By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamBased on Soffid: “Identity Management Solutions for the major challenges of enterprise cybersecurity” (September 22, 2025)

TL;DR: Identity management now has to unify authentication, access administration, governance and privileged controls to reduce cybersecurity risk without disrupting operations, particularly where identities, assets and regulatory obligations intersect, according to Soffid. The practical issue is less product choice than whether IAM, IGA, SSO, MFA and PAM are actually operating as one governed control plane.


At a glance

What this is: This is a Soffid analysis arguing that identity management must unify access, governance, authentication and privileged control into one operating model to keep security and operations aligned.

Why it matters: It matters because IAM teams, PAM teams and identity architects need a single governance model for human, non-human and privileged access, not separate control chains that leave gaps.


Context

Identity management breaks down when authentication, authorization, governance and privileged access are treated as separate programmes. The article argues that the security problem is not access alone but the absence of one governed control plane across the full identity lifecycle.

That matters for IAM and IGA teams because the same identity estate now spans standard users, suppliers, partners and privileged accounts. If access is administered in silos, organisations lose visibility, increase operational duplication and make policy enforcement harder across the lifecycle.


Key questions

Q: When should organisations unify IAM, PAM, and NHI governance?

A: Unify them when the same applications, data, and business processes are already being accessed by people, service accounts, and agents. That is the point where separate policies create blind spots. A single governance model gives security teams one place to define ownership, privilege boundaries, and review responsibility.

Q: Why does fragmented identity management create security and audit problems?

A: Fragmentation creates inconsistent truth about who has access, which exceptions exist, and whether offboarding actually worked. That weakens least privilege, slows audits, and leaves orphaned access behind. In practice, the more systems that can independently change identity state, the harder it becomes to prove governance is working.

Q: What breaks when access reviews and offboarding are handled inconsistently?

A: Inconsistent reviews and offboarding create lingering access, compliance gaps, and unnecessary exposure after roles change or people leave. Credentials may remain active longer than intended, and permissions can drift away from business need. Over time, that increases the chance of misuse, complicates audits, and makes it harder to prove that access is still appropriate.

Q: When should security teams prioritise PAM over broader identity governance?

A: Prioritise PAM when the immediate risk is privileged execution, such as accounts that can modify systems, access production data, or change infrastructure. Prioritise broader identity governance when the larger problem is incomplete inventory, weak ownership, or missing offboarding. For most NHI programmes, both are needed, but the order depends on where the highest blast radius sits.


Technical breakdown

Why unified access matters for identity governance

Unified access is not just a convenience layer. In IAM terms, it means identities are authenticated, authorised, monitored and audited through one coordinated model instead of isolated tools for each function. That reduces control drift, makes policy enforcement more consistent, and lowers the chance that one system grants access that another system cannot see. For organisations running mixed environments, the architectural problem is fragmentation: separate products can satisfy individual use cases while still leaving governance blind spots across the identity estate.

Practical implication: align access, audit and policy decisions to one identity model rather than independent tool decisions.

How identity lifecycle administration drives operational control

The article points to access administration across onboarding, authentication, termination and access change as a continuous lifecycle problem. That is the same governance challenge whether the identity is a person, a service account or a privileged user. The technical issue is not only provisioning, but ensuring the right policy state follows the identity as it moves through joiner, mover and leaver events. Without that lifecycle discipline, even strong authentication controls can sit on top of inconsistent entitlement management.

Practical implication: tie access changes, recertification and offboarding to lifecycle events instead of treating them as one-off admin tasks.

Why privileged access must sit inside the same control plane

Privileged access is a different risk tier, but it is not a separate governance problem. The article highlights executive and other sensitive accounts because privilege concentration increases blast radius when access is mismanaged. PAM only works properly when it is linked to the same identity, policy and monitoring structure as the rest of IAM. If privileged controls are detached, organisations can secure high-value accounts locally while still losing enterprise-wide visibility into who can reach them, when, and under what policy conditions.

Practical implication: connect PAM to central identity governance so privileged access is monitored under the same policy and audit model.


Threat narrative

Attacker objective: The attacker wants durable access to sensitive systems and high-value accounts without being detected early by fragmented identity controls.

  1. Entry begins when an attacker impersonates or compromises a legitimate identity and requests access to business systems.
  2. Escalation occurs when weakly governed entitlements, duplicate controls or over-permissioned accounts expand the attacker’s usable access.
  3. Impact follows when the attacker reaches sensitive assets, privileged accounts or regulated data that should have been separated by consistent governance.
  • Sisense breach 2024: A credential in Sisense's GitLab reportedly opened S3 buckets of customer tokens, passwords and certificates; CISA urged a full reset.

Read and download The State of NHI & AI Agent Breach Report 2026, covering 200+ breaches impacting Non-Human Identities including AI Agents.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

Identity unification is a governance requirement, not an architecture preference. When authentication, access administration, governance and privileged control sit in separate stacks, no one owns the end-to-end identity decision. That creates policy gaps, audit friction and inconsistent enforcement across the lifecycle. The implication is that identity programmes should be judged on control coherence, not on the number of tools deployed.

The strongest identity risk is control fragmentation across the lifecycle. The article is right to frame onboarding, authentication, termination and ongoing access management as one operational chain. Joiner, mover and leaver events are where entitlement drift appears first, and where separate teams often lose synchronisation. Practitioners should treat lifecycle consistency as the real test of IAM maturity.

Privileged access cannot be governed as an exception process. Sensitive and executive accounts need tighter monitoring, but they still depend on the same identity source, policy model and audit trail as other accounts. If PAM is isolated from governance, organisations may protect a subset of accounts while leaving the broader control plane fragmented. The conclusion is simple: privilege is a governance state, not a separate product category.

Unified control plane: The article’s core concept is that identity security works best when IAM, IGA, SSO, MFA and PAM are managed as one governed system. That model reduces duplication and improves visibility, but only if policy, monitoring and lifecycle administration stay synchronised. Practitioners should measure success by whether identity decisions are consistent across the full stack.

Operational efficiency and security are not competing outcomes here. The article argues that centralisation can reduce duplication, simplify audits and improve response without weakening control. That is the correct framing for identity programmes under pressure: the objective is fewer disconnected decisions, not more standalone controls. Teams should optimise for governed integration, not tool sprawl.

From our research library:

What this signals

Control coherence is becoming the real IAM maturity signal. Identity teams should stop measuring success by how many separate tools they can run and start measuring whether policy, audit and lifecycle actions produce the same answer everywhere. When that answer changes by platform, the governance model is already fragmented.

Privileged access belongs inside the same governance fabric as standard access. A privileged account is not a separate identity problem, only a higher-risk one. The practical signal for programmes is whether PAM, access administration and lifecycle controls share the same source of truth and review logic.


For practitioners

  • Unify identity policy decisions Map authentication, authorisation, governance and privileged control to a single operating model so different teams are not making conflicting access decisions.
  • Tie lifecycle events to entitlement changes Make onboarding, mover events, termination and access revocation trigger the same policy workflow so entitlements do not drift outside governance.
  • Bring PAM under the same identity governance Ensure privileged account approvals, monitoring and review follow the same identity source and audit trail as standard user access.
  • Eliminate duplicate access administration paths Review where SSO, MFA, IGA and admin consoles overlap, then remove redundant approval and provisioning steps that create inconsistent state.
  • Measure control coherence across the stack Track whether the same identity, policy and monitoring logic applies from standard access through to privileged access and audit evidence.

Key takeaways

  • Identity risk rises when authentication, access administration and privileged control are handled as separate processes instead of one governed model.
  • The article argues that unified IAM reduces duplication, improves auditability and makes identity control easier to operate across the lifecycle.
  • Practitioners should evaluate whether policy, monitoring and entitlement changes stay coherent from standard access through to privileged accounts.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 set the technical controls, while ISO/IEC 27001:2022 defines the regulatory obligations.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-05 — Access Permissions, Entitlements and AuthorizationsThe article centres on governing access permissions and entitlement consistency across IAM and PAM.
GV.RR-01 — Roles, responsibilities, and authoritiesThe piece stresses unified ownership across IAM, IGA and PAM operations.
Recommendation — Apply PR.AA-05 to keep access permissions and authorisations consistent across the identity lifecycle. Define clear roles and authorities for identity governance so access decisions do not fragment across teams.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5AC-6 — Least PrivilegeUnified governance is needed to keep privileges minimal across standard and elevated access.
IA-5 — Authenticator ManagementThe article discusses authentication controls such as MFA and access administration.
Recommendation — Enforce least privilege so standard and privileged accounts share the same entitlement discipline. Manage authenticators centrally so MFA and related credentials stay aligned to governance and lifecycle rules.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022A.5.15 — Access controlThe article is fundamentally about a unified access control model across the identity stack.
Recommendation — Implement access control as one managed policy domain rather than disconnected approval paths.

Key terms

  • Identity Governance: Identity governance is the set of controls that defines who approves access, who owns it, how it is reviewed, and when it is removed. In practice, it turns identity management from a deployment task into a durable control system that can withstand audits, organisational change, and operational growth.
  • Privilege Access Management: Privilege Access Management is the discipline of controlling and monitoring elevated access to critical systems and data. It governs how privileged accounts, credentials, sessions, and commands are issued, used, recorded, and revoked, so administrative power is limited, traceable, and aligned to policy, risk, and operational need.
  • Identity Lifecycle Event: A business event that changes a person’s access, obligations, or record status, such as hiring, role change, or offboarding. In HR programmes, these events often drive entitlement changes and evidence requirements, so they need to be governed as part of the identity lifecycle rather than handled as isolated paperwork.
  • Access Unification: Access unification is the practice of coordinating authentication, authorisation and administration through a single governance model. It reduces duplication and inconsistency by ensuring the same identity state and policy logic apply across multiple systems and access types.

Deepen your knowledge

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on July 11, 2026.
Updated on October 11, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org