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APT31 Threat Actor Profile Guide: Political targeting, tracking emails and defences explained

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 11 min read
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APT31, which Microsoft calls Violet Typhoon, is a Chinese espionage group that maps politicians, officials, dissidents and their staff with tracking-link emails, then goes after their accounts, home routers and the servers of the organisations around them. On 25 March 2024 the UK and US governments both named APT31 publicly: the UK's NCSC said the group was almost certainly behind 2021 reconnaissance against UK parliamentarians' email accounts, and the US Department of Justice said APT31 was part of a Ministry of State Security programme run from Wuhan. This profile covers its names, targeting, the techniques MITRE ATT&CK records for it, how it abuses identities, notable reported activity and the controls that blunt it. It is written for security teams in parliaments, government, political parties, think tanks, NGOs and media, and for those protecting high-risk individuals. Attribution is given as the named governments and vendors state it, at group level only, and the page describes behaviour for defenders.

Key takeaways

  • Governments have attributed it publicly. The NCSC assessed in March 2024 that APT31 was "almost certainly" responsible for reconnaissance against UK parliamentarians in 2021; the DOJ the same day described a roughly 14-year APT31 campaign run by the Hubei State Security Department of the Ministry of State Security.
  • Tracking links come first. The DOJ says the group sent more than 10,000 emails, often disguised as news articles, with links that collected recipient details; Microsoft described the same web beacon technique against 2020 election targets.
  • Home routers and edge servers follow. The DOJ reports compromise of targets' home routers and devices and use of zero-days; ATT&CK records an operational relay box network of compromised routers and IoT devices; Microsoft saw Violet Typhoon exploit SharePoint in July 2025.
  • Critics of Beijing are the focus. UK targets were mostly parliamentarians who had publicly criticised China; US targets included dissidents, campaign staff, officials and members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China.
  • Personal accounts are in scope: phishing-resistant MFA on personal and work mail, router hygiene and link tracking awareness matter as much as corporate controls.

Who they are (names and aliases)

MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as ZIRCONIUM (G0128), with APT31 and Violet Typhoon as aliases, and describes it as operating out of China, active since at least 2017, with targeting of people associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community. Sources differ on start date: Microsoft says Violet Typhoon has been active since 2015, and the DOJ says APT31 activity dates to at least 2010.

NameUsed byNotes
APT31UK NCSC, US DOJ, industryName used in the 2024 government attributions
ZIRCONIUM (G0128)Microsoft (former name); MITRE ATT&CKATT&CK's primary name
Violet TyphoonMicrosoft (current name); listed in ATT&CKMicrosoft describes it as dedicated to espionage

The NCSC notes that APT31 was previously linked to China's Ministry of State Security in 2021, after the Microsoft Exchange Server compromise. The UK attributed the 2021 to 2022 Electoral Commission compromise to a China state-affiliated actor but did not name APT31 for it, so do not conflate the two. US indictments name individual officers; this page stays at group level. See the Threat Actor Groups Guide and the China State Cyber Operations Guide.

Targeting and motivation

  • Legislators: UK members across both Houses, mostly those critical of China (NCSC); members of both US parties in Congress and foreign parliamentarians in the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (DOJ).
  • Government and campaign staff: US government staff at several departments and the White House, and campaign personnel before the 2020 election (DOJ). Microsoft reported thousands of ZIRCONIUM attacks between March and September 2020 with nearly 150 compromises, including unsuccessful indirect targeting of the Biden campaign through non-campaign accounts of affiliated people.
  • Dissidents and critics: activists and supporters in Hong Kong, the US and elsewhere (DOJ).
  • Policy community: Microsoft named academics from more than 15 universities and 18 international affairs and policy organisations; its 2025 description of Violet Typhoon adds former government and military personnel, NGOs, think tanks, higher education, media, finance and health in the US, Europe and East Asia.
  • Industry: defence, IT, telecoms, manufacturing, finance, consulting, legal and research, including managed service providers and a 5G equipment provider (DOJ).

The NCSC says data from the separate Electoral Commission compromise would highly likely be used for espionage and transnational repression. APT31's targeting fits the same pattern: identify critics, map their networks, then collect.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

ATT&CK v20 links ZIRCONIUM to 29 techniques. All IDs below are listed for G0128 except T1190 and T1505.003, which reflect Microsoft's July 2025 SharePoint reporting and are marked.

TacticTechniqueHow it shows up
ReconnaissanceT1598.003 Spearphishing Link; T1598 Phishing for InformationWeb beacons in emails to confirm live accounts; credential phishing of campaign staff
Resource developmentT1583.001 Domains; T1583.006 Web ServicesPurchased domains filled with content; GitHub hosting malware
Resource developmentT1584.008 Network DevicesCompromised SOHO routers and IoT devices for relay infrastructure
Initial accessT1566.002 Spearphishing LinkLinks in emails leading to malware
Initial accessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application (Microsoft 2025, not in G0128)SharePoint CVE-2025-49706 and CVE-2025-49704
PersistenceT1505.003 Web Shell (Microsoft 2025, not in G0128); T1547.001 Registry Run KeysWeb shells after scanning; Run key named "Dropbox Update Setup"
Privilege escalationT1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationCVE-2017-0005
StealthT1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service; T1218.007 MsiexecSpoofed application names; MSI files run through msiexec.exe
Credential accessT1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersStealing saved passwords from Internet Explorer and Chrome
Command and controlT1102.002 Bidirectional Communication; T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy; T1665 Hide InfrastructureDropbox API as C2; ORB network of routers, IoT and leased servers
ExfiltrationT1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageStolen data uploaded to Dropbox

How they abuse identities and credentials

  1. Validate the identity before attacking it: a tracking link tells the group which addresses are live, when they are read and from what IP and device. The DOJ says this data drove follow-on intrusions. Blocking remote image loading and link pre-fetching in mail clients for high-risk users reduces what leaks.
  2. Phish the credential: ATT&CK records credential phishing against presidential campaign staffers. Phishing-resistant MFA removes the value of a captured password. See the Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide.
  3. Harvest saved browser passwords: once on a device, a tool steals credentials stored in browsers, which often include personal webmail and social media. Encourage a password manager over browser storage on shared or personal devices.
  4. Use the home network: compromising home routers puts the group between a target and every service they use, and gives it residential IPs that look legitimate. See the Securing Your Home Router Guide and the Operational Relay Box Networks Guide.
  5. Blend into trusted cloud services: Dropbox C2 and exfiltration ride on an OAuth-authorised application identity that proxies often allow. See the Box and Dropbox Security Guide.

Many targets are individuals, so personal accounts, family devices and home networks are part of the attack surface. The Personal Security for High-Risk Individuals Guide covers how to extend protection beyond the office.

Notable incidents

DateActivitySource
From at least 2010Start of the APT31 campaign described in the 2024 indictmentUS DOJ, 25 March 2024
2018Targeting of Norwegian officials and a managed service providerUS DOJ, 25 March 2024
March to September 2020Thousands of attacks on election-related and policy targets, nearly 150 compromisesMicrosoft, September 2020 (as ZIRCONIUM)
2021Reconnaissance against UK parliamentarians' email accounts, mitigated by Parliament's Security Department before any account was compromisedUK NCSC, 25 March 2024 ("almost certainly" APT31)
25 March 2024Coordinated UK and US public attribution; US indictment unsealedUK NCSC; US DOJ
July 2025Exploitation of on-premises SharePoint to install web shellsMicrosoft, 22 July 2025 (as Violet Typhoon)

The SharePoint wave is covered in the ToolShell SharePoint exploitation breach analysis, where Microsoft named Violet Typhoon alongside Linen Typhoon and Storm-2603, and where stolen ASP.NET machine keys let attackers return after patching.

Detection and defence

Controls mapped to behaviours

BehaviourControlNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5NIST CSF 2.0
Tracking-link reconnaissance (T1598.003)Block remote content by default; rewrite and sandbox links; brief staff that "news" emails may be beaconsSI-8, AT-2PR.AT-01
Credential phishing (T1598)Phishing-resistant MFA on work and personal accounts of high-risk usersIA-2, IA-2(1)PR.AA-03
Router compromise (T1584.008)Supported, patched home and office routers; remote admin disabled; replace end-of-life devicesCM-2, SA-22PR.PS-02
SharePoint exploitation (T1190, T1505.003)Patch, AMSI Full Mode, rotate machine keys and restart IISSI-2, SI-3, IA-5ID.RA-01
Browser credential theft (T1555.003)Disable browser password saving on managed devices; use a managed password managerIA-5PR.AA-01
Cloud storage C2 and exfiltration (T1102.002, T1567.002)Allow only sanctioned tenants of file-sharing services; alert on API use from unusual processesSC-7, SI-4DE.CM-01

Phased rollout

  1. Week 1: identify high-risk people: legislators, staff, campaign teams, China-focused researchers and dissident contacts. Give them one reporting route and brief them on tracking links.
  2. Weeks 2 to 4: enrol them in phishing-resistant MFA (security keys or passkeys) for work mail, then help them do the same on personal mail and social media. Pilot with a small group and keep a recovery process with a second registered key.
  3. Month 2: set mail clients to block remote images for this group, and check that their home routers are supported and patched; replace end-of-life models.
  4. Month 3: patch and harden internet-facing SharePoint and other web applications, with machine key rotation after any SharePoint update.
  5. Ongoing: follow national guidance such as the NCSC's Defending Democracy material, which recommends MFA on cloud and internet-connected services for political organisations.

What to monitor

  • Mass "news" mailings to legislators or staff from new domains, especially with unique per-recipient links.
  • Sign-ins from residential IPs that do not match the user's own ISP, which may indicate ORB relays.
  • Run keys or tasks named after cloud sync tools but pointing to unusual paths.
  • Dropbox API traffic from processes other than the official client.
  • IIS worker processes spawning shells on SharePoint servers.

Metrics

  • Percentage of high-risk users with phishing-resistant MFA on work and personal accounts.
  • Percentage of high-risk users with remote content blocked in their mail client.
  • Number of end-of-life routers in staff home and constituency offices.
  • Median days to patch KEV-listed web application flaws.
  • Time from a reported suspicious email to blocking its domain across the organisation.

A small think tank or NGO gets most value from security keys, strict mail client settings and replacing old routers. A parliament or ministry needs a dedicated protective security service for members, threat hunting across mail logs, and coordination with the national CERT.

Common failure patterns

  • Ignoring "harmless" emails: a tracking-link email contains no malware, yet the DOJ says the data it collected fed later intrusions.
  • Protecting only the work account: Microsoft's 2020 report shows the group went after non-campaign personal accounts of affiliated people.
  • Leaving home routers unmanaged: the DOJ describes compromise of targets' home routers, outside any corporate control.
  • Confusing separate incidents: the UK did not attribute the Electoral Commission compromise to APT31; response planning should follow what was actually attributed.
  • Patching SharePoint without rotating keys: stolen machine keys survive the patch.

Practitioner checklist

  • List high-risk individuals and give them a single, fast reporting route.
  • Require phishing-resistant MFA on their work accounts and help secure personal accounts.
  • Block remote images and link pre-fetching in their mail clients.
  • Replace end-of-life home and constituency office routers and disable remote administration.
  • Patch internet-facing SharePoint, enable AMSI Full Mode and rotate machine keys.
  • Disable browser password storage on managed devices and provide a password manager.
  • Restrict file-sharing services to sanctioned tenants and monitor API use.
  • Map APT31, ZIRCONIUM and Violet Typhoon together in threat intelligence tooling.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Threat Actor Groups Guide · China State Cyber Operations Guide · Personal Security for High-Risk Individuals Guide · Operational Relay Box Networks Guide · Phishing-Resistant MFA Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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