By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamBased on Veza: “New Gartner Report: Reduce Your IAM Attack Surface Using Visibility, Observability, and Remediation” (February 25, 2026)

TL;DR: By 2028, 70% of CISOs will use an identity visibility and intelligence platform to reduce IAM attack surface, according to Veza’s citation of Gartner research. The shift reflects a programme reality: visibility, observability, and remediation now define whether human, machine, and AI identities can be governed at scale.


At a glance

What this is: This analysis says identity visibility platforms are becoming central to reducing IAM attack surface because visibility, observability, and remediation are now treated as essential controls.

Why it matters: For IAM teams, the shift matters because human, machine, and AI identities cannot be governed at scale if risk is invisible, uncontextualised, or too slow to remediate.

By the numbers:

  • By 2028, 70% of Chief Information Security Officers will utilize an identity visibility and intelligence platform to shrink their IAM attack surface.

Context

Identity visibility platforms sit between identity data, access relationships, and operational response. In practical terms, they build a graph of who or what can access which systems, then expose where risk is concentrated across human users, service accounts, and AI-driven access paths.

The governance gap is not just lack of inventory. IAM teams often know identities exist, but not how privileges intersect, where exposure has accumulated, or which access paths create the fastest route to compromise. That makes visibility, observability, and remediation a single control chain rather than separate disciplines.

This article frames IVIP as a response to attack surface reduction in mixed identity estates, where the programme problem is not only authentication but the inability to see access relationships quickly enough to govern them.


Key questions

Q: What do organisations get wrong when they treat human, machine, and AI identities the same?

A: They apply one policy model to identities with very different lifecycles, behaviours, and evidence requirements. Human users, service accounts, and AI identities should not share the same review cadence or control assumptions. When they do, governance becomes broad but shallow, and the most risky access paths are usually the least visible.

Q: Why does transparency matter in IAM and identity governance?

A: Transparency matters because governance breaks down when people cannot explain how access decisions are made or why a control exists. Clear operating detail reduces rework, improves auditability, and makes it easier to manage lifecycle events, entitlement reviews, and exceptions without relying on tribal knowledge.

Q: What are the signs that an IAM programme has too much hidden identity risk?

A: Common signs include unclear ownership of service accounts, recurring privilege exceptions, slow remediation of risky access, and an inability to explain who can reach critical systems through indirect paths. If teams can describe identities but not their effective access scope, hidden risk is already embedded in the programme.

Q: When should organisations separate human IAM from NHI governance?

A: Organisations should separate them whenever service accounts, API keys, tokens, or certificates are part of the access estate. Human identity controls are built around user behaviour and interactive authentication, while NHI governance must address secrets, standing privileges, rotation, and offboarding. Treating them as the same model leaves machine access under-governed.


Technical breakdown

Identity graph visibility and access relationships

An identity visibility and intelligence platform typically maps relationships between identities, entitlements, applications, and data access into a graph rather than a flat inventory. That matters because risk rarely sits in one account alone. It emerges where permission chains, inherited access, stale entitlements, and indirect trust relationships create exposure that standard IAM reports miss. The operational value is context: who can reach what, through which path, and with what degree of privilege. In mixed environments, that context has to include human users, service accounts, tokens, and other non-human identities, because the attack surface often spans all of them at once.

Practical implication: build a continuously updated identity graph that can surface indirect access paths before they become abuse paths.

Observability as an IAM control, not a dashboard

Observability in IAM is the ability to detect meaningful access behaviour, not just log authentication events. A mature visibility layer has to answer which identities are overexposed, where privilege sprawl is growing, and which access paths are most likely to support compromise or takeover. Without that context, logs become after-the-fact evidence rather than a governance signal. For identity programmes, observability becomes a decision input for risk prioritisation, entitlement review, and remediation sequencing. It is the difference between knowing an event occurred and understanding whether that event materially expanded the attack surface.

Practical implication: tie access observability to entitlement review and prioritise identities with the widest blast radius.

Remediation loops across human, machine, and AI identities

Remediation is the control that turns visibility into risk reduction. In identity governance, that means revoking excess access, correcting privilege scope, and removing pathways that expose accounts to compromise or takeover. The challenge is speed and scope. If remediation is manual, the exposure window stays open long enough to be exploited. If it only covers human users, the programme leaves machine identities and AI-linked access paths outside the control boundary. IVIP-style governance therefore pushes remediation closer to the discovery layer so that the same system that finds the risk can also drive the fix.

Practical implication: shorten the time between exposure detection and privilege reduction, and include non-human identities in the same remediation workflow.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

Identity visibility is becoming the front line of IAM risk reduction. The old assumption was that identity governance could rely on periodic reviews, static reports, and separate tooling for access analysis. That model breaks when exposure is distributed across human, machine, and AI identities and attackers move faster than review cycles. The practical conclusion is that visibility is no longer a supporting function; it is the control plane that determines whether IAM risk can be reduced at all.

Access graph context changes the economics of remediation. When teams can see privilege relationships and transitive access paths, they can target the identities that matter most instead of treating all entitlements equally. That shifts IAM from broad certification exercises toward risk-based action on the accounts that expand blast radius. The result is a more defensible governance model because remediation effort follows exposure density, not just policy calendars.

Identity attack surface reduction is now a cross-domain identity problem. Human IAM, NHI governance, and emerging AI identity controls are converging around the same need: knowing what exists, what it can reach, and what to do when it is overexposed. A visibility platform becomes the bridge between discovery and governance, but only if it covers all identity types and not just the ones easiest to inventory. Practitioners should treat that breadth as a programme requirement, not a product feature.

Visibility without action creates a new form of governance debt. The value of IVIP is not that it shows more data, but that it exposes risk in a form that can be acted on. If organisations adopt identity visibility without connecting it to entitlement cleanup, access review, and privilege reduction, they merely improve their awareness of exposure. The field is moving toward measurable attack-surface reduction, and the governance test is whether the platform changes outcomes, not dashboards.

Ivory-tower identity metrics will not be enough. Programmes will be judged less on how many identities they can count and more on how quickly they can reduce the access paths that matter. That forces IAM leaders to align visibility, observability, and remediation around operational timelines, not reporting cadences. The implication for practitioners is clear: identity security now has to show risk movement, not just risk description.

From our research library:

What this signals

Identity visibility will become a prerequisite for measurable attack-surface reduction. IAM teams should expect executive scrutiny to shift from whether identities are inventoried to whether access paths are actually being reduced. That means the programme conversation moves from static coverage to operational closure on overexposure, with privileged paths and non-human identities carrying the most weight.

Access review cycles are no longer enough when exposure changes continuously. The practical shift is toward continuous context around who or what can reach critical systems, not quarterly certification alone. Teams that still rely on periodic review will keep discovering risk after it has already expanded.

Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, so NHI governance remains a blind spot even in mature IAM programmes. That gap matters because machine identities often sit on the shortest path to infrastructure, and visibility is the condition for any credible remediation programme.


For practitioners

  • Map transitive access paths Identify where indirect permissions, inherited roles, and delegated trust relationships expand the effective attack surface across your identity estate.
  • Prioritise remediation by blast radius Rank identities by the number of systems, data sets, and critical workflows they can reach, then remediate the highest-exposure accounts first.
  • Include non-human identities in review cycles Extend visibility and entitlement governance to service accounts, tokens, and other machine identities so they are not outside the same risk controls.
  • Connect discovery to revocation Make sure the same workflow that identifies excess access can remove or narrow it without waiting for a separate manual escalation path.

Key takeaways

  • Identity visibility platforms are moving from nice-to-have reporting layers to core controls for reducing IAM attack surface.
  • The main challenge is not just finding identities, but understanding privilege relationships, indirect access paths, and the accounts that create the largest blast radius.
  • Programmes that connect visibility to remediation can reduce exposure faster across human, machine, and AI identities than review-only governance models.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and MITRE ATT&CK address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and CIS Controls v8 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHIThe article centres on shrinking identity attack surface by finding excessive access across machine identities.
NHI-10 — Human Use of NHIThe article covers human, machine, and AI identity coverage, including risks when humans rely on NHI access paths.
Recommendation — Use NHI-05 to identify and remove non-human identities with unnecessary privilege. Apply NHI-10 controls to stop humans from depending on unmanaged non-human credentials.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-05 — Access Permissions, Entitlements and AuthorizationsThe article is about reducing excess permissions and governing entitlements across identity types.
Recommendation — Use PR.AA-05 to continually validate and reduce access permissions and entitlements.
CIS Controls v8CIS-5 — Account ManagementVisibility into accounts and their access scope is central to the attack-surface reduction model.
Recommendation — Apply CIS-5 to inventory accounts, review access, and remove stale or excessive permissions.
MITRE ATT&CKTA0006;TA0008 — Credential Access; Lateral MovementThe article explicitly ties identity visibility to reducing credential compromise and account takeover paths.
Recommendation — Map exposed identity paths to TA0006 and TA0008 to prioritise the riskiest access chains.

Key terms

  • Identity Visibility Platform: An Identity Visibility Platform is a system that discovers, inventories, and continuously monitors identities across human and machine environments. It correlates accounts, credentials, permissions, and activity to show who or what can access resources, where risk exists, and how identity posture changes over time across cloud, applications, endpoints, and infrastructure.
  • Identity Attack Surface: Identity attack surface is the total set of accounts, tokens, login endpoints, trust paths, and supporting systems that can be probed for access. For password spraying, the risk grows with every externally reachable authentication path and every dormant or weakly protected identity.
  • Access Graph: An access graph is a relationship model that links identities, permissions, data objects, and system interactions. In NHI governance, it helps security teams see the full path from an agent or user to the action it can take, which is more useful than isolated account reviews.
  • Remediation Feedback Loop: A remediation feedback loop is the cycle of detecting a vulnerability, passing the finding back to the developer, fixing the code, and retesting the result. It matters because security value depends on verified closure, not just detection. In AI-assisted development, short feedback loops help keep pace with rapid code generation and reduce lingering risk.

Deepen your knowledge

NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity lifecycle are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.
NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on August 25, 2026.
Updated on October 7, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org