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Active Directory ACL and Delegation Hygiene Guide: Finding and Fixing Dangerous Directory Permissions

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 15 min read
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Most Active Directory attack paths do not exploit a vulnerability: they follow permissions that someone granted years ago and nobody reviewed. A GenericAll on a group, a WriteDacl on an organisational unit or a Reset Password right held by a helpdesk group that includes a service account is enough to turn an ordinary foothold into domain control. This guide covers the mechanics of directory access control lists (ACLs), which rights matter, how to build and review a delegation model, how to audit changes with SACLs and event 5136, and how to clean up safely. It is for AD engineers, identity architects and the security teams that review their work. Attack path graphing is covered in the BloodHound and Active Directory Attack Path Guide; this page is about fixing and governing the permissions those graphs reveal.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • Four rights cause most of the damage. GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner and GenericWrite on a privileged object are each equivalent, in practice, to controlling it.
  • Extended rights are permissions too. Reset Password, the two replication rights used by DCSync, and validated writes such as adding yourself to a group need the same scrutiny as full control.
  • Delegate to groups on dedicated OUs. Microsoft's own delegation guidance is to grant rights to security groups on purpose-built OUs and leave default containers to service administrators.
  • Auditing needs SACLs. Event 5136 is only written when the object carries a SACL that audits writes, so permission changes on Tier 0 objects go unseen unless you configure it.
  • Clean up in rings with a backup of every DACL. Export the security descriptor before each change so any removal can be reversed in minutes.

How directory permissions work

Every AD object has a security descriptor holding an owner, a discretionary ACL (DACL) that grants or denies access, and a system ACL (SACL) that controls auditing. Each access control entry (ACE) names a trustee, a set of rights, optionally an object type GUID that narrows the right to one attribute, property set or extended right, and inheritance flags that decide whether it flows to child objects.

  • Inheritance: permissions set on a domain root or OU can be inherited by every object beneath it. Microsoft notes that inheritable permissions apply to OUs placed in subtrees of the original OU, which is why one ACE on a high-level OU can reach thousands of accounts.
  • Ownership: the owner of an object has implicit rights to read and change its DACL. Whoever creates an object usually becomes its owner, so creators keep control long after their role changes. Windows Server 2008 and later support the OWNER RIGHTS principal to limit these implicit rights.
  • Create rights are broader than they look: Microsoft warns that the ability to create an object implicitly grants the ability to manipulate any attribute of objects the user creates, and of anything placed inside a container they create.
  • Protected objects: members of protected groups have their DACL overwritten from the AdminSDHolder template, so a dangerous ACE on AdminSDHolder spreads to every privileged account. See the AdminSDHolder, SDProp and Protected Groups Guide.

The rights that create attack paths

The values below are the .NET ActiveDirectoryRights flags Microsoft documents; review tools report rights in these terms. The impact column describes what holding the right on a privileged target means for a defender.

RightWhat Microsoft defines it asImpact when held on a privileged objectTypical legitimate holder
GenericAllFull rights: create and delete children, read and write properties, extended rights and moreComplete control of the object, including resetting passwords and changing membershipDomain Admins, Enterprise Admins, SYSTEM
WriteDaclModify the DACL in the security descriptorThe holder can grant itself any other rightDomain and enterprise administrators only
WriteOwnerAssume ownership of the objectOwnership brings implicit DACL control, so this leads to WriteDaclAdministrators only
GenericWriteWrite all properties and perform all validated writesChange attributes that control authentication or delegation, such as service principal names or key credentialsRarely needed; replace with attribute-scoped writes
WriteProperty (scoped)Write a specific attribute or property setDepends on the attribute: member, msDS-KeyCredentialLink, msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity and gPLink are all high impactGroup managers (member), provisioning services
ExtendedRight: Reset PasswordUser-Force-Change-Password, GUID 00299570-246d-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529Take over the account without knowing its passwordHelpdesk, scoped to standard user OUs only
ExtendedRight: Replicating Directory Changes AllDS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2With Replicating Directory Changes, allows replication of secret domain data (DCSync, T1003.006)Domain controllers and named synchronisation accounts
Self (validated write) on memberValidated write controlled by a validated write access rightAdd yourself to the groupSelf-service group joins for low-value groups only
CreateChild (computer)Create child objects of a classNew objects owned by the creator; combined with ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota this lets ordinary users create computer accountsBuild and provisioning groups on named OUs

Note the domain-wide default behind the last row: Microsoft documents that ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota allows authenticated users to join 10 machine accounts by default. Setting it to 0 and delegating computer creation to a named group on a specific OU removes an easy source of attacker-controlled objects.

Where dangerous ACEs come from

  • Product installers: Exchange is the best-known example. Microsoft documents that in shared and RBAC split models the Exchange Windows Permissions group holds permissions on many non-Exchange objects and attributes across AD, and that Active Directory split permissions removes its ACEs from the domain object. Identity synchronisation, backup, privileged access and MDM products also request broad rights at installation.
  • Service accounts for provisioning: HR-driven provisioning, IGA connectors and the Entra Connect AD DS connector account typically need write and reset rights. Scoped correctly they are fine; granted at the domain root they become the shortest path to Tier 0. See the Microsoft Entra Connect and Cloud Sync Hardening Guide.
  • Delegation of Control Wizard habits: quick delegations granted to individual users, to Authenticated Users, or at the domain root to save time.
  • Object creators: administrators who created groups, OUs or GPOs years ago and still own them through implicit owner rights.
  • Migrations and mergers: ACEs referencing groups from old domains, or unresolvable SIDs whose source domain still trusts yours.
  • Troubleshooting leftovers: "temporary" full control granted to fix a broken application and never removed.

Designing a delegation model

Microsoft's model for delegating administration has three steps: put the people receiving rights into a security group, place the objects to be managed into an OU, and delegate the task on that OU to the group. Build the rest of the model around that pattern:

  1. Tier the directory: keep Tier 0 objects (domain controllers, privileged groups, AD CS, sync servers, their service accounts) in OUs that only Tier 0 administrators can manage. See the Tiered Administration and Enterprise Access Model Guide.
  2. Use role groups for tasks: define groups per task and scope, such as "Reset passwords in Staff OU" or "Manage workstations in Branch OU", and grant rights only to those groups.
  3. Grant the narrowest right: prefer attribute-scoped WriteProperty and specific extended rights over GenericWrite or GenericAll. Scope inheritance to the object class the task needs (for example, user objects only).
  4. Leave defaults alone: Microsoft recommends that service administrators keep control of the default containers and OUs created at installation and that delegated objects move into new OUs.
  5. Record intent: every non-default ACE should map to a documented role, owner and ticket. Anything that cannot be explained is a removal candidate.
TaskOver-broad grant often seenLeast-privilege alternative
Helpdesk password resetsGenericAll on all user objects at the domain rootReset Password and write pwdLastSet and lockoutTime on user objects in standard user OUs only
Group membership managementGenericAll on groupsWriteProperty on member for named groups, never on Tier 0 groups
Joining workstationsMachineAccountQuota left at 10 for all usersQuota 0; create computer objects rights on a staging OU for a build group
Provisioning connectorDomain-root full control for the service accountCreate, delete and attribute writes on the managed OUs only; no rights on Tier 0 OUs
GPO managementEdit rights on every GPO and gPLink write at the domain rootEdit rights on named GPOs and gPLink write on the specific OUs they target

Decision guidance: a small domain with a handful of administrators gains more from removing delegation entirely and using a few well-controlled admin accounts than from building a fine-grained model. A large, multi-region estate needs the role-group model, automation to apply it, and an owner for each OU. If you run Exchange, choose RBAC split or Active Directory split permissions deliberately, because the shared default leaves Exchange groups with broad AD rights.

Reviewing ACLs

A useful review answers three questions: who can control Tier 0, which non-default ACEs exist, and who owns what. Work in this order:

  1. Define the target set: the domain root, AdminSDHolder, the Domain Controllers OU, privileged groups and their members, AD CS objects, GPOs linked to Tier 0 OUs and the accounts that run Tier 0 services.
  2. Export security descriptors: read the DACL and owner for each target and for each OU. Native tooling (Active Directory Users and Computers advanced view, PowerShell access to the directory, dsacls) is enough to start; graph tools add transitive analysis.
  3. Diff against defaults: compare each object's DACL with the schema default security descriptor for its class. The non-default ACEs are your review list.
  4. Flag high-impact rights: any trustee outside Tier 0 holding GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, Reset Password or replication rights on a target object.
  5. Flag risky trustees: Everyone, Authenticated Users, Domain Users, Domain Computers, individual user accounts and unresolved SIDs anywhere in an ACE that grants write or control.
  6. Check owners: Tier 0 objects should be owned by Domain Admins or another Tier 0 group, not by individual or former staff accounts.
  7. Assign and record: every flagged ACE gets an owner decision: keep with justification, narrow, or remove.

Run the full review at least annually and the Tier 0 subset quarterly. The attack path graph then tells you which remaining ACEs still create transitive routes to Tier 0.

Auditing permission changes

The Audit Directory Service Changes subcategory produces event 5136, "A directory service object was modified", on domain controllers. Microsoft's documentation stresses two practical points: the event is generated only when the object has a SACL entry auditing writes for the attribute, and one change usually produces two events with the same correlation ID, a "Value Deleted" event holding the old value and a "Value Added" event holding the new one.

What to watchEvent and fieldAlert condition
DACL changes on Tier 0 objects5136 with LDAP Display Name nTSecurityDescriptorAny change to the domain root, AdminSDHolder, Domain Controllers OU, privileged groups or AD CS objects outside an approved change
Membership of privileged groups4728, 4732, 4756 (member added to global, local, universal security group)Any addition to Tier 0 groups
Authentication-controlling attributes5136 on msDS-KeyCredentialLink, servicePrincipalName, msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, userAccountControlWrites by anyone other than the expected service, especially on privileged accounts and computers
GPO links5136 on gPLinkNew links on Tier 0 OUs or the domain root
Ownership changes5136 on nTSecurityDescriptor where the owner changesOwner set to a non-Tier 0 principal
Use of replication rights4662 with the replication control access right GUIDsRequests from hosts that are not domain controllers (see the DCSync detection in the Active Directory Security Monitoring and Event IDs Guide)

Configure the SACLs through policy so they are consistent: audit successful writes of all properties and permission changes on Tier 0 objects, and write-property on the specific high-risk attributes elsewhere. Auditing everything everywhere creates volume without value.

Cleaning up safely

  1. Back up first: export the full security descriptor (SDDL) of every object you intend to change and store it with the change ticket. Restoring the SDDL is the rollback.
  2. Start with no-regret removals: ACEs for deleted accounts, unresolved SIDs, departed staff and Everyone or Authenticated Users with write rights on Tier 0 objects.
  3. Narrow before removing: where a service needs some access, replace GenericAll with the specific attribute writes and extended rights it uses, then watch for failures.
  4. Observe usage: for service accounts with broad rights, review 5136 and 4662 data for 30 days to learn which attributes they actually write.
  5. Ring the changes: apply to a test domain or a pilot OU, then a business unit, then everywhere. Remember that AdminSDHolder reapplies protected object DACLs roughly every hour, so test changes to protected accounts there, not on the accounts.
  6. Fix ownership: transfer ownership of Tier 0 objects to the appropriate Tier 0 group.
  7. Lock the door: once clean, alert on new non-default ACEs and require changes to go through a reviewed process, ideally as code.

Where identity fits

Many of the riskiest ACEs belong to non-human identities: sync connectors, provisioning engines, backup agents, monitoring tools and legacy application accounts. They hold rights nobody remembers granting, run without MFA, and their passwords are often stored in configuration files. Treat every service account with delegated AD rights as a privileged identity: give it an owner, store its credential in a vault or use a group managed service account, restrict where it can log on, and include it in access reviews. See the Least Privilege Techniques Guide for the wider method.

Measuring progress

  • Non-Tier 0 control of Tier 0: number of trustees outside Tier 0 holding GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericWrite or reset rights on Tier 0 objects (target zero).
  • Risky trustees: ACEs granting write or control to Everyone, Authenticated Users, Domain Users or Domain Computers.
  • Non-default ACE count: total and per OU, with the share that has a documented owner.
  • Owner hygiene: Tier 0 objects owned by individual or disabled accounts.
  • Audit coverage: share of Tier 0 objects with SACLs producing 5136 in the SIEM.
  • Drift: new non-default ACEs per month that bypassed the change process.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
MITRE ATT&CK v20T1098 Account Manipulation; T1003.006 DCSync; T1484.001 Group Policy Modification; T1069.002 Domain Groups; T1087.002 Domain AccountPermission abuse, replication rights, GPO links, and the discovery that precedes them
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5AC-6 Least Privilege; AC-6(5) Privileged Accounts; AC-6(7) Review of User Privileges; AC-5 Separation of Duties; CM-3 Configuration Change Control; AU-12 Audit Record GenerationScoped delegation, periodic ACL review, change control and SACL-based auditing
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-05; ID.RA-01; PR.PS-04; DE.CM-09Least privilege, identifying permission weaknesses, logging and monitoring
CIS Controls v8.1Control 5 Account Management; Control 6 Access Control Management; Control 8 Audit Log ManagementAccount inventory, scoped access, directory change auditing
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex AA.5.15 Access control; A.5.18 Access rights; A.8.2 Privileged access rights; A.8.15 LoggingAccess policy, rights review, privileged rights, logging

Common failure patterns

  • Reviewing group membership but not ACLs: the privileged group list looks clean while a provisioning account holds GenericAll on the domain root.
  • Granting rights at the domain root for convenience: inheritance carries a helpdesk reset right onto service and privileged accounts that sit outside protected groups.
  • Editing protected accounts directly: changes are overwritten by SDProp, while a stray ACE on AdminSDHolder silently propagates to every protected account.
  • No SACLs on Tier 0 objects: the audit policy is enabled, but no 5136 events appear because nothing asks for them.
  • Leaving installer permissions in place: products removed years ago still have groups with broad AD rights, and those groups still have members.
  • One-off clean-ups: a major remediation project is followed by no drift detection, and dangerous ACEs return within a year.

Practitioner checklist

  • Define the Tier 0 object set and export the owner and DACL of each object and OU.
  • List every non-default ACE granting GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, GenericWrite, Reset Password or replication rights, and assign each an owner decision.
  • Remove write or control rights granted to Everyone, Authenticated Users, Domain Users, Domain Computers and unresolved SIDs.
  • Set ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to 0 and delegate computer creation to a named group on a staging OU.
  • Rebuild delegation as role groups on dedicated OUs with attribute-scoped rights.
  • Scope provisioning, sync and Exchange permissions to the OUs they manage, and choose Exchange split permissions deliberately.
  • Transfer ownership of Tier 0 objects to a Tier 0 group.
  • Configure SACLs on Tier 0 objects and high-risk attributes and alert on 5136 changes.
  • Back up SDDL before every change and alert on new non-default ACEs afterwards.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: BloodHound and Active Directory Attack Path Guide · AdminSDHolder, SDProp and Protected Groups Guide · Tiered Administration and Enterprise Access Model Guide · Top 10 Active Directory Security Risks

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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