An Azure landing zone decides, before any workload is deployed, who can change policy, where logs go, which networks are reachable and which subscriptions escape governance. Microsoft's Cloud Adoption Framework (CAF) describes the Azure landing zone as the architecture for governing, securing and scaling a multi-subscription Azure environment, built from a platform landing zone and workload landing zones. Most organisations adopt it through Microsoft's accelerators, which deploy a management group hierarchy, dozens of Azure Policy assignments and central logging and networking. This guide looks at that foundation from a security angle: the management group hierarchy and the points that need the most protection, the default policy assignments and what they do not cover, how to secure the platform subscriptions, how to make subscription vending a security control, and how to detect tampering with the foundation itself. It is for cloud platform teams and security architects running or reviewing Azure. The provider-neutral pattern is in the Cloud Landing Zone Security Guide; Azure Policy mechanics are in the Azure Policy and Management Groups Guide.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- The hierarchy is the control plane: policies and role assignments inherit down management groups, so whoever can change the hierarchy or move a subscription can change its security. Turn on hierarchy authorisation and set a default management group for new subscriptions.
- Defaults are a starting point: the ALZ default assignments deny classic resources, public IPs in Identity, management ports from the internet, and public network access to PaaS in Corp, and deploy Activity Log diagnostic settings. They do not decide who holds Owner, how break-glass works, or which identities can deploy.
- Platform subscriptions are crown jewels: Management (logs), Security (SIEM), Connectivity (firewalls, DNS) and Identity (domain controllers) hold the assets an attacker needs to hide, move laterally or own the directory. Protect them more tightly than any workload.
- Vending is where least privilege is won or lost: subscription vending sets owners, groups, workload identities, network and management group placement. Microsoft notes that deployment workload identities hold standing subscription-scoped permissions and cannot use PIM, so prefer managed identities and scope them tightly.
- Watch the foundation, not just the workloads: alert on management group changes, subscription moves, policy exemptions, Activity Log diagnostic setting changes and root scope role assignments.
The ALZ architecture through a security lens
CAF organises landing zone decisions into eight design areas: Azure billing and Active Directory tenant, identity and access management, resource organisation, network topology and connectivity, security, management, governance, and platform automation and DevOps. The reference management group hierarchy that Microsoft recommends, and that the accelerators deploy, is the part most security controls hang from.
| Management group | Holds | Security significance |
|---|---|---|
| Tenant root group | Everything in the Entra tenant | ALZ automation assigns no policy here; any role assignment here reaches every subscription |
Intermediate root (for example contoso) | All ALZ management groups | Carries organisation-wide guardrails: Defender for Cloud configuration, Microsoft cloud security benchmark, Activity Log diagnostic settings, deny classic resources |
| Platform | Security, Management, Connectivity, Identity children | Key Vault guardrails, backup policies, private subnets, deny deletion of the monitoring managed identity |
| Platform / Identity | AD DS or Entra Domain Services | Denies public IPs and internet-facing management ports; compromise here is directory compromise |
| Platform / Connectivity | Hub networks, Azure Firewall, gateways, private DNS zones | Controls all east-west and egress paths; DDoS Protection policy |
| Platform / Management and Security | Log Analytics, Microsoft Sentinel | Log integrity and detection; the attacker's first target for defence impairment |
| Landing zones / Corp | Workloads connected to the hub | Public network access disabled for PaaS, private DNS integration, no public IPs on NICs, no gateways in spokes |
| Landing zones / Online | Internet-facing workloads | No extra default assignments; needs WAF, DDoS and exposure review by design |
| Sandbox | Experimentation | Sandbox guardrails (deny); isolated from Corp and Online |
| Decommissioned | Cancelled subscriptions awaiting deletion | Decommissioned guardrails (deny and deploy) stop reuse |
Microsoft's hierarchy guidance carries several security-relevant recommendations: keep the tree to three or four levels; limit policy assignments at root scope; configure a default management group (such as Sandbox) so new subscriptions do not land under the tenant root; enable Azure RBAC authorisation for hierarchy changes, because by default any principal in the tenant can create management groups; and do not assign workload team permissions at management group scope. Platform teams that need management group access should get it through Privileged Identity Management (PIM).
Default policy assignments and what they leave to you
The Azure landing zone policy assignment list (published in the ALZ documentation) shows what a default deployment enforces. A selection with effects:
| Scope | Assignment | Effect | What it prevents or ensures |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intermediate root | Deploy Diagnostic Settings for Activity Log to Log Analytics workspace | DeployIfNotExists | Every subscription streams Activity Log to the central workspace |
| Intermediate root | Deny the deployment of classic resources | Deny | Legacy resources outside Resource Manager governance |
| Intermediate root | Microsoft Cloud Security Benchmark (and v2 preview) | Audit | Posture measurement against the benchmark |
| Platform / Identity | Deny the creation of public IP | Deny | Internet exposure of identity infrastructure |
| Platform / Identity and Landing zones | Management port access from the Internet should be blocked | Deny | NSG rules opening RDP or SSH to the internet |
| Platform and Landing zones | Enforce recommended guardrails for Azure Key Vault | Deny, Audit | Key Vault configuration below the recommended baseline |
| Landing zones / Corp | Public network access should be disabled for PaaS services | Deny | Corp PaaS resources reachable from the internet |
| Landing zones / Corp | Deny the deployment of vWAN/ER/VPN gateway resources | Deny | Spokes creating their own routes around the hub |
| Platform | Do not allow deletion of resource types | DenyAction | Deletion of the managed identity used by Azure Monitor Agent |
What the defaults leave to you:
- Who holds Owner and User Access Administrator at each scope, and whether it is standing or eligible through PIM.
- Diagnostic settings for resource logs beyond the Activity Log on your critical services; ALZ includes an initiative for allLogs category groups at intermediate root, but review that it covers Key Vault, storage and network resources you depend on. See the Azure Monitor, Activity Log and Diagnostic Settings Guide.
- Policy enforcement mode: confirm assignments are set to enforce, not left in DoNotEnforce after a pilot.
- Exemptions: every policy exemption is a hole; govern them with expiry and approval.
- Online landing zones: no default assignments beyond inheritance, so internet-facing workloads need explicit controls.
Microsoft also maps policy to its benchmark; see the Microsoft Cloud Security Benchmark Guide.
Securing the platform subscriptions
- Identity subscription: treat domain controllers and Entra Domain Services as Tier 0. No public IPs (enforced by default), no internet management ports, Azure Bastion or private jump hosts only, backup to a vault with soft delete and immutability, and a separate, minimal set of administrators. See the Active Directory and Entra ID Hardening Guide.
- Management and Security subscriptions: restrict who can delete or modify Log Analytics workspaces, data collection rules and Microsoft Sentinel analytics rules. Use resource locks on workspaces and the DenyAction policy pattern for critical resources. Set workspace retention to meet your investigation window, and archive to immutable storage where regulation requires it.
- Connectivity subscription: firewall policy, route tables and private DNS zones control every workload. Limit write access to the network team through PIM, deploy changes through a pipeline, and alert on route table and firewall policy edits.
- Break-glass access: keep at least two emergency access accounts excluded from normal Conditional Access, monitored for any sign-in, and able to recover the hierarchy if PIM or federation fails.
- Root scope: Global Administrators can elevate themselves to User Access Administrator at root scope (
Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action). Remove the elevation after use and alert on every occurrence.
Privileged Azure RBAC lets a holder change Key Vault access settings and read secrets, write SQL firewall rules, change storage network settings and list storage keys. Every one of those actions is constrained by how tightly the platform team scoped roles and how many custom roles carry broad write permissions.
Subscription vending as a security control
Subscription vending issues subscriptions to workload teams programmatically, using the Bicep and Terraform subscription vending modules Microsoft publishes, orchestrated by a pipeline tied to an ITSM approval. Security decisions are made at each step:
- Intake: capture owner, budget, networking needs, business criticality and confidentiality classification. Classification drives management group placement (Corp, Online, or a regulated group), which drives policy.
- Placement: the pipeline places the subscription in the right management group at creation, so it never exists ungoverned. A default management group catches anything created outside vending.
- Identity: designate a subscription owner (Microsoft notes guest users are not allowed), grant access to Entra groups, use PIM for groups for elevated access, and create a deployment workload identity. Prefer a managed identity or federated credential over a client secret.
- Network: allocate non-overlapping address space from IPAM; the platform team creates virtual networks that peer to the hub. Azure Virtual Network Manager security admin rules can block high-risk ports above NSGs.
- Handoff: the workload team receives Contributor-level access within guardrails; the platform team keeps governance and can move the subscription if its classification changes.
Vending pipeline identity: the identity that creates subscriptions needs billing scope rights and the ability to assign roles and move subscriptions between management groups. It is one of the most privileged non-human identities in the tenant: protect it with federated credentials, restrict the pipeline repository, and require approval for changes. See the Azure RBAC and Service Principals Guide and the Workload Identity Federation Guide.
Implementation choices
| Option | Suits | Security trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Portal accelerator | Evaluation and organisations new to landing zones | Fast, but changes after deployment drift unless you move to infrastructure as code |
| Azure Verified Modules (AVM) for Platform landing zone, Bicep | Teams standardised on Bicep and Azure DevOps or GitHub | Modular and customisable; reviewable pull requests for every policy change |
| AVM for Platform landing zone, Terraform | Teams already on Terraform or running multi-cloud | Same modularity; state files hold sensitive configuration and need protecting |
| Custom build | Organisations with strong existing platforms | Full control, but you own policy currency as Microsoft updates and deprecates definitions |
Smaller organisations can start with the portal accelerator and a reduced hierarchy (for example, no Local group) but should still turn on hierarchy authorisation and a default management group on day one. Larger or regulated organisations should run the platform from infrastructure as code with pull request review and use a canary hierarchy, which the ALZ documentation describes, to test policy changes before they reach production.
Rollout and testing
- Assess the current tenant: list subscriptions under the tenant root, role assignments at root and management group scopes, and existing policy assignments that would conflict.
- Deploy the hierarchy in a canary: a parallel intermediate root to test policies and automation without affecting live subscriptions.
- Enable hierarchy settings: RBAC authorisation for management group changes and a default management group.
- Assign policies in audit first where the effect is Deny and existing resources would be affected, review compliance, then enforce.
- Move subscriptions in waves, lowest risk first; moving a subscription changes its inherited policy and RBAC immediately.
- Roll back by moving a subscription back to its previous management group or setting an assignment to DoNotEnforce, both recorded in the Activity Log; never by deleting the assignment ad hoc.
Detection and measurement
Most of these signals are Activity Log events at tenant or management group scope, which need tenant-level diagnostic settings or log collection beyond subscription Activity Logs. Alert on:
- Management group create, delete and move operations and subscription moves between management groups (ATT&CK T1666 Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy).
- Role assignments at root, intermediate root and Platform scopes, and any
elevateAccessaction (T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles). - Policy assignment deletion, enforcement mode changes and new policy exemptions.
- Deletion or modification of diagnostic settings, Log Analytics workspaces and Sentinel rules (T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log).
| Metric | Target |
|---|---|
| Subscriptions directly under the tenant root | Zero |
| Standing Owner or User Access Administrator assignments at management group scope | Zero outside break-glass; all others eligible through PIM |
| Subscriptions created through vending | 100% of new subscriptions |
| Active policy exemptions past expiry | Zero |
| Policy assignments in DoNotEnforce mode without a dated reason | Zero |
Common failure patterns
- Subscriptions under the tenant root: created by individuals or partners before a default management group was set, and so outside every ALZ guardrail.
- Workload permissions at management group scope: Contributor granted at Landing zones for convenience reaches every workload subscription.
- Open hierarchy: hierarchy authorisation left off, so any user can create management groups and, with subscription rights, move subscriptions into them.
- Policies stuck in audit: pilots that never moved to enforcement, leaving Deny assignments as reports.
- Over-privileged vending and deployment identities: client secrets with Owner at Landing zones scope, stored in pipeline variables.
- Platform logs deletable by platform operators: the same team that could be phished can remove the evidence.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | PL-8 Security and Privacy Architectures; CM-2 Baseline Configuration; CM-6 Configuration Settings; AC-6 Least Privilege; AU-2 Event Logging | Reference architecture, enforced baselines, scoped access, central logging |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.PO-01; GV.RR-02; PR.PS-01; PR.AA-05; ID.AM-02 | Policy, roles, configuration management, least privilege, inventory |
| CIS Controls v8.1 | Control 4 Secure Configuration of Enterprise Assets and Software; Control 6 Access Control Management; Control 8 Audit Log Management | Policy baselines, RBAC, logging |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A | 8.9 Configuration management; 8.2 Privileged access rights; 8.15 Logging; 8.22 Segregation of networks | Hierarchy and policy as configuration management; Corp and Online segregation |
| MITRE ATT&CK v20 | T1666 Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy; T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles; T1685.002 Disable or Modify Cloud Log; T1078.004 Cloud Accounts | Attacks on the foundation itself |
Practitioner checklist
- Enable RBAC authorisation for management group hierarchy changes and set a default management group for new subscriptions.
- Remove workload team permissions from management group scopes; give platform teams PIM-eligible access only.
- Review every default ALZ policy assignment for enforcement mode and every exemption for owner and expiry.
- Treat the Identity, Management, Security and Connectivity subscriptions as Tier 0 with separate administrators and locks on logging resources.
- Run all new subscriptions through vending with classification-driven placement and federated deployment identities.
- Protect the vending pipeline identity and repository as highly privileged assets.
- Alert on hierarchy changes, root scope role assignments, elevate access, policy deletions and diagnostic setting changes.
- Test policy changes in a canary hierarchy before production.
Standards and references
- Microsoft Learn: What is an Azure landing zone?
- Microsoft Learn: Azure landing zone design areas
- Microsoft Learn: Management groups (resource organisation design area)
- Microsoft Learn: Subscription vending
- Microsoft: Azure landing zones policy documentation and default assignments
- Microsoft: Azure Landing Zones documentation repository
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- MITRE ATT&CK: Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Cloud Landing Zone Security Guide · Azure Policy and Management Groups Guide · Microsoft Azure Security Guide · Microsoft Defender for Cloud Guide