TL;DR: Akamai Identity Cloud is in maintenance mode with support ending on December 31, 2027, and Descope argues that legacy CIAM now lags on adaptive MFA, passwordless authentication, multi-tenant design, and agentic identity support, according to Descope. Legacy customer identity assumptions are giving way to orchestration-led, migration-aware platforms that can handle human users, partners, and AI agents together.
At a glance
What this is: This is a Descope analysis of why organisations are looking for Akamai Identity Cloud alternatives, with the central finding that legacy CIAM now struggles to support modern authentication, orchestration, and multi-tenant needs.
Why it matters: It matters because IAM teams planning customer identity, B2B SaaS, or agentic workflows need to separate platform inertia from actual governance fit before legacy technical debt turns into migration risk.
By the numbers:
- Descope’s 2025 State of Customer Identity Report found that only 2% of organizations believe legacy username/password auths balance security and user experience.
👉 Read Descope's analysis of Akamai Identity Cloud alternatives and CIAM migration
Context
Akamai Identity Cloud sits inside a common CIAM problem: a platform can still function while no longer matching current authentication, governance, and application design requirements. When a customer identity stack cannot natively support adaptive MFA, passwordless options, or flexible orchestration, teams begin carrying more custom logic in the application layer and more operational risk in the identity layer.
For IAM practitioners, the question is not whether the legacy platform once met the need. The issue is whether current customer, partner, and AI-driven access patterns can be governed without increasing engineering effort, slowing change, or creating migration debt that becomes harder to unwind each quarter.
Key questions
Q: How should teams choose an Akamai Identity Cloud replacement?
A: Start with governance fit, not feature parity. The right replacement should support tenant-aware identity, modern authentication, migration tooling, and enough orchestration to move identity logic out of application code. Teams should also check whether the platform can handle both customer and non-human identity patterns without creating separate governance silos.
Q: Why do legacy CIAM platforms create more risk as requirements change?
A: They often freeze identity decisions inside rigid rules and platform-specific workflows, which makes ordinary changes slower and harder to test. Over time, the organisation accumulates migration debt, higher engineering effort, and more brittle dependencies between application release cycles and identity operations.
Q: What breaks when B2B multi-tenancy is bolted onto a B2C identity model?
A: Teams usually end up with custom tenant modelling, manual onboarding, and complicated delegated administration. That creates inconsistent policy enforcement and makes it harder to separate one customer’s access from another’s, especially when the same platform must serve multiple trust domains.
Q: Who should own CIAM migration when a platform enters maintenance mode?
A: Ownership should sit across IAM, application engineering, and security architecture, because the migration changes both controls and code paths. The identity team needs to define target policy and assurance requirements, while engineering removes embedded flow logic and security verifies that access boundaries remain intact.
Technical breakdown
Why legacy CIAM platforms create migration debt
Legacy CIAM platforms often encode authentication and lifecycle decisions in rigid configuration models, rules, and platform-specific constructs. That works until product requirements change faster than the identity architecture can absorb them. At that point, even small changes to login, recovery, or step-up flows become code-adjacent projects that require testing, specialist knowledge, and coordinated release work. The technical issue is not just lack of features. It is that the identity layer becomes a constraint on product iteration instead of a control plane for it.
Practical implication: map which authentication decisions are still trapped in application code before migration scope expands.
How tenant-aware identity changes CIAM architecture
Multi-tenant CIAM is more than a cosmetic organisation feature. It separates users, roles, policies, and delegated administration so B2B, partner, and ecosystem access can be governed without duplicating identity stacks. When that isolation is weak, teams compensate with custom tenant modelling, manual onboarding, and brittle policy branching. That increases both operational load and blast radius because the same platform logic has to serve multiple trust domains with different privilege expectations.
Practical implication: validate whether tenant isolation is native, policy-driven, and auditable before relying on a shared customer identity model.
What agentic identity support means inside customer identity
Agentic identity support extends CIAM beyond human login journeys to software entities that also need authentication, authorisation, and scoped access. In practice, that means the identity platform must represent AI agents, their delegated permissions, and their interaction with tools or APIs without collapsing them into generic service accounts. If the platform only treats non-human actors as an afterthought, governance becomes inconsistent across human, workload, and agent paths. This is where identity orchestration becomes a design requirement rather than an integration convenience.
Practical implication: decide early whether AI agents will be governed in the same identity plane as customers and workloads.
NHI Mgmt Group analysis
Legacy CIAM becomes a governance liability when orchestration stops evolving. The problem is not simply that support has a sunset date. The deeper issue is that identity workflows freeze while product teams keep changing user journeys, trust boundaries, and access paths. That creates a widening gap between how access is governed and how applications now behave. Practitioners should treat maintenance mode as a signal to re-evaluate the identity control plane, not just the procurement timeline.
Multi-tenant identity is now a structural requirement, not an optional SaaS feature. B2B SaaS, partner ecosystems, and external users need tenant-aware policies, delegated administration, and clear isolation boundaries. When those controls are bolted on after the fact, lifecycle administration becomes slower and error-prone. The practical conclusion is that tenant modelling now belongs in architecture decisions, not in later-stage implementation cleanup.
Agentic identity is pushing CIAM beyond human-centric assumptions. Descope’s positioning reflects a wider market shift: identity systems must increasingly govern customers, workloads, and AI agents in one operational model. That does not mean every AI-adjacent workflow is autonomous, but it does mean non-human actors can no longer be treated as edge cases. IAM teams should expect customer identity platforms to absorb more machine identity responsibility over time.
Modern authentication is now a trust and usability baseline, not an enhancement. The article’s repeated emphasis on passkeys, passwordless flows, adaptive MFA, and orchestration reflects a market where legacy username/password assumptions are already out of step with user expectations and risk management goals. Organisations that keep extending older CIAM patterns are really extending the cost of change. Practitioners should align roadmaps to current authentication behaviour, not historic platform convenience.
From our research:
- 80% of organisations report their AI agents have already performed actions beyond their intended scope, including accessing unauthorised systems (39%), inappropriately sharing sensitive data (31%), and revealing access credentials (23%), according to AI Agents: The New Attack Surface report.
- Only 44% of organisations have implemented policies to govern AI agents, even though 92% agree that governance is critical to enterprise security, according to the same report.
- That gap is why teams should also review OWASP NHI Top 10 alongside CIAM modernisation work.
What this signals
Legacy CIAM migration is increasingly part of broader identity modernisation, not a standalone platform swap. Teams that treat customer identity as separate from workload and agent identity will keep re-solving the same policy and lifecycle problems in different stacks. The practical signal is to align CIAM roadmaps with the rest of the identity architecture, including machine identity and delegated trust.
The strongest programmes will be those that use platform change to remove hidden identity logic from application layers and make governance more explicit. That matters because once identity flows become brittle, every new requirement, from passkeys to partner onboarding to agentic access, adds more custom exception handling than the original platform was designed to absorb.
When modern CIAM is being assessed, practitioners should compare orchestration depth, tenant isolation, and lifecycle control against the organisation’s real operating model rather than marketing checklists. The architecture that wins is the one that reduces long-term change cost while preserving auditability and clear trust boundaries.
For practitioners
- Audit identity decisions still embedded in application code Catalogue login, recovery, MFA, consent, and step-up logic that still lives outside the CIAM layer. The goal is to separate identity policy from release engineering so migration planning can focus on genuine control dependencies rather than every custom workaround accumulated over time.
- Test tenant isolation before you model growth Verify whether tenant-aware users, roles, permissions, and delegated administration are native capabilities or custom constructs. If the platform depends on manual onboarding or branching policies, model the operational burden for B2B, partner, and ecosystem growth before committing to the architecture.
- Separate human and non-human identity requirements Document where customer identity, service identity, and AI agent identity will diverge on authentication, authorisation, and lifecycle handling. A single platform may still be appropriate, but only if it can represent each actor type without forcing one trust model onto the others.
- Plan migration as control redesign, not lift-and-shift Treat end-of-life CIAM migration as a chance to remove brittle orchestration, reduce custom dependencies, and align identity patterns to current application architecture. If you only move configurations, you will likely carry the same governance limits into the next platform.
Key takeaways
- Akamai Identity Cloud’s maintenance mode changes the IAM decision from feature preference to migration necessity.
- The main risk in legacy CIAM is not just missing features, but accumulating identity debt inside application code and custom workflows.
- Practitioners should evaluate replacements on tenant isolation, orchestration depth, and whether they can support human, customer, and agent identity patterns together.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
NIST CSF 2.0, NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) and NIST SP 800-63 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AC-4 | Tenant-aware access and delegated administration map to permissions and access governance. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | SC-3 | CIAM modernisation should preserve continuous verification across changing sessions. |
| NIST SP 800-63 | Modern authentication methods such as passkeys and MFA are directly relevant here. |
Use digital identity guidance to align stronger authenticators with the customer experience you need.
Key terms
- Customer identity and access management: Customer identity and access management is the discipline of governing how external users register, authenticate, and continue to access applications. In practice it combines identity proofing, authentication, policy enforcement, and lifecycle controls so customer journeys remain secure without forcing every access decision into application code.
- Identity orchestration: Identity orchestration is the coordinated control of authentication, MFA, SSO, recovery, consent, and authorisation steps across systems. It lets teams design and modify identity journeys centrally instead of scattering logic across apps, which improves consistency, auditability, and migration flexibility.
- Multi-tenant identity: Multi-tenant identity is an identity model that isolates users, roles, policies, and administration across separate customer or partner domains. It is essential when one platform serves multiple organisations, because it prevents privilege bleed, supports delegated administration, and keeps governance boundaries explicit.
- Agentic identity: Agentic identity is the identity model used to authenticate and authorise AI agents or similar software actors that act on behalf of a person or system. The key requirement is to govern the agent as a distinct actor with scoped permissions, lifecycle handling, and accountability, rather than treating it as generic automation.
What's in the full article
Descope's full post covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:
- Side-by-side feature breakdowns of each Akamai Identity Cloud alternative and the use cases they fit best
- Implementation detail on visual orchestration, multi-tenant identity, and SSO setup workflows
- Migration-oriented comparisons that go beyond strategy and into platform-specific capabilities
- Product-specific notes on agentic identity support, developer tooling, and lifecycle automation
Deepen your knowledge
NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity security are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2026-06-18.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org