China National Network Identity Authentication Guide: Cyberspace ID, Network Certificates and Platform Duties

China's real-name rules have long pushed every app, game and service to collect and store copies of national ID numbers, and each of those stores is a breach waiting to happen. The Measures for the National Network Identity Authentication Public Service (国家网络身份认证公共服务管理办法), issued as Ministry of Public Security Order No. 173 together with the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) and four other departments, took effect on 15 July 2025. They create a state-run service that issues each citizen a network number (网号, often called a "cyberspace ID") and a network certificate (网证), so platforms can verify real identity without receiving the plaintext ID number. This guide explains the 16 articles, what changes for platforms that connect, the data handling and security duties, how the service fits with PIPL, the Cybersecurity Law and real-name rules, and what multinational product, identity and privacy teams should decide. It is for identity architects, privacy officers and compliance leads running consumer services in mainland China.

Source note: article content is from the full Chinese text of the Measures (MPS Order No. 173) as published on 12371.cn, and dates from Xinhua and the CAC draft notice; English renderings are ours. Confirm against the official text before relying on it.

Key takeaways

• Voluntary for users and platforms, on paper. Article 4 lets citizens apply voluntarily, Article 7 encourages but does not require internet platforms to connect, and Article 6 tells government and key industries to keep existing lawful verification methods.
• Two artefacts, one identity. The 网号 is a unique alphanumeric identifier with no plaintext identity data; the 网证 is a credential that carries the 网号 and non-plaintext identity information. Both are issued by the national platform from a statutory ID document.
• Connected platforms must stop asking for ID numbers. Once a user verifies with a 网号 or 网证, a platform may not demand plaintext identity data unless a law requires it or the user agrees, and must give equal service to users who do not use the service.
• Minimum data by design. Article 8 says a platform that only needs to verify identity receives only the verification result; retained identity data needs user authorisation or separate consent and the minimum necessary.
• Penalties come from the core data laws. Article 14 applies the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law to breaches of Articles 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12.

What the Measures are and their status

The Measures were adopted at a Ministry of Public Security ministerial meeting on 27 February 2025, dated 19 May 2025, published on 23 May 2025 and took effect on 15 July 2025 (Article 16). The six issuing departments are the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the National Health Commission and the National Radio and Television Administration. A draft for comment was published by the MPS and CAC on 26 July 2024 with comments due by 25 August 2024; the final text keeps the 16-article structure of the draft.

Article 1 names the legal basis: the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law, Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law and the Law on the Protection of Minors. The stated purpose is to implement a trusted online identity strategy, protect citizens' identity information and support the digital economy. Under Article 3, the MPS and CAC lead supervision, with the other departments acting within their remits. The measures are departmental rules, which sit below national laws and State Council regulations in China's legal hierarchy.

How the service works

• Network number (网号): a unique, permanent code of letters and digits linked one-to-one to a person, containing no plaintext name or ID number (Article 2).
• Network certificate (网证): a credential carrying the 网号 and non-plaintext identity information. State media describe it as a dynamic, encrypted credential that can be shown as a QR code, not a new ID card.
• Enrolment: an adult downloads the 国家网络身份认证 (National Network Identity Authentication) app on an NFC-capable phone, chooses the document type, reads the chip of a valid resident ID card over NFC, completes face recognition, links a phone number and sets a credential password. Expired or lost ID cards must be renewed first.
• Verification: the user authorises a check at a connected platform; the national platform returns a result or, where law requires retained identity data, the minimum necessary data with consent (Article 8). Identity data stays on the MPS national platform.
• Eligible documents (Article 15): resident ID cards, passports for citizens living abroad, travel permits for Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan residents, residence permits for those residents, and foreign permanent residence ID cards.
• Minors (Articles 4 and 5): under 14 needs guardian consent and a guardian applies on the child's behalf; 14 to 17 apply under guardian supervision. Article 10 lets the service give platforms age indicators so they can meet minor protection duties.

Before the Measures took effect, state media (Xinhua, May 2025) reported millions of app downloads and authentication requests during the pilot, across government services, education and examinations, culture and tourism, healthcare, postal delivery and transport. We could not verify those figures independently, so they are not repeated here.

Article-by-article reference

Platform duties when you connect

Connection is voluntary, but once a platform connects the duties are not. The practical design questions are what data you still need and what you can delete.

• Stop collecting plaintext identity by default: after a successful 网号 or 网证 verification you may not ask for the ID number unless a law or regulation requires it or the user agrees (Article 7). Design the user journey so that consent to share more is a genuine choice, not a gate.
• Keep the old route open: users who do not use the service must get the same service (Article 7), so the existing real-name flow must keep working.
• Prefer result-only checks: if your obligation is to verify real identity rather than retain it, request only the result (Article 8). Sectors that must keep identity records (for example where telecoms, finance or hotel rules require them) receive the minimum necessary data after authorisation or separate consent.
• Treat what you receive as sensitive personal information: identity data and any face data remain sensitive under PIPL Article 28, with separate consent and impact assessment duties. See the China PIPL Guide.
• Use age indicators: the age signal from Article 10 can support minor mode and gaming time limits without collecting a birth date.
• Record the integration: document the data flow, legal basis and retention for your PIPL records and any compliance audit. See the China Personal Information Protection Compliance Audits guide.

How it fits with China's other identity and data rules

Comparison with other national digital identity models

The central model reduces scattered ID number copies, but it also concentrates identity data and the record of where people authenticate in one state platform. Multinationals should weigh that concentration in their own risk assessment as a policy question, not only a technical one. See the eIDAS 2.0 and the European Digital Identity Framework Guide and the India Aadhaar and Digital Public Infrastructure guide for those models.

Deciding whether to connect

Implementing an integration

1. Map every real-name touchpoint: list where you collect, verify, store and display ID numbers and face data, and the law that requires each one.
2. Classify each touchpoint: verify-only, or verify-and-retain. Verify-only flows are the candidates for result-only checks.
3. Design the dual path: add the 网号 or 网证 option alongside the existing flow, with equal service for both, and consent screens for any extra data.
4. Pilot one product: start with a low-risk service, run both paths in parallel, and compare verification success rate and abandonment.
5. Delete legacy data: for verify-only flows, delete stored ID numbers that are no longer needed, with a documented retention decision.
6. Update PIPL documentation: privacy notices, records of processing and personal information protection impact assessments.
7. Plan rollback: keep the original verification path live so that an outage of the national platform does not block users.

Where identity fits for machine identities

The integration itself creates non-human identities: the platform's credentials to call the national service, API keys or certificates, and the backend services that receive results. Store those credentials in a secrets manager, rotate them, restrict which services can call the verification API, and log every call with a request ID, so that an attacker who compromises a backend cannot query identities at scale. See the Secrets Management Guide.

Measuring the change

• Plaintext ID holdings: number of stored ID numbers, trending down after verify-only flows move to result-only checks.
• Adoption share: percentage of real-name verifications completed through the national service.
• Verification success and abandonment: compared across the two paths.
• Consent rate for extra data: how often users agree to share more, which shows whether the choice is genuine.
• Availability fallbacks: number of times the fallback path was used because the national platform was unavailable.

Common failure patterns

• Connecting but still collecting: keeping the old form that asks for the ID number after a 网号 check, which Article 7 prohibits without a legal requirement or consent.
• Degrading the non-user path: making the traditional flow slower or limited to push adoption, which breaches the equal service duty.
• Keeping legacy stores: adopting the service while leaving years of copied ID numbers in databases and logs.
• Treating it as mandatory: blocking users who do not enrol, or assuming foreign users have eligible documents.
• Weak API credentials: long-lived keys for the verification integration shared across services, turning one compromise into bulk identity queries.

Framework mapping

Practitioner checklist

• Inventory every place your China services collect, verify or store ID numbers and face data.
• Record the legal requirement behind each touchpoint and whether it requires retention.
• Decide, with legal and group privacy, whether to connect to the national service.
• If you connect, offer it alongside the existing flow and keep service equal for both paths.
• Use result-only verification wherever retention is not legally required, and delete legacy ID copies.
• Update privacy notices, processing records and impact assessments under PIPL.
• Protect integration credentials in a secrets manager with rotation and call logging.
• Keep a fallback path for national platform outages and monitor its use.

Standards and references

• Ministry of Public Security and CAC: Measures for the National Network Identity Authentication Public Service (full text)
• Xinhua: Publication of MPS Order No. 173 on the national network identity authentication public service
• Cyberspace Administration of China: Draft Measures for public comment
• Xinhua: National network identity authentication, how to apply
• Xinhua and People's Daily: National network identity authentication now in effect
• NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5 Security and Privacy Controls

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: China PIPL Guide · China Cybersecurity Law Guide · China Cross-Border Data Transfers · Digital Identity Wallets Guide. This guide summarises China's Measures for the National Network Identity Authentication Public Service and is not legal advice.