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Azure Backup and Recovery Services Vault Security Guide: Immutability, MUA and soft delete

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 14 min read
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An attacker who reaches Owner on an Azure subscription can delete your backups through the same portal and APIs you use to manage them, unless the vault itself refuses. Microsoft's 2025 reporting on Storm-0501 described exactly that: after taking over a Global Administrator account, the group gave itself Owner across subscriptions, removed resource locks and immutability policies, and targeted snapshots, restore points and Recovery Services vault data for deletion before demanding a ransom. This guide explains how access to Azure Backup works, which roles can destroy recovery points, how immutable vaults, multi-user authorization (MUA) and soft delete close that gap, and what to monitor. It is for Azure platform, backup and security teams. The general principles of immutable and isolated backup are in the Backup Security and Immutable Backup Guide; this page covers the Azure implementation.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • Lock immutability once you have tested it. An immutable vault in the Enabled state can be switched off by anyone with enough rights; only Enabled and locked is irreversible and uses WORM storage.
  • Put a second person in front of destructive operations. MUA with Resource Guard requires approval from a security admin, ideally in a different subscription or tenant, before soft delete, immutability or protection can be removed.
  • Soft delete is now enforced by default, but check the retention. Deleted backup data is kept for 14 days by default and up to 180 days; set it longer than your realistic detection time.
  • Restore needs more rights than you think, and so does deletion. Backup Contributor can stop protection and delete data, and subscription Owner or Contributor inherits that. Keep these roles small and just in time.
  • Alerts for deletion exist by default; routing them does not. Built-in Azure Monitor alerts fire for deletion of backup data and disabling of soft delete, but they reach nobody until you add an alert processing rule and action group.

How identity and access work in Azure Backup

Azure Backup stores data in two vault types. The Recovery Services vault holds Azure VM, SQL Server and SAP HANA in VM, Azure Files and hybrid (MARS agent, DPM, MABS) backups. The Backup vault holds newer workloads such as Azure Database for PostgreSQL, Azure Kubernetes Service, blobs and disks. Microsoft notes that all operations on backup data happen through the vault, so customers and attackers do not get direct access to the stored backup data; control of the vault is control of the backups.

  • Control plane: every vault operation is an Azure Resource Manager call authorised by Azure RBAC: configure protection, change policy, stop protection, delete data, restore, change vault properties.
  • Resource Guard: a separate Azure resource that adds a second authorisation check to critical operations when MUA is enabled. The user must hold rights on the vault and on the Resource Guard.
  • Vault managed identity: the vault uses a system-assigned or user-assigned managed identity to reach a customer-managed key in Azure Key Vault and, for some workloads, the protected resources.
  • Agents and extensions: the VM backup extension and the MARS agent register to one vault and talk to it over HTTPS with TLS 1.2 or later; with private endpoints they use vault-specific private URLs.
  • MARS security PIN: a PIN generated in the portal for sensitive hybrid backup operations; MUA can protect the "Get backup security PIN" operation.
ProtectionWhat it blocksCan an Owner turn it off?Notes
Soft delete (secure by default)Permanent loss on delete: data and vaults are kept in a soft-deleted state for 14 to 180 daysNo, where secure by default is enforced (Recovery Services vaults in all public regions and national clouds; Backup vaults GA in some regions, preview elsewhere)First 14 days are free; not for SQL Server and SAP HANA log recovery points
Immutable vault, EnabledDeleting recovery points before expiry, reducing retention, swapping to a lower-retention policyYes, it is reversibleUse as a test phase only
Immutable vault, Enabled and lockedSame operations, permanentlyNo, locking is irreversible and moves backups to WORM storageDoes not cover operational backups of blobs, files and disks
MUA with Resource GuardCritical operations unless the user also has rights on the Resource GuardNot without the Resource Guard owner, if the Resource Guard is outside their reachRemoving MUA and disabling soft delete are mandatory protected operations
Resource locksDeletion of the vault resourceYes, Owners can remove locksStorm-0501 removed locks; treat locks as accident protection, not an attacker control

Admin roles and privileged access

Microsoft's built-in backup roles are useful, but the real exposure is that subscription-level Owner and Contributor include every backup permission. A compromised cloud administrator is therefore a compromised backup administrator unless MUA and locked immutability are in place. See the Azure RBAC and Service Principals Guide and the Backup Identity Isolation Guide.

RoleScopeWhat it can doHandling
Owner, ContributorSubscription or resource groupEverything on the vault, including stop protection with delete data and removing resource locksPIM with approval; no standing assignments on backup subscriptions
User Access AdministratorSubscriptionGrant itself OwnerStorm-0501 used this step; alert on any assignment
Backup ContributorVaultCreate and manage backup, except deleting the vault and granting access to othersBackup engineering team only, just in time
Backup OperatorVaultEverything Backup Contributor can, except removing backup and managing backup policiesDay-to-day operations and restores
Backup ReaderVaultView backup management operationsMonitoring and audit
Backup MUA AdminResource GuardManage the Resource Guard and its accessSecurity team, not the backup team
Backup MUA OperatorResource GuardPerform the critical operations Resource Guard protects, but not delete the Resource GuardGranted temporarily through PIM per request

Setting up MUA so it actually separates duties

  1. Place Resource Guard out of reach: Microsoft allows the Resource Guard in a different subscription or tenant from the vault. Use a security-owned subscription with its own administrators, so a single compromised tenant admin or subscription Owner cannot satisfy both checks.
  2. Check the backup admin's rights: Microsoft states that the vault admin must not have Contributor, Backup MUA Admin or Backup MUA Operator on the Resource Guard. Reader on the Resource Guard is enough to associate it.
  3. Keep the default protected operations: disable soft delete and remove MUA protection are mandatory; leave the optional ones (delete protection, modify policy, modify protection, modify encryption settings, disable immutability, delete hybrid container) enabled. Consider protecting Restore as well for vaults holding highly sensitive data, since it is off by default.
  4. Route requests through PIM: the backup admin requests Backup MUA Operator on the Resource Guard for a time-boxed window; the security admin approves with a ticket reference.
  5. Test it: attempt a protected operation as the backup admin without the role and confirm it fails.

Integrations, API tokens and service accounts

Backup estates accumulate non-human identities: automation that configures protection, scripts that run restores, monitoring tools, and third-party backup or reporting products that read vaults. Each one is a path to the destructive operations above.

  • Automation identities: pipelines that deploy backup policy should run as a workload identity (managed identity or federated service principal) with Backup Contributor on named vaults, never Owner on the subscription. See the Azure Managed Identities Security Guide.
  • Monitoring and reporting tools: Backup Reader is enough for reporting; tools that ask for Contributor to "simplify setup" should be refused.
  • The vault's own managed identity: for customer-managed key encryption the vault's identity needs access to the key in Azure Key Vault in the same region. Microsoft warns not to disable that identity, even temporarily, and requires soft delete and purge protection on the key vault. See the Azure Key Vault Security Guide.
  • Keys as a ransom lever: Storm-0501 tried to encrypt data with a new Key Vault key and then delete the key; Key Vault soft delete allowed recovery. Purge protection on every key vault that protects backups is not optional.
  • Hybrid agents: MARS agents use a vault credentials file to register and a passphrase to encrypt; store the passphrase outside the environment it protects, and protect the security PIN operation with MUA.
  • Long-lived keys elsewhere: if backups are also copied to storage accounts, do not let engineers hold storage keys in personal vaults.

Logging and detection

SignalSourceWhy it matters
Deletion of backup data, stop protection with delete dataBuilt-in Azure Monitor alerts (Security category)Direct sign of T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
Disabling soft delete, disabling immutability, removing MUABuilt-in alerts (global alerts), Activity logPreparation for destruction; should never happen outside a change
Backup policy retention reduced or policy swappedActivity log, Log Analytics backup tablesQuiet way to age out recovery points
Role assignments on backup subscriptions, elevate access by a Global AdministratorActivity log, Entra audit log, Defender for Cloud ("Suspicious elevate access operation", "Suspicious Azure role assignment detected")The Storm-0501 path to Owner
Snapshot and restore point collection deletionActivity log, Defender for Resource Manager ("Suspicious backup resource deletion")Instant restore snapshots are outside the vault
Resource lock removalActivity log (Microsoft.Authorization/locks/delete)Often the step before deletion
Backup job failures across many itemsBuilt-in alerts, Azure Monitor metricsAgents disabled or VMs encrypted
Key Vault key deletion or disable for a backup CMKKey Vault diagnostic logsMakes backups unreadable
  • Route the alerts: built-in alerts are generated at no charge, but you need an alert processing rule and action group to send them to email, ITSM, a webhook or the SIEM. Disable classic alerts (classicAlertsForCriticalOperations) once Azure Monitor alerts are routed, so there is one path to maintain.
  • Send vault diagnostics to Log Analytics: jobs, policies and protected items in a central workspace let you query coverage and correlate with the Activity log. See the Azure Monitor, Activity Log and Diagnostic Settings Guide.
  • Use security levels as a posture metric: Azure Backup grades vaults as Excellent (immutability or soft delete irreversible, plus MUA), Good (locked immutability or always-on soft delete), Fair (MUA only) or Poor.

Metrics that show it is working

  • Percentage of vaults at the Excellent security level.
  • Percentage of production data sources in a vault with locked immutability.
  • Number of standing Owner, Contributor and Backup Contributor assignments on backup subscriptions (target: zero standing).
  • Restore test success rate per quarter, including a cross-region restore drill for critical systems.
  • Median time from a built-in security alert to triage.

Hardening baseline

ControlSettingMCSB v1
Automated backup with defined retentionBackup policies applied by Azure Policy to tagged resources; retention longer than expected dwell timeBR-1
ImmutabilityEnabled and locked, after a test period in Enabled; choose "based on backup policy" or a fixed duration that covers your detection windowBR-2
Soft deleteAlways on; retention raised from 14 days towards 180 for critical vaults (charged beyond 14 days)BR-2
Multi-user authorizationResource Guard in a separate security subscription or tenantBR-2, PA-7
NetworkPrivate endpoints with public network access set to Deny; private endpoints must be created before items are protectedBR-2
EncryptionPlatform-managed keys by default; customer-managed key in a same-region Key Vault with purge protection where policy requiresBR-2
RedundancyGeo-redundant storage (the default; it cannot be changed after items are protected) and Cross Region Restore for critical workloadsBR-1
MonitoringBuilt-in alerts routed, diagnostics in Log AnalyticsBR-3
Restore testingScheduled restores, including to an isolated subscriptionBR-4

Vault design and isolation

  • Dedicated backup subscriptions: keep vaults in subscriptions that application teams cannot administer, under a separate management group with its own policy assignments. An application team's Owner rights should stop at the workload subscription.
  • One vault per trust boundary, not per application: immutability and MUA apply to the whole vault, so group data sources by sensitivity and retention need. A vault that mixes test and production data forces the weakest settings on both.
  • Region and redundancy choices are early decisions: the vault's storage replication type cannot be changed after you start protecting items, and private endpoints must exist before items are registered. Get both right at vault creation.
  • Know where soft delete can still be switched off: for Backup vaults in regions where secure by default is still in preview, Microsoft notes soft delete can be disabled from the portal. Pair those vaults with MUA so disabling soft delete needs a second person.
  • Network dependencies: with private endpoints, Microsoft notes that database backups in VMs still need outbound access to Microsoft Entra ID, which has no private endpoint. Plan firewall rules for those FQDNs rather than reopening public access to the vault.

Rollout

  1. Inventory: list vaults, protected items, policies, current security level, and every principal with write access to backup subscriptions.
  2. Remove standing privilege: move Owner, Contributor and Backup Contributor to PIM eligible assignments.
  3. Enable MUA: create the Resource Guard in the security subscription and associate it with each vault.
  4. Pilot immutability: set a non-critical vault to Enabled, run normal operations for a few weeks, and confirm policy changes and cost are acceptable.
  5. Lock: move production vaults to Enabled and locked. There is no rollback: storage cost for the locked retention is committed, so confirm retention values first.
  6. Route alerts and test restores: trigger a test alert, then restore a VM and a database into an isolated subscription. See the Cloud Recovery and Clean Room Guide.

Small team or large estate

  • Small team: one or two vaults with soft delete at the maximum affordable retention, locked immutability, and MUA where a second person exists. If there is no separate security admin, an external provider or a senior manager can own the Resource Guard.
  • Large estate: vaults in dedicated backup subscriptions under a separate management group, Resource Guards in a security tenant, Azure Policy to enforce protection and settings, and security levels reported centrally.

Common misconfigurations

  • Immutability enabled but never locked: the vault looks protected in reports, but anyone with Owner can disable it in seconds.
  • Resource Guard in the same subscription, owned by the backup team: MUA then adds a click, not a second person. Microsoft's own requirement is a different owner.
  • Relying on resource locks and blob immutability policies alone: Owners can delete both. See the Storm-0501 Threat Actor Profile Guide.
  • Only instant restore snapshots: snapshots used for fast VM restores live with the VM and can be deleted; they are not the vault copy.
  • Alerts going nowhere: built-in security alerts exist in the portal but no action group is attached.
  • Customer-managed key vault without purge protection: deleting the key makes the backups useless.

Framework mapping

RiskMITRE ATT&CKNIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5NIST CSF 2.0
Deletion of recovery points and snapshotsT1490 Inhibit System RecoveryCP-9, CP-10PR.DS-11
Destruction of cloud dataT1485 Data DestructionCP-9PR.DS-11
Compromised cloud admin accountsT1078.004 Cloud AccountsAC-5, AC-6PR.AA-05
Self-assigned rolesT1098 Account ManipulationAC-6DE.CM-09
Untested or tampered restoresn/aCP-10RC.RP-03

Practitioner checklist

  • Lock immutability on every production vault after a test period.
  • Enable MUA with a Resource Guard in a separate subscription or tenant, owned by the security team.
  • Set soft delete retention to cover your realistic detection window, up to 180 days.
  • Remove standing Owner, Contributor and Backup Contributor on backup subscriptions; use PIM with approval.
  • Alert on User Access Administrator assignments and Global Administrator elevate access.
  • Route built-in Azure Backup security alerts to the SOC through an action group.
  • Use private endpoints with public network access denied for vaults.
  • Enable purge protection on any key vault holding backup encryption keys.
  • Test restores quarterly into an isolated subscription and record results.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Backup Security and Immutable Backup Guide · Cloud Native Backup and Ransomware Resilience Guide · Cloud Ransomware Guide · Microsoft Azure Security Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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