TL;DR: PAM vendors are being judged on AI-driven privilege controls, runtime analysis, and integration depth across human, machine, and AI identities, according to Delinea’s Frost Radar recognition from Frost & Sullivan. The strategic issue for identity teams is no longer vaulting alone but whether privilege governance can keep pace with continuously changing actors and access paths.
At a glance
What this is: This is an analysis of Delinea’s Frost Radar recognition for PAM 2026 and the market shift toward AI-era privilege control across human, machine, and AI identities.
Why it matters: It matters because PAM teams are being pushed to govern privilege as a continuous runtime problem, not just a vaulting or session-monitoring problem, across NHI, autonomous, and human access patterns.
Context
Delinea’s latest Frost Radar recognition lands in a PAM market that is no longer judged only on vaulting, session monitoring, or MFA enforcement. The primary governance problem is broader: privilege now spans human users, machine identities, and AI agents, which means static access models and isolated control planes can miss how access changes during execution.
The article positions AI-driven privilege controls, integration depth, and runtime analysis as the differentiators that matter in hybrid environments. For IAM and PAM teams, the relevant question is not whether a platform can store credentials, but whether privilege governance can follow identity behaviour as access paths expand across cloud, on-premises, and agentic systems.
Key questions
Q: How can teams govern machine identities and AI agents in access reviews?
A: Teams should assign ownership, define review cadence, and include machine identities and AI agents in the same certification logic as human access, but with role-appropriate approvers. If a non-human identity can act on sensitive data, it needs a lifecycle owner and a removal path just like any other privileged account.
Q: Why does privilege management need to move beyond vaulting in hybrid environments?
A: Vaulting protects secrets, but it does not govern how privilege behaves after access is issued. Hybrid environments add more places for identity state to drift, so the control plane has to monitor sessions, enforce policy in context, and share risk signals with adjacent security tools.
Q: What signs show that a PAM programme is too static for AI-era privilege control?
A: Common signs include periodic reviews that do not match execution-time access, isolated session logs that never reach other tools, and persistent exceptions for workloads or agents. When privilege is only understood after the fact, the programme is reacting to state instead of governing it.
Q: What should identity teams re-evaluate after market consolidation in PAM?
A: They should re-evaluate whether they are buying isolated features or a control plane that can govern privilege across identity types and toolchains. Consolidation tends to reward platforms that reduce operational fragmentation, so teams need to check where their current architecture still depends on manual joins.
Technical breakdown
Why static privilege models break down in AI-era environments
Classic PAM was designed around stable subjects: a human admin, a service account, or a vaulted secret with a clear owner. That model weakens when privilege is dynamic, identity boundaries blur, and access decisions happen continuously during a session. The article points to just-in-time access, continuous discovery, and runtime analysis because those controls are trying to keep pace with actors whose privilege state changes faster than a periodic review cycle can capture. In practice, the mechanism that matters is not storage alone but issuance, monitoring, and revocation in context.
Practical implication: Treat privilege as a runtime state, not a static entitlement, and evaluate whether your PAM controls can observe and adjust access while work is happening.
How AI-driven privilege controls change PAM operating assumptions
AI-driven privilege controls add analysis and decision support to what used to be mostly administrative enforcement. The article describes real-time session analysis, anomaly detection, and AI agent discovery as part of the platform’s direction, which signals a shift from vault management toward behavioural governance. For practitioners, that matters because AI agents and other non-human identities can request access, use tools, and trigger downstream actions in ways that do not map neatly to human approval workflows. The core technical issue is whether the control plane can see identity context quickly enough to govern action at runtime.
Practical implication: Map which privilege decisions now depend on runtime signals rather than pre-approved roles or scheduled reviews.
Why integration depth is now part of privilege governance
The article highlights bidirectional identity risk signal sharing across more than 600 prebuilt integrations and more than 145 vendors. That is not just an ecosystem metric. It reflects a technical requirement: PAM cannot operate as a closed vault if it is expected to feed SIEM, SOAR, IGA, CIEM, and endpoint workflows with current identity risk signals. In hybrid environments, privilege governance increasingly depends on whether detection, context, and remediation can move across systems without manual stitching. The architecture challenge is orchestration across identity and security domains, not just access storage.
Practical implication: Assess whether your PAM stack can exchange identity risk signals with the rest of the security toolchain without creating manual handoffs.
NHI Mgmt Group analysis
AI-era PAM is becoming a runtime governance discipline, not a credential repository discipline. The article’s market signal is that the useful boundary of PAM has moved from vaulting to continuous privilege control across humans, workloads, and AI agents. That shift matters because the control point is now execution-time behaviour, not only secret custody. For practitioners, the implication is that PAM roadmaps should be measured by runtime visibility and decision speed, not by how much credential inventory they centralise.
Identity control plane: the market is rewarding platforms that can connect discovery, enforcement, and analytics across changing identity types. Delinea’s Frost Radar placement reflects a broader consolidation pattern in which buyers want fewer privilege silos and more operational continuity across IAM, IGA, CIEM, SIEM, and PAM. That is a market response to access paths that no longer sit cleanly inside one control domain. Practitioners should expect evaluation criteria to shift toward cross-domain signal sharing and policy consistency.
Zero standing privilege is becoming a baseline expectation for machine and AI access, not a special case for administrators. The article ties its roadmap to continuous discovery, ephemeral access, and agentic AI access governance, which shows where the category is heading. That means persistent privilege is increasingly hard to justify in environments where identity behaviour changes mid-task. Teams should treat standing access as an exception that must be actively defended, not a default to be tolerated.
The governance question is changing from who has access to what to how long access remains valid while work is being done. That is the practical consequence of privilege extending to machine identities and AI agents. Traditional reviews assume a person or account can be recertified after the fact, but runtime systems make that too slow for many access paths. The implication is that identity governance will be judged on issuance-time control and continuous enforcement, not only on periodic certification.
Platform depth matters now because privilege risk is no longer isolated. The article shows a market preference for platforms that combine JIT, session monitoring, anomaly detection, and ecosystem integration. This is less about feature accumulation than about reducing the number of places where privilege can drift out of policy. Practitioners should expect procurement to favour control planes that can show how access is discovered, granted, monitored, and revoked across the full identity lifecycle.
From our research library:
- 97% of NHIs carry excessive privileges, increasing unauthorised access and broadening the attack surface, according to the Ultimate Guide to NHIs.
- 49% of IT professionals would prioritise improving privileged access management if the decision were theirs alone, according to Netwrix's 2023 Hybrid Security Trends Report.
- Read next: Just-in-Time Access and Zero Standing Privilege Guide
What this signals
Identity control is moving toward continuous enforcement. PAM teams should expect evaluation criteria to centre on whether the platform can see, issue, and withdraw privilege as work happens, especially when access is used by workloads or AI-driven systems. Static entitlement reviews alone will not describe real exposure in these environments.
Privilege governance is becoming a cross-domain orchestration problem. The useful signal is no longer whether the vault exists, but whether session, detection, and response tooling can share identity context in time to influence the next action. That pushes PAM closer to the centre of broader identity security architecture.
Zero standing privilege is now a design baseline for machine-era access. When access is temporary and contextual, persistent privilege starts to look like technical debt. The programme question shifts to where standing access still exists and whether it is genuinely necessary.
For practitioners
- Audit privilege coverage across human, machine, and AI identities Check whether your current PAM programme explicitly covers non-human and agentic access, not just human administrators. Document where privilege is still assumed to belong to a person so you can see where review, approval, and monitoring gaps begin.
- Evaluate runtime controls over vault-centric controls Compare your current stack on just-in-time issuance, session visibility, and revocation at execution time. If the programme depends mainly on vaulted secrets and periodic certification, it is likely to miss access changes that happen during task execution.
- Test identity signal sharing across security tools Verify that PAM events can flow into SIEM, SOAR, IGA, CIEM, and endpoint workflows without manual rekeying or report export. The objective is to make access decisions and response actions follow the same identity signal across systems.
Key takeaways
- PAM market consolidation is pushing buyers toward platforms that can govern privilege at runtime across human, machine, and AI identities.
- The article’s signal is architectural as much as commercial: privilege control is being measured by continuous enforcement, ecosystem integration, and execution-time visibility.
- Identity teams should re-check where their PAM model still depends on vaulted secrets and periodic review instead of live access control.
Standards & Framework Alignment
This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 and MITRE ATT&CK address the attack and risk surface, while NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 sets the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.
| Framework | Control / Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 | NHI-05 — Overprivileged NHI | The article centres on privilege control across machine and AI identities, where excessive access remains the core risk. |
| NHI-07 — Long-Lived Secrets | The article’s move toward JIT and ephemeral access directly addresses the risk of durable credentials in hybrid environments. | |
| NHI-10 — Human Use of NHI | The article spans human, machine, and AI identities, making misuse or overextension of NHI controls relevant. | |
| Recommendation — Audit non-human privilege scope and remove any standing access that is not required for runtime execution. Replace long-lived credentials with ephemeral access paths and track where secrets still outlive the task. Separate human administrative workflows from non-human access paths and enforce distinct governance for each. | ||
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | IA-5 — Authenticator Management | The article discusses credential vaulting, JIT access, and runtime authorization, all of which depend on authenticator lifecycle control. |
| Recommendation — Apply authenticator lifecycle controls so privileged credentials can be issued, monitored, rotated, and revoked on demand. | ||
| MITRE ATT&CK | TA0006;TA0008 — Credential Access; Lateral Movement | PAM reduces the impact of credential abuse and movement across hybrid identity environments. |
| Recommendation — Map privileged access gaps to credential access and lateral movement techniques in your detection and response pipeline. | ||
Key terms
- Runtime Privilege: Runtime privilege is the effective access an identity has after tools, data sources, and permissions are combined during execution. For AI agents, it can exceed the originally approved scope because the agent may chain actions across systems in ways no single entitlement review reveals.
- Zero Standing Privilege: A control model in which an identity does not keep persistent access unless it is actively needed. For NHIs, this means credentials and permissions are issued for a narrow task and then removed. It reduces the time window and reuse value of stolen access.
- Identity Control Plane: An identity control plane is the governance layer that decides who or what can access systems and under what conditions. In practice, it coordinates authentication, authorization, privilege review, and lifecycle management across human and machine identities so access policy is enforced consistently across environments.
- Ephemeral Access: Ephemeral access is permission that exists only for the duration of a specific task or session. For agents, it reduces the lifetime of credentials and limits blast radius if a workflow is abused or misrouted. The control is only effective when issuance, expiry, and revocation are enforced automatically.
Deepen your knowledge
NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity lifecycle are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are building or maturing an IAM programme, it is worth exploring.
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on June 20, 2026.
Updated on October 10, 2026.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org