Most hospitals still run infusion pumps, imaging modalities, patient monitors and the PACS on networks that can be reached from ordinary staff workstations. When ransomware lands on a desktop, that flat reach is what turns an IT incident into diverted ambulances and paper charts. This guide covers how to design and roll out segmentation for clinical and biomedical devices: zone design, device identity and network access control, flows for DICOM, HL7 and vendor support, testing without harming patient care, and how to measure progress. It is written for hospital network and security engineers, clinical engineering (biomed) teams and the CISOs who sponsor the work. Device-side security, procurement and FDA expectations are covered in the Medical Device Security Guide, which this page does not repeat.
Key takeaways
- Zone by clinical function and risk, not by building. Group devices by what they do and who must talk to them (imaging, infusion, monitoring, lab, building systems), then allow only the minimum flows, as NIST's NCCoE healthcare builds recommend.
- Inventory comes first. You cannot write allow rules for flows you have not observed, so run passive discovery and flow capture for several weeks before enforcing anything.
- Device identity is the hard part. Use certificate-based 802.1X (EAP-TLS) where devices support it, and profiling plus MAC authentication bypass with tight policies where they do not.
- Enforce in monitor mode, then by unit, with a rollback. Clinical availability is a patient safety requirement, so every enforcement change needs a clinical owner, a change window and a tested back-out.
- Vendor remote access and shared services are the usual gaps. Isolate vendor support paths and protect the shared integration points, because a single compromised login can reach far beyond its intended scope.
Why clinical networks need their own segmentation model
Clinical networks differ from office IT in four ways that shape the design:
- Patient safety and availability: an infusion pump that cannot reach its drug library server, or a modality that cannot send studies, affects care directly. NIST SP 1800-8 lists dose changes and interference with pump function among the risks of networked infusion pumps.
- Long-lived and constrained devices: many biomedical devices run vendor-controlled operating systems, cannot take endpoint agents, and may be patched only through the manufacturer. Segmentation is often the main compensating control.
- Dense integration: NIST SP 1800-24 describes PACS as an authoritative repository that connects to clinical information systems, medical devices and staff; modalities send images using DICOM and clinical systems exchange data with PACS using HL7. Every integration is a flow you must permit and protect.
- Shared responsibility: IEC 80001-1:2021 sets risk management requirements for organisations that connect medical devices and health software to their IT infrastructure, covering safety, effectiveness and security. ISO lists the 2021 edition as "To be revised", to be replaced by ISO/CD 81001-4-1, so track the successor.
NIST SP 1800-24 names "lack of network segmentation" and "permissive network boundaries" as vulnerabilities its PACS build addresses, and describes network zoning that limits communications to the minimum necessary to support the business function. That principle is the whole design brief.
Designing clinical zones
Start from a small number of zones and split further only when inventory and flow data justify it. A typical starting model:
| Zone | Typical contents | Allowed to talk to | Key controls |
|---|---|---|---|
| Imaging | CT, MRI, X-ray and ultrasound modalities, modality worklist clients | PACS or VNA, modality worklist server; nothing on the internet | Allow only DICOM to named PACS nodes; vendor support through the remote access zone |
| Imaging core (PACS) | PACS, VNA, image routers, reading workstations' back end | Imaging zone, EHR or RIS interface engine, reading workstations | Certificate-based authentication, MFA for administrators, microsegmentation between servers |
| Infusion | Wireless infusion pumps, pump servers and drug library servers | Pump server; pump server to EHR integration | Dedicated SSID with EAP-TLS, per-pump certificates, no shared keys |
| Patient monitoring | Bedside monitors, central stations, telemetry gateways | Central station, HL7 gateway to the EHR | Often vendor-specified networks: confirm design limits with the manufacturer |
| Laboratory and pharmacy automation | Analysers, middleware, dispensing cabinets | LIS or pharmacy systems, interface engine | Allow-list flows; restrict USB and local admin where the vendor permits |
| Clinical workstations | Nursing PCs, workstations on wheels, reading stations | EHR, PACS viewers, printers | Managed endpoints with EDR; no direct path to device zones except listed services |
| Building and facilities | Building management, nurse call, RTLS, HVAC, medical gas alarms | Their own controllers and servers | Treat as OT; see the zones and conduits approach |
| Vendor remote access | Jump hosts or brokered sessions for manufacturer support | Specific devices on request, time-bound | MFA, session recording, approval per session |
| Guest and patient Wi-Fi | Personal devices | Internet only | Separated from all internal zones by a firewall, as in the SP 1800-8 build |
Enforcement points
- VLANs and internal firewalls: the SP 1800-8 reference build uses switch port controls and VLAN segmentation, with an internal firewall applying rules between zones. This is the baseline every hospital can reach.
- Dynamic assignment through NAC: the same build uses a NAC service that ties user identity and device profiling to access policy, so a device lands in its zone wherever it is plugged in. See the Network Access Control (NAC) Guide.
- Microsegmentation: SP 1800-24 includes microsegmentation in its PACS controls, useful inside the imaging core and data centre where many servers share a VLAN. See the Network Segmentation Guide.
Device identity and network access control
Segmentation only works if the network knows what each device is. Clinical estates need a layered approach because device capability varies widely.
| Method | When to use | Strength | Watch out for |
|---|---|---|---|
| 802.1X with EAP-TLS (device certificate) | Devices that support enterprise Wi-Fi or wired 802.1X, such as the pumps in SP 1800-8 | Strong, per-device identity; supports revocation | Certificate enrolment and renewal on devices; expired certificates take devices offline |
| 802.1X with PEAP or shared credentials | Interim, where certificates are not supported | Better than open ports | Shared credentials cannot be revoked per device; SP 1800-8 recommends no shared keys |
| MAC authentication bypass plus profiling | Legacy devices without 802.1X | Works with almost anything | MAC addresses can be spoofed; pair with a tight zone policy and anomaly alerts |
| Static port or SSID assignment | Fixed, rarely moved equipment such as large modalities | Simple and predictable | Drift when devices are moved or ports repatched |
- Certificates for devices and systems: SP 1800-24 uses certificate-based authentication for imaging devices and clinical systems and MFA for care providers; SP 1800-8 recommends mutual TLS between pumps and pump servers and individual pump authentication. Device certificates are non-human identities: give them owners, an inventory and renewal alerts. See the Machine Identity, PKI and Certificate Lifecycle Guide.
- Profiling sources: combine DHCP fingerprints, passive traffic analysis and the clinical engineering asset system. Ask manufacturers for their documented ports, protocols and remote service needs before you write rules.
- Service accounts in integrations: interface engines, modality worklist, pump servers and PACS routers use accounts and certificates to talk to the EHR. Inventory them alongside the network flows. See the Service Account Security Guide.
Wireless clinical networks
- Separate SSIDs by device class: give infusion pumps, monitoring telemetry and clinical workstations their own SSIDs or dynamic VLAN assignment from the NAC policy, rather than one shared clinical SSID with a pre-shared key.
- Use enterprise authentication: the SP 1800-8 build authenticates access points through the NAC service and uses pumps that support IEEE 802.11i enterprise authentication with EAP-TLS. Where a device supports only pre-shared keys, put it on its own SSID and rotate the key on a schedule agreed with clinical engineering.
- Plan for roaming and coverage: devices that move between wards must keep their zone. Test handover in the pilot unit, because a pump that drops off the network mid-infusion is a clinical event, not a network ticket.
Mapping and controlling clinical flows
Write rules from observed and documented flows, not from assumptions. Common flows to capture and then constrain:
- DICOM: modality to PACS store, query and retrieve, worklist. DICOM conventionally uses TCP 104 or 11112, with 2762 registered for DICOM over TLS, but check each device's configuration; restrict to named application entities and hosts.
- HL7: orders, results and ADT messages between the EHR, interface engine, LIS, RIS, monitoring gateways and pump servers. Ports are set locally per interface, so record each one.
- Drug libraries and device management: pump servers to pumps, monitor central stations to bedside devices, vendor update servers. Limit updates to a managed staging host where the vendor supports it.
- Core services: DNS, NTP, DHCP, directory and certificate services. Provide these from inside or adjacent to each zone rather than opening broad paths to the data centre.
- Remote support: SP 1800-8 highlights improper third-party vendor connections as a risk and SP 1800-24 limits vendor remote support to the imaging components. Route all manufacturer access through the vendor remote access zone. See the OT Remote Access Guide.
Phased rollout
- Govern: form a working group of network, security, clinical engineering, imaging and nursing informatics, with a clinical owner per device class. Agree that availability incidents trigger immediate rollback.
- Discover: run passive discovery and NetFlow or packet capture for at least a full clinical cycle (weekends, month-end, downtime procedures). Reconcile with the biomed asset database.
- Design: define zones, the allowed-flow matrix per zone, enforcement points and NAC policy. Review each flow with the device owner and manufacturer documentation.
- Monitor mode: deploy NAC in monitor or audit mode and firewall rules as log-only, then compare hits against the matrix for two to four weeks. Fix missing flows before blocking.
- Pilot: enforce in one low-acuity unit or one device class (for example, imaging in an outpatient site), with clinical engineering on call and a written back-out (return ports to the previous VLAN, switch rules to permit-and-log).
- Expand by unit: roll out ward by ward, leaving intensive care, theatres and the emergency department until the process is proven. Freeze changes during major clinical events.
- Operate: add new devices through an onboarding step that assigns zone, identity method and flows before the device goes live. Review rule hits and exceptions monthly.
Small hospital versus large health system
- Single site or small hospital: start with VLANs and an internal firewall separating guest, workstations, imaging, infusion and building systems, plus a brokered vendor access path. This alone removes the most dangerous reach.
- Multi-site health system: standardise a zone template, NAC policy set and device profiles centrally, add microsegmentation in data centres, and make the template part of new-site and new-device onboarding.
Detection and measurement
Segmentation creates choke points; use them. Log denied and permitted flows at zone boundaries, NAC authentication results and profiling changes, and vendor session start and end. Alert on:
- A clinical device initiating connections to workstations, the internet or other device zones (possible compromise, ATT&CK Exploitation of Remote Services, T1210).
- Remote desktop or file sharing traffic crossing into device zones (Remote Services, T1021).
- Vendor or remote access logins outside approved sessions (External Remote Services, T1133; Valid Accounts, T1078).
- A device profile changing on the same MAC address, which may indicate spoofing.
| Metric | What it shows | Target direction |
|---|---|---|
| Percentage of networked clinical devices assigned to a defined zone | Coverage of the programme | Rising to near 100% |
| Percentage of devices authenticated by certificate rather than MAB | Strength of device identity | Rising |
| Number of permit-any rules into device zones | Residual flat reach | Falling to zero |
| Vendor sessions brokered and recorded versus direct | Control of third-party access | 100% brokered |
| Clinical incidents attributed to segmentation changes | Safety of the rollout | Zero, each reviewed |
| Time to onboard a new device into its zone | Whether the process is sustainable | Days, not weeks |
Framework mapping
| Control area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zones and boundary enforcement | SC-7, AC-4 | PR.IR-01 | A.8.22 Segregation of networks |
| Device identity and NAC | IA-3 | PR.IR-01 | A.8.20 Networks security |
| Clinical device inventory | CM-8 | ID.AM-01 | A.5.9 Inventory of information and other associated assets |
| Vendor remote access | AC-17 | PR.IR-01 | A.5.19 Information security in supplier relationships |
| Boundary monitoring | SC-7 | DE.CM-01 | A.8.16 Monitoring activities |
For HIPAA obligations and US sector rules see the Healthcare Cyber Regulation Map.
Common failure patterns
- Segmenting devices but not their servers: pumps sit on their own SSID while the pump server shares a flat data centre VLAN with everything else, so an attacker reaches the devices through the server.
- Enforcing before discovering: blocking in week one breaks a monthly or downtime-only flow, a clinical incident follows, and the programme loses its mandate.
- MAB everywhere, forever: MAC bypass used as the permanent answer, with broad policies, so a spoofed MAC lands in a device zone with wide access.
- Direct vendor tunnels: manufacturer VPNs or remote tools installed on modalities that bypass the vendor access zone. One weak remote login can reach a great deal: the Change Healthcare breach began with a remote access portal without MFA and ran for nine days before ransomware.
- Shared services left open: directory, file shares and management tools reachable from every zone, which gives ransomware (Data Encrypted for Impact, T1486) its path back into device zones.
- Expired device certificates: certificates deployed without renewal monitoring, so a batch of devices drops off the network on the same day.
Practitioner checklist
- A joint network, security and clinical engineering group owns the programme, with a clinical owner per device class.
- Passive discovery and flow capture cover a full clinical cycle and reconcile with the biomed asset database.
- Zones and an allowed-flow matrix exist for imaging, infusion, monitoring, lab, workstations, building systems, vendor access and guest.
- Guest and patient Wi-Fi are separated from every internal zone.
- Devices that support it use 802.1X with EAP-TLS; MAB devices have tight policies and spoofing alerts.
- Device and integration certificates have owners, an inventory and renewal alerts.
- All manufacturer remote support is brokered, MFA-protected, time-bound and recorded.
- Enforcement follows monitor mode, a pilot unit and a written rollback for every change.
- Boundary logs and NAC events reach the SOC with alerts for device-initiated lateral traffic.
- New devices are onboarded into a zone before go-live.
Standards and references
- NIST: SP 1800-24 Securing Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS)
- NIST: SP 1800-8 Securing Wireless Infusion Pumps in Healthcare Delivery Organizations
- ISO: IEC 80001-1:2021 Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating medical devices
- FDA: Cybersecurity in Medical Devices: Quality System Considerations and Content of Premarket Submissions
- NIST NCCoE: Securing Picture Archiving and Communication System project
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
- MITRE ATT&CK: Exploitation of Remote Services
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Medical Device Security Guide · Healthcare Identity Security Guide · Network Access Control (NAC) Guide · Network Segmentation Guide · HIPAA Security Rule Guide