By NHI Mgmt Group Editorial TeamPublished 2025-11-17Domain: Governance & RiskSource: Imprivata

TL;DR: Zero Trust programmes can still leave a major gap when vendor and contractor access is not governed consistently, with only 36% of health IT leaders saying privileged access strategy is applied enterprise-wide, according to Imprivata and the Ponemon Institute. The control model is incomplete until third-party identities are brought into the same verification, least-privilege, and review discipline as internal users.


At a glance

What this is: This is an analysis of why Zero Trust architectures weaken when vendor access is not governed with the same rigor as internal access.

Why it matters: It matters because third-party identities often bypass the controls IAM, PAM, and security teams assume are already covering privileged access, contractor access, and remote entry paths.

By the numbers:

👉 Read Imprivata's analysis of why vendor access gaps weaken Zero Trust


Context

Vendor access is a zero trust problem when third-party users can reach sensitive systems without being held to the same identity controls as employees. Zero Trust depends on continuous verification, least privilege, and explicit authorization, but those principles break down if contractors, suppliers, and support partners sit outside the governance model.

The practical issue for IAM and PAM teams is not whether Zero Trust exists in policy. It is whether privileged access, MFA, credential vaulting, and session controls are applied consistently across all identities that can touch production systems, including external vendors. In many environments, that is where the architecture stops being comprehensive and starts becoming partial.


Key questions

Q: How should security teams govern vendor access in a zero trust environment?

A: Security teams should treat vendor access as part of the core zero trust policy, not as a separate exception process. That means MFA, least privilege, session monitoring, approval workflows, and entitlement review must all apply to contractors, suppliers, and support partners wherever they can reach production systems.

Q: Why does vendor access weaken zero trust programmes in practice?

A: Vendor access weakens Zero Trust when it is managed through separate onboarding paths, broader privileges, or lighter review than internal access. The architecture then verifies some identities continuously while leaving others on a weaker control plane, which creates inconsistent enforcement and larger attack surfaces.

Q: What do organisations get wrong about privileged access for third parties?

A: Organisations often assume privileged access controls only need to cover employees or permanent administrators. In reality, external identities can reach the same systems and should be governed with the same rigor, including vaulting, short-lived elevation, logging, and recertification of access scope.

Q: How do you know if zero trust is actually covering vendor access?

A: You know Zero Trust is covering vendor access when third-party identities follow the same approval, session recording, and entitlement review process as internal privileged users. If vendors still use separate support channels or standing access exceptions, the programme is only partially enforced.


Technical breakdown

Why vendor access breaks zero trust enforcement

Zero Trust only works when every session is authenticated, authorized, and continuously re-evaluated against context. Vendor access often enters through separate onboarding paths, remote support tools, or exception-based privileged workflows that are treated as operationally necessary rather than security-governed. That creates a parallel access plane with weaker approval, shorter review cycles, and inconsistent logging. Once a contractor or supplier account is allowed to bypass standard enterprise controls, the architecture no longer enforces a single trust policy. It enforces two, one for internal identities and one for everyone else.

Practical implication: bring vendor identities into the same policy, approval, and session-monitoring stack as internal privileged users.

How privileged access strategy and PAM fit into zero trust

A privileged access strategy defines who can reach high-risk systems, under what conditions, and with what level of session oversight. In Zero Trust environments, PAM and vendor privileged access management turn that policy into operational control by reducing standing privilege, vaulting credentials, and constraining elevation to specific tasks. The weakness appears when privileged access is managed well for employees but not extended to third parties. In that case, the trust boundary is drawn around employment status instead of risk. Security may look mature on paper while the most exposed accounts remain only partially governed.

Practical implication: unify PAM rules, vaulting, and elevation workflows so third-party access is not treated as an exception class.

Why MFA and least privilege are necessary but not sufficient

MFA reduces credential replay risk, and least privilege reduces blast radius, but neither control is complete if access rights are too broad or never revisited. Vendor accounts often need temporary, task-specific reach, which makes them especially sensitive to over-permissioning and stale approvals. If remote access tooling does not enforce real-time identity verification and granular authorization, the organization preserves convenience at the expense of control. Zero Trust is therefore not only about authenticating the user at login. It is about continuously shrinking what that user can do once inside.

Practical implication: pair MFA with scoped entitlements, short-lived elevation, and periodic review of every third-party access path.


NHI Mgmt Group analysis

Vendor access is the missing trust boundary in many Zero Trust programmes. The architecture is often designed around internal users, while third-party identities are handled through exceptions, shared support pathways, or separate tooling. That leaves a structural gap between policy intent and operational enforcement. Practitioners should treat external access as part of the core trust model, not as an edge case.

Privileged access strategy is only credible when it covers suppliers, contractors, and support partners. The article’s 36% figure signals that enterprise-wide consistency is still weak, even where Zero Trust language is common. If privileged access is not applied uniformly, the organisation is protecting the wrong boundary. The implication is that governance has to be identity-wide, not employment-wide.

Zero trust controls lose force when access is granted for convenience rather than session risk. Vendor support often depends on rapid access and operational continuity, but those needs do not justify standing privilege or broad remote reach. MFA, vaults, and least privilege matter, but only when they are enforced for every external identity with production access. Practitioners should assume the control gap is in exception handling, not in the framework itself.

Third-party access creates the same governance burden as internal privileged access, but with weaker ownership. Contractors and vendors may not sit inside the same joiner-mover-leaver discipline, yet they can still reach the same sensitive systems. That makes access review, offboarding, and entitlement scope more fragile. The implication for IAM and PAM teams is to treat external identity governance as a first-class operating requirement.

Zero Trust is becoming the control language, but not yet the control reality for vendor identities. The market has moved toward continuous verification, yet many programmes still stop at internal users and endpoints. That mismatch is where exposure accumulates. The practical conclusion is that mature Zero Trust must be measured by the treatment of third-party access, not by policy documentation.

From our research:

What this signals

Vendor access should now be measured as a trust-boundary problem, not an IT convenience problem. If Zero Trust stops at the employee perimeter, it leaves the most operationally sensitive identities partially governed. The governance question is whether third-party access is being reviewed with the same rigor as privileged internal access, or whether exceptions have become the norm.

The visibility gap around third-party identities is already large enough to undermine assurance. With 85% of organisations lacking full visibility into third-party vendors connected via OAuth apps, per The State of Non-Human Identity Security, teams should expect similar blind spots wherever external access is granted outside the main identity plane.

The next stage of maturity is not another policy statement, but operational proof that vendor identities are inside the same control loop as everyone else. That means access review, session control, and lifecycle offboarding must extend to suppliers, contractors, and support partners without creating a separate governance tier.


For practitioners

  • Map every third-party access path Inventory vendor, contractor, and support access routes into production systems, including remote access tools, shared admin channels, and emergency exceptions. Classify each path by privilege level, data reach, and session oversight so that hidden trust boundaries become visible.
  • Extend PAM controls to external identities Apply vaulting, just-in-time elevation, session recording, and approval workflows to vendor access instead of reserving them for employees. If a third party can reach sensitive systems, the same privileged access controls should apply without exception.
  • Replace broad remote access with granular verification Retire VPN-style access where possible and use tools that enforce real-time identity verification, task-scoped entitlements, and tighter session boundaries. This reduces the chance that a vendor account can move laterally once access is granted.
  • Review third-party entitlements on a fixed cadence Recertify contractor and vendor access regularly, especially where access was granted for operational urgency or incident support. Remove stale approvals, narrow over-broad roles, and verify that access still matches the current business relationship.

Key takeaways

  • Zero Trust fails to deliver full protection when vendor access sits outside the same governance model as employee access.
  • The strongest evidence of the gap is not policy absence but inconsistent enforcement, especially around privileged access, session control, and recertification.
  • IAM and PAM teams should measure Zero Trust by third-party access coverage, because external identities often define the real attack surface.

Standards & Framework Alignment

This section maps relevant standards and security frameworks to the operational risks and controls described in this guidance.

OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10 address the attack and risk surface, while NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207) and NIST CSF 2.0 set the governance and control requirements practitioners need to meet.

FrameworkControl / ReferenceRelevance
NIST Zero Trust (SP 800-207)Zero Trust is the article's core operating model for vendor access.
OWASP Non-Human Identity Top 10NHI-03Privileged vendor access creates the same lifecycle and exposure issues as other NHI credentials.
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AC-4Access permissions and least privilege are central to governing external identities.

Apply continuous verification to every third-party access path and remove blanket trust assumptions.


Key terms

  • Vendor Access: Access granted to external suppliers, contractors, or support partners so they can reach internal systems, data, or administrative functions. In Zero Trust programmes, vendor access must be governed like any other privileged identity because it can reach the same sensitive assets and create the same exposure if left broad or unreviewed.
  • Privileged Access Strategy: The policy and operating model that defines who can use elevated access, under what conditions, and with what oversight. It usually includes approval, credential protection, session monitoring, and periodic review, and it fails when those controls apply only to employees rather than all identities with high-risk access.
  • Vendor Privileged Access Management: A PAM pattern focused on controlling third-party administrative access to production environments. It extends credential vaulting, approval, least privilege, and monitoring to vendors and contractors, reducing the chance that external support access becomes a standing back door.

Deepen your knowledge

NHI governance, agentic AI identity, and machine identity lifecycle are core topics in our NHI Foundation Level course, the industry's only accredited NHI security programme. If you are responsible for identity security strategy or NHI governance in your organisation, it is worth exploring.

This post draws on content published by Imprivata: Zero Trust Efforts Fall Short When Vendor Access Is Ignored. Read the original.

NHIMG Editorial Note
Published by the NHIMG editorial team on 2025-11-17.
NHI Mgmt Group — the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM, and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org