Refresh tokens matter more because they last longer and can mint new access tokens after the short-lived access token expires. If the refresh token is exposed, the attacker can keep re-establishing the session. Teams should therefore protect refresh-token storage with the same seriousness they apply to other durable credentials, including rotation and revocation.
Why This Matters for Security Teams
CLI refresh tokens deserve stronger protection because they are durable session material, not just another login artifact. A short-lived access token limits exposure when a command-line session is intercepted, but a refresh token can silently mint fresh access tokens long after the original session should have ended. That makes it closer to a high-value secret than a routine credential, especially on developer workstations and automation hosts where copy-paste, shell history, and local files are easy to overlook.
Security teams often underestimate the blast radius because the CLI feels local and interactive, yet the token can become a bridge into cloud APIs, source code, and administrative controls. NHI Management Group’s research has shown that 44% of NHI tokens are exposed in the wild, which is a strong indicator that token handling failures are common, not exceptional. Guidance in the OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 both point toward tighter protection for durable credentials and better lifecycle control.
In practice, many security teams encounter refresh-token abuse only after a developer workstation, CI runner, or support laptop has already been used to mint replacement sessions.
How It Works in Practice
Access tokens and refresh tokens serve different security purposes, so they should not be treated the same way. Access tokens are usually short-lived and scoped to a specific API or action set. Refresh tokens last longer and exist to recover access without forcing the user or workload through full reauthentication. That convenience is exactly why they need more control: if an attacker gets the refresh token, they can keep generating new access tokens until the refresh token is revoked or expires.
For CLI workflows, stronger protection means reducing where the refresh token can live, how long it remains valid, and who or what can read it. Current best practice is to treat it like a durable secret:
- Store it in a protected secrets store or OS-backed credential vault, not in shell history, plaintext config files, or shared dotfiles.
- Use the shortest feasible lifetime and rotate it when the CLI session ends, the device changes, or the user changes role.
- Bind it to a device, workload, or identity context where possible, so the token is less useful if copied elsewhere.
- Revoke it on logout, offboarding, suspicious reuse, or token leakage events.
- Prefer ephemeral access tokens for execution and reserve refresh tokens for controlled renewal only.
This is consistent with the threat patterns documented in the Guide to the Secret Sprawl Challenge, where long-lived tokens often spread into logs, tickets, and local tooling. It also aligns with operational guidance in the OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10, which emphasizes lifecycle discipline over static trust assumptions.
These controls tend to break down on shared developer machines and unmanaged automation hosts because local storage, token caching, and ad hoc scripts make refresh-token theft and reuse difficult to detect.
Common Variations and Edge Cases
Tighter refresh-token protection often increases operational overhead, requiring teams to balance user convenience against session resilience and incident containment. That tradeoff is especially visible in CLI tooling, where engineers expect seamless reauthentication and may resist controls that interrupt workflows.
There is no universal standard for this yet, but current guidance suggests a few practical variations. Some CLIs use rotating refresh tokens so each exchange invalidates the prior token, which reduces replay risk but can create failure modes if the client loses state. Others rely on device-bound credentials or browser-mediated login flows, which improve assurance but may not fit headless scripts or air-gapped environments. In high-risk cases, teams may choose to disable persistent refresh tokens entirely and require periodic full reauth.
Edge cases also matter. Offline laptops, CI/CD runners, and shared jump hosts often cannot tolerate long-lived refresh tokens safely, because a stolen token can outlive device trust. The same is true when tokens are cached by third-party tooling or copied into container images. NHI Management Group’s JetBrains GitHub plugin token exposure coverage shows how quickly developer tooling can turn credential convenience into exposure. For broader identity context, the Ultimate Guide to NHIs is useful when teams need to map refresh-token handling into a wider NHI lifecycle model.
In the most mature environments, the decision is not whether refresh tokens exist, but whether they are short-lived, tightly scoped, and revocable enough to survive real-world compromise scenarios.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST AI RMF set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-03 | Refresh tokens are durable secrets and need rotation and revocation discipline. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AC-1 | Session and credential access controls apply directly to token protection. |
| NIST AI RMF | Risk governance supports lifecycle controls for durable credentials used by automation. |
Treat refresh tokens as high-value NHI credentials and automate rotation, revocation, and exposure monitoring.
