TL;DR: IT asset management software is increasingly presented as a single source of truth for asset visibility, lifecycle tracking, and audit preparation, but the source article also shows why identity and entitlement context now matter alongside inventory control, according to Zluri. The real governance gap is that assets can be tracked without proving who or what can still use them, which makes the case for identity-centric controls stronger.
At a glance
What this is: This is a curated review of IT asset management software, with the key finding that inventory, lifecycle, and audit readiness are becoming inseparable from identity governance.
Why it matters: For IAM teams, the article matters because asset visibility alone does not answer who, or what, retains access across devices, cloud resources, and software estates.
By the numbers:
- Organisations that describe themselves as confident in their AI deployment actually experience a 72% security incident rate, compared to 33% for those who remain cautious.
- 72% of organisations have experienced or suspect they have experienced a breach of non-human identities , 46% confirmed, 26% suspected.
- Only 44% of organisations have implemented any policies to manage their AI agents, despite 92% agreeing that governing AI agents is critical to enterprise security.
👉 Read Zluri’s top 20 IT asset management software review for 2026
Context
IT asset management software is meant to create an accurate inventory of hardware, software, contracts, and lifecycle status. In practice, that inventory often sits apart from the identity layer, which means teams can know what exists without knowing who or what can still act on it. The result is a governance blind spot that grows as cloud, mobile, SaaS, and AI-linked assets multiply.
Zluri’s list is useful because it reflects how ITAM is being asked to do more than catalog devices. Asset discovery, lifecycle tracking, audit prep, and licence control now overlap with identity visibility, entitlement oversight, and offboarding hygiene. That overlap is where IAM, IGA, and ITAM programmes increasingly meet, especially when non-human identities are part of the estate.
Key questions
Q: How should security teams connect IT asset management with identity governance?
A: Security teams should connect IT asset management with identity governance by linking each asset to its owner, access grants, and retirement status. That lets them spot orphaned access, dormant credentials, and unresolved exceptions before an asset is reissued, decommissioned, or migrated. The goal is to make the asset record and the access record close together, not drift apart.
Q: Why do asset inventories often miss the real access risk?
A: Asset inventories often miss real access risk because they describe what exists, not what can still authenticate to it. A device, application, or cloud resource can be fully catalogued while its service account, token, or certificate remains active. That leaves a hidden control gap, especially when disposal, transfer, or contract changes do not trigger access closure.
Q: What breaks when access lifecycle and asset lifecycle are not aligned?
A: When access lifecycle and asset lifecycle are not aligned, organisations keep valid identities attached to retired assets and lose the ability to prove who still has authority. That creates orphaned access, audit gaps, and a larger blast radius if credentials are reused. The control failure is not inventory accuracy alone, but incomplete closure of access state.
Q: How do organisations reduce audit risk in IT asset management programmes?
A: Organisations reduce audit risk by maintaining a single evidence chain that ties asset ownership, access reviews, revocation events, and retirement dates together. Auditors care less about the size of the inventory than whether the organisation can prove access was reviewed and removed on time. If the evidence is fragmented, the control is harder to defend.
Technical breakdown
Why asset inventory and identity data must be joined
An asset register tells you what exists, where it sits, and how it is classified. Identity data tells you who or what can authenticate, authorise, or retain access to that asset. When those datasets are separate, teams can report on inventory completeness while missing orphaned access, dormant accounts, or stale service credentials tied to retired assets. The technical problem is not discovery alone but correlation across asset, entitlement, and activity records. That correlation is what turns a list of assets into a control surface for ITAM, IAM, and IGA teams.
Practical implication: tie asset records to identity and entitlement sources so retirement, transfer, and decommissioning events also close access.
Lifecycle tracking is only useful if access follows the same lifecycle
ITAM platforms often describe a full asset lifecycle from procurement to disposal. Identity governance has an equivalent lifecycle requirement for accounts, tokens, certificates, and service identities attached to those assets. If the asset is retired but the associated credentials remain valid, the lifecycle is incomplete from a security perspective. That is especially important for cloud resources, software licences, and managed devices, where access can outlive the business need by weeks or months. Lifecycle control is therefore not a reporting feature but an enforcement problem.
Practical implication: align retirement workflows with deprovisioning, secret revocation, and certificate expiry so access ends with the asset.
Audit readiness depends on evidence, not just visibility
Audit preparation is often presented as a reporting exercise, but for identity programmes the deeper requirement is provable control over access history. A clean inventory does not demonstrate that access was reviewed, revoked, or bounded over time. Practitioners need evidence that an organisation can trace asset ownership, access grants, revocations, and outstanding exceptions across the full lifecycle. In mixed estates, that evidence has to include both human and non-human identities, because auditors increasingly test whether access controls still match operational reality.
Practical implication: store lifecycle and access evidence together so audit trails can show ownership, review, and revocation in one chain.
Breaches seen in the wild
- Cisco DevHub NHI breach — IntelBroker exploited exposed Cisco credentials, API tokens and keys in DevHub.
- Snowflake breach — Snowflake breach compromised Ticketmaster, Santander and others via cloud credential abuse.
Read our 52 NHI Breaches Analysis report for a comprehensive view of breaches impacting Non-Human Identities including AI Agents.
NHI Mgmt Group analysis
Asset management has become an identity problem in disguise. The article treats inventory accuracy as the primary outcome, but modern estates fail when ownership, access, and usage are not bound to the same record. A device, app, or cloud resource that is accurately counted but incorrectly governed still creates security exposure. Practitioners should treat asset visibility as a prerequisite, not a control outcome.
Orphaned access is the failure mode hidden inside lifecycle drift. When assets move through procurement, assignment, maintenance, and disposal, the associated identity state often changes more slowly than the asset record. That gap leaves dormant permissions, leftover tokens, and stale approvals attached to things the business thinks are gone. The practitioner conclusion is that decommissioning must include entitlement closure, not just asset retirement.
Identity blast radius is the right named concept for ITAM teams now. The useful question is no longer only how many assets exist, but how far a compromised or stale identity can reach across them. Once ITAM is tied to SaaS, cloud, devices, and AI-linked tools, one unmanaged identity can create cross-system access that the inventory view alone will not expose. Practitioners should measure asset control by how far access can spread, not just by how many items are listed.
Shadow AI and shadow access are converging inside the asset estate. The article’s mention of AI apps under governance is a signal that ITAM is now touching unmanaged non-human identities as well as software licences. That widens the governance surface from inventory control into identity discovery, entitlement review, and offboarding discipline. Practitioners should assume that any asset programme that ignores AI-linked identities is already incomplete.
ITAM and IGA are becoming adjacent controls, not separate programmes. Asset management can no longer stop at reporting because the business impact now depends on whether the associated identities are still valid, over-privileged, or owned. This is why the strongest programmes connect asset discovery to lifecycle governance and access evidence. Practitioners should plan for a shared control model across inventory, identity, and review.
From our research:
- 72% of organisations have experienced or suspect they have experienced a breach of non-human identities, according to 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- Enterprises that have experienced a compromised NHI averaged 2.7 separate incidents in the past 12 months, according to the 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- For a broader control view, read Ultimate Guide to NHIs , Lifecycle Processes for Managing NHIs for the lifecycle discipline that asset programmes now need.
What this signals
Identity blast radius is now an asset-management metric, not just an IAM metric. With 19% of organisations giving AI systems dramatically more access than human employees, per the 2026 Infrastructure Identity Survey, the control question shifts from counting assets to bounding what each identity can reach.
Asset programmes that do not link inventory to entitlement data will continue to overstate control maturity. The next wave of governance will be measured by whether teams can prove that retirement, transfer, and exception handling all terminate access cleanly across human and non-human identities.
For practitioners
- Correlate assets to identities Link every managed asset to a human owner, a non-human executor, and the entitlement set that can act on it. Treat missing ownership as a control defect, not a data-quality issue.
- Make decommissioning revoke access Require retirement workflows to trigger deprovisioning, secret revocation, and certificate expiry checks before the asset is marked closed in the register.
- Track orphaned access as an operational risk Report on assets that have no current owner, no active business purpose, or unresolved access links. Escalate those records to IAM and IGA teams for closure.
- Join audit evidence across ITAM and IAM Keep access reviews, lifecycle events, and asset disposition records in the same evidence chain so auditors can trace the control path without manual reconstruction.
Key takeaways
- IT asset management becomes a security control only when inventory is tied to identity and entitlement data.
- The main failure mode is orphaned access that survives asset retirement, transfer, or disposal.
- Practitioners should treat lifecycle closure, access closure, and audit evidence as one workflow, not three separate tasks.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-03 | Asset-linked secrets and service identities need lifecycle closure. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AC-4 | Access management must stay aligned to asset lifecycle changes. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | Zero trust requires continuous verification across asset and identity state. |
Map asset retirement to NHI credential revocation and verify no standing secrets remain active.
Key terms
- Identity Blast Radius: The maximum extent of systems, data, and workflows that one identity can reach if its access is misused or left uncleared. In practice, the blast radius depends on entitlement scope, credential persistence, and whether asset retirement also removes the related access state.
- Orphaned Access: Access that remains active after the business owner, asset owner, or operational need has changed. It often appears when deprovisioning, certificate expiry, or secret revocation is not tied to the same lifecycle event that retires the asset or application.
- Lifecycle Closure: The point at which an asset and all of its related access, credentials, and records are fully retired. For identity programmes, closure is only real when ownership, entitlements, tokens, and audit evidence are removed or archived together, not when inventory status changes alone.
- Asset-Identity Correlation: The practice of linking asset records to the identities that can authenticate, authorise, or act on them. This gives security teams a joined view of inventory and access, which is necessary for spotting dormant permissions, unmanaged service accounts, and stale exceptions.
Deepen your knowledge
IT asset inventories, entitlement closure, and lifecycle governance are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If your programme is already managing devices, SaaS, and AI-linked access, it is worth exploring.
This post draws on content published by Zluri: IT Teams Top 20 IT Asset Management Software - 2026. Read the original.
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2026-05-19.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org