Teams should evaluate whether the resource is business critical, security sensitive, and likely to change over time. If it matters to operations or risk, it should usually be brought under Infrastructure as Code so it can be reviewed, versioned, and tracked. If the resource is temporary or obsolete, the better decision may be to remove it instead of importing it.
Why This Matters for Security Teams
Deciding whether to import an unmanaged cloud resource is really a question of control, evidence, and future risk. A resource that stays outside Infrastructure as Code can drift without review, escape change tracking, and quietly accumulate permissions or dependencies. That becomes especially dangerous when the resource is tied to secrets, access paths, or production workloads described in the NHI Lifecycle Management Guide and the Top 10 NHI Issues.
The decision is not just operational. It affects auditability, incident response, and whether the resource can be governed under the same review discipline as everything else in the estate. NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 emphasises asset visibility and risk-based management, which maps directly to this choice. NHIMG research also shows the broader maturity gap: only 19.6% of security professionals express strong confidence in securely managing non-human workload identities in The 2024 Non-Human Identity Security Report.
In practice, many security teams discover unmanaged resource only after they have already been used in a change window, incident, or audit finding.
How It Works in Practice
Teams usually evaluate unmanaged resources through three lenses: business criticality, security exposure, and lifecycle stability. If a resource supports production traffic, stores sensitive data, exposes an API, or carries privileged access, the default should be to bring it under version control and policy review. If it is nonessential, duplicate, abandoned, or a one-off test object, removal is often the cleaner outcome.
The practical workflow is straightforward. First, inventory the resource and identify what depends on it. Then determine whether the current configuration is known-good or already drifting from approved state. Next, decide whether importing it into IaC will preserve the real configuration cleanly, or whether the import would bake in technical debt that is better eliminated by recreating the resource from code. This is where Ultimate Guide to NHIs is useful as a lifecycle reference, because unmanaged resources often become NHI problems when they contain tokens, certificates, or service permissions that nobody owns.
- Import when the resource is business critical, change-prone, or linked to privileged access.
- Leave it alone only when the team can justify a short-lived exception with documented ownership.
- Delete it when the resource is obsolete, duplicated, or no longer tied to a live service.
- Use policy checks so imported state does not silently expand permissions or drift from approved baselines.
For sensitive cloud services, incident history matters too. Cases such as the Codefinger AWS S3 ransomware attack and the Azure Key Vault privilege escalation exposure show how untracked configuration becomes an access and resilience problem, not just a housekeeping issue. These controls tend to break down when the resource is already embedded in undocumented application dependencies, because import or deletion can break services that no one has mapped.
Common Variations and Edge Cases
Tighter control often increases operational overhead, requiring organisations to balance governance against speed and service stability. That tradeoff matters because not every unmanaged resource is worth importing. A temporary sandbox, disposable test artifact, or expired experiment may create more risk by preserving it than by deleting it. Current guidance suggests treating these cases as exception handling, not as a normal management model.
There is also no universal standard for this yet when the resource cannot be safely imported without side effects. Some cloud objects are easy to adopt into IaC, while others have generated state that does not map cleanly to code. In those cases, teams should document ownership, set a short review window, and decide whether to recreate, import partially, or retire the resource. The key is that “do nothing” should be a conscious decision with an expiry date, not an absence of action.
For regulated environments, import decisions often need audit evidence as well as technical justification. That is why resource history, access logs, and dependency mapping matter as much as the configuration itself. NHIMG’s Regulatory and Audit Perspectives help frame this as a control decision, not merely an infrastructure preference. In high-change environments, the safest path is often to import only after the resource has been rationalised, because importing a messy asset can freeze bad state into your control plane.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0, NIST AI RMF and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-01 | Unmanaged resources often hide NHIs, secrets, or privilege paths that need ownership and inventory. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | ID.AM | Asset management is the core control family behind deciding whether a cloud resource stays unmanaged. |
| NIST AI RMF | AI RMF supports risk-based decisions when automated or agentic systems create unmanaged cloud resources. | |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | SC-7 | Unmanaged resources can create uncontrolled trust paths that violate zero trust segmentation principles. |
Inventory the resource, identify any embedded NHI credentials, and assign an owner before deciding import or removal.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How do security teams evaluate whether cloud resource import workflows are actually reducing manual effort?
- How should security teams decide whether to build authorization logic inside applications or externalize it to a centralized policy layer?
- How do security teams decide whether to prioritise NHI governance, workload identity protection, or identity threat detection first?
- What breaks when cloud teams cannot drill down from a compliance score to the failing resource?