Independent analysis by NHI Mgmt GroupSource article: WitnessAI, “What is AI observability and why your security team needs it” (June 7, 2026)

TL;DR: Enterprises are already seeing prohibited genAI use, shadow AI, and agent activity that legacy DLP, CASB, SIEM, and firewall controls cannot fully inspect, according to WitnessAI and cited industry research. The governance gap is widening because security teams need prompt, response, data-flow, and agent-action visibility before AI adoption outpaces review cycles.


At a glance

What this is: NHI Mgmt Group's analysis, drawing on WitnessAI's blog post: AI observability is the visibility and enforcement layer enterprises need to govern prompts, responses, shadow AI and agent actions.

Why it matters: It matters because identity, access and security teams cannot govern AI use they cannot see, especially when employees and agents move sensitive data and decisions through runtime interactions outside legacy monitoring paths.

By the numbers:

  • 69% of organizations already suspect or have confirmed evidence of employees using prohibited generative AI tools, according to Gartner GenAI blind spots survey cited by WitnessAI.
  • 63% of breached organizations either lack an AI governance policy or are still developing one, according to the Cost of Data Breach report cited by WitnessAI.

Context

AI observability is the security and governance layer for seeing what AI systems, employees and autonomous agents are doing with enterprise data in real time. Legacy controls were built for files, endpoints, SaaS sessions and network flows, not for prompts, responses, agent tool calls and model-generated actions.

The core problem is governance blind spot, not model performance. As AI use spreads across sanctioned tools and shadow deployments, security teams need content-level inspection, discovery, policy enforcement and audit trails that can support investigations and runtime decisions.

For IAM, PAM and NHI teams, the issue now crosses human users and non-human actors. The same control gap that leaves employee chatbot use unmanaged also leaves agent actions, MCP connections and delegated AI workflows outside normal identity oversight.


Key questions

Q: What breaks when AI data loss controls rely only on DLP and CASB?

A: They miss the main AI leakage paths because prompts, responses, embeddings, and agent actions are not ordinary file transfers. Traditional DLP and CASB depend on labels, regexes, and perimeter visibility, but AI workflows are contextual and often occur inside approved tools. Teams need controls that inspect the interaction itself, not just the network or file.

Q: Why do AI coding agents create access and governance risk even when they are not autonomous?

A: Because they already operate with tool access, repository access, and execution permissions inside a live workflow. That means the risk comes from delegated authority, not just independence. Even partially supervised agents can still manipulate sensitive code, secrets, or deployment paths if their permissions and review boundaries are loose.

Q: How do teams know if AI observability is actually working?

A: It is working when teams can show which change caused a quality shift, which dataset surfaced the issue, and whether the regression was contained before users were affected. If the team cannot trace behaviour across versions, observability is producing logs, not governance evidence.

Q: Should organisations treat AI observability as part of IAM and governance or as a separate security tool?

A: It should be integrated into identity and governance because AI use now spans human users, service integrations and non-human agents. A separate silo usually leaves attribution, approval and policy enforcement disconnected from the identities actually driving the activity.


Technical breakdown

Why traditional controls miss conversational AI activity

Traditional DLP, CASB, SIEM and firewall controls were designed around structured events such as file movement, application access and network traffic patterns. Conversational AI breaks those assumptions because the sensitive content may appear inside a prompt, inside a model response, or inside an agent chain that never maps cleanly to a file or ticket. That is why AI observability focuses on bidirectional content inspection, discovery of shadow tools, and activity tracing across models, apps and agents. The technical shift is from observing transport to observing intent, content and action in the same session.

Practical implication: security teams need telemetry that can inspect prompts, responses and agent actions, not just network sessions and logs.

How agent action tracking changes identity governance

Agent action tracking extends observability from conversation to execution. An autonomous or semi-autonomous agent may issue API calls, invoke tools, connect to MCP servers, and continue acting across multiple systems without a human reauthorising each step. That makes the identity problem more than authentication. It becomes attribution, scope control and runtime approval. When the action chain is not visible, you cannot tell whether the agent stayed within policy or drifted into unauthorised behaviour. This is where AI observability overlaps with non-human identity governance and with agentic runtime control.

Practical implication: identity teams must account for agent actions as governed execution, not just as authenticated access.

Why policy needs business context and real-time enforcement

AI policy fails when it treats every prompt as the same risk. Intent-based classification adds business context so the same words can be judged differently depending on the user, the application and the operational purpose. That is what allows an AI security control plane to choose among allow, warn, block, route and tokenise responses in real time. The architecture matters because binary controls alone either break workflows or miss exposure. In practice, policy has to be aligned to risk tier, data sensitivity and the approved model path, with immutable audit trails for later review.

Practical implication: enforcement must be context-aware and inline, otherwise AI governance becomes either too blunt to use or too weak to trust.


Threat narrative

Attacker objective: The objective is to extract sensitive information or induce harmful AI-driven actions through a channel that legacy monitoring does not fully inspect.

  1. Entry begins when an employee uses an unsanctioned chatbot or agent outside the approved AI stack and places sensitive business data into a prompt.
  2. Exposure escalates when the model or agent processes the data, generates a response, and may retain, route or transform information beyond the security team's view.
  3. Impact follows when shadow AI use, prompt injection or agent action creates unlogged data exposure, policy violations or unauthorised workflow execution.
  • OmniGPT breach claim 2025: A hacker claims to have leaked 34 million OmniGPT AI chat messages holding users' API keys and credentials; OmniGPT has not confirmed it.
  • Meta AI Instagram Account Takeover: 20,225 Instagram accounts hijacked via compromised Meta AI support chatbot with overprivileged access.

Read and download The State of NHI & AI Agent Breach Report 2026, covering 200+ breaches impacting Non-Human Identities including AI Agents.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

AI observability is becoming the control plane because visibility is now the prerequisite for governance. Security teams cannot enforce policy on prompts, responses and agent actions if they only see network traffic or cloud application access. The control plane has shifted from static approval to runtime inspection, which is the only way to govern how AI is actually used.

Legacy security assumptions break when AI becomes conversational and agentic. DLP expects files, CASB expects sanctioned app sessions, SIEM expects structured logs, and firewalls expect protocol boundaries. Those assumptions fail when the primary security event is a prompt, a tool invocation or an AI-generated action, so the governance model itself has to change.

Runtime accountability becomes a first-class identity problem for autonomous systems. Once agents can call tools, connect to MCP servers and act without immediate human approval, the question is no longer just what data they saw. It is who owns the action, what scope they were allowed to exercise, and how the organisation proves the chain of custody after the fact.

Shadow AI discovery should be treated as an inventory discipline, not a one-time discovery project. AI tools, embedded assistants and agent frameworks appear faster than approval cycles can catch them, which means inventory has to be continuous and tied to governance. The practical conclusion is that discovery, classification and policy enforcement now belong in the same operating model.

AI observability exposes the new enterprise security boundary: the moment data leaves a person and enters a model. That boundary is where sensitive information, intent and action converge, and where conventional monitoring loses precision. The organisations that define and govern that boundary early will be able to adopt AI with less operational guesswork.

From our research library:

What this signals

Prompt visibility is now an identity and governance requirement, not just a security telemetry feature. If a team cannot see what is being entered into models, it cannot prove whether the resulting action was authorised, risky or out of policy. That is why AI observability belongs in the same operating model as identity governance and incident response.

7% of security leaders admit they do not know how often their AI systems are making autonomous changes to infrastructure, according to the 2026 Infrastructure Identity Survey. That gap signals a larger programme problem: many organisations still cannot tell whether AI is merely assisting work or actively changing production state.

Runtime AI control is becoming the new boundary for zero trust in AI-heavy environments. The practical question is no longer whether the model is approved, but whether each interaction is visible, attributable and constrained before data or actions move beyond the point of control.


For practitioners

  • Establish AI inventory across all usage paths Map sanctioned and unsanctioned AI applications, embedded assistants, IDE extensions, MCP-connected tools and agent frameworks so governance starts from a complete asset view.
  • Inspect prompts, responses and agent actions in real time Deploy controls that can see the content entering models, the output returning from them and the tool calls or API actions triggered by agents.
  • Classify AI activity by intent and business context Use user role, data sensitivity and workflow purpose to distinguish routine use from risky or prohibited use instead of relying on keywords alone.

Key takeaways

  • Legacy security tools leave AI prompts, responses and agent actions outside the normal visibility model, which is why AI observability is moving into the control plane role.
  • Shadow AI and autonomous workflows create governance gaps that identity, GRC and security teams cannot close without real-time inspection and policy enforcement.
  • The practical answer is continuous discovery, bidirectional inspection, intent-aware policy and audit-ready attribution across human and non-human AI use.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 and OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST AI RMF and NIST CSF 2.0 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
OWASP Agentic AI Top 10ASI03 — Identity & Privilege AbuseAgent actions and delegated tool use are central to the observability gap described here.
ASI02 — Tool MisuseThe article focuses on agents and prompts driving tool calls that may be unauthorised or invisible.
Recommendation — Map AI agent execution to ASI03 and control tool scope before agents can act beyond approved identity boundaries. Instrument tool invocation paths to detect and block AI tool misuse before actions reach downstream systems.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-10 — Human Use of NHIEmployees are using AI systems in ways that bypass normal NHI oversight and policy enforcement.
Recommendation — Apply NHI-10 controls to govern human-driven AI use that bypasses approved identity and usage paths.
NIST AI RMFGOVERN — AI Governance and AccountabilityThe article is fundamentally about establishing governance, policy and accountability for AI use.
Recommendation — Use GOVERN to define accountability, oversight and policy enforcement for enterprise AI observability.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-05 — Access Permissions, Entitlements and AuthorizationsThe article ties observability to whether AI actions are properly authorised and attributable.
Recommendation — Apply PR.AA-05 to ensure AI actions are authorised, attributable and governed within policy.

Key terms

  • AI observability: AI observability is the ability to see how AI systems are being used, what information they process, and what actions they trigger. In security programmes, it extends beyond uptime or model quality to runtime visibility, policy enforcement, and audit evidence across human and agent-driven use cases.
  • Shadow AI: AI agents, copilots, or connected tools operating without full visibility or governance from security teams. Shadow AI becomes an identity problem when those systems authenticate with unmanaged tokens, service accounts, or OAuth apps that can reach production resources.
  • Bidirectional Inspection: Bidirectional inspection means examining both prompts sent to an AI system and the responses it produces. This is essential when outputs can trigger follow-on actions, leak sensitive data, or carry instructions that affect downstream systems, users, or automated workflows.
  • Agent action tracking: Agent action tracking is the monitoring of the tool calls, API requests, and downstream operations performed by autonomous AI systems. It matters because the security risk often emerges after the prompt is answered, when the agent starts influencing other systems or moving data across workflows.

Deepen your knowledge

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on June 9, 2026.
Updated on October 10, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org