Yes. CISA added CVE-2016-0040 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 28 March 2022, which it does only when there is reliable evidence of active exploitation. CISA has not linked it to known ransomware campaigns. The kernel in Microsoft Windows allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application. Any organisation running the affected product should treat remediation as urgent.
Why confirmed exploitation changes the response
This is not a routine CVE triage question. Once CISA places a vulnerability in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, the practical assumption changes from “potentially dangerous” to “active exploitation is already a confirmed risk.” For a Windows kernel privilege-escalation issue, that means even a local foothold can become a route to full-system control, so exposure should be treated as operationally urgent.
That urgency is why teams should prioritise asset identification, rapid patching, and exception handling before they spend time debating whether exploitation is theoretical. For the broader response pattern, use the Zero-Day and Exploited Vulnerabilities Guide to anchor KEV-based triage, emergency mitigation, and post-patch verification.
How to confirm whether you are exposed
Start with product scope, not exploit detail. The key question is whether any endpoint, server, virtual desktop, or management host is running the affected Microsoft Windows kernel component and whether it can be reached by users who could obtain a local execution path. In practice, that means inventorying versions, validating patch status, and checking whether high-value systems are still carrying the vulnerable build.
For teams that need a practical prioritisation method, the right next step is to compare exposure against CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog and use the vendor advisory for authoritative product and fix details rather than reproducing version guidance from memory.
What remediation should look like when patching is delayed
If immediate patching is not possible, the goal is to reduce the chance that local access becomes privilege escalation. That usually means tightening who can log on interactively, limiting local administrator membership, reviewing remote administration paths, and watching for unusual child-process, token, or privilege-change behaviour on the most exposed hosts. Any compensating control is only a delay tactic, not a substitute for remediation.
Where local privilege escalation is the issue, the operational priority is to remove the attacker’s ability to turn one compromised user session into kernel-level control. Microsoft-facing exploit patterns are often easiest to weaponise after initial access, so shorten the exposure window as much as possible and treat the unpatched host as a temporary high-risk exception.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Active exploitation matters because privilege escalation changes the blast radius of an intrusion. A local attacker who can move from user-level access to kernel-level privilege can disable defenses, dump credentials, tamper with security tooling, and stage lateral movement from a trusted internal system.
Failure mechanism: A crafted application reaches the vulnerable kernel path and converts low-privilege execution into elevated privileges, which can then be used to bypass local security boundaries and gain deeper system control.
Impact: The host may become a staging point for credential theft, persistence, tampering, and further intrusion, especially if the system holds administrative tokens or has access to sensitive internal resources.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
MITRE ATT&CK addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK | T1068 — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Kernel privilege escalation is an attack path to higher privileges. |
| Recommendation — Map observed abuse to privilege-escalation hunts and validate local admin tampering. | ||
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | SI-2 — Flaw Remediation | KEV-listed flaws require urgent remediation tracking and verification. |
| AU-6 — Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting | Post-exploitation checks depend on review of anomalous privilege and admin activity. | |
| Recommendation — Prioritise, patch and verify the vulnerable Windows systems immediately. Review logs for privilege changes, suspicious admin actions and pre-patch compromise. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-7 — Continuous Vulnerability Management | KEV exploitation is exactly the kind of condition this safeguard is meant to prioritise. |
| CIS-5 — Account Management | Privilege escalation often becomes actionable through local admin and account misuse. | |
| Recommendation — Use exposure and exploitability to drive urgent remediation on affected Windows hosts. Restrict local administrative access and remove unnecessary privileged accounts. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to prioritise: Patch or isolate systems that are both exposed and operationally powerful first, because the combination of active exploitation and local privilege escalation makes them the highest-value targets.
What to verify: Confirm not just that a patch exists, but that vulnerable hosts are actually remediated and that no suspicious administrative activity, new local accounts, or privilege changes appeared before the fix was applied. For KEV-driven response and evidence retention, align the workflow to the Vulnerability Management Guide, which covers prioritisation, exceptions, and verification discipline.
What good looks like: The vulnerable build is removed from the estate, compensating restrictions are temporary and documented, and the team can show post-remediation validation on the same hosts that were at greatest risk.
Practitioner takeaway: When CISA has already confirmed exploitation, the right question is not whether the CVE is “serious enough,” but how quickly you can eliminate the privilege-escalation path and check whether it was used before you patched.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- Is CVE-2016-3309 (Microsoft Windows Kernel Privilege Escalation) being exploited in the wild?
- How do you patch or mitigate CVE-2016-0040 (Microsoft Windows Kernel Privilege Escalation)?
- Is CVE-2013-5065 (Microsoft Windows Kernel Privilege Escalation) being exploited in the wild?
- Is CVE-2020-0986 (Microsoft Windows Kernel Privilege Escalation) being exploited in the wild?