CVE-2024-38107 is a power dependency coordinator privilege escalation vulnerability in Microsoft Windows. CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 13 August 2024, which means attackers have used it in real attacks. Microsoft Windows Power Dependency Coordinator contains an unspecified vulnerability that allows for privilege escalation, enabling a local attacker to obtain SYSTEM privileges.
What Makes This Vulnerability Class Dangerous
Privilege escalation flaws in Windows matter because they convert an already local foothold into full operating-system control. In this case, the attacker does not need remote code execution to gain SYSTEM-level authority, which makes the weakness especially valuable after an initial compromise.
That kind of escalation can turn a low-privilege user session, a compromised service, or malware running under an ordinary account into a platform for disabling security tools, tampering with logs, and staging further access. For vulnerability context and record validation, readers should check the CVE Program and the NIST National Vulnerability Database.
How Attackers Use It After Initial Access
Local privilege escalation is usually not the first move in an intrusion, but it is often the move that changes the whole incident. Once attackers can elevate to SYSTEM, they can disable defenses, access protected processes, and prepare persistence or lateral movement with far fewer restrictions.
This is why privilege-escalation techniques are tracked closely in adversary knowledge bases. The MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix is useful for mapping this kind of behaviour to credential access, privilege escalation, and post-exploitation activity.
How Organisations Check Exposure and Prioritise Action
Exposure assessment starts with knowing where Microsoft Windows systems run, which versions are present, and which assets are reachable by a local attacker or untrusted user context. Asset inventory, endpoint ownership, and vendor guidance are the practical starting points, especially when the vulnerability has already been listed in CISA’s KEV catalogue.
Organisations should also review whether administrative workstations, shared servers, jump hosts, and developer endpoints have the strongest blast radius if one local account is abused. A general vulnerability workflow is useful here, and NHIMG’s Vulnerability Management Guide is a practical reference for KEV-led prioritisation and remediation tracking.
Remediation, Detection, and Post-Compromise Review
Where patching is available, it should be treated as the primary fix and validated quickly. If patch deployment must be delayed, compensate by reducing who can log on locally, limiting administrative exposure on high-value endpoints, and tightening monitoring around unexpected privilege transitions.
Detection should look for signs that a normal user or service account suddenly acted like an administrator, including unusual token behaviour, security tool interference, and suspicious process chains that end in SYSTEM context. After patching, teams should review for any evidence that the flaw was already exploited, because privilege escalation often accompanies credential theft, persistence, or defence evasion rather than appearing as a standalone event.
Risk and Threat Considerations
This flaw creates a clear post-compromise risk: once an attacker has any local foothold, privilege escalation can collapse the remaining trust boundary on the host. That can expose local secrets, tamper with security software, and give the attacker the authority needed to pivot into broader enterprise access.
Failure mechanism: The vulnerability allows a local attacker to elevate from ordinary execution to SYSTEM privileges, which can neutralise host controls and unlock protected resources.
Impact: A successful exploit can lead to full host takeover, stronger persistence, easier lateral movement, and higher confidence that the attacker can evade basic endpoint restrictions.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
MITRE ATT&CK addresses the attack surface, NIST CSF 2.0, NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and CIS Controls v8 set the technical controls, and ISO/IEC 27001:2022 defines the regulatory obligations.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1068 — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Models local escalation from user to SYSTEM on Windows |
| Recommendation — Map exploit activity to T1068 and hunt for privilege-escalation execution chains. | ||
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-05 — Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control | Supports restricting local privilege and access pathways on endpoints |
| Recommendation — Enforce least-privilege access on affected Windows systems and review local admin exposure. | ||
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | AC-6 — Least Privilege | Directly governs limiting excessive permissions that make escalation more damaging |
| Recommendation — Apply AC-6 to reduce standing privilege and constrain high-risk local accounts. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-5 — Account Management | Addresses controlling and reviewing privileged and local accounts on endpoints |
| Recommendation — Audit local and privileged accounts and remove unnecessary access paths. | ||
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | A.8.2 — Privileged access rights | Annex A control directly addresses governance over elevated rights that this flaw can abuse |
| Recommendation — Review privileged access rights on Windows hosts and tighten approval for elevation. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
Why practitioners should care: Treat this as a host-level escalation problem, not just another CVE entry. The operational question is whether an ordinary local account on any Windows system can be turned into a privileged execution path faster than defenders can detect and contain it.
What to watch for: Focus on endpoints and servers that routinely host untrusted users, third-party tools, or high-value administrative sessions, because those environments make local escalation far more consequential than a standalone desktop. A confirmed exploit path should trigger immediate review of nearby accounts, sessions, and security telemetry.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- CVE-2014-1812 (Microsoft Windows Group Policy Preferences Password Privilege Escalation)
- CVE-2019-1388 (Microsoft Windows Certificate Dialog Privilege Escalation)
- What should security teams do first when a Windows privilege-escalation CVE is already being exploited?
- CVE-2021-31199 (Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider Privilege Escalation)