By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamPublished 2025-06-26Domain: Governance & RiskSource: Zluri

TL;DR: ITAM gaps let shadow SaaS, weak access oversight, and poor renewal discipline create security, compliance, and cost risk as organisations scale, according to Zluri. The underlying issue is not tool shortage but governance drift across discovery, access, and lifecycle control.


At a glance

What this is: This is a practitioner-focused ITAM post arguing that visibility, compliance, lifecycle, and usage gaps turn SaaS sprawl into security and cost risk.

Why it matters: It matters because the same discovery, access, and lifecycle failures that create SaaS risk also weaken NHI and broader IAM governance when organisations scale.

By the numbers:

👉 Read Zluri's analysis of the top ITAM challenges affecting SaaS governance


Context

IT asset management only works when teams can see what exists, who is using it, and when it should be removed. In SaaS environments, that visibility problem quickly becomes an identity governance problem because untracked applications often carry unreviewed access, weak ownership, and missed offboarding.

The article frames four recurring failure points: incomplete asset visibility, security and compliance risk, complex onboarding and offboarding, and missing usage metrics. That is a familiar pattern for identity teams because the same lifecycle blind spots that affect SaaS also affect service accounts, tokens, and other non-human identities.

The central issue is not simply asset inventory. It is the loss of governance over procurement, access, and renewal decisions, which leaves organisations with shadow IT, unmanaged access, and renewal decisions made too late to influence risk.


Key questions

Q: How should security teams reduce SaaS sprawl without creating more governance overhead?

A: Start with a single authoritative inventory, then attach ownership, access, and renewal data to each application. The goal is not more reporting. It is a control loop that lets teams approve, recertify, restrict, or retire apps before they become shadow IT. If an app cannot be owned, it cannot be governed.

Q: Why do unused SaaS apps become security risk even if nobody is actively using them?

A: Unused apps often still retain valid identities, permissions, and integrations. That means the business keeps an attack surface open even after the original business need has faded. When ownership and offboarding are weak, dormant applications become easy targets for abuse, audit exceptions, and accidental renewal.

Q: How do organisations know whether SaaS usage data is good enough for governance decisions?

A: Usage data is good enough when it can support a specific action, such as renewal, restriction, or retirement, without manual reconciliation. If the data cannot show who used the app, how often, and for which business purpose, it is descriptive but not decision-grade.

Q: Who should be accountable for SaaS offboarding and renewal control?

A: Accountability should sit with the business owner for need, the IT or IAM team for control execution, and procurement for contract enforcement. That division matters because ownership, access, and spend are different control points. If any one of them is missing, applications linger past their useful life.


Technical breakdown

Why SaaS visibility fails in decentralised environments

Visibility breaks when purchasing, provisioning, and administration happen in different teams without a shared control plane. In that model, IT may not know which apps exist, security may not know which identities can reach them, and finance may only see them at renewal. Discovery tools help, but discovery alone does not solve ownership. The hard part is connecting each application to a business owner, an access path, and a lifecycle state so that the organisation can act on what it finds.

Practical implication: build a discovery-to-ownership process that assigns every SaaS app a business owner and a removal path.

How SaaS sprawl turns into security and compliance exposure

SaaS sprawl creates risk when unused or duplicate applications stay active after the business no longer needs them. That leaves standing access in place, expands the attack surface, and makes audit evidence harder to assemble. Compliance risk follows the same pattern because teams cannot prove who had access, whether access was justified, or whether offboarding happened on time. This is less a software issue than a governance issue: unknown apps cannot be recertified, and unowned apps cannot be controlled.

Practical implication: tie app approval, access review, and offboarding to a single inventory so abandoned apps can be removed before audit or abuse.

Why usage metrics matter more than app counts

Usage metrics convert inventory into decision support. A large app list tells you what exists, but usage data tells you what deserves renewal, what should be restricted, and what can be retired. Without that signal, teams renew by default and often carry redundant licences, stale entitlements, and unnecessary exposure. Usage is also a proxy for governance quality because an application that is invisible in usage reporting is usually invisible in ownership and access accountability as well.

Practical implication: use usage telemetry to drive renewal, restriction, and deprovisioning decisions instead of relying on calendar reminders alone.



NHI Mgmt Group analysis

ITAM is now identity governance by another name: once SaaS becomes the delivery layer for business access, inventory control and access control stop being separable disciplines. The article shows the same failure pattern that NHI programmes face: assets are purchased locally, used informally, and retired too late. The practical conclusion is that every application inventory is also an entitlement inventory.

Visibility without lifecycle control creates governance debt: the article correctly points to discovery, but discovery is only the entry point. If teams cannot offboard unused apps, revoke access when usage drops, and confirm renewal intent before contracts roll over, they accumulate dormant exposure that is hard to explain in audit terms. Governance debt: the hidden accumulation of unowned applications, stale access, and delayed decisions that makes later remediation expensive and unreliable.

Usage data is the control that separates active risk from dead weight: renewal decisions based on contract dates alone are a weak proxy for actual business need. When usage, ownership, and access are not aligned, the organisation keeps paying for systems that also keep holding identity risk. Practitioners should treat low or absent usage as a governance signal, not just a cost signal.

The same lifecycle discipline should apply across SaaS, NHI, and human access: onboarding, approval, review, and offboarding only work when each identity-bearing resource has a named owner and a defined exit path. The article's strongest lesson is that lifecycle process quality, not tool count, determines whether access remains defensible over time.

Top 10 NHI Issues still maps here: unmanaged access, weak visibility, and poor lifecycle governance are not separate concerns. They are the same operating failure expressed through SaaS sprawl, and that makes the governance model portable across apps, service accounts, and broader identity estates.

From our research:

  • 71% of NHIs are not rotated within recommended time frames, increasing the risk of compromise over time, according to Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
  • Only 5.7% of organisations have full visibility into their service accounts, which is the same visibility problem this post identifies in SaaS governance.
  • For the lifecycle angle, read NHI Lifecycle Management Guide for how ownership, rotation, and offboarding should work together.

What this signals

Governance programmes that separate SaaS management from IAM are carrying hidden exposure. When application ownership, access review, and renewal happen in different workflows, the organisation creates the same kind of blind spot seen in unmanaged NHI estates. A useful next step is to treat SaaS inventory as part of identity governance rather than as a procurement side task.

The more scalable pattern is not more manual review, but tighter linkage between discovery, entitlement context, and retirement decisions. That is where the operational value sits: fewer orphaned apps, fewer stale entitlements, and less time spent reconciling who still needs what.

Teams that already use the 52 NHI Breaches Analysis will recognise the pattern. Governance failures usually start with missing ownership and end with delayed removal, which is why lifecycle discipline matters even when the subject is SaaS rather than a service account.


For practitioners

  • Map every SaaS app to an accountable owner Require a named business owner, a technical owner, and a removal path for every application in inventory so no app remains unowned at renewal or offboarding.
  • Tie renewal decisions to usage telemetry Use active usage, last-access data, and department demand to decide whether an app should be renewed, restricted, or retired before the contract date arrives.
  • Unify app approval and access review Connect procurement, entitlement approval, and access recertification so that apps cannot remain approved without a current access justification.
  • Treat shadow SaaS as an identity problem Fold unmanaged applications into IAM and governance workflows so hidden apps are discovered, assigned, and offboarded through the same controls used for other access-bearing assets.

Key takeaways

  • SaaS sprawl becomes an identity risk when organisations cannot tie each application to a clear owner, access path, and retirement process.
  • Usage telemetry is the deciding signal because it separates active business need from stale applications that should be restricted or removed.
  • The strongest control response is lifecycle governance across approval, review, and offboarding, not isolated inventory reporting.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AC-4Access permissions must stay aligned with active SaaS ownership and usage.
NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207)Zero trust depends on continuous verification of access to cloud applications.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-03Lifecycle failures in SaaS resemble unmanaged non-human identity persistence.

Review non-human identity lifecycles and remove stale credentials before they become orphaned access.


Key terms

  • Shadow SaaS: Applications adopted or retained outside formal IT and security oversight. Shadow SaaS often appears when teams can buy and use tools without a shared approval, inventory, or offboarding process, leaving access, data handling, and renewal decisions outside governance.
  • Governance Debt: The accumulated cost of delayed ownership, review, and cleanup across applications or identities. It shows up when teams keep apps, credentials, or entitlements active after the business need has changed, making later remediation slower, more expensive, and harder to prove.
  • Usage Telemetry: Operational data showing how often and by whom an application is used. In identity governance, usage telemetry matters because it helps distinguish active access from stale access, which supports renewal, restriction, recertification, and removal decisions.

Deepen your knowledge

NHI governance, machine identity security, and identity lifecycle management are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.

This post draws on content published by Zluri: IT Teams Top 4 ITAM Challenges And Solutions to Overcome Them. Read the original.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2025-06-26.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org