Monetized botnets turn forgotten routers into covert criminal relays

At a glance

What this is: This is an analysis of monetized botnets that hijack overlooked connected devices and quietly use them for relay, mining, and DDoS activity.

Why it matters: It matters because IoT and network-device compromise can become a stealthy foothold that bypasses endpoint-centric controls and weakens broader identity and access assumptions around managed infrastructure.

👉 Read ColorTokens' analysis of monetized botnets in routers and IoT devices

Context

Monetized botnets exploit the gap between what organisations monitor closely and what they leave at the edge of the threat surface. Routers, cameras, VoIP phones, and firewalls are often treated as infrastructure rather than assets that need continuous security governance, yet they can provide durable covert access once compromised. In identity terms, these devices also matter because their default credentials, remote management interfaces, and unmanaged access paths create standing trust that attackers can abuse.

The article frames a familiar but under-prioritised problem: attackers do not need to crash systems to extract value from them. They only need enough control to turn them into relays, miners, or launch pads. That makes network-device hygiene, segmentation, and administrative access governance part of the same control problem, not separate operations tasks.

Key questions

Q: What breaks when routers and cameras are left outside normal security governance?

A: When routers and cameras sit outside normal governance, they keep their administrative trust and network reach even after compromise. That lets attackers turn them into relays, miners, or pivot points without disrupting normal operations. The failure is not only technical exposure. It is the absence of lifecycle control over connected device identities and their management paths.

Q: Why do default credentials on network devices increase botnet risk?

A: Default credentials make it easy for attackers to authenticate after they find an exposed interface or known vulnerability. Once inside, they can install backdoors or redirect traffic while the device still appears to function. In practice, the risk rises when organisations leave device administration outside privileged access control and credential rotation discipline.

Q: How do security teams know if a connected device is being abused as a relay?

A: Look for changes in traffic shape, not just outages. Unexpected encrypted connections, unusual high-port egress, or bandwidth patterns that do not match the device’s normal role are strong indicators of abuse. Because the device may still look healthy, detection must focus on behaviour and destination patterns rather than service uptime.

Q: Who is accountable when a forgotten device becomes criminal infrastructure?

A: Accountability usually spans operations, network security, and identity governance because the failure crosses asset ownership, credential management, and segmentation. If the device had unmanaged administrative access or no clear owner, that gap is part of the incident. Frameworks such as NIST CSF and NIST SP 800-53 make ownership and access control auditable obligations, not optional hygiene.

Technical breakdown

How monetized botnets turn network devices into relay infrastructure

Monetized botnets differ from noisy DDoS-heavy botnets because they optimise for persistence and concealment. A compromised router, firewall, or camera can forward attacker traffic through encrypted channels, making attribution difficult while keeping the device apparently functional. The attacker’s value comes from using trusted infrastructure as a disposable relay layer, which can also support proxying, command-and-control, or traffic redirection. Because the device still appears operational, traditional availability monitoring often misses the abuse until traffic patterns or external complaints expose it. In practical terms, this means asset inventory and egress visibility must include network appliances and IoT gear, not just laptops and servers.

Practical implication: classify routers, cameras, and VoIP devices as monitored assets with enforced egress controls and anomaly detection.

Why default credentials and exposed management interfaces matter

Many of these campaigns begin with known vulnerabilities or exposed remote administration paths, then succeed because device access is still governed by weak or default credentials. Once an attacker authenticates, they can install backdoors, miners, or tunnelling tools without needing a full OS compromise. This is an access-control problem as much as a patching problem, because the device’s administrative trust model often assumes a small, stable set of operators. Where that assumption fails, the device becomes a long-lived foothold. For identity teams, the lesson is that device administration, remote management, and credential lifecycle controls belong in the same governance conversation as service-account sprawl and privileged access.

Practical implication: eliminate default credentials, restrict remote administration, and tie device admin access to managed identity and least privilege.

How microsegmentation limits the blast radius of hidden botnet activity

Microsegmentation works by preventing a compromised device from reaching everything else simply because it sits on the same network. That matters for monetized botnets because the device itself may never look obviously broken, yet it can still serve as a springboard for lateral movement or traffic abuse. Segmentation turns a hidden compromise into a contained event by limiting which destinations a router, phone, or camera can contact. This is especially important in mixed environments where operational technology, IoT, and business systems share flat networks. The governance challenge is not only deploying segmentation, but keeping policy aligned with how devices are actually used and updated.

Practical implication: segment connected devices away from critical business workloads and explicitly deny unnecessary east-west and outbound paths.

Threat narrative

Attacker objective: The attacker wants low-visibility revenue generation through proxying, mining, and attack infrastructure that blends into normal network operations.

1. Entry occurs when attackers exploit known vulnerabilities or exposed management services on routers, firewalls, cameras, or VoIP devices.
2. Escalation follows when the attacker installs a custom backdoor or miner and gains durable administrative control over the device.
3. Impact is achieved by using the compromised device as a covert relay, DDoS node, or crypto-mining asset while the organisation remains unaware.

NHI Mgmt Group analysis

Connected device compromise is an identity problem as much as a network problem. Routers, cameras, and VoIP phones are not just endpoints with firmware. They expose administrative identities, default trust relationships, and management planes that attackers can abuse once the organisation stops treating them as governed assets. The practical conclusion is that device identity, credential lifecycle, and admin access controls need the same discipline applied to high-risk service accounts.

Monetized botnets expose the cost of assuming “working” means “safe”. These campaigns succeed because compromised devices often continue functioning normally while quietly relaying traffic or mining cryptocurrency. That creates a dangerous governance blind spot: availability telemetry can look healthy while the security posture is already broken. Practitioners should treat silent abuse as a control failure, not an edge case.

Microsegmentation is now a containment control for unmanaged infrastructure, not just a zero-trust slogan. When connected devices share flat access to business systems, a single compromised router can become a lateral-movement bridge. Segmentation reduces that blast radius, but only if policy includes IoT, network appliances, and operational devices rather than stopping at servers and laptops. The practitioner implication is straightforward: segment the forgotten assets first.

Hidden device abuse sharpens the case for continuous asset discovery and credential governance. If security teams cannot enumerate connected devices, they cannot patch them, rotate their credentials, or restrict their management paths. That is why this problem intersects directly with NHI governance where machine credentials, remote admin tokens, and default secrets are concerned. The field should treat device-level trust as an identity lifecycle issue, not just an operations backlog.

Monetized botnets are a resilience test for flat networks. They reveal whether an enterprise can isolate compromise before it becomes a business continuity issue. Organisations that still rely on perimeter assumptions will continue to miss low-noise device abuse. The correct response is to build containment and visibility around the assets attackers actually target, not the ones teams most often monitor.

What this signals

Connected-device abuse should push security teams toward broader asset governance. If routers, cameras, and VoIP gear are not in the inventory, they are not in the control plane. That makes them attractive to attackers who want quiet persistence, so the next step is to extend segmentation, monitoring, and ownership to every internet-reachable device, not only the systems that already get board attention.

Silently compromised infrastructure creates a governance gap that looks like reliability until it becomes abuse. The practitioner challenge is to stop equating normal service behaviour with low risk. Teams should review whether their control set can detect anomalous outbound traffic, restrict administrative reach, and revoke access paths on non-traditional assets as quickly as they would for a server account.

Device identity and credential lifecycle now sit closer to operational resilience than many programmes assume. If a router or camera can be turned into criminal infrastructure, then unmanaged administrative secrets are not a minor hygiene issue. They become a containment and continuity problem, which means identity governance must extend beyond human users and into the access patterns of connected systems.

For practitioners

• Inventory all connected devices Maintain an authoritative inventory of routers, cameras, VoIP phones, firewalls, and other non-traditional assets so exposed management surfaces do not fall outside patch and monitoring cycles.
• Remove default and shared credentials Replace factory settings with unique administrative credentials and rotate them on a defined schedule, especially for internet-facing management interfaces and remote access paths.
• Disable unnecessary remote management Turn off external administration where it is not required, and require controlled jump paths or approved management networks for the systems that must remain reachable.
• Segment connected devices from critical systems Place IoT and network appliances into separate zones with explicit deny rules for east-west movement and tightly scoped outbound access to reduce relay and pivot opportunities.
• Monitor for covert traffic patterns Flag unexpected encrypted sessions, high-numbered port use, unexplained bandwidth spikes, and anomalous outbound destinations from devices that should not normally generate that behaviour.

Key takeaways

• Monetized botnets rely on quiet compromise, not obvious disruption, which lets attackers profit from devices that still appear to work.
• The scale matters because tens of thousands of infected devices can become relays, miners, and DDoS assets while remaining operationally invisible.
• The most effective limiter is not only patching, but governance over connected-device identity, segmentation, and administrative access.

Key terms

• Monetized Botnet: A monetized botnet is a collection of compromised devices used to generate revenue rather than obvious disruption. Attackers may route traffic, mine cryptocurrency, or sell access to the infrastructure. The compromise can remain hidden because the devices continue to operate normally while serving criminal purposes.
• Relay Infrastructure: Relay infrastructure is compromised equipment that forwards attacker traffic so the original source is harder to trace. Routers, firewalls, and other edge devices are attractive because they already sit between networks and often have trusted connectivity. The abuse is especially dangerous when the device still looks healthy from the outside.
• Microsegmentation: Microsegmentation is a network control that limits how systems can talk to each other based on policy rather than shared location. It is used to shrink blast radius when a device or workload is compromised. In practice, it helps prevent a single infected asset from becoming a pathway to critical systems.
• Shared Device Identity: Identity control on a reused endpoint where multiple people access the same workstation or terminal across a shift. The core challenge is preserving attribution, session separation, and policy enforcement when the device is not tied to one person or one role for the full workday.

What's in the full article

ColorTokens' full blog covers the operational detail this post intentionally leaves for the source:

• Device-specific indicators of compromise for PolarEdge and Gayfemboy that help teams validate exposure.
• Examples of router, camera, and firewall management patterns that show where hidden access paths persist.
• Practical containment guidance for segmenting network appliances without breaking business connectivity.
• Advisory detail on recovery steps for devices that require resets, firmware updates, or special cleanup procedures.

👉 ColorTokens' full post covers the device types, compromise patterns, and containment steps in more operational detail.

Deepen your knowledge

NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme, covers NHI governance, machine identity security, secrets management, and identity lifecycle control. It helps practitioners connect connected-device access governance to broader identity security programmes.