TL;DR: A survey of 130 manufacturing technology leaders found that 74% lack fully automated provisioning and de-provisioning, 48% cannot revoke access within 24 hours, and 89% have not fully automated user access reviews, according to Pathlock. That combination turns seasonal hiring and digital transformation into a standing access governance problem, not a temporary operations issue.
At a glance
What this is: This Pathlock survey shows that manufacturing access governance is not keeping pace with seasonal staffing spikes, transformation projects, and privileged access pressure.
Why it matters: It matters because the same control gaps affect NHI, human, and privileged access programmes, where delay, overreach, and poor review discipline all expand blast radius.
By the numbers:
- 74% of manufacturing organizations lack fully automated user provisioning and de-provisioning.
- 48% of manufacturing organizations fail to revoke access within 24 hours.
- 89% do not have user access reviews fully automated.
👉 Read Pathlock's research on manufacturing access resilience during seasonal peaks
Context
Manufacturing access governance breaks down when organisations have to grant and remove access quickly across plants, suppliers, contractors, and IT administrators. In that environment, the problem is not simply access volume. It is the mismatch between business speed and governance processes that still rely on manual review, delayed de-provisioning, and fragmented privileged access controls.
The article's core finding is that seasonal workforce surges and digital transformation are colliding with weak access automation. That puts human identities, third-party access, and privileged accounts into the same failure zone, where stale access can survive long enough to become an audit issue, an operational issue, or a security incident. The primary keyword here is access governance, and the article shows why it now needs to be treated as a resilience control.
Key questions
Q: How should manufacturing teams automate access governance during seasonal hiring spikes?
A: They should automate provisioning, de-provisioning, and access certification across the systems where seasonal workers and contractors actually operate. The key is to remove manual queues and tie revocation to role end, contract end, or project completion. If access removal depends on human follow-up, it will lag behind operational demand and create unnecessary exposure.
Q: Why do delayed access reviews create so much risk in manufacturing?
A: Delayed reviews let stale access, copied roles, and excess permissions survive across plants, vendors, and cloud systems. In manufacturing, that is especially dangerous because access often spans multiple operational environments and temporary staff changes quickly. The longer the review cycle, the more likely it is that access no longer matches business need when someone finally checks it.
Q: What breaks when privileged access is not time-bound for third parties and admins?
A: Standing privileged access breaks accountability and makes it harder to tell whether elevated rights still have a valid business purpose. In practice, that creates persistent admin paths that attackers can exploit and auditors will flag. Time-bounded access is not optional in high-change environments because the risk is not just misuse, it is unmanaged persistence.
Q: Who is accountable when access governance gaps appear during digital transformation?
A: Accountability sits with the business and identity owners that approve role design, transformation timelines, and control updates. If GRC controls and SoD simulations are updated after go-live, the gap is not technical alone. It is a governance decision that allowed excessive access to enter production before the organisation had the controls to challenge it.
Technical breakdown
Automated provisioning and de-provisioning in seasonal environments
Provisioning is the controlled creation of access, while de-provisioning is the removal of access when a role, contract, or project ends. In manufacturing, those lifecycle events happen fast because contractors, system integrators, and temporary workers are often onboarded for narrow windows. Manual workflows do not scale when access must be created and removed across multiple systems at once. The operational risk is not only delay. It is inconsistency, where access is revoked in one system but left active in another, creating hidden residual privilege.
Practical implication: automate joiner-mover-leaver controls so removal happens consistently across all connected systems.
Automated elevated access management for admins and third parties
Elevated access is the high-risk access used by administrators, consultants, and other users who can change systems or data at scale. In this research, those roles were among the hardest to manage because their permissions are broader and their need for access is often temporary. Without automation, privileged access becomes persistent by default, which makes oversight weaker and misuse harder to detect. This is especially risky in manufacturing, where IT, OT-adjacent systems, and ERP environments may share overlapping administrative pathways.
Practical implication: time-bound privileged access should be centrally governed and monitored, not left as standing entitlement.
User access reviews and SoD controls during digital transformation
User access reviews are periodic checks to confirm that access still matches business need, while segregation of duties prevents one identity from holding conflicting powers. The article shows that both controls often lag behind transformation projects, especially when legacy roles are copied into new systems or when teams move workloads to the cloud. That creates a quiet accumulation of risk: excess access enters production, but the review process is too slow or too manual to catch it before it matters.
Practical implication: run access reviews and SoD simulation before go-live, not after business change is complete.
Threat narrative
Attacker objective: The objective is to preserve trusted access paths inside manufacturing systems long enough to bypass oversight, amplify privilege, and reach operational or data-bearing assets.
- Entry occurs when temporary workers, contractors, or third-party specialists are granted access quickly during seasonal manufacturing peaks or migration projects.
- Escalation follows when elevated or stale access is not revoked promptly, leaving privileged identities active long after the operational need has ended.
- Impact emerges when dormant accounts, excessive permissions, or missed segregation-of-duties conflicts let an attacker or insider move through mission-critical systems undetected.
Breaches seen in the wild
- DeepSeek breach — DeepSeek breach exposed 1M+ log lines and sensitive secret keys.
- BeyondTrust API key breach — compromised BeyondTrust API key led to unauthorized SaaS access.
Read our 52 NHI Breaches Analysis report for a comprehensive view of breaches impacting Non-Human Identities including AI Agents.
NHI Mgmt Group analysis
Manufacturing access governance is now a resilience control, not a back-office process. The article shows that seasonal hiring and digital transformation collide at the exact point where manual access control is weakest. In practice, that means access latency becomes a business continuity risk as much as a security risk. Organisations that treat provisioning and revocation as operational hygiene will keep discovering that their control model fails under peak load.
Delayed de-provisioning is the failure mode this research exposes. 48% of manufacturers fail to revoke access within 24 hours, which means access often outlives the role that justified it. That is not a minor process defect, it is a standing exposure window that makes stale accounts and dormant privileged identities attractive targets. Practitioners should read this as evidence that lifecycle discipline is still incomplete where it matters most.
Identity becomes the new perimeter when third-party and admin access are the easiest paths to overreach. The hardest roles to manage in the survey were third-party consultants and internal IT administrators, both of which typically carry broad permissions. That pattern matters because manufacturing attack paths increasingly begin with trusted access rather than overt intrusion. The practical conclusion is that privileged identity governance must be designed around time, scope, and accountability, not job title alone.
Access governance before transformation: the article shows that legacy role copying and late GRC updates let excessive access enter production before teams can challenge it. Only 9% updated GRC controls before migration, while 61% did not run comprehensive SoD simulations. That means the control failure is often embedded at design time, not introduced after go-live. The implication is that transformation programmes need access design decisions earlier in the lifecycle, before temporary exceptions become permanent entitlements.
From our research:
- 1 in 4 manufacturing organizations experienced compliance violations, according to The 2024 ESG Report: Managing Non-Human Identities.
- 1 in 5 manufacturing organizations suffered security incidents, which shows the gap is already moving from governance failure into operational impact.
- Manufacturing teams should also compare access resilience with the lifecycle guidance in NHI Lifecycle Management Guide to tighten provisioning, revocation, and review discipline.
What this signals
Seasonal access pressure is the visible symptom, but lifecycle drift is the real issue. When access must be granted in hours and revoked across a fragmented stack, manual governance stops being a control and becomes a delay mechanism. Teams that already struggle with temporary workers in manufacturing will feel the same pressure whenever machine identities, service accounts, or admin credentials are treated as permanent by default.
The practical signal for IAM, IGA, and PAM leaders is that transformation programmes now need access design work earlier in the delivery lifecycle. If role models, SoD rules, and revocation paths are not built before migration or seasonal ramp-up, the programme is accepting avoidable exposure as a normal operating cost. That is the point at which access governance stops supporting change and starts lagging behind it.
For practitioners
- Automate joiner-mover-leaver flows across plants and cloud systems Remove manual handoffs from provisioning and de-provisioning so access is created and revoked consistently across ERP, MES, shared services, and third-party platforms.
- Time-box privileged access for admins and consultants Require elevated access to expire on task completion or contract end, then validate removal across every system where the identity had admin rights.
- Run SoD simulations before go-live Test new roles, copied entitlements, and cloud-migration access models before deployment so conflicting privileges are found before they reach production.
- Prioritise access reviews on dormant and high-privilege accounts Focus review cycles on identities that changed role, lost business ownership, or retained administrative authority after a transformation milestone.
Key takeaways
- Manufacturing access risk is rising because seasonal staffing and transformation projects are outpacing manual governance.
- The survey data shows that delayed revocation, weak privileged access automation, and incomplete access reviews are already producing compliance and security failures.
- The control priority is early lifecycle design, especially automated provisioning, time-bound privileged access, and pre-go-live SoD validation.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-03 | Automated rotation and revocation are central to the delayed de-provisioning risk here. |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AC-4 | Least-privilege access management applies to seasonal workers, admins, and third parties. |
| NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) | PR.AC-1 | Zero Trust access decisions must account for changing trust and short-lived access in manufacturing. |
Review access assignments against PR.AC-4 and remove entitlements that no longer match business need.
Key terms
- De-provisioning: The controlled removal of access when an identity no longer needs it. In manufacturing, de-provisioning must cover workers, contractors, and administrative identities across every connected system so that a role change or contract end does not leave behind active privileges.
- Segregation of duties: A governance control that prevents one identity from holding conflicting permissions that would let it complete sensitive actions alone. In transformation programmes, SoD controls are especially important because copied legacy roles can silently combine incompatible powers in new environments.
- Elevated access: Access that gives an identity administrative or otherwise high-impact rights over systems, data, or operational processes. Elevated access is risky because it expands the blast radius of mistakes or misuse, and in seasonal environments it is often granted faster than it is later reviewed.
Deepen your knowledge
NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity security are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.
This post draws on content published by Pathlock: How Ready Are Manufacturers to Maintain Access Resilience During Seasonal Peaks? Read the original.
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2026-03-18.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org