This policy grants read-only access to GuardDuty findings and configuration data. The principal can inspect threat detections and detector settings, but cannot change them. Use it for analysts and auditors who need visibility, and monitor access because the data can expose active threats, affected resources, and defensive coverage.
What this managed policy lets you inspect
AmazonGuardDutyReadOnlyAccess is a visibility policy, not a control policy. It lets a principal review GuardDuty findings, detector configuration, and related security telemetry so they can understand what GuardDuty is seeing without changing detection logic or suppressing alerts. That makes it useful for read-side security workflows where investigation, reporting, or oversight is the goal.
The practical boundary is important: read access can reveal active threat signals, account context, and the shape of your detections, so it should be granted only to people who truly need that visibility. If you are validating the policy in an environment, compare the permitted actions against what analysts actually need to query and what configuration changes must remain restricted.
What it does not let you do
This policy does not grant administrative control over GuardDuty. It should not be treated as a shortcut to tuning detectors, changing findings, or managing organization-wide security posture. If a role needs to suppress, remediate, or reconfigure GuardDuty, that is a different access requirement and should be reviewed separately.
That distinction matters because read-only access still exposes enough detail to support reconnaissance inside the account. The principal can learn which resources are being flagged, which detectors exist, and how the environment is instrumented, so the permission set should be treated as sensitive even though it is non-mutating.
For a broader view of how AWS policies are evaluated and how managed policy scope differs from inline or custom policies, see the AWS IAM Policies and Roles Guide.
Who should have it, and how to scope it safely
Use this policy for analysts, auditors, and incident responders who need to inspect GuardDuty output but do not need to administer it. In practice, the safest pattern is to attach it to a tightly controlled role rather than a broad user population, then pair that role with separate approval or elevation paths for any action that changes security settings.
Read-only access is often a stepping stone to broader operational knowledge, so it should be paired with account hygiene and privilege review. If the same role can also reach other security services, confirm that the combined permissions do not create a wider investigative surface than intended. When teams need a stronger governance model around cloud permissions, Cloud PAM and CIEM Guide is a useful companion reference for effective permissions and right-sizing.
If you are trying to separate detection review from remediation authority, the Privileged Access Management Guide explains how to keep observation, approval, and administrative control distinct across cloud roles.
Risk and Threat Considerations
Read-only GuardDuty access can still be sensitive because findings often expose which assets are under scrutiny, what threat patterns have triggered, and how the environment is defended. That information can help an attacker understand where monitoring exists, which resources are high-value, and where detection coverage may be incomplete.
Failure mechanism: A broadly granted read-only role gives too many people visibility into security telemetry and detector configuration, increasing the chance of information leakage or misuse of operational security context.
Impact: Unauthorized readers may gain insight into active attacks, exposed assets, or defensive blind spots, which can support evasion planning, internal reconnaissance, or unnecessary disclosure of sensitive security data.
For an external reference on the broader permission and secret-exposure risks that often sit next to cloud read access, the OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 is a useful parallel lens on overprivilege and exposed security material.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 addresses the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | AU-6 — Audit Review, Analysis, and Reporting | GuardDuty findings are audit-style security telemetry that must be reviewed carefully. |
| AC-6 — Least Privilege | The policy should be scoped to analysts and auditors who only need read access. | |
| Recommendation — Review GuardDuty findings with access limited to roles that need security telemetry. Restrict the policy to the smallest role set that needs GuardDuty visibility. | ||
| CIS Controls v8 | CIS-5 — Account Management | Managed policy access should be governed through tightly controlled role assignments. |
| Recommendation — Assign the policy only to approved roles and review access regularly. | ||
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHI | Cloud read access can still expose sensitive security material when overbroad. |
| NHI-10 — Human Use of NHI | Human readers of security telemetry can misuse or overexpose sensitive operational context. | |
| Recommendation — Right-size the role so it can inspect GuardDuty without broader account visibility. Separate human review access from administrative control and sensitive workflows. | ||
Practitioner Guidance
What to verify: Confirm the role really needs read access to findings and configuration, not just incident summaries. If the user can already see alert outputs elsewhere, avoid duplicating access through another broad role.
Decision rule: If the principal only needs awareness, keep the policy read-only and time-bound. If they need to tune detectors or change response posture, move them to a separately governed administrative path instead of expanding this policy.
Practitioner takeaway: Treat GuardDuty read access as security-sensitive visibility, not low-risk convenience, because the information it reveals can materially improve both investigation quality and attacker reconnaissance.
Related resources from NHI Mgmt Group
- What permissions does the AWS AmazonEC2FullAccess managed policy grant?
- How should security teams handle deprecated AWS managed policies that still grant broad instance profile permissions?
- AWS AmazonGuardDutyReadOnlyAccess Managed Policy
- What breaks when AWS Identity Center permissions are managed manually at scale?