By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamBased on Keeper Security: “Top 7 Privileged Access Management Solutions” (September 10, 2025)

TL;DR: Tool sprawl and deployment complexity are now governance problems as much as technology ones, as 68% of IT leaders believe their current PAM stack includes features they rarely use, according to Keeper Security. The practical lesson is that privilege control must be simpler, cloud-aware, and easier to operate than many legacy PAM models allow.


At a glance

What this is: Keeper Security’s comparison of seven PAM platforms argues that feature-heavy, complex deployments are pushing teams toward cloud-native access models with simpler operations and clearer core controls.

Why it matters: For IAM and PAM practitioners, the issue is not just vendor preference but whether privileged access can be governed at scale across cloud, hybrid and DevOps environments without adding unmanaged operational burden.

By the numbers:

  • 68% of IT leaders say their current PAM solution includes unnecessary features they rarely use.
  • KeeperPAM is priced at $85 per user/month, with a minimum of 5 users.
  • StrongDM Essentials starts at $70 per user/month, billed annually.

Context

Privileged access management is now being judged against the environment it has to serve, not just against a feature checklist. In cloud-first, hybrid and DevOps-heavy estates, the question is whether privileged access controls remain usable, governable and scalable enough to keep pace with operational reality.

This article frames PAM complexity as a practical adoption problem. The central tension is that platforms can accumulate vaulting, session control, secrets management and endpoint privilege features faster than teams can operationalise them, which turns access governance into a deployment and maintenance burden.

That makes simplification a security issue, not just a procurement preference. When teams cannot consistently deploy and use privileged access tooling, least privilege, session oversight and credential handling all become harder to sustain in practice.


Key questions

Q: How should teams decide whether a PAM platform is too complex to operate safely?

A: Teams should judge PAM complexity by how consistently the platform can be deployed, administered and used across the environments it must protect. If routine controls such as session recording, JIT access or rotation depend on specialist effort, extra infrastructure or separate workflows, the control is likely too hard to sustain at scale.

Q: Why do fragmented PAM workflows increase access risk?

A: Fragmented workflows split entitlement data, session evidence, and approval records across tools, which makes it hard to know who has access and for how long. That fragmentation increases the chance that standing privilege survives unnoticed and that reviews miss critical exceptions.

Q: What are the signs that a PAM programme is becoming shelfware?

A: Common signs include separate login paths for different privileged tasks, repeated professional-services dependency, limited use of advanced features, and administrators bypassing the platform for speed. When the security team avoids the tool for ordinary work, PAM has become a governance burden rather than an access-control layer.

Q: What should organisations prioritise when moving to cloud-native privileged access?

A: They should prioritise simplicity, identity-provider integration, JIT access, session logging and low-friction deployment over broad feature sets that require dedicated maintenance. Cloud-native privilege control only works when it fits the operating model of hybrid, DevOps and multi-cloud environments instead of forcing those environments to adapt to the tool.


Technical breakdown

Why feature-heavy PAM stacks create governance drag

PAM platforms often start with core controls such as vaulting, session recording and credential rotation, then accrete modules for secrets, endpoint privilege and third-party access. The technical problem is not feature count alone, but the operational coupling between modules, interfaces and deployment dependencies. When those parts are split across appliances, services or separate products, teams spend more effort maintaining the control plane than governing access. That creates a hidden compliance risk: controls exist on paper but are too fragmented to be used consistently across environments.

Practical implication: assess whether the PAM architecture reduces operational friction or merely relocates it into integration and maintenance work.

Cloud-native PAM versus appliance-based access control

Cloud-native PAM shifts the privileged access workflow toward proxies, agentless connectivity, identity provider integrations and ephemeral credentials. Appliance-based models can still provide strong control, but they often depend on heavier infrastructure and more bespoke administration. For modern hybrid estates, the architectural issue is whether the platform can issue, monitor and revoke privileged access without forcing a separate operational stack for every environment. That distinction matters because the more infrastructure the PAM layer requires, the more likely teams are to underuse it for routine access decisions.

Practical implication: map each privileged access path to the smallest architecture that can still enforce policy and record sessions.

Where JIT access and credential rotation fit in modern PAM

Just-in-time access and automated rotation are important because they reduce standing privilege and shrink the exposure window for privileged credentials. But these controls only help when they are woven into the daily operating model rather than treated as optional add-ons. In complex environments, teams often retain static workflows for some systems and dynamic workflows for others, which creates inconsistent enforcement. The result is that the strongest control is reserved for the cleanest environment, not the riskiest one.

Practical implication: design JIT access and rotation as default operating patterns for high-risk accounts, not as special-case exceptions.


Threat narrative

Attacker objective: The attacker objective is to reach privileged systems through access paths that governance teams believe are controlled but have not operationalised consistently.

  1. Entry begins when privileged access tooling is adopted faster than the team can standardise its operating model, leaving some access paths governed and others effectively manual.
  2. Credential access becomes easier to miss when vaulting, rotation, session control and endpoint privilege live in separate components with different workflows and administrative overhead.
  3. Escalation occurs when unused features and fragmented deployment models create blind spots that keep standing privilege or weak workflows in place across cloud and hybrid systems.
  4. Impact is broader unauthorized access exposure and a governance gap where privileged access exists, but the organisation cannot consistently prove or enforce how it is controlled.
  • Azure Key Vault Contributor escalation 2024: Datadog found Azure Key Vault Contributor could add itself to access policies and read every secret, key and certificate in a vault.
  • BeyondTrust breach 2024: A stolen BeyondTrust Remote Support API key let a China state-sponsored actor reset accounts and reach US Treasury workstations in 2024.

Read and download The State of NHI & AI Agent Breach Report 2026, covering 200+ breaches impacting Non-Human Identities including AI Agents.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

Feature sprawl has become a PAM governance problem, not just a buying problem: When platforms accumulate modules faster than teams can operate them, privileged access controls stop behaving like controls and start behaving like shelfware. The real risk is not that every feature is unused, but that teams cannot consistently apply the features that matter most. In practice, governance quality collapses when operational simplicity is missing.

Cloud-native PAM is winning on operability because privileged access is now an environment problem: Hybrid estates, DevOps pipelines and distributed admin workflows reward access models that fit the way work is actually done. Appliance-heavy designs can still be secure, but they create a larger burden for rollout, maintenance and standardisation. Practitioners should treat deployment friction as an access-control risk factor, not a mere IT inconvenience.

Least privilege fails when the control cannot be sustained across every execution path: Privilege should not depend on whether an account lives in a vault, an appliance workflow, a proxy or a separate secrets product. The more paths teams need to remember, the more likely standing privilege and manual exceptions persist. That is why access governance has to favour the smallest number of enforceable paths, not the largest feature catalogue.

Consistent privilege control now depends on architecture, not just policy: A policy that says 'use JIT' means little if the tooling makes JIT awkward for some systems and easy for others. The category is moving toward models that align enforcement with daily operations, which suggests the market is favouring simpler, more cloud-aware privilege governance. Practitioners should expect procurement to shift from capability checklists to operational fit.

Identity blast radius: The meaningful question is no longer how many privileged features a platform offers, but how far access can spread when governance breaks down. Once teams cannot see, record and revoke access consistently, the blast radius is defined by the weakest workflow, not the strongest control. That is the right lens for evaluating PAM sprawl across cloud and hybrid estates.

From our research library:

What this signals

Privilege control now has an operability threshold: Once PAM workflows become too fragmented to use consistently, policy quality stops mattering because enforcement is no longer dependable. The operational question is whether teams can actually sustain vaulting, session oversight and JIT access across the environments they run.

Cloud-native access models are shifting the decision point left: The most useful evaluation question is not whether a platform can do everything, but whether it makes the right things easier to adopt repeatedly. In practice, that means deployment friction, workflow consistency and integration burden should be treated as first-order security criteria.

Identity blast radius matters more than feature breadth: A platform that reduces access sprawl, simplifies review and keeps privilege paths predictable will usually outperform one that forces administrators to navigate multiple overlapping components. For teams with hybrid and multi-cloud estates, the architecture has to reduce the distance between policy and execution.


For practitioners

  • Audit feature-to-usage gaps Inventory the PAM capabilities you own, then identify which ones are rarely used, operationally duplicated or blocked by deployment friction. The goal is to separate indispensable privilege controls from features that add complexity without improving governance.
  • Standardise around the core privilege paths Reduce the number of workflows used for vaulting, session control, secrets management and JIT access so administrators are not forced to learn a different operating model for each environment. The more consistent the privilege path, the easier it is to enforce least privilege.
  • Prioritise cloud-aware access models For hybrid and cloud-first estates, choose access patterns that minimise appliances, manual handoffs and separate operational stacks. Cloud-aware PAM should make policy enforcement and session oversight easier, not add a second control plane to manage.
  • Treat JIT and rotation as default controls Use just-in-time access and automated credential rotation as baseline controls for privileged accounts that touch high-risk infrastructure, rather than as optional enhancements. If a control is too cumbersome to use routinely, it will not reduce standing privilege at scale.
  • Rework procurement around operability metrics Measure deployment time, workflow consistency, administrative overhead and integration effort alongside security features when evaluating PAM tools. Procurement decisions should favour the platform your team can actually operate every day, not the one with the longest feature list.

Key takeaways

  • PAM complexity becomes a governance issue when teams cannot operate the controls they buy consistently across cloud, hybrid and DevOps environments.
  • The article’s core evidence is that 68% of IT leaders say their current PAM solution includes unnecessary features they rarely use.
  • For practitioners, the decisive question is whether a PAM model reduces operational friction enough to make least privilege, JIT access and session oversight sustainable.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and MITRE ATT&CK address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHIThe article centers on excessive privilege and broad access in PAM workflows.
NHI-07 — Long-Lived SecretsThe discussion highlights rotation and vaulting as controls against persistent credentials.
Recommendation — Reduce standing privilege by enforcing least-privilege access paths for privileged accounts. Shorten secret lifetimes and automate rotation where privileged credentials are exposed to routine use.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-05 — Access Permissions, Entitlements and AuthorizationsPAM selection is framed around how access permissions are issued and sustained across environments.
Recommendation — Align privileged access workflows to PR.AA-05 so entitlements stay reviewable and enforceable.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5IA-5 — Authenticator ManagementCredential vaulting and rotation are central to the article's PAM control discussion.
Recommendation — Apply IA-5 to manage privileged authenticators and rotate them as part of normal operations.
MITRE ATT&CKTA0006;TA0008 — Credential Access; Lateral MovementThe article's PAM focus maps directly to credential exposure and movement through privileged paths.
Recommendation — Map PAM gaps to credential access and lateral movement tactics to prioritise the highest-risk workflows.

Key terms

  • Privilege Access Management: Privilege Access Management is the discipline of controlling and monitoring elevated access to critical systems and data. It governs how privileged accounts, credentials, sessions, and commands are issued, used, recorded, and revoked, so administrative power is limited, traceable, and aligned to policy, risk, and operational need.
  • Just-in-Time Access Request: Just-in-Time Access Request is a pattern that grants access only when it is needed and only for the duration required. It reduces standing privilege by making access temporary, policy driven, and task scoped. This approach is especially useful for contractors, sensitive systems, and short-lived operational work.
  • Cloud-native access model: A cloud-native access model is a privileged access design built to work with cloud services, identity providers and distributed infrastructure rather than around heavyweight appliances. Its value comes from making access control easier to deploy, operate and scale in fast-changing environments.
  • Session Recording: Session recording is the capture of user activity during a privileged session, such as commands, queries, or administrative actions. It gives security and audit teams a verifiable record of what happened after authentication, which is essential when access itself is not enough to prove control.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on June 23, 2026.
Updated on October 11, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org