Security teams should move from network-centric access to application-scoped access. The key decision is not whether the user can reach the corporate perimeter, but whether the user can reach only the claims applications, data, and workflows required for the job. That reduces tunnel sprawl, lowers support burden, and makes remote access easier to govern.
How remote claims access should be re-architected
Remote claims work should be designed around the application and workflow, not the network perimeter. In practice, that means users get access to the specific claims systems they need, with the minimum privileges required, instead of a broad tunnel that can reach far more than the job requires. The operating goal is narrower reach, clearer governance, and fewer support exceptions.
That shift matters because claims operations typically involve structured workflows, sensitive customer data, and multiple internal systems that do not all need the same remote exposure. A legacy VPN treats remote staff as if they are inside the network, but claims support works better when access is evaluated per application, per role, and per device posture.
This is why many teams move toward Remote Access Identity Guide style patterns: authenticate the user, verify the device or session conditions, and then grant access only to the claims applications, data, and workflows that match the task. The result is less lateral movement potential and a smaller blast radius if a session or credential is abused.
What replaces the VPN mindset in day-to-day support
The practical replacement for a VPN-first model is application-scoped access with strong authentication at each entry point. Instead of asking whether someone can reach the corporate network, security teams should ask whether they can open the claims portal, document repository, case management tool, or approval workflow that they actually need. That is a materially different control objective.
For claims teams, this usually means central identity checks, conditional access, and well-defined application entitlements. It also means separating access to production claims data from access to administration tools, remote support consoles, and back-office systems. Where a legacy remote-access path still exists, it should be treated as an exception path with tighter logging and stronger review.
Using NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture is a good fit here because the core decision is explicit verification and least-privilege access, not implicit trust from being on the internal network. That same principle aligns with claims work, where access should follow the user, device, and application context rather than the location of the endpoint.
In remote service-heavy environments, a broader access platform can also be introduced carefully. Teams often use application proxies, ZTNA-style brokers, or identity-aware gateways so that claims staff never need unfettered network reach just to process a case.
What to govern so the model stays supportable
Once access is application-scoped, governance becomes more precise. Teams can review which claims roles are entitled to which applications, which access paths are still justified, and which remote exceptions exist for contractors, adjusters, or third-party processors. That makes it easier to remove dormant remote access, especially when a VPN account was created for a temporary need and never retired.
Where the access path includes privileged support or third-party tooling, the strongest control point is credential hygiene. A remote session that depends on a long-lived secret, shared account, or stale privilege is still a support risk even if the network tunnel has been replaced. Teams should prefer short-lived, audited access and clear ownership of every remote path.
For a broader governance view, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Security and Privacy Controls provides direct control anchors for access control, identification and authentication, auditing, and configuration management. Those control families map well to remote claims access because the main problem is not just connectivity, it is controlling who can do what, where, and under what conditions.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Legacy VPNs create concentrated failure modes because one valid credential or one exposed remote access appliance can open a much larger part of the environment than the task requires. In claims operations, that can turn a simple remote-support need into an opportunity for credential abuse, session hijacking, or lateral movement into systems that hold sensitive customer and financial data.
Failure mechanism: A broad remote network path, especially when paired with weak MFA coverage, dormant accounts, or shared secrets, lets an attacker or unauthorized user move from initial access to claims applications that were never intended to be remotely reachable.
Impact: The likely consequence is expanded blast radius, harder incident containment, and greater operational disruption if a remote credential, session, or appliance is compromised. Support teams also inherit more access review and exception handling burden because the network tunnel has to be trusted more than the workflow itself.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 set the technical controls, while ISO/IEC 27001:2022 defines the regulatory obligations.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | Zero Trust Architecture | Remote claims access should verify each request and limit reach per app/session. |
| Recommendation — Apply zero trust to replace network trust with per-application verification and least privilege. | ||
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | AC-6 — Least Privilege | Claims staff should receive only the applications and workflows needed for their role. |
| IA-2 — Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | Remote claims access depends on strong user authentication before application access is granted. | |
| AU-2 — Event Logging | Application-scoped access needs auditability for remote access, support sessions, and exceptions. | |
| Recommendation — Enforce least privilege so remote users can access only required claims resources. Require strong authentication before granting access to claims applications. Log remote claims access events and support sessions for review and incident response. | ||
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | A.5.15 — Access control | The question is fundamentally about governing remote access by application and role. |
| Recommendation — Define and enforce access control rules for remote claims applications and workflows. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to prioritise: Start with the claims applications that are actually used remotely and remove the assumption that every support task needs network-level access. If a task can be completed through a web app, brokered session, or application gateway, do not keep a general-purpose VPN path open just for convenience.
What to verify: Confirm that every remote access path maps to an owner, a business purpose, an authentication requirement, and a review cadence. If you cannot name the application, the role, and the exception process for a remote path, it is already too broad.
Practitioner takeaway: The best remote-claims design is the one that makes support easier to govern than a legacy VPN, because access is tied to specific work, not a blanket network reach.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- How should security teams design remote access for AWS workloads without relying on a legacy VPN?
- How should security teams reduce VPN risk without disrupting remote work?
- How should security teams manage privileged access for vendors and remote users without relying on VPN access?
- How should security teams secure remote production workflows without relying on always-on VPN access?