By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamPublished 2025-09-15Domain: Governance & RiskSource: Zluri

TL;DR: IGA approaches differ sharply, with one leaning into identity governance, PAM convergence, and zero trust, while the other emphasizes lifecycle management, authentication, and scale across large enterprise estates, according to Zluri’s comparison. The real decision is not feature breadth alone, but which control model fits your access review, certification, and least-privilege priorities.


At a glance

What this is: This is a vendor comparison of Saviynt and ForgeRock that frames IGA selection around governance, authentication, lifecycle, and zero-trust controls.

Why it matters: It matters because identity teams still need to decide whether their programme is optimising for access governance, user lifecycle control, or broader IAM coverage across human and non-human identities.

By the numbers:

👉 Read Zluri's comparison of Saviynt and ForgeRock for IGA selection


Context

IGA platform selection is usually treated as a feature comparison, but the real issue is governance fit: how access is governed, reviewed, certified, and removed across the identity lifecycle. In this article, the primary keyword is identity governance and administration, and the practical question is which control model better supports least privilege, certification, and access decisioning at scale.

That distinction matters because IGA programmes rarely fail on one missing feature alone. They fail when access review, onboarding, privileged access, and policy enforcement are split across tools that do not align with how the organisation actually governs human users, service accounts, and other non-human identities.


Key questions

Q: How should organisations choose between IGA platforms with similar feature lists?

A: They should start with the governance outcome they need most, then test whether the platform actually enforces it across the full identity lifecycle. If access review, certification, provisioning, and deprovisioning do not line up, a rich feature list will not prevent entitlement drift or excess privilege.

Q: When does just-in-time access add more value than broader role-based access?

A: JIT adds the most value when standing privilege is the main exposure and access is only needed for short, task-specific work. If the platform cannot shorten duration, scope, and review friction together, JIT becomes a naming convention rather than a real control improvement.

Q: What do teams get wrong when they treat zero trust as an IGA feature?

A: They often treat zero trust as a label instead of a control model. In practice, the key question is whether the platform continuously validates access, reduces privilege persistence, and supports timely removal when the risk or role changes.

Q: Who should own recertification and access review decisions in an IGA programme?

A: Ownership should sit with the business and application context, while identity teams provide the workflow, evidence, and enforcement. That separation keeps review decisions tied to real access need rather than letting technical teams approve entitlements without operational accountability.


Technical breakdown

Identity governance and administration versus access management

IGA and IAM are related but not interchangeable. IGA focuses on who should have access, who approves it, how often it is reviewed, and when it should be removed. IAM focuses more on authentication, federation, and runtime access enforcement. In practice, tool selection becomes difficult when vendors blend these functions into one narrative. The operational question is whether the platform can continuously reconcile entitlements, lifecycle changes, and approval evidence without turning governance into a manual spreadsheet exercise.

Practical implication: Use a control-first evaluation model so governance capabilities are measured separately from login and authentication features.

Zero trust, just-in-time access, and standing privilege reduction

The article repeatedly points to zero trust, JIT access, adaptive policies, and privilege clipping. These controls all aim to reduce standing privilege, but they work differently. JIT lowers exposure by time-boxing access, while adaptive policy adds context to decisions and continuous monitoring checks whether the access still fits the risk posture. The important architectural point is that least privilege is not a single permission model. It is the combination of entitlement scope, duration, monitoring, and revocation.

Practical implication: Assess whether the platform actually shortens access lifetime and reduces privilege scope, rather than merely documenting those intentions.

Lifecycle management and certification at enterprise scale

Lifecycle management becomes the real test once an organisation has thousands of apps and millions of entitlements. The question is not whether a platform supports onboarding, access requests, and periodic certification in theory. It is whether those flows can be applied consistently enough to produce reliable review evidence and timely removals. In large estates, the control failure is usually drift between role assignment, actual usage, and recertification outcomes, especially when business change outpaces governance cadence.

Practical implication: Prioritise platforms that can automate certification, deprovisioning, and entitlement reconciliation across a large application estate.


Threat narrative

Attacker objective: The objective is to obtain and retain access that should have been reduced, reviewed, or removed, enabling misuse of application data or administrative privileges.

  1. Entry occurs through excessive or poorly governed access rather than a single exploit, with the article emphasising onboarding, authentication, and entitlement assignment as the first control boundary.
  2. Escalation happens when standing privilege, overbroad roles, or weak certification processes allow users to retain access beyond what their job requires.
  3. Impact follows when access is not removed or clipped in time, leaving sensitive SaaS data, administrative functions, or compliance evidence exposed to misuse.
  • Cisco DevHub NHI breach — IntelBroker exploited exposed Cisco credentials, API tokens and keys in DevHub.
  • Sisense breach — unauthorized GitLab access led to exfiltration of access tokens, API keys and certificates.

Read our 52 NHI Breaches Analysis report for a comprehensive view of breaches impacting Non-Human Identities including AI Agents.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

IGA decisions are really governance-design decisions, not product-feature decisions. The article frames Saviynt and ForgeRock as different answers to the same operational problem, but the deeper issue is whether the organisation wants governance, authentication, or lifecycle orchestration to sit at the centre of its identity programme. That matters because the control plane you privilege determines how quickly access drift is detected and corrected. Practitioners should evaluate the governance model before they evaluate the feature list.

Standing privilege remains the real risk signal, even when the vendor language shifts to zero trust. The comparison makes heavy use of JIT access, adaptive policy, and continuous monitoring, but those are only meaningful if they materially reduce persistent privilege and shorten the time access exists outside of review. If entitlement scope and duration do not change, the platform is mostly rebranding access control. Practitioners should measure whether the platform reduces standing access, not whether it sounds modern.

Lifecycle scale is the differentiator that matters once access volume becomes operationally painful. ForgeRock’s large-entitlement claims and Zluri’s access discovery emphasis point to a common programme reality: governance breaks when the entitlement base outgrows human review capacity. That is where automated certification, onboarding, and deprovisioning become governance controls rather than administrative convenience. Practitioners should align the platform to the size and churn of their estate, not the depth of its marketing matrix.

Role-appropriate access is only useful when the organisation can prove it is still appropriate later. The article treats role-based assignment as a provisioning success, but the harder test is whether the same platform can confirm that access remained justified after job changes, app growth, and exceptions. That is why access review evidence, audit trails, and recertification cadence are the governance artifacts that matter. Practitioners should demand proof of persistence, not just proof of initial approval.

From our research:

  • Only 1.5 out of 10 organisations are highly confident in their ability to secure NHIs, compared to nearly 1 in 4 for securing human identities, according to The State of Non-Human Identity Security.
  • The same research found that 85% of organisations lack full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, showing how governance gaps often begin with incomplete access discovery.
  • That visibility problem is why practitioners should also review Ultimate Guide to NHIs , Key Challenges and Risks when aligning lifecycle, access review, and privilege controls.

What this signals

Zero trust language is no substitute for entitlement evidence. As IGA platforms converge with PAM, certification, and policy automation, the programme signal to watch is whether the organisation can prove privilege reduction rather than merely describe it. That is especially relevant when access decisions span human users and NHI-style service identities, because the governance logic must survive scale, churn, and exception handling.

Role assignment without later recertification creates identity debt. The operational risk is not the first grant, but the accumulation of access that remains technically valid after the business justification has changed. Teams should expect more scrutiny on whether their review cadence, removal workflow, and audit trail can demonstrate continuous governance across the full entitlement lifecycle.

Access review effectiveness depends on discovery quality before certification starts. If the organisation cannot see who has what access across SaaS and connected systems, certification becomes symbolic. That is why the combination of discovery, review evidence, and revocation traceability matters more than any single IGA feature.


For practitioners

  • Separate governance from authentication in your shortlist. Score IGA, IAM, certification, and lifecycle controls independently so the platform choice reflects the actual programme gap rather than a blended feature narrative.
  • Test standing-privilege reduction against real access histories. Use historical entitlements, admin assignments, and certification results to see whether the platform truly reduces persistent access or only documents it.
  • Validate lifecycle automation across joiner, mover, and leaver cases. Check whether onboarding, access modification, and offboarding can be executed consistently for high-volume application estates without manual exception handling.
  • Review evidence quality before accepting zero trust claims. Look for audit trails, access review outputs, and revocation evidence that demonstrate control execution rather than policy declarations.

Key takeaways

  • IGA tool choice is fundamentally a governance model choice, not a checkbox comparison of product features.
  • The strongest control signal in the comparison is whether the platform actually reduces standing privilege and access drift.
  • At enterprise scale, lifecycle automation and review evidence matter more than how many identity functions the platform claims to cover.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST CSF 2.0 and NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-03Access rotation and standing privilege reduction are central to the comparison.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AC-4The post centres on least-privilege entitlement governance and review.
NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207)AC-6Zero trust and JIT access are discussed as governance and access enforcement patterns.

Apply AC-6 to ensure access is continuously validated and narrowed to the minimum required scope.


Key terms

  • Identity Governance And Administration: Identity Governance and Administration is the control discipline for deciding who should have access, approving that access, reviewing it over time, and removing it when it is no longer justified. It turns identity policy into evidence, workflows, and auditability across the access lifecycle.
  • Standing Privilege: Standing privilege is access that remains continuously available instead of being provisioned only when needed. It increases exposure because the entitlement can be abused long after the original business need has passed, especially when reviews are slow or incomplete.
  • Just-In-Time Access: Just-in-time access is a provisioning pattern that grants privileged access only for the duration of a specific task. In mature programmes it reduces persistent exposure, but only if the platform can time-box access, capture evidence, and revoke it reliably after use.
  • Recertification: Recertification is the periodic review of whether an entitlement is still appropriate for the identity that holds it. It is a governance control, not a checkbox, and it only works when reviewers have enough context to judge real business need and revoke stale access.

Deepen your knowledge

NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity lifecycle are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.

This post draws on content published by Zluri: Security & Compliance Saviynt Vs. ForgeRock: Which IGA Tool To Choose? Read the original.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2025-09-15.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org