They should use simulation results to inform who needs closer monitoring, more targeted training, or stronger access scrutiny. The key is to link human behaviour with role, privilege, and exposure so identity decisions reflect observed risk instead of assumptions about awareness.
How smishing simulation results should feed identity governance
Security teams should treat smishing simulation outcomes as identity signals, not just awareness metrics. A failed simulation can indicate which users, roles, or access paths deserve more scrutiny, especially where a phish could expose privileged systems or sensitive workflows. That makes the result useful for recertification, role review, and targeted control tightening, rather than generic training alone.
What the results change in identity decisions
The practical value is in connecting observed behaviour to access decisions. If certain roles consistently click, respond, or escalate under simulated pressure, that evidence can inform access reviews and certification, because reviewers can look harder at high-risk entitlements rather than treating every account the same. It also helps separate low-risk users from those whose role and exposure justify tighter monitoring.
That same logic supports better role design and governance. Smishing results can reveal where role mining and role design need refinement, for example when a job family shows repeated susceptibility and also holds broad permissions that are not necessary for day-to-day work. The point is not to punish users, but to make identity controls reflect actual exposure patterns.
For organisations with stronger governance maturity, the results can also feed IGA platform evaluation and operating decisions, because the issue is not only who clicked, but whether the governance process can absorb behavioural evidence and turn it into timely review actions. Where the governance workflow cannot do that, the simulation programme becomes a report-only exercise instead of a control input.
How to turn simulation data into governance signals
Use the simulation output to create a small number of decision inputs that identity teams can actually act on. Useful inputs include repeated failure by role, repeated failure by user segment, failure after access to specific systems, and failure by users who already have elevated or sensitive access. Those patterns are more actionable than a raw pass rate because they point to where privilege and exposure intersect.
- Flag users who failed simulations and also hold elevated, finance, admin, or production access.
- Use repeat failure by role to trigger targeted access review, not just repeat training.
- Compare simulation results with current entitlements to see whether excessive privilege is amplifying risk.
- Escalate cases where a failed simulation aligns with recent role change, onboarding, or access expansion.
Security teams should also consider where simulation results intersect with existing governance triggers. A one-off failure may justify coaching, but repeated failure in a privileged population usually warrants stronger review, closer monitoring, or temporary reduction of exposure until the access picture is validated.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Smishing results become risky when they are stored as awareness scores but never translated into access action. The exposure is greatest when the same people who are easiest to socially engineer also hold broad entitlements, because a real message can become credential theft, session compromise, or fraudulent access to sensitive systems.
Failure mechanism: Security teams separate training outcomes from identity governance, so risky behaviour does not influence recertification, role review, or privilege decisions. That leaves high-risk users in place even when the simulation shows they are more likely to fall for a real lure.
Impact: The organisation keeps excessive exposure in roles where social engineering is most likely to succeed, which increases the chance of account takeover, unauthorized action, and downstream abuse of trusted access paths.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP ASVS, CIS Controls v8, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and NIST CSF 2.0 set the technical controls, while ISO/IEC 27001:2022 defines the regulatory obligations.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP ASVS | V16 — Security Logging and Error Handling | Smishing outcomes are useful telemetry that should feed logged review and escalation workflows. |
| Recommendation — Log repeated simulation failures and route them into review queues for follow-up. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-5 — Account Management | Simulation results should influence account scrutiny, recertification, and privilege cleanup. |
| Recommendation — Use simulation outcomes to prioritize account reviews and reduce unnecessary access. | ||
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | AC-6 — Least Privilege | Failed smishing behaviour should inform tighter privilege decisions where exposure is high. |
| Recommendation — Reduce privileges when simulation results show elevated social-engineering exposure. | ||
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | A.5.18 — Access rights | Identity governance uses behaviour signals to review and adjust access rights appropriately. |
| Recommendation — Review access rights for users whose simulation results indicate higher risk. | ||
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-05 — Managed Access Control | Simulation findings should inform who gets closer access control attention and review. |
| Recommendation — Adjust access control rigor for users and roles with repeated simulation failures. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to prioritise: Start with users and roles where simulation failure overlaps with privileged access, sensitive data access, or production reach. Those are the cases where identity governance can most reduce real risk, because the behavioural signal and the access impact reinforce each other.
What to verify: Check that the governance workflow can carry simulation outcomes into an actual review queue, with owner assignment and a decision record. If results only go to the awareness team, the organisation will miss the chance to tighten access where exposure is highest.
Decision rule: If a user repeatedly fails smishing tests and has broad or high-impact access, treat that as a review trigger for privilege scope, monitoring, and recertification priority. If the user has limited exposure, use the result more as a training signal than an access change signal.
Practitioner takeaway: The best use of smishing results is to make identity governance more evidence-based, so access scrutiny follows demonstrated exposure instead of relying on assumptions about awareness.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How should security teams use IAST and RASP in NHI governance?
- How should security teams connect identity governance to risk management and compliance?
- How should security teams connect data security posture management to identity governance?
- How should security teams connect password security, PAM and identity governance?