By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamBased on Signifyd: “The complete guide to ecommerce return optimization in 2026” (February 19, 2026)

TL;DR: Ecommerce returns are shifting from a customer-experience issue into a fraud and operations control problem, with Signifyd citing research that returns cost merchants about $850 billion in 2025 and 9% of that activity is tied to fraud. Agentic returns abuse raises the stakes because automation can scale repeat claims faster than legacy review workflows can separate good customers from coordinated abuse.


At a glance

What this is: This guide reframes ecommerce returns as a fraud-control and operations problem, highlighting AI-driven returns abuse, hidden loss, and risk-based friction as the central finding.

Why it matters: It matters because teams governing identity, fraud, and customer workflows need to distinguish legitimate post-purchase activity from scaled abuse without making every return path hostile to good customers.

By the numbers:

  • Returns cost merchants about $850 billion in 2025, according to the National Retail Federation and Happy Returns research cited by Signifyd.
  • 9% of returns activity is tied to fraud, according to the National Retail Federation and Happy Returns research cited by Signifyd.
  • The cost of processing an online return averages 21% of an order’s value, according to a Pitney Bowes BOXpoll survey cited by Signifyd.
  • Signifyd’s work with online retailers found that 23% of consumers who receive an instant refund will soon buy something again from that business.

Context

Ecommerce return optimisation is the discipline of reducing return cost and abuse while keeping the legitimate customer experience smooth. The control gap is that many merchants still treat returns as a post-purchase service workflow rather than a governed decisioning surface where fraud, operations, and customer trust intersect.

That gap matters because return abuse now spans familiar patterns such as bracketing and item swapping as well as agentic returns abuse, where AI shopping agents and fraud rings can scale claims across many accounts. For identity and fraud teams, the relevant problem is not just refund leakage, but the absence of risk-based controls around a high-volume post-purchase process.

The article also shows why a one-size-fits-all returns policy fails. Low-friction returns can improve retention and conversion, but the same openness can create blind spots when abuse is coordinated, repeated, or automated rather than isolated.


Key questions

Q: What breaks when ecommerce returns are treated as a simple service process?

A: The main failure is that fraud, abuse, and customer friction are handled with the same rules. That makes it harder to spot repeated claims, item swapping, or coordinated abuse, while also creating unnecessary friction for legitimate customers. A governed returns process separates low-risk fast paths from higher-risk cases that need inspection or verification.

Q: Why does agentic returns abuse increase fraud risk for merchants?

A: Agentic returns abuse increases risk because automation can generate many return requests across multiple accounts faster than manual review can distinguish normal activity from coordinated abuse. The individual claim may look ordinary, but the pattern across time, products, and accounts exposes the fraud. Merchants need behavioural and velocity-based controls, not just case-by-case review.

Q: How can teams tell whether return friction is working?

A: Return friction is working when it reduces abusive behaviour without materially increasing complaints, abandonment, or false declines among legitimate customers. Useful signals include fewer repeated claims from the same patterns, lower empty-box or item-swapping losses, and stable or improved customer satisfaction for low-risk returns. The test is whether controls are selective rather than universal.

Q: When should merchants require inspection before issuing a refund?

A: Require inspection when the item is high value, prone to substitution or tampering, or associated with repeated abuse from the same customer or account cluster. Inspection is most useful when physical condition must be confirmed before money leaves the merchant.


Technical breakdown

How returns workflows become a fraud control surface

Returns systems decide whether a request is accepted, inspected, refunded, or challenged, so they function as a control plane rather than a simple service desk. The article’s examples show that policy design, claims validation, weight checks, and purchase verification all shape the attack surface. When those checks are too loose, repeat abuse looks like ordinary customer behaviour. When they are too rigid, legitimate returns become costly and abandoned. The mechanism is therefore not just logistics, but governed decisioning across product, identity, and transaction data.

Practical implication: Treat the returns workflow as a governed control path and align verification depth to risk, not to refund volume alone.

What agentic returns abuse changes about fraud patterns

Agentic returns abuse is a scale problem, not a new fraud category. The article describes AI shopping agents being used to drive high-velocity serial returns, coordinated wardrobing, and repeated refund claims across many accounts. That matters because automation compresses the time between account creation, purchase, return request, and retry. Legacy review queues are built to spot isolated suspicious cases, but automation can distribute activity enough to look normal at the individual request level while still creating large aggregate loss.

Practical implication: Move from single-case review to pattern detection across accounts, time, product type, and refund behaviour.

Why risk-based friction works better than blanket friction

The article makes a practical distinction between legitimate returns and returns that carry abuse signals. Risk-based friction means adding inspection, payment controls, or delayed refunding only when the item, customer history, or request pattern suggests higher exposure. This is more effective than making all returns harder because broad friction punishes good customers and can damage retention. The governance challenge is to preserve a fast path for low-risk returns while making the high-risk path more expensive for abusers.

Practical implication: Design separate low-risk and high-risk return paths so legitimate customers keep speed while abuse encounters targeted verification.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

Returns governance is becoming a fraud-control discipline, not a customer-service side function. The article shows that return workflows now influence margin, inventory integrity, and abuse exposure at the same time. That makes returns data, refund decisioning, and policy design part of a broader control framework rather than an isolated ecommerce operation. Practitioners should treat returns as a governed business process with fraud consequences, not a back-office convenience layer.

Agentic returns abuse is the clearest sign that post-purchase controls are lagging automation. When AI shopping agents can create coordinated returns at scale, the old assumption that abuse will be visible as a single suspicious case no longer holds. The new control problem is aggregate behaviour across many apparently ordinary requests. Practitioners need to move toward anomaly detection, velocity analysis, and account linkage as core controls.

Hidden fraud is the harder problem because it degrades profit without looking like a breach. The article is right to frame serial returns, bracketing, empty-box returns, and item swapping as leakage that accumulates. That means the failure mode is not only obvious fraud, but the absence of controls that can distinguish genuine customer friction from repeated policy exploitation. The practitioner takeaway is that low-friction returns must be paired with targeted verification.

Risk-based returns design is the right named concept for this category. It captures the balance between fast customer resolution and selective friction when abuse signals appear. In identity and fraud governance terms, the lesson is to shift controls to the point of decision and to reserve stricter checks for the combinations of product, behaviour, and history that justify them. Practitioners should optimise for differentiated treatment, not universal delay.

What this signals

Risk-based returns governance is becoming a practical control pattern for ecommerce and adjacent identity teams. The core shift is from treating every return as a customer-service event to treating some returns as a decision point that deserves verification, inspection, or delayed payout. That same logic will keep showing up anywhere automated behaviour can be mistaken for normal customer activity.

Agentic returns abuse sharpens a broader governance lesson: velocity matters as much as intent. A small number of abusive accounts can create outsized loss when request volume, refund speed, and policy consistency are not monitored together. Teams should assume that automation will keep compressing the window between first abuse and material margin impact.

Identity-linked signals are now useful beyond login and account creation. In returns, the relevant question is whether the same behavioural pattern, account history, or product mix is being reused across many claims. That means fraud teams and identity practitioners need shared views of customer behaviour, not separate dashboards that miss the full pattern.


For practitioners

  • Build a risk-based returns policy Create separate handling rules for low-risk and high-risk returns so legitimate customers get fast resolution while suspicious patterns face inspection, verification, or delayed refunding.
  • Use returns data to find root causes Track return reasons, timing, product categories, and customer behaviour to tell the difference between policy abuse, sizing issues, product quality problems, and repeated fraud patterns.
  • Add targeted friction at the refund decision Require step-up checks for item swapping, empty-box claims, repeated wardrobing, or high-velocity serial returns instead of applying the same controls to every request.
  • Publish a plain-language return policy State packaging, condition, timing, and refund expectations clearly so customers know the rules and staff can apply them consistently across channels.

Key takeaways

  • Ecommerce returns now sit at the intersection of customer experience, fraud control, and margin protection, so policy design has become a governance problem.
  • AI-assisted abuse changes the scale of the threat because repeated claims, wardrobing, and item swapping can be coordinated across many accounts.
  • The strongest control pattern is selective friction, where low-risk returns stay fast and suspicious returns face targeted verification or inspection.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 sets the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-10 — Human Use of NHIAI shopping agents are being used to scale return abuse across many accounts.
Recommendation — Map automated return activity to NHI-10 and separate human customer actions from agent-driven request patterns.
OWASP Agentic AI Top 10ASI02 — Tool MisuseAgentic workflows can be abused to submit repeated claims and drive refund misuse.
ASI09 — Human-Agent Trust ExploitationFraudsters exploit trust in normal customer behaviour to hide abusive returns.
Recommendation — Treat return automation as a tool-misuse risk and constrain what agent workflows can request on behalf of users. Use human-agent trust controls to flag return traffic that mimics legitimate customer intent at abnormal scale.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-05 — Access Permissions, Entitlements and AuthorizationsReturns decisioning depends on knowing who or what is authorised to trigger payouts and exceptions.
ID.RA-01 — Asset Vulnerabilities Are Identified and RecordedReturns channels and refund workflows need risk visibility because abuse patterns hide inside normal operations.
Recommendation — Apply PR.AA-05 to constrain who can approve exceptions, refunds, and policy overrides. Record return-channel vulnerabilities and fraud indicators so policy changes follow observed abuse patterns.

Key terms

  • Return Fraud: Return fraud is the abuse of merchant return policies to obtain refunds, replacements, or store credit without a legitimate basis. It can include exaggerated damage claims, item substitution, wardrobing, and AI-assisted narratives that make a weak claim appear credible to review teams.
  • Agentic Returns Abuse: Agentic returns abuse is the use of AI shopping agents or other automated systems to scale return requests, refund claims, and account cycling across many identities. The risk is not only volume, but coordination, because the automation can make abuse look like ordinary customer behaviour.
  • Risk-Based Friction: Risk-based friction is the practice of applying extra verification, inspection, or policy constraints only when signals indicate elevated abuse or loss exposure. It protects the merchant without forcing every customer through the same slow process, which is essential when trust and conversion must both be preserved.
  • Hidden Fraud: Hidden fraud is loss that accumulates through many small abusive actions rather than a single obvious incident. In returns operations, it often shows up as repeated low-value claims, policy edge-case exploitation, or product-specific abuse that erodes margin without triggering a single major alert.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on July 11, 2026.
Updated on October 11, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org