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 applies here: if an identity can still authenticate, it can still be abused. In practice, many teams discover stale access only after a vendor audit, a suspicious login, or a mass offboarding event has already exposed gaps.
How It Works in Practice
The most reliable pattern is to reconcile three views together: entitlement, usage, and business need. License assignment shows what should be available. SSO or IdP membership shows what is provisioned. App activity shows whether the user is actually using the service. Teams should set a review cadence that flags inactive users based on a documented threshold, then require an owner to confirm whether access is still needed. If it is not, remove the entitlement and deprovision the account rather than leaving it dormant.
This is easiest when the SaaS app supports SCIM provisioning and deprovisioning, because access removal can be automated instead of handled manually. If the app does not support SCIM, security teams should still enforce the process through identity governance, access review workflows, or admin scripts tied to the IdP. The control objective is the same: reduce the gap between license assignment and actual use. That fits the broader lifecycle logic in NHI Lifecycle Management Guide and aligns with control thinking in NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0, where access governance must be continuously maintained.
- Define inactivity thresholds by application sensitivity, not one universal number.
- Separate license optimisation from access approval so cost savings do not override business validation.
- Recheck shared mailboxes, delegated admin roles, and OAuth app grants, not just named users.
- Use alerts for stale access exceptions, then require explicit renewal before reactivation.
Where this guidance breaks down is in SaaS environments with weak audit logs, no SCIM, and multiple shadow admins, because usage and entitlement data cannot be reconciled with confidence.
Common Variations and Edge Cases
Tighter license and access review often increases operational overhead, requiring organisations to balance security and savings against manager effort and user friction. That tradeoff becomes more visible in departments with seasonal usage, contractors, or infrequent but legitimate access patterns. Best practice is evolving here: there is no universal standard for how many days of inactivity should trigger removal, because business context matters more than a fixed threshold.
One common edge case is the “inactive but legitimate” user, such as finance staff who use the app only at month end or compliance reviewers who log in quarterly. Another is the user who is inactive in the app but still indirectly powerful through a group, role, or connected integration. Security teams should not rely on login history alone; they should also review whether the account has API tokens, delegated permissions, or admin consent that persists beyond user activity. The Top 10 NHI Issues is a useful reminder that stale credentials and excessive standing access often travel together, even in SaaS settings that appear human-centric.
Another variation is third-party SaaS access tied to vendors or partners. In those cases, app inactivity may be low because the account is not used often, but the exposure remains high if the account retains broad permissions. Current guidance suggests treating these accounts as higher risk and applying shorter review cycles, stronger approval requirements, and faster revocation on contract end. The goal is not perfect elimination of dormant users. It is to ensure that non-use does not become a reason to ignore access ownership.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and CSA MAESTRO address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and NIST AI RMF set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-01 | Stale SaaS access mirrors dormant identity risk and privilege creep. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-1 | Identity and access governance covers entitlement review and deprovisioning. |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | AC-2 | Account management requires timely disabling of unnecessary user access. |
| CSA MAESTRO | IAM-01 | MAESTRO emphasizes identity governance for cloud and SaaS access lifecycle. |
| NIST AI RMF | GOVERN | Governance requires accountability for access decisions and ongoing oversight. |
Assign ownership for SaaS access decisions and review exceptions through a documented governance process.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How should security teams govern access when users can bind the organisation to a cloud security service agreement?
- How should security teams manage privileged access in SAP S/4HANA environments that span on premises, cloud, and hybrid deployments?
- How should security teams reduce segregation of duties risk when access reviews span multiple SaaS and ERP applications?
- How should security teams design app request workflows so employees get access quickly without creating shadow IT risk?
