TL;DR: Security and IT are working from incomplete views of human and non-human identities, which keeps remediation open for weeks, according to Zluri's analysis. The real issue is structural: access reviews, offboarding, and remediation workflows were not built for service accounts, OAuth tokens, and AI tools that sit outside the managed directory.
At a glance
What this is: This is an analysis of why IT and security teams keep missing each other on identity remediation, especially when non-human identities and unmanaged applications are involved.
Why it matters: It matters because IAM, IGA, and PAM programmes now have to govern identities that security can detect but IT cannot always remediate safely without better inventory, ownership, and workflow linkage.
👉 Read Zluri's analysis of the IT and security remediation gap across modern identities
Context
The problem is not just slower ticket handling. It is an identity governance gap in which security can surface risky access faster than IT can determine ownership, dependencies, and safe remediation paths across human and non-human identities.
As SaaS sprawl, service accounts, OAuth tokens, and AI tools expand the identity surface, the old model of detection in one team and cleanup in another leaves exposure open longer than either side intends. The question is no longer whether teams can communicate, but whether their identity data and workflows are aligned enough to close risk before it becomes persistent exposure.
Key questions
Q: How should teams close the gap between security alerts and identity remediation?
A: They need a shared identity inventory and a workflow that maps each alert to an accountable owner before remediation begins. Without that context, security can detect exposure but IT still has to reconstruct dependencies and business impact manually. The result is slow closure, inconsistent handling, and recurring findings that never reach root cause resolution.
Q: Why do non-human identities make remediation slower than standard user accounts?
A: Because service accounts, OAuth tokens, and AI tools often carry embedded dependencies that are not obvious in a directory record. Revoking access may break workflows or integrations, so teams must first determine what the identity actually does. That reconstruction step extends timelines and exposes the weakness of human-centric remediation processes.
Q: What do security teams get wrong about AI tools in identity governance?
A: They often treat them as software procurement issues rather than access governance issues. If an AI tool can read data, call APIs, or write back into systems, it is part of the identity surface and should be reviewed like any other non-human identity. Leaving it outside governance creates unmanaged access and offboarding blind spots.
Q: Who is accountable when risk remains open after security flags it?
A: Accountability sits with both functions, but only if ownership data and remediation workflow are aligned. Security owns the risk signal, while IT owns execution. If the organisation cannot connect the two through a live control system, leadership will keep seeing recurring findings that reflect a structural governance gap rather than a single team's failure.
Technical breakdown
Why identity surface drift breaks remediation workflows
Identity surface drift occurs when the set of identities, applications, and permissions in use no longer matches what governance tooling can see or manage. In this article's pattern, security finds issues in service accounts, OAuth connections, legacy systems, and AI tools that are outside the managed console or missing an owner. That creates a reconstruction step before action can begin. The technical problem is not detection alone, but the absence of a reliable identity inventory that links findings to accountable systems and downstream dependencies.
Practical implication: build a current inventory that spans managed and unmanaged identities before expecting remediation SLAs to hold.
Closed-loop remediation and shared identity context
Closed-loop remediation means the detection, ownership mapping, approval, execution, and evidence capture happen in one connected workflow. Without that loop, security generates tickets and IT spends time translating the alert into operational context. The article shows why this breaks down for non-human identities: revoking access can affect pipelines, integrations, or tools that were never documented cleanly. When the workflow is fragmented, remediation slows because the control plane and the operational plane are not the same system.
Practical implication: connect security findings to owner metadata and execution workflows so remediation does not require a separate manual context-gathering step.
Why AI tool permissions behave like unmanaged identity risk
AI tools adopted by departments often arrive with access that was never explicitly scoped, reviewed, or offboarded. Technically, that makes them behave like unmanaged non-human identities, even when they are purchased as productivity software rather than infrastructure. The risk is not the label on the tool, but the permissions it holds and the fact that those permissions may sit outside directory-centric governance. This is where IAM, IGA, and SaaS governance converge: if a system can read, write, or transmit data, it belongs in identity control scope.
Practical implication: treat department-owned AI tools as governed identities, not shadow software, and include them in access review and offboarding flows.
NHI Mgmt Group analysis
Identity governance fails when security can detect risk faster than IT can establish ownership. The article describes a system in which findings arrive before the accountable system or identity owner is known, especially for unmanaged SaaS and non-human identities. That creates a governance bottleneck, not a communications problem. The implication is that remediation speed is capped by identity context quality, not ticket priority.
Identity surface drift is the operational failure mode this article exposes. Security's view and IT's view diverge because the live identity surface now includes legacy systems, service accounts, OAuth tokens, and AI tools that were never fully onboarded into governance. That means access decisions are being made against partial inventories. Practitioners should read this as a signal that the inventory itself has become a control surface.
Access reviews cannot compensate for incomplete identity ownership data. If the reviewer cannot tell who owns an account, what depends on it, or whether revocation is safe, the review becomes delay rather than control. The article shows why this is most visible in non-human identities, where business processes are often embedded in the credential rather than the directory entry. The lesson for programmes is that review quality depends on context completeness before cadence.
AI tools are now part of the NHI governance problem, whether procurement teams treat them that way or not. Department-led adoption creates permissions that sit outside traditional IT oversight, which means standard IAM and IGA workflows miss a growing category of exposure. This is not a new class of identity, but it is a new route for unmanaged access. Practitioners should fold these tools into the same governance model used for service accounts and integrations.
Closed-loop remediation is becoming the minimum viable identity control model. The article's core argument is that security detection, remediation execution, and evidence capture must operate as one system if teams are going to keep pace with modern identity sprawl. That aligns with NIST CSF thinking on governance, identify, and protect functions. The practical conclusion is simple: if the loop is broken, the risk window stays open.
From our research:
- 85% of organisations lack full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, according to The State of Non-Human Identity Security.
- 38% have no or low visibility and a further 47% have only partial visibility into those OAuth-connected vendors, which means ownership and exposure are still being inferred rather than governed.
- That visibility gap is why NHI Lifecycle Management Guide matters for offboarding, ownership mapping, and access review design.
What this signals
Identity surface drift: when unmanaged apps, service accounts, and AI tools outpace the governance inventory, remediation becomes a reconstruction exercise instead of a control outcome. Teams should expect more findings to originate outside the systems they officially manage, which makes ownership metadata a prerequisite for any credible closure process.
Because 85% of organisations lack full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, per The State of Non-Human Identity Security, the governance challenge is no longer limited to credential hygiene. Programmes need a live control layer that connects detection to offboarding, access review, and audit evidence before risk can be closed.
For practitioners building the next phase of IAM and IGA maturity, the signal is clear: shared dashboards are useful, but shared execution is what changes outcomes. A programme that cannot remove access from non-human identities and unmanaged applications in the same workflow will keep converting alerts into backlog.
For practitioners
- Map every finding to an accountable owner before remediation starts Require security alerts to carry system owner, business owner, and dependency metadata before they enter the remediation queue. Where ownership is unclear, treat the finding as untriaged governance debt rather than a standard ticket.
- Extend inventory coverage beyond the managed directory Include service accounts, OAuth-connected apps, API keys, legacy systems, and department-owned AI tools in one live inventory so security findings can be matched to real operational dependencies.
- Automate access reviews for non-human identities and unmanaged apps Run access reviews on a defined cadence for identities that are not covered by HR-driven joiner mover leaver processes, and attach evidence at the point of review so later reconstruction is unnecessary.
- Link offboarding to every access vector, not just user accounts Remove SaaS entitlements, OAuth tokens, API integrations, and AI tool permissions in the same offboarding sequence so access does not survive outside the directory.
Key takeaways
- The article shows that remediation delays are usually caused by missing identity context, not by a lack of effort from IT or security.
- The largest exposure now sits in unmanaged identities such as service accounts, OAuth connections, legacy systems, and AI tools that sit outside the managed console.
- Teams need closed-loop identity workflows that combine inventory, ownership, remediation, and evidence if they want to reduce persistent risk windows.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-03 | The article centers on lifecycle gaps and ungoverned non-human access. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AC-1 | Identity and access management must connect detection to enforcement. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | PR.AC-4 | Least-privilege and continuous verification reduce open exposure windows. |
Extend lifecycle control to service accounts, tokens, and AI tool permissions before findings become backlog.
Key terms
- Identity Surface Drift: The condition where the identities, applications, and permissions actually in use no longer match the systems covered by governance tooling. In practice, drift creates blind spots around ownership, dependencies, and revocation risk, especially for non-human identities and unmanaged SaaS applications.
- Closed-Loop Remediation: A control pattern where detection, ownership mapping, approval, execution, and evidence capture happen in one connected workflow. It reduces the delay between identifying a risky entitlement and proving that the access was removed or corrected.
- Non-Human Identity: A machine- or workload-based identity used by software rather than a person, such as a service account, API key, token, certificate, or AI agent. These identities often outlive projects and can accumulate access unless they are inventoried, reviewed, and offboarded like any other governed subject.
- Identity Security Posture Management: A continuous control approach that finds misconfigurations, excessive permissions, and unmanaged identities across the identity surface. It is most effective when posture findings are tied directly to remediation workflows and evidence rather than treated as standalone alerts.
Deepen your knowledge
NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity security are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.
This post draws on content published by Zluri: Career The IT-Security Misalignment That Keeps Your Risk Window Open. Read the original.
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2026-06-25.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org