Cisco IOS XE routers and switches are trusted to carry every packet in the network, so turning off unused services such as the web UI, Smart Install and Telnet, and moving to strong password types, is worth doing on every device. Apply Cisco's security updates promptly and follow the Cisco security advisories. This guide covers administrator and machine identity on IOS XE, the hardening steps Cisco and the December 2024 CISA, NSA and Five Eyes communications infrastructure guidance set out, the logs that reveal tampering, and the common misconfigurations. It is for network engineers, architects and SOC teams. For the general edge device view, see the Edge Device Security Guide.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Cisco's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Cisco. Product features change, so confirm settings against Cisco's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Turn off the HTTP server unless you need it.
no ip http serveralways, andno ip http secure-serverwhere the web UI and RESTCONF are not used. - Disable Smart Install with
no vstack. It listens on TCP 4786 on client switches without authentication, so turn it off once deployment is complete. - Use Type 8 or Type 9 password hashes. CISA advises avoiding Type 5 and Type 7, which can be recovered offline from a stolen configuration.
- Centralise AAA with TACACS+ and MFA. Command authorisation and accounting give a record of every change, with local accounts kept only for emergencies.
- Treat configurations as secrets and as evidence. They hold SNMP strings, AAA keys and VPN keys; store them centrally, compare against a golden copy and alert on changes outside change management.
How identity and access work in Cisco IOS XE
IOS XE runs on Catalyst switches, ISR and Catalyst 8000 routers, ASR 1000 and wireless controllers. Access control follows the classic IOS model.
- Privilege levels: 0 to 15, with 1 (user EXEC) and 15 (privileged EXEC, full control) used by default. A privilege 15 account can change anything, so keep these accounts few and monitored.
- Authentication sources: local usernames, the
enable secret, and, afteraaa new-model, AAA method lists that point at TACACS+ or RADIUS server groups with local fallback. - Access paths: console and auxiliary lines, VTY lines (SSH; Telnet if not disabled), the web UI and RESTCONF over the HTTP or HTTPS server, NETCONF over SSH, SNMP, and Smart Install on switches.
- Machine identities: TACACS+ and RADIUS shared keys, SNMP communities or SNMPv3 users, NTP keys, routing protocol keys, IPsec pre-shared keys and certificates, SSH host keys, and accounts used by network automation, configuration backup and monitoring tools.
- Guest shell and application hosting: a Linux container on the device that can run scripts. Useful for automation, but another execution environment to control; CISA advises
guestshell disablewhere it is not required.
Password and key storage types
| Type | Method | Use |
|---|---|---|
| Type 0 | Plain text | Never |
| Type 7 | Reversible obfuscation | Avoid (CISA guidance); trivially reversed offline |
| Type 5 | MD5-based hash | Avoid (CISA guidance) |
| Type 8 | PBKDF2 with SHA-256 | Preferred by CISA where supported |
| Type 9 | scrypt | Strong; Cisco's hardening guide shows algorithm-type scrypt for local users |
| Type 6 | Reversible AES encryption with a device master key | For secrets the device must recover, such as TACACS+ keys (CISA guidance) |
Admin roles and privileged access
- Enable AAA:
aaa new-model, a TACACS+ server group, login authentication method list of TACACS+ then local, and exec and command authorisation for level 15 commands. CISA's guidance is that the AAA server should support MFA and should not be linked to the primary corporate identity store, so a compromise of the corporate directory does not hand over the network. - Account for every command: TACACS+ command accounting records who ran what. Locally,
archivewithlog config,logging enable,hidekeysandnotify syslogsends each configuration command to syslog with secrets masked. - Keep local accounts for emergencies only: one break-glass user with
algorithm-type scrypt secret, stored in a vault and, per CISA, changed after every use. Remove any other local users, and alert on new ones. See the Break-Glass Account Guide. - Lock out guessing:
aaa local authentication attempts max-failfor local accounts, and the login block feature to slow brute force on VTY lines. - Restrict VTY lines:
transport input ssh,transport output noneso the device cannot be used as a jump point, anaccess-classpermitting only management hosts, andexec-timeouton console and VTY. - Strong SSH: SSH version 2 only, RSA keys of at least 3072 bits and Diffie-Hellman group 16, as the CISA guidance specifies.
- Management plane protection:
control-plane hostwithmanagement-interface <interface> allow ssh httpsconfines management protocols to the interfaces you name, ideally an out-of-band management network reached from dedicated administrative workstations. See the Network Device Management Plane Hardening Guide.
Services to disable or restrict
| Service | Risk | Configuration |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP server (web UI) | Exposed management interface; account creation if compromised | no ip http server; no ip http secure-server unless needed; otherwise ip http access-class limited to trusted hosts |
| Smart Install | Unauthenticated service on TCP 4786; configuration theft | no vstack; verify with show vstack config |
| Telnet | Clear text credentials | transport input ssh on every VTY |
| SNMP v1 and v2c | Clear text community strings | SNMPv3 with authentication and privacy, ACL-restricted, with views |
| CDP and LLDP | Leaks platform and version to neighbours | no cdp run or per-interface no cdp enable where not needed |
| Guest shell | Extra execution environment | guestshell disable where not required |
| FTP, TFTP, IP source routing, unused VPN features | Clear text configuration transfer and unused attack surface | Disable; use SCP for file transfer |
Integrations, API tokens and service accounts
- Automation accounts: configuration backup, NetBox or Ansible, monitoring and controller platforms log in over SSH, NETCONF (SSH on TCP 830) or RESTCONF (which runs on the HTTPS server). Give each tool its own TACACS+ account, authorise only the commands it needs, and store its credentials in a secrets manager. If RESTCONF is required, keep
ip http secure-serverbut restrict it withip http access-classand keep the web UI session modules disabled if you do not use the GUI (ip http secure-active-session-modules none). - AAA shared keys: the TACACS+ key should be stored as Type 6 where supported. SNMP, TACACS and RADIUS traffic can expose shared secrets if captured, so rotate keys after any suspected compromise and prefer TACACS+ over TLS or IPsec-protected transport where available. See the RADIUS Security Guide.
- SNMP: read-write communities are effectively configuration credentials. Remove them, use SNMPv3 users with
priv, and restrict by ACL and view. See the SNMP Security Guide. - Configuration backups: the backup server holds every device secret. Encrypt backups at rest, restrict who can read them, and pull them over SCP rather than TFTP or FTP.
- Keys for routing and time: authenticate NTP (
ntp authenticate, trusted keys) and routing protocols, and rotate those keys with the same discipline as passwords.
Valid device credentials are the main thing to protect: a configuration pulled over TFTP or FTP that contains SNMP read-write strings and reversible local passwords gives access to further devices. See the Non-Human Identity (NHI) Guide for treating these device credentials as managed identities.
Logging and detection
Cisco's hardening guide sets logging host, logging trap 6, a local buffer at level 6, no logging console and no logging monitor, a fixed logging source-interface, and service timestamps log datetime msec show-timezone. CISA adds that remote log traffic should be encrypted (for example over IPsec or TLS) and that copies should be kept off the device, because the device is the first thing an attacker will tamper with.
| Signal | Source | What it can mean |
|---|---|---|
%SYS-5-CONFIG_P or %SEC_LOGIN-5-WEBLOGIN_SUCCESS for unknown users (such as cisco_tac_admin or cisco_support) | Syslog | Unexpected local account activity; check the Cisco security advisories for current indicators |
%WEBUI-6-INSTALL_OPERATION_INFO with an unexpected filename | Syslog | Cisco's indicator for the implant stage |
| Configuration change outside a change window | Archive log, TACACS+ accounting, configuration diff | Unauthorised change, new local user, new SSH key, changed AAA server |
| New GRE or IPsec tunnels, unexpected open ports or services | Configuration diff, external scan | Traffic redirection or persistence (CISA visibility guidance) |
| Unusual route updates | Routing logs, flow monitoring | Traffic interception |
| Image hash mismatch | show software authenticity file, copy /verify | Modified or unsigned image |
CISA's guidance is to store configurations centrally rather than treating the device as the source of truth, compare them frequently, and alert on deviations. Flow monitoring at key ingress and egress points shows traffic the device logs will not. See the Network Device Syslog and Configuration Change Detection Guide.
Metrics
- HTTP server exposure: count of devices with
ip http serveror an unrestrictedip http secure-server(target: zero unrestricted). - Smart Install: devices answering on TCP 4786 in internal scans (target: zero).
- Legacy hashes: devices with any Type 0, 5 or 7 secret in configuration.
- AAA coverage: percentage of devices with TACACS+ authorisation and command accounting.
- Configuration drift: devices differing from the golden configuration, and time to explain each difference.
- Patch latency: days from a Cisco Critical or High IOS XE advisory to fixed code on exposed devices.
Hardening baseline
- Find exposure first: scan for HTTP, HTTPS, Telnet, SNMP and TCP 4786 on all device addresses, from outside and from user networks. Run
show running-config | include ip http server|secure|activeandshow vstack configacross the estate with your automation tool. - Remove the worst services:
no ip http server,no vstack, Telnet off, SNMP v1 and v2c off. Push to a pilot group (one site or lab) first and check monitoring and automation still work. Save withcopy running-config startup-configonce validated; roll back by reloading the saved startup configuration or reapplying the archived copy. - Patch: apply Cisco's security updates promptly using the Cisco Software Checker, and verify image signatures with
show software authenticity filebefore and after upgrade. - Rebuild AAA: TACACS+ with MFA, command authorisation and accounting, one scrypt-hashed local break-glass account, VTY access-class and SSH-only transport. Enable command authorisation on a pilot device first; keep a console session open while testing so a mistake does not lock you out.
- Rotate secrets: replace Type 5 and 7 secrets, rotate SNMP, TACACS+, RADIUS, NTP and routing keys, and store recoverable keys as Type 6.
- Logging and integrity: remote encrypted syslog, archive logging, NTP authentication, golden configuration comparison, and flow monitoring at key points.
Framework mapping
| Control area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | CIS Controls v8.1 | ATT&CK technique addressed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Disable HTTP server, Smart Install, Telnet | CM-7 | PR.PS-01 | 4.8, 12.3 | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| TACACS+, MFA, command authorisation | IA-2, AC-6, AU-12 | PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05 | 5.4, 6.5 | T1078 Valid Accounts |
| Strong hashes, key rotation, protected backups | IA-5 | PR.AA-01 | 3.11 | T1602 Data from Configuration Repository |
| Encrypted management and SNMPv3 | SC-8 | PR.DS-02 | 3.10 | T1040 Network Sniffing |
| Image verification | SI-7 | DE.CM-09 | 4.1 | T1601 Modify System Image |
| Configuration change detection | CM-3, AU-6 | DE.CM-09, PR.PS-04 | 8.2, 8.11 | T1556 Modify Authentication Process |
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A equivalents are A.8.2, A.8.5, A.8.8, A.8.9, A.8.15, A.8.20 and A.8.24 (use of cryptography).
Common misconfigurations
- Web UI left on by default image settings: many devices ran
ip http serverorip http secure-serverwithout anyone using the GUI; turn it off where it is not used. - Smart Install still active on access switches: the feature exists for zero-touch deployment and is rarely needed afterwards; turn it off with
no vstack. - Type 7 passwords and read-write SNMP communities in backups: one stolen configuration hands over device and neighbour credentials.
- AAA tied to the corporate directory without MFA: a phished or sprayed corporate password becomes network admin access. CISA advises a separate AAA identity store with MFA.
- No outbound restriction on VTY: without
transport output none, a compromised device becomes a hop to other devices. - Patching without hunting: an update removes a flaw but not any accounts an intruder created, so check for unknown accounts and configuration changes as part of every emergency patch. See the Emergency Out-of-Band Patching Playbook.
Practitioner checklist
- Disable
ip http servereverywhere, andip http secure-serverunless required; restrict it withip http access-classwhere kept. - Run
no vstackon every switch and confirm TCP 4786 is closed. - Allow only SSH version 2 on VTY lines, with an access-class,
transport output noneand exec timeouts. - Use TACACS+ with MFA, command authorisation and accounting; keep one scrypt-hashed, vaulted local account.
- Remove Type 0, 5 and 7 secrets; store recoverable keys as Type 6; rotate SNMP, AAA, NTP and routing keys.
- Move to SNMPv3 with privacy, ACLs and views; remove read-write communities.
- Send encrypted syslog off the device, enable archive logging and alert on configuration changes outside change windows.
- Compare running configurations with a centrally stored golden copy and verify image signatures after every upgrade.
- Apply Cisco's IOS XE security updates promptly and hunt for unknown local users after each emergency patch.
Standards and references
- Cisco: IOS XE Software Hardening Guide
- CISA, NSA, FBI and partners: Enhanced Visibility and Hardening Guidance for Communications Infrastructure
- Cisco: Security Advisories
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- MITRE ATT&CK: Data from Configuration Repository
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Edge Device Security Guide · Network Device Management Plane Hardening Guide · Vulnerability Management for Network Devices Guide · Cisco ASA and Firepower Threat Defense Hardening Guide