CISA's Binding Operational Directives are compulsory orders for US federal civilian agencies, yet their deadlines quietly set the patching, scanning and configuration norms that auditors, insurers and customers now expect from everyone. A Binding Operational Directive (BOD) is defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552 as "a compulsory direction to an agency", issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security through CISA under 44 U.S.C. 3553(b)(2). This guide covers the directives that drive day-to-day security operations: BOD 22-01 (Known Exploited Vulnerabilities), BOD 23-01 (asset visibility), BOD 23-02 (internet-exposed management interfaces), BOD 25-01 (cloud secure configuration) and the newer BOD 26-02 on end-of-support edge devices, with the older BOD 18-01 and 19-02 for context. It is written for federal security teams, the contractors and cloud providers who run systems on their behalf, and private-sector teams who borrow BOD timelines as a benchmark. For the wider federal compliance picture, see the FISMA Guide.
Status checked 27 October 2026: BOD 22-01, 23-01, 23-02 and 25-01 are listed on CISA's directives page with no revocation marked. BOD 26-02 was released on 5 February 2026; its official CISA page could not be retrieved when this guide was written, so its deadlines below come from secondary summaries and should be confirmed against the directive text. The KEV catalog held 1,754 entries (catalog version 2026.10.21), 361 of them flagged for known ransomware campaign use.
Key takeaways
- BODs bind agencies, not companies: they apply to federal information systems, including systems a contractor or cloud provider operates for an agency, and exclude national security systems and certain Defense and Intelligence Community systems.
- BOD 22-01 is the one everyone copies: KEV entries must be remediated within two weeks (six months for CVEs assigned before 2021), and CISA adds a CVE only when it has clear remediation guidance and reliable evidence of active exploitation.
- Visibility comes first: BOD 23-01 requires automated asset discovery every 7 days and vulnerability enumeration every 14 days, with credentialed scanning wherever possible, which is why its machine credentials need the same care as any privileged account.
- Admin interfaces stay off the internet: BOD 23-02 gives agencies 14 days to remove internet exposure of in-scope management interfaces or put them behind a separate zero trust policy enforcement point.
- Configuration is now measured continuously: BOD 25-01 made SCuBA baselines mandatory for in-scope cloud tenants (Microsoft 365 first) with automated, continuous reporting to CISA, and most mandatory policies are identity controls.
Scope: who and what is covered
The statutory authority sits in FISMA. Section 3553(b)(2) lets the Secretary develop and oversee directives covering incident reporting to the federal incident centre, annual report contents, mitigation of exigent risks and other operational requirements. Section 3553(h) separately allows emergency directives (EDs) for a known or reasonably suspected threat that poses a substantial threat to agency security. Both exclude national security systems as defined in 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(6).
| Who | Bound? | How it reaches them |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies | Yes | Directly; compliance reported to CISA and tracked through CDM dashboards and CyberScope |
| Contractors and service providers running systems for an agency | Indirectly | BOD 22-01 and 23-01 cover systems hosted or operated by third parties on an agency's behalf; agencies flow the requirement down through contracts and authorisations |
| Cloud service providers | Partly | BOD 25-01 covers agency cloud tenants; BOD 23-02 excludes CSP management portals and APIs; BOD 23-01 excludes third-party managed SaaS |
| National security systems, certain DoD and IC systems | No | Excluded by statute and by each directive's scope text |
| State, local, private sector | No | CISA encourages adoption; KEV and SCuBA baselines are freely usable |
Key obligations
The table summarises the operative directives. Dates are issue dates from CISA's directives listing.
| Directive | Issued | Core requirement | Key timelines |
|---|---|---|---|
| BOD 18-01 Enhance Email and Web Security | 16 Oct 2017 | STARTTLS, SPF and DMARC; HTTPS-only with HSTS; disable SSLv2, SSLv3, 3DES and RC4 | DMARC p=reject on all second-level domains within one year |
| BOD 19-02 Vulnerability Remediation for Internet-Accessible Systems | 29 Apr 2019 | Fix findings from CISA Cyber Hygiene scanning; do not block CISA scan sources | Critical 15 calendar days, high 30 days from initial detection; IP changes reported within 5 working days |
| BOD 22-01 Known Exploited Vulnerabilities | 3 Nov 2021 | Remediate every KEV entry on any federal information system; update vulnerability management procedures | Two weeks (pre-2021 CVEs six months); procedures within 60 days of issuance |
| BOD 23-01 Asset Visibility and Vulnerability Detection | 3 Oct 2022 | Automated discovery and enumeration of all IP-addressable assets, results to the CDM dashboard | Discovery every 7 days, enumeration every 14 days, ingest within 72 hours, from 3 Apr 2023 |
| BOD 23-02 Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces | 13 Jun 2023 | Remove internet exposure of management interfaces or protect them with zero trust controls | Within 14 days of CISA notification or agency discovery |
| BOD 25-01 Secure Practices for Cloud Services | 17 Dec 2024 | Inventory cloud tenants, deploy SCuBA assessment tools, implement mandatory SCuBA policies | 21 Feb 2025 inventory, 25 Apr 2025 tools, 20 Jun 2025 policies |
| BOD 26-02 End-of-Support Edge Devices | 5 Feb 2026 | Inventory, replace and continuously track edge devices that no longer receive vendor security updates | Inventory 3 months, removal 18 months, lifecycle programme 24 months (confirm against official text) |
BOD 22-01 in practice
- Inclusion criteria: a CVE ID exists, there is clear remediation guidance such as a vendor update, and there is reliable evidence of active exploitation. A public proof of concept is not required.
- Remediation: the default is two weeks from the date added, with six months for CVEs assigned before 2021. CISA can set shorter timelines where risk is grave; the catalog records a due date per entry.
- Procedures: agencies had to update vulnerability management procedures within 60 days to include ongoing remediation, roles, prompt response actions, validation and enforcement, and tracking and reporting.
- Reporting: through the CDM Federal Dashboard, which tags KEVs automatically from the catalog feed. Agencies not yet on CDM reported bi-weekly through CyberScope from 1 October 2022.
- No waivers: CISA does not grant exceptions; special cases go to [email protected]. BOD 22-01 enhances but does not replace BOD 19-02.
See the Risk-Based Vulnerability Management Guide for how KEV fits alongside EPSS and CVSS.
BOD 23-01 in practice
- Scope: reportable, non-ephemeral IT and OT assets with an IPv4 or IPv6 address, on premises, roaming or in cloud: servers, workstations, virtual machines, routers, switches, firewalls, appliances and network printers. Containers and third-party managed SaaS are excluded.
- Cadence: discovery every 7 days covering at least the agency's whole IPv4 space; enumeration started every 14 days across all discovered assets; detection signatures updated within 24 hours of vendor release.
- Credentials: privileged, credentialed scanning on managed endpoints and network devices to the maximum extent possible, by network scan or agent.
- On demand: start discovery or enumeration within 72 hours of a CISA request and deliver results within 7 days.
See the Asset Inventory and CMDB Security Guide.
BOD 23-02 in practice
- Device classes: routers, switches, firewalls, VPN concentrators, proxies, load balancers and out-of-band server management interfaces such as iLO and iDRAC.
- Protocols: HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SNMP, Telnet, TFTP, RDP, rlogin, RSH, SSH, SMB, VNC and X11 reachable from the public internet. A device must match both a class and a protocol.
- Options: make the interface reachable only from an internal network (CISA recommends an isolated management network), or keep it reachable but mediate all access through a policy enforcement point separate from the interface, aligned with OMB M-22-09, NIST SP 800-207, TIC 3.0 and the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model.
See the Out-of-Band Management Network Design Guide and the Edge Device Security Guide.
BOD 25-01 in practice
- Scope: all production or operational cloud tenants that have a finalised SCuBA Secure Configuration Baseline. Microsoft 365 was the only finalised baseline at issuance; CISA can add more, and a baseline not updated within a year drops out of scope.
- Actions: tenant inventory by 21 February 2025 (updated each first quarter), SCuBA assessment tools deployed with continuous reporting by 25 April 2025, all mandatory policies on the Required Configurations website implemented by 20 June 2025.
- New tenants: baselines and continuous monitoring must be in place before an Authority to Operate is granted.
- Deviations: an Authorising Official may accept risk under agency policy, but the deviation must be identified and explained in the tool output sent to CISA.
See the Microsoft 365 Security Guide.
Timeline and current status
- 2015 to 2016: the first directives (BOD 15-01, 16-01) are issued; both are now marked revoked. BOD 19-02 superseded BOD 15-01.
- 16 October 2017: BOD 18-01 on email and web security. DHS later issued a temporary exception for disabling 3DES in mail environments (20 September 2018).
- 3 November 2021: BOD 22-01 and the KEV catalog.
- 3 October 2022: BOD 23-01; main requirements effective 3 April 2023.
- 13 June 2023: BOD 23-02. CISA committed to update it within two years; no revision is shown on the directive page as checked.
- January to April 2024: ED 24-01 (Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure) with two supplemental directions, and ED 24-02 on the nation-state compromise of Microsoft's corporate email.
- 17 December 2024: BOD 25-01, with all three fixed deadlines falling in 2025.
- 5 February 2026: BOD 26-02 on end-of-support edge devices. Reported deadlines: immediately move supported devices off end-of-support software; inventory against CISA's end-of-support edge device list by 5 May 2026; begin removal and report devices reaching end of support within 12 months by 5 February 2027; remove all identified devices by 5 August 2027; continuous discovery and a lifecycle programme by 5 February 2028.
Directives change through supplemental direction, new baselines and revocation. Check the directive page and, for BOD 25-01, the Required Configurations website before relying on any date here. The KEV catalog changes several times a week.
Enforcement and penalties
There are no fines. A BOD is an internal executive branch instruction, and its teeth are oversight rather than penalties:
- Measurement: CISA sees compliance directly through CDM dashboards, Cyber Hygiene scanning, SCuBA tool output and CyberScope reports. BOD 23-02 relies on CISA's own scanning and notification.
- Escalation: CISA reports status to the DHS Secretary, the OMB Director and, for BOD 25-01, the National Cyber Director, and engages agency CIOs and CISOs where agencies fall behind.
- FISMA consequences: non-compliance surfaces in FISMA metrics, inspector general audits and authorisation decisions, which affects budgets and leadership accountability.
- For contractors: the consequence is contractual. An agency that must meet a BOD will require it of the systems you run, and failure can block an authorisation or breach the contract. Read your contract and the agency's authorisation package, not this guide, for what binds you.
What it means for AI agents and non-human identities
Several directives are, underneath, about machine credentials and automated access.
- Scanner credentials are privileged NHIs: BOD 23-01 credentialed scanning means a service account that can log in to every endpoint and network device. Vault it, rotate it, restrict where it can authenticate from and alert on its use outside scan windows. See the Service Account Security Guide.
- Exploited edge devices leak machine secrets: the Ivanti Connect Secure exploitation in 2024, which drove ED 24-01, exposed service accounts used for authentication server configuration, stored API keys and certificates. Supplemental direction ordered credential resets, so a KEV response plan must include rotating every secret the device held.
- SCuBA covers app identities: the Microsoft 365 baselines include controls on application consent and legacy authentication, which govern OAuth apps and service principals as much as people. See the SaaS Security Guide.
- Static admin keys defeat the intent: the Private-CISA GitHub leak, where a contractor's public repository exposed AWS GovCloud administrator keys for six months, shows that configuration directives do not help if long-lived keys sit in code.
- AI agents and automation: no directive names AI agents, but an agent acting in a cloud tenant or patch pipeline is a federal information system component. Give it its own identity, least privilege and logging so its actions appear in the same evidence CISA sees.
Framework mapping
| Directive | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ATT&CK technique addressed |
|---|---|---|---|
| BOD 22-01, 19-02 | RA-5 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning, SI-2 Flaw Remediation | ID.RA-01 | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| BOD 23-01 | CM-8 System Component Inventory, RA-5 | ID.AM-01 | Supports detection of all techniques by closing blind spots |
| BOD 23-02 | AC-17 Remote Access, SC-7 Boundary Protection | PR.AA-05 | T1133 External Remote Services |
| BOD 25-01 | CM-6 Configuration Settings, IA-2 | PR.AA-05 | Identity and configuration abuse in cloud tenants |
| BOD 26-02 | SI-2, CM-8 | PR.PS-02 | T1190 |
Compliance steps
- Establish scope: list every system that is a federal information system or processes agency information, including those you host for an agency, and record exclusions with justification.
- Automate KEV intake: pull the KEV JSON feed daily, match it against your asset and software inventory, and open tickets with the catalog due date rather than an internal SLA.
- Stand up discovery and enumeration: 7-day discovery and 14-day enumeration with credentialed scans; pilot on one network segment first, confirm scan impact on OT and fragile devices, then widen.
- Find exposed interfaces: scan your own external ranges for the BOD 23-02 protocols on management planes, move them to an isolated management network, and keep a rollback path (console access) before closing remote access.
- Run SCuBA assessment: run CISA's assessment tooling in report-only mode, fix gaps on a test tenant, then apply to production in rings; document every Authorising Official risk acceptance.
- Plan edge device replacement: map devices against vendor end-of-support dates and CISA's list, budget replacements now, and isolate anything you cannot replace in time.
- Prove it: keep evidence of detection dates, remediation dates, exceptions and the reporting submitted.
Detection and measurement
- KEV on-time rate: percentage of KEV findings closed by the catalog due date (target 100 percent).
- Mean time to remediate KEV: from catalog addition, not from first ticket.
- Discovery coverage: percentage of known IP space scanned in the last 7 days, and percentage of assets with credentialed results.
- Exposed management interfaces: count from your own external scans and CISA notifications, with time to close.
- SCuBA pass rate: mandatory policies passing per tenant, and open deviations by age.
- End-of-support edge devices: count remaining against the BOD 26-02 milestones.
Common failure patterns
- Patching without rotating: fixing an exploited VPN or firewall but leaving the credentials, keys and certificates it stored unchanged.
- Inventory gaps: cloud, roaming and OT assets missing from discovery, so KEV matching silently misses them.
- Treating two weeks as the start: internal SLAs that begin when a ticket is raised rather than when CISA adds the CVE.
- Unprotected scanner accounts: a domain-wide scanning credential with no logon restrictions becomes the attacker's best lateral movement tool.
- Configuration drift: SCuBA passes once, then a new conditional access exclusion or app consent setting quietly reverses it.
Practitioner checklist
- Confirm in writing which of your systems are federal information systems under each directive.
- Subscribe to the KEV feed and match it automatically against inventory every day.
- Track KEV remediation against catalog due dates, with no waivers assumed.
- Run discovery at least every 7 days and credentialed enumeration every 14 days.
- Vault, rotate and restrict scanner and automation credentials.
- Remove management interfaces from the internet or put them behind a separate policy enforcement point.
- Run SCuBA assessments continuously and record every deviation and risk acceptance.
- Rotate all secrets held by any device affected by an exploited vulnerability.
- Build an end-of-support edge device register with replacement dates and budget.
- Recheck CISA's directive pages each quarter for new directives and supplemental direction.
Standards and references
- CISA: Cybersecurity Directives
- CISA: BOD 22-01 Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities
- CISA: BOD 23-01 Improving Asset Visibility and Vulnerability Detection on Federal Networks
- CISA: BOD 23-02 Mitigating the Risk from Internet-Exposed Management Interfaces
- CISA: BOD 25-01 Implementing Secure Practices for Cloud Services
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
- Cornell LII: 44 U.S.C. 3553 Authority and functions of the Director and the Secretary
- Cisco: Understanding CISA BOD 26-02 Mitigating Risk from End-of-Support Edge Devices
This guide summarises CISA Binding Operational Directives as of 27 October 2026 and is not legal advice. Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: FISMA Guide · Vulnerability Management Guide · Edge Device End of Life Replacement Playbook · Edge Device Exploitation by Threat Actors Guide · CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model Guide