TL;DR: Forrester’s Q3 2025 PIM evaluation highlights privilege governance, credential and secrets management, and session controls as the criteria shaping modern identity security decisions, according to Delinea’s summary of the report. The broader lesson is that privilege management is now a lifecycle and detection problem, not just an elevation-control problem.
At a glance
What this is: This is Delinea’s summary of being named a leader in Forrester’s Q3 2025 Privileged Identity Management evaluation, with emphasis on centralized authorization, continuous monitoring, and broader privileged identity governance.
Why it matters: It matters because IAM, PAM, NHI, and emerging agentic identity programmes increasingly converge on the same question: how to govern privileged access across human users, machines, and AI-assisted workflows without losing control of context.
By the numbers:
- Delinea says its platform can be deployed in weeks, not months, and requires 90% fewer resources to manage than the nearest competitor.
- 99.995% uptime for identity security operations., ime for identity security operations.
👉 Read Delinea’s summary of the Forrester PIM evaluation and AI security positioning
Context
Privileged identity management is the control layer that decides who or what can receive elevated access, when that access is granted, and how it is observed. In practice, the challenge is no longer limited to human admins, because machines, service accounts, and AI-assisted workflows now sit in the same privilege plane.
That shift matters for IAM and PAM teams because privilege has become contextual and continuous, not a static role assignment. When a platform is evaluated on governance, workflow, secrets, session recording, and threat detection together, the message is that old silos between human IAM and non-human identity controls no longer hold cleanly.
Delinea’s position in the article reflects that broader market direction rather than a single feature story. The useful question for practitioners is not whether one vendor was ranked highly, but what the ranking says about the control surface enterprise privilege management now has to cover.
Key questions
Q: How should security teams govern privileged access across humans and machine identities?
A: Security teams should use one privilege governance model with actor-specific rules for humans, service accounts, and automation. The model should cover approval, session visibility, credential control, and revocation together so access can be explained and contained. Separate human PAM and machine access controls create blind spots that attackers and operators both exploit.
Q: Why do credential and secrets controls matter so much in privileged identity management?
A: Because the privilege decision is only meaningful if the credential that enables it is also controlled. If keys, tokens, or certificates escape the PAM workflow, authorization becomes a policy layer with no real enforcement. Mature programmes treat secrets issuance, rotation, and revocation as part of the same privileged access control plane.
Q: How can organisations tell whether privileged access governance is actually working?
A: They should be able to reconstruct every privileged action from request to session to evidence without relying on manual correlation. If approvals are recorded but session activity is missing, or if sessions exist without clear entitlement lineage, the programme is not providing defensible control. Effective governance produces audit-ready traceability, not just access logs.
Q: What should teams do when privileged access programmes expand into AI and machine identities?
A: They should extend governance to include the actor type, access scope, and operating context of each non-human identity. AI-facing workflows and service accounts should not inherit the same standing privilege model used for human admins. The right approach is to define different privilege boundaries while keeping one accountable control framework.
Technical breakdown
Privileged identity governance now spans more than elevation requests
PIM has moved beyond simple approval for admin access. Modern privileged identity governance combines policy-based authorization, conditional workflows, session visibility, and evidence capture so that access decisions are tied to context, not just entitlement. That matters because privileged access is increasingly temporary, cross-platform, and linked to both human and machine activity. When governance, workflow, and recording are separated, organizations lose the ability to explain why access was granted, how it was used, and whether it matched policy.
Practical implication: map PIM controls to the full privilege lifecycle, not just the approval step.
Credential and secrets management are part of the same control plane
Credentials, tokens, keys, and certificates are the assets that make privileged access real. If they are not governed alongside authorization, the organization ends up protecting a policy layer while leaving the actual access mechanism exposed. That is why modern PIM reporting often includes secrets management, entitlement visibility, and threat detection together. The architecture question is no longer whether access can be granted, but whether the credential that enables it is traceable, scoped, and revocable across environments.
Practical implication: align secrets handling, session controls, and revocation processes under one privileged access operating model.
Identity threat detection closes the loop on privileged misuse
Privileged access controls fail when they stop at issuance. Identity threat detection adds behavioural monitoring, anomaly detection, and alerting so that misuse can be identified after access is granted. In environments with hybrid infrastructure, SaaS, and machine identities, that closing loop is essential because compromise often looks like legitimate access until the pattern of use becomes abnormal. The real security value comes from correlating who requested access, what was granted, and how the session behaved afterward.
Practical implication: integrate privileged access telemetry with detection workflows so abnormal use is visible in time to act.
NHI Mgmt Group analysis
Privilege governance is becoming the control centre of identity security. The article’s real signal is not the ranking itself, but the convergence of governance, workflow, session control, secrets, and detection into one discipline. That convergence reflects how enterprises actually lose control of privileged access across humans and machines. Practitioners should treat PIM as the operational core of identity security rather than a niche admin tool.
Context-aware authorization is now the meaningful standard, not static entitlement. Forrester’s language about a source of truth for privilege identities points to a market expectation that access should be explainable at the moment it is used. That is a direct challenge to models built only on role assignment or periodic review. The practical conclusion is that privilege decisions must be tied to context, session, and evidence.
Privileged access controls increasingly have to span NHI and human identity together. The article explicitly frames secure identity as covering human and machine identities, which reflects how privilege issues cross traditional programme boundaries. A service account, an admin user, and an AI-assisted workflow may all need different enforcement, but they are governed by the same privilege risk question. Teams should plan for a unified governance model with actor-specific controls, not separate islands of policy.
Identity threat detection has become part of privilege governance, not an adjacent capability. The market is moving toward systems that do more than issue access. They must also detect irregular use, preserve evidence, and support response. That changes the role of PAM teams, which now need to think like both policy owners and control operators. The implication is that privileged access programmes will be judged on visibility and response, not just entitlement management.
90% fewer resources to manage: the operating model is being simplified, but governance pressure is not. Efficiency claims matter less than the underlying programme shift, which is toward fewer control handoffs and more centralized accountability. Even if administration becomes leaner, the scope of what must be governed keeps expanding across cloud, traditional infrastructure, SaaS, and AI-facing use cases. The practitioner takeaway is to use consolidation to tighten control ownership, not to relax oversight.
From our research:
- 80% of identity breaches involved compromised non-human identities such as service accounts and API keys, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- Only 20% have formal processes for offboarding and revoking API keys, and even fewer have procedures for rotating them, which helps explain why privilege governance keeps failing in practice.
- For a broader control view, read NHI Lifecycle Management Guide for provisioning, rotation, and offboarding patterns that support privileged access governance.
What this signals
Privilege programmes are drifting toward unified identity governance. As enterprises fold human admins, service accounts, and AI-adjacent workflows into the same access plane, the old split between PAM and machine identity management becomes less defensible. The teams that win will be those that can evidence request, issuance, session use, and revocation in one chain rather than three disconnected tools.
The practical pressure point is lifecycle control. If access is granted quickly but revoked slowly, governance becomes theatrical rather than operational, and privilege risk persists even when the policy looks complete on paper.
Identity blast radius: the next maturity test is not how many privileged sessions are recorded, but how quickly an organisation can prove scope, ownership, and reversibility after access is used. That is where role-based reviews, secrets handling, and session telemetry must converge.
For practitioners
- Re-centre PAM around policy and evidence Review whether privileged access approvals, session recording, and audit evidence are managed as one process or as disconnected controls. If the workflow cannot reconstruct who approved access, what was used, and what happened in-session, the model is too fragmented for modern privilege risk.
- Unify human and machine privilege governance Inventory where admins, service accounts, automation, and AI-assisted workflows all receive elevated access through different paths. Build one governance view that differentiates the actor type but applies consistent rules for approval, scope, expiry, and review.
- Treat secrets and sessions as first-class controls Do not let secrets management sit outside the privilege programme. Make credential issuance, rotation, revocation, and session visibility measurable together, so compromised access can be traced back to the exact entitlement and session path.
- Tie detection to privileged access telemetry Ensure privileged identity alerts are correlated with the original access request and the recorded session. Detection that cannot connect those three points will miss the difference between expected administrative activity and compromised privilege use.
Key takeaways
- The article signals that privileged identity management is now a cross-domain governance problem, not a narrow PAM feature set.
- The most relevant evidence is the move toward context-aware authorization, centralized policy, and integrated detection across human and machine identities.
- Practitioners should respond by unifying approval, secrets control, session visibility, and revocation into one accountable privilege model.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-03 | Credential and secrets control is central to the article's privilege governance theme. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AC-4 | Privileged authorization and least privilege are the core governance concerns here. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | JIT | The article emphasizes contextual, temporary privilege rather than permanent access. |
Map privileged secrets handling to NHI-03 and enforce issuance, rotation, and revocation as one process.
Key terms
- Privileged Identity Management: Privileged Identity Management is the set of controls used to govern elevated access to systems, data, and administrative functions. It covers approval, issuance, session oversight, and revocation so that high-risk access is both justified and observable across human and non-human identities.
- Context-aware Authorization: Context-aware authorization is an access decision model that considers the requestor, environment, purpose, and risk at the moment access is granted. It goes beyond static roles by using live conditions to decide whether a privileged action should proceed and under what constraints.
- Identity Threat Detection and Response: Identity Threat Detection and Response is the practice of monitoring identity activity for abnormal behaviour and responding when privileged access looks risky or compromised. It connects identity telemetry, behavioural signals, and remediation workflows so misuse can be contained after access has been issued.
Deepen your knowledge
NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity lifecycle are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.
This post draws on content published by Delinea: Delinea Named a Leader in Q3 2025 Privileged Identity Management Solutions Report by Independent Research Firm. Read the original.
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2025-08-06.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org