Selling or running cloud services for the Government of Canada means meeting a control framework that is older than most of the cloud services it now governs, layered with cloud profiles and an assessment programme that changed names along the way. ITSG-33, IT Security Risk Management: A Lifecycle Approach, is the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (Cyber Centre) guidance that defines the federal control catalogue and risk management process, and the CCCS Medium Cloud Control Profile, which replaced the old PROTECTED B, Medium Integrity, Medium Availability (PBMM) profile, is how it applies to cloud. This guide explains the framework and its annexes, the cloud profiles, the Cyber Centre's cloud service provider assessment programme, where identity and machine credentials fit, and how to prepare evidence. It is written for cloud providers, federal security practitioners, departmental authorisers and assessors, and anyone mapping FedRAMP or ISO/IEC 27001 work to Canadian requirements.
Key takeaways
- ITSG-33 is a lifecycle, not just a catalogue. It defines risk management activities at two levels, departmental (Annex 1) and information system (Annex 2), plus a control catalogue (Annex 3A) and control profiles (Annex 4A).
- The catalogue follows NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4. The Cyber Centre states the Annex 3A catalogue is consistent with NIST's SP 800-53 Revision 4, so control IDs such as AC-2 and IA-4 map directly, though Rev. 5 content has moved on.
- PBMM is now the CCCS Medium Cloud Control Profile. The Government of Canada's 2016 PBMM cloud profile appendix was replaced by the Medium profile in Annex B of ITSP.50.103, published in May 2020.
- Federal use needs a Cyber Centre assessment. The CSP ITS Assessment Program evaluates commercial IaaS, PaaS and SaaS up to Protected B, at Cloud Low, Medium or High, using third-party assessment organisations.
- The consumer half of the profile is where identity sits. The cloud profiles allocate each control to the provider or the consumer; account management, MFA, service accounts and keys in the tenancy are largely the department's.
What it is and who it applies to
ITSG-33 took effect on 1 November 2012 under the authority of the Chief of the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC), now CSE, whose Cyber Centre publishes it. It superseded the older MG-2 and MG-4 publications on security risk management and certification and accreditation. The Cyber Centre's pages note that the publication does not currently meet Government of Canada web standards but that the information remains valid.
| Document | Date (Cyber Centre or GC page) | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| ITSG-33 overview | Effective 1 November 2012 | Lifecycle approach to IT security risk management |
| Annex 1 | Part of ITSG-33 | Departmental IT security risk management activities |
| Annex 2 | Part of ITSG-33 | Information system security risk management activities (the ISSIP) |
| Annex 3A | Effective 30 December 2014 | Security control catalogue, consistent with NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 |
| Annex 4A | Part of ITSG-33 | Profiles, including Profile 1 (PROTECTED B, medium integrity, medium availability) and Profile 3 (SECRET, medium integrity, medium availability) |
| GC Security Control Profile for Cloud-based GC Services | 2016 | PBMM cloud profile; its Appendix A control list is now replaced |
| ITSM.50.062 Cloud security risk management | March 2019 | How ITSG-33 activities apply to cloud |
| ITSP.50.103 Security categorization of cloud-based services | May 2020 | Categorisation method, Low profile (Annex A) and Medium profile (Annex B) |
- Federal departments and agencies: apply ITSG-33 activities and select profiles for their systems, including cloud services.
- Cloud service providers: implement the provider-allocated controls of the relevant cloud profile and go through the CSP ITS Assessment Program to serve federal customers. AWS, for example, states the assessment is mandatory for it to provide cloud services to federal departments and agencies.
- Provinces, municipalities and regulated industries: often reuse ITSG-33 and Cyber Centre assessment results as a reference, although they are not bound by them.
- Assessors: third-party assessment organisations validate evidence for the Cyber Centre.
Structure and key requirements
The control catalogue
Annex 3A groups controls into three classes and 17 families. Withdrawn controls keep their numbers so references stay stable.
| Class | Families |
|---|---|
| Technical | AC Access Control, AU Audit and Accountability, IA Identification and Authentication, SC System and Communications Protection |
| Operational | AT Awareness and Training, CM Configuration Management, CP Contingency Planning, IR Incident Response, MA Maintenance, MP Media Protection, PE Physical and Environmental Protection, PS Personnel Security, SI System and Information Integrity |
| Management | CA Security Assessment and Authorization, PL Planning, RA Risk Assessment, SA System and Services Acquisition |
The information system lifecycle (Annex 2)
Annex 2 defines the information system security implementation process (ISSIP), with approvals by the authoriser at each gate.
| Phase | Key security activities |
|---|---|
| Stakeholder engagement | Identify and engage security stakeholders |
| Concept | Select domain security control profiles, determine the system security category, set initial assurance requirements |
| Planning | Integrate ISSIP activities into the project plan |
| Requirement analysis | Define business needs for security, tailor and approve controls |
| High-level and detailed design | Build controls into design, assess and approve |
| Development | Secure development environment, develop and test security solutions |
| Integration and testing | Integration security testing, approve production installation |
| Installation | Verify security in production, residual risk assessment, authorisation package, authorise operations |
| Operations and maintenance; disposal | Secure operations, then disposal |
The cloud profiles and categorisation
ITSP.50.103 sets a four-step categorisation: build an injury assessment table, inventory business processes and information assets, assess injury to confidentiality, integrity and availability, and analyse business domains. The overall category is generally the high-water mark. Profiles are published as spreadsheets for Low (Annex A) and Medium (Annex B), each marking whether the provider or the consumer is responsible for each control; for High, the Cyber Centre asks organisations to contact it. The profiles are scoped to the ITSG-33 threat categories Td4 (deliberate) and Ta3 (accidental and natural). The 2016 GC PBMM profile was heavily influenced by the FedRAMP moderate baseline, and its Appendix A control list is now replaced by the Medium profile; providers authorised against Appendix A version 1.1 were asked to contact the Cyber Centre about transition.
The CSP ITS Assessment Program
| Assessment level | Scope (Cyber Centre) |
|---|---|
| Cloud Low | SaaS only, up to Protected A, low injury from loss of integrity or availability |
| Cloud Medium | Up to Protected B, medium injury |
| Cloud High | Protected B with high injury |
Enterprise-level assessments are led by the Cyber Centre for services procured centrally by Shared Services Canada and Public Services and Procurement Canada; local assessments are led by a department for single-use SaaS, with Cyber Centre oversight. The programme is not for classified or national security systems. Evidence is validated by third-party assessment organisations (3PAOs) funded by the vendor; the Cyber Centre states that only FedRAMP-accredited companies are currently eligible, and that it is working with the Standards Council of Canada on a Canadian 3PAO accreditation programme.
Identity and NHI requirements
ITSG-33 inherits the identity controls of SP 800-53 Rev. 4. For cloud services the split in the Medium profile matters more than the control text: the department configures and operates identities in its tenancy, while the provider protects its own administrative plane. ITSM.50.062 notes that consumer organisations select and assess the controls assigned to them.
| ITSG-33 control | Machine identity relevance | Typical owner in cloud |
|---|---|---|
| AC-2 Account Management | Service accounts, workload identities and automation accounts created, reviewed and disabled | Consumer for tenant accounts; provider for its operators |
| AC-6 Least Privilege | Scoped roles for pipelines and integrations | Consumer |
| IA-2 Identification and Authentication (organisational users) | MFA for administrators who can create keys and roles | Consumer for tenant admins |
| IA-4 Identifier Management | Unique identifiers for each workload or device, no shared accounts | Consumer |
| IA-5 Authenticator Management | Rotation and protection of API keys, secrets and certificates | Consumer for tenant credentials; provider for platform credentials |
| IA-9 Service Identification and Authentication | Services authenticating to each other, for example with mTLS or workload federation | Shared, depending on service model |
| AU-2 Event Logging | Logging key creation, role changes and token use | Consumer enables and retains; provider supplies the logs |
See the Cloud IAM Review Checklist, the Cloud Workload Identity Guide and the Public Sector Identity Security Guide.
Implementation steps
For a department adopting a cloud service
- Categorise the service with the ITSP.50.103 method and record the high-water mark.
- Select the profile (Low or Medium; contact the Cyber Centre for High) and download the Annex spreadsheet.
- Check the provider's assessment through the CSP ITS Assessment Program, including which services and Canadian regions were assessed.
- Tailor and assign consumer controls. Use the profile's allocation columns to build the department's control responsibility list.
- Configure and test consumer controls, starting with identity, logging and data protection, in a non-production tenancy first.
- Assemble the authorisation package with the provider's assessment summary, your consumer control evidence and the residual risk assessment, and obtain authorisation to operate.
- Operate and monitor, with periodic review of provider reassessments and your own control evidence.
For a cloud service provider
- Map existing evidence. FedRAMP moderate work maps closely, given the shared SP 800-53 heritage; ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 rarely cover every profile requirement, as ITSM.50.062 notes.
- Prepare Canadian regions. AWS reports that only services in its Canadian regions can be assessed.
- Engage an eligible 3PAO and the Cyber Centre intake process.
- Publish a clear responsibility matrix aligned to the profile allocation columns.
- Plan for reassessment as services change and new services are added.
Decision guidance
- Protected A SaaS with low injury: Cloud Low may be enough; confirm with the department's security team.
- Protected B business systems: Medium is the norm and most major IaaS and SaaS providers are assessed at this level.
- High-injury Protected B: expect a bespoke engagement with the Cyber Centre; plan more time.
- Classified systems: out of scope of the cloud assessment programme entirely.
- Stacked services: ITSM.50.062 allows reuse of an underlying IaaS assessment for services built on it where the scope covers the service model and region.
Evidence and assessment
| Evidence | Produced by | Measure |
|---|---|---|
| Security categorisation and injury assessment | Department | Systems with a recorded category |
| Cyber Centre assessment summary for the service | Provider, via Cyber Centre | Services in use that are inside the assessed scope and region |
| Consumer control implementation evidence | Department | Consumer controls implemented and tested versus allocated |
| Identity reviews | Department | Service accounts without an owner; keys older than the rotation policy; admins without MFA |
| Residual risk assessment and authorisation | Authoriser | Systems operating with a current authorisation |
| Monitoring and incident records | Both | Time to detect unauthorised role or key creation |
For cloud estates, automated evidence helps: AWS, for instance, published a prebuilt CCCS Medium framework in its Audit Manager service with 71 automated and 282 manual controls in 175 control sets, while stating that it does not verify compliance. Treat such tooling as an evidence collector, not an assessment.
Mapping to other frameworks
| Framework | Relationship |
|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4 and Rev. 5 | Annex 3A is consistent with Rev. 4; Rev. 5 adds new families such as SR Supply Chain Risk Management and PT PII Processing and Transparency, so map carefully. See the NIST SP 800-53 Guide. |
| FedRAMP moderate | The 2016 PBMM profile was heavily influenced by it; currently only FedRAMP-accredited 3PAOs are eligible assessors. See the FedRAMP Guide. |
| ISO/IEC 27001 and SOC 2 | Accepted as inputs but rarely cover every profile requirement (ITSM.50.062) |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.AA-01 identities and credentials managed; GV.SC-07 supplier risk; ID.RA-10 critical suppliers assessed before acquisition |
| Canadian privacy law | The assessment programme examines compliance with Canadian privacy regulations. See the Canada PIPEDA and Bill C-27 Guide. |
Common pitfalls
- Still asking for "PBMM": the profile is now the CCCS Medium Cloud Control Profile; old questionnaires built on the 2016 appendix may not match current assessments.
- Assuming the provider assessment covers the department: consumer-allocated controls, especially identity and logging, remain the department's to implement and evidence.
- Using services outside the assessed scope: the assessment lists specific services and regions; AWS notes customers must check whether using services outside Canada meets their own requirements.
- Mapping Rev. 5 controls one to one: ITSG-33 follows Rev. 4, so new Rev. 5 controls and enhancements need explicit mapping.
- Shared automation accounts: a single deployment identity across environments defeats IA-4 and AC-6 and makes authorisation boundaries meaningless.
- Treating the authorisation as permanent: provider reassessments and service changes require the department to revisit residual risk.
Practitioner checklist
- Categorise every cloud service with the ITSP.50.103 method and record the high-water mark.
- Use the current Low or Medium profile spreadsheet, not the 2016 PBMM appendix.
- Confirm the provider's Cyber Centre assessment covers the exact services and regions used.
- Build a consumer control list from the profile's allocation columns.
- Inventory service accounts, keys and workload identities in each tenancy, with owners.
- Enforce MFA for all administrators able to create roles, keys or federation trusts.
- Log and alert on identity changes and key creation; retain logs per departmental policy.
- Map any Rev. 5 based evidence back to ITSG-33 (Rev. 4) control IDs explicitly.
- Review authorisation after each provider reassessment or major service change.
Standards and references
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: IT Security Risk Management, A Lifecycle Approach (ITSG-33)
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: ITSG-33 Annex 3A Security Control Catalogue
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: ITSG-33 Annex 2 Information System Security Risk Management Activities
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Guidance on the Security Categorization of Cloud-based Services (ITSP.50.103)
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Cloud Security Risk Management (ITSM.50.062)
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Cloud Security Assessment Program
- Government of Canada: Security Control Profile for Cloud-based GC Services
- AWS: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS) Assessment
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Public Sector Identity Security Guide · FedRAMP Guide · NIST SP 800-53 Guide · Canada PIPEDA and Bill C-27 Guide