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CMMC Scoping Guide: Asset Categories, Enclaves and Service Providers Done Right

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 14 min read
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In a CMMC Level 2 assessment, scope decides cost: every asset placed in the wrong category either adds assessment effort or hides a gap the assessor will find. The CMMC Program rule, 32 CFR Part 170, defines five asset categories for Level 2, sets out how each is documented and assessed, and treats external service providers and cloud service providers differently depending on what data they handle. This guide explains those categories, how to build a CUI enclave that keeps most of the business out of scope, how to handle managed service providers and cloud platforms, and where identity systems and service accounts sit. It is for compliance leads, IT managers and MSPs in the defence industrial base. For the requirements and the programme overview, see the NIST SP 800-171 and CMMC 2.0 Guide; this page goes deeper on scope.

Key takeaways

  • Five Level 2 categories, five treatments. CUI Assets and Security Protection Assets are assessed; Contractor Risk Managed Assets and Specialized Assets are reviewed through the SSP; Out-of-Scope Assets are not assessed but must be justified.
  • Security protection assets come with the data they protect. Identity providers, SIEM, EDR consoles, vulnerability scanners and password vaults that serve the CUI environment are in scope even if they never hold CUI.
  • An enclave shrinks scope only if separation is real. Out-of-scope status requires that an asset cannot process, store or transmit CUI, for example through physical or logical separation; shared admin accounts and credentials break that quickly.
  • Service providers follow the data. An ESP that handles CUI or Security Protection Data is in scope; a cloud provider handling CUI must meet FedRAMP Moderate or an equivalent under DoD policy.
  • Check the programme status. The DoD CIO states that Phase 1 began on 10 November 2025 and that Phase 2 requirements, originally scheduled for 10 November 2026, were suspended on 13 July 2026 (checked 27 October 2026). DFARS 252.204-7012 obligations still apply.

How CMMC defines scope

The rule defines the CMMC Assessment Scope as the set of all assets in the organisation seeking assessment (OSA) environment that will be assessed against CMMC security requirements. Section 170.19 then sets the rules per level.

  • Level 1: information systems that process, store or transmit Federal Contract Information (FCI) are in scope and self-assessed. Specialized Assets are excluded, there is no Contractor Risk Managed Asset category, and out-of-scope assets need no documentation. OSAs should consider the people, technology, facilities and ESPs that handle FCI.
  • Level 2: five asset categories (below) for environments handling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), assessed against the 110 requirements of NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2, either by self-assessment or by a Certified Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO).
  • Level 3: the scope must be equal to or a subset of the Level 2 scope. The rule gives the example of "a Level 3 data enclave with greater restrictions and protections within a Level 2 data enclave". At Level 3, Contractor Risk Managed Assets are treated as CUI Assets and Specialized Assets are assessed. See the NIST SP 800-172 Rev 3 Guide.

The five Level 2 asset categories

CategoryDefinition in 32 CFR 170.19 (summarised)OSA mustAssessor will
CUI AssetsAssets that process, store or transmit CUIList in asset inventory, document in the SSP, show on the scope network diagram, prepare for assessmentAssess against all Level 2 requirements
Security Protection Assets (SPA)Assets that provide security functions or capabilities to the assessment scopeSame documentation as CUI AssetsAssess against the Level 2 requirements relevant to the capabilities provided
Contractor Risk Managed Assets (CRMA)Assets that can, but are not intended to, process, store or transmit CUI because of security policy, procedures and practices; not required to be physically or logically separatedSame documentation set, plus show the policies and practices that keep CUI off themReview the SSP; a limited check only if documentation raises questions, which "shall not materially increase the assessment duration nor the assessment cost"
Specialized AssetsAssets that can process, store or transmit CUI but cannot be fully secured: IoT, IIoT, operational technology, Government Furnished Equipment, Restricted Information Systems and Test EquipmentInventory, SSP treatment, show they are managed under risk-based security policy, include on diagramReview the SSP; no assessment against other requirements
Out-of-Scope AssetsAssets that cannot process, store or transmit CUI and do not provide security protections for CUI Assets; includes assets physically or logically separated from CUI AssetsBe prepared to justify why the asset cannot process, store or transmit CUINone

The rule adds that an asset in any in-scope category cannot also be out of scope, and gives one specific example: an endpoint hosting a Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) client is out of scope if it is configured so that nothing beyond keyboard, video and mouse input and output reaches the client.

Choosing between CRMA and out of scope

  • CRMA suits corporate laptops that could technically open CUI but are prevented by policy, training, DLP or labelling. It is cheaper than full assessment, but the assessor can perform a limited check, and policy failures found there become findings.
  • Out of scope needs a technical reason the asset cannot handle CUI. If you cannot explain the barrier in one sentence (no network path, no credentials, VDI with clipboard and file transfer disabled), it is probably CRMA.
  • Small organisations often find a single well-defined enclave plus CRMA for everything else simpler than arguing out-of-scope status for many assets.

Security Protection Assets and Security Protection Data

The rule defines Security Protection Data (SPD) as data stored or processed by Security Protection Assets that are used to protect the assessed environment, including configuration data, logs, vulnerability status data and passwords that grant access to the in-scope environment. That definition drives most of the identity scope decisions.

Asset or serviceTypical categoryWhy
Identity provider, directory and MFA service for enclave usersSPAProvides identification and authentication to the CUI environment
Privileged access management and password vaults holding enclave credentialsSPAStore SPD: passwords that grant access to the in-scope environment
SIEM and log storage receiving enclave logsSPAProcess SPD (logs) and support audit requirements
EDR, patch and configuration management consolesSPAProvide security functions and can push changes into the enclave
Vulnerability scannersSPAHold vulnerability status data for in-scope assets
Backup systems storing enclave dataCUI AssetStore CUI; treat encrypted backups as CUI Assets unless current DoD guidance and your SSP support another treatment
Firewalls and network devices forming the enclave boundarySPAProvide the separation that defines scope

The practical consequence: a shared corporate identity platform or SIEM brings its admin plane into scope for the requirements relevant to what it does. Many organisations therefore give the enclave its own tenant or a dedicated, separately administered instance of these services.

Where identity and NHIs sit in scope

Credentials are the most common way an enclave boundary is quietly crossed. Plan these explicitly in the SSP.

  • Admin accounts: enclave administrators should use dedicated accounts that cannot sign in to out-of-scope systems, with MFA (32 CFR 170.24 deducts 3 or 5 points for IA.L2-3.5.3 gaps). See the Privileged Access Management Guide.
  • Service accounts and API keys: any account that can read enclave data or change enclave systems, including backup, monitoring, scanning, CI/CD and integration accounts, is part of the in-scope identity population. Record owner, purpose and rotation for each. See the Service Account Security Guide.
  • Credentials held outside the enclave: a password for an enclave account stored in a corporate password manager makes that password manager hold SPD. Either bring it into scope or use a separate vault.
  • MSP access: remote monitoring and management agents and the MSP's own admin accounts are paths into the enclave; treat them under the ESP rules below. See the GDAP and MSP Delegated Admin Access Guide.
  • Device identity: enclave endpoints should be uniquely identified and authenticated before connecting (device certificates or managed device compliance), which also supports the VDI out-of-scope argument.

The wider identity picture for defence contractors is covered in the Defence Industrial Base Identity Security Guide.

Enclave patterns

PatternHow it limits scopeTrade-offsFits
Whole organisation in scopeNo separation; everything is a CUI Asset, SPA or CRMASimplest architecture, largest assessment and control burdenSmall firms where most staff handle CUI
Cloud tenant enclaveCUI lives in a separate cloud tenant meeting FedRAMP Moderate or equivalent; only enclave users and devices access itLicensing and tenant administration cost; corporate collaboration split across tenantsFirms where a minority of staff handle CUI
VDI enclaveCUI stays in virtual desktops; endpoints configured for keyboard, video and mouse only can be out of scopeUser experience, offline work impossible, clipboard, printing and file transfer must be controlledEngineering teams accessing CUI part time
On-premises enclave networkDedicated network segment, systems and admin plane for CUIHardware and operations cost; separation must be maintained over timeManufacturing, labs, classified-adjacent work
Nested Level 3 enclaveLevel 3 enclave within the Level 2 enclave, as the rule's own exampleTwo scope sets to maintainContracts requiring Level 3 for a programme

See the Virtual Desktop (VDI) and DaaS Security Guide for hardening VDI so that the out-of-scope argument holds.

External service providers and cloud service providers

The rule treats an ESP as in scope only if CUI or Security Protection Data is processed, stored or transmitted on its assets. The table follows tables 4 and 6 of section 170.19.

What the provider handlesProvider is a CSPProvider is not a CSP (for example an MSP or MSSP)
CUI (with or without SPD)Must meet the FedRAMP requirements in DFARS 252.204-7012: FedRAMP Moderate (or higher) authorised, or FedRAMP Moderate equivalent in accordance with DoD policyIn scope; its services are assessed as part of the OSA's assessment
Security Protection Data onlyIn scope; assessed as Security Protection AssetsIn scope; assessed as Security Protection Assets
NeitherNot an ESP under the CMMC definitionNot an ESP under the CMMC definition
  • Documentation: the use of the ESP, its relationship to the OSA and the services provided must be documented in the SSP and described in the ESP's service description and customer responsibility matrix (CRM).
  • Connecting infrastructure: for both CSPs and other ESPs, the OSA's on-premises infrastructure that connects to the provider is in scope, and the CRM requirements must be documented in or referenced from the SSP.
  • Voluntary ESP certification: an ESP may obtain its own CMMC certification to reduce the effort in its customers' assessments.
  • DFARS cloud clause: 252.204-7012 (b)(2)(ii)(D) also requires the contractor to ensure the cloud provider complies with the clause's incident reporting, malicious software, media preservation, forensic access and damage assessment paragraphs.
  • Read the CRM line by line: every requirement marked "customer" or "shared" is yours to implement and evidence. See the FedRAMP Guide and the Cybersecurity for MSPs and MSSPs Guide.

Building and proving the scope

  1. Find the CUI: identify contracts with CUI, the CUI categories and markings, and where CUI arrives (email, portals, file shares, removable media). See the CUI Guide.
  2. Map flows: trace CUI from arrival through processing, storage, backup and disposal, including people and facilities.
  3. Choose the enclave pattern: decide what will be CUI Assets and what can be CRMA or out of scope, before buying anything.
  4. Classify every asset: build the asset inventory with a category, owner and justification column; include SPAs, Specialized Assets and ESP services.
  5. Trace credentials and management paths: list every account, agent and console that can reach CUI Assets, and either bring its source into scope or remove the path.
  6. Draw the scope diagram: show the boundary, SPAs, ESP connections and data flows. Assessors use it to test your story.
  7. Write the SSP treatment: for each category, describe how it is protected, with CRMA policies and Specialized Asset risk treatment explicit. An up-to-date SSP is mandatory; without it the assessment cannot be completed.
  8. Test separation: attempt to reach enclave systems and data from out-of-scope networks and accounts; try file transfer, clipboard and printing from VDI sessions; record results.
  9. Self-assess and remediate: score against the requirements using 32 CFR 170.24, close gaps, and remember the POA&M limits in 170.21 (minimum score ratio of 0.8, only certain 1-point items, closeout within 180 days).
  10. Maintain: rerun classification on every change to network, identity platform, ESP contracts or CUI flows, and before each annual affirmation.

Detection and metrics

  • Boundary monitoring: alert on new network paths, peering, VPN or remote access into the enclave, and on sign-ins to enclave systems from non-enclave devices or accounts.
  • Data monitoring: DLP or labelling alerts for CUI markings found on CRMA or out-of-scope systems; each one is a scoping incident.
  • Metric: classification coverage, share of discovered assets with a category and justification.
  • Metric: credential containment, number of accounts with rights both inside and outside the enclave (target near zero outside named SPAs).
  • Metric: CUI spill rate, CUI found outside the enclave per quarter.
  • Metric: CRM coverage, share of customer-responsibility items for each ESP with an owner and evidence.

Framework mapping

Scoping activityCMMC Level 2 (SP 800-171 Rev. 2)SP 800-171 Rev. 3NIST CSF 2.0
Asset inventory with categoriesCM.L2-3.4.103.04.10 System Component InventoryID.AM-01
Scope diagram and data flowsCA.L2-3.12.4 (SSP)03.15.02 System Security PlanID.AM-03
Boundary and enclave separationSC.L2-3.13.1, SC.L2-3.13.603.13.01, 03.13.06PR.IR-01
Enclave identities and admin separationIA.L2-3.5.1, IA.L2-3.5.3, AC.L2-3.1.503.05.01, 03.05.03, 03.01.05PR.AA-01, PR.AA-05
ESP and CSP oversightSSP and CRM documentation03.17.01 Supply Chain Risk Management PlanGV.SC-05, GV.SC-07

Common failure patterns

  • Logical separation in name only: an enclave VLAN or tenant administered by the same accounts that administer everything else, so the corporate admin plane is effectively in scope.
  • Forgotten SPAs: SIEM, EDR, backup, scanning and password vaults left off the inventory, then found during interviews.
  • VDI that leaks: endpoints declared out of scope while clipboard, drive mapping, printing or file transfer remain enabled.
  • CRMA without evidence: laptops declared CRMA with no policy, training or technical control that actually keeps CUI off them.
  • Unread CRMs: cloud or MSP responsibility matrices never mapped to owners, leaving shared requirements unimplemented.
  • Scope frozen at assessment: new integrations, AI tools or file-sharing services added to the enclave without reclassification.

Practitioner checklist

  • Confirm which contracts require CMMC and at what level, and check the DoD CIO page for current phase status.
  • Map CUI flows and choose an enclave pattern before procurement.
  • Classify every asset into one of the five categories with a written justification.
  • List all Security Protection Assets, including identity, vault, SIEM, EDR, scanning and backup services.
  • Give enclave administrators and service accounts dedicated identities with MFA and recorded owners.
  • For each ESP and CSP, record what it handles, its FedRAMP or assessment status, and map its CRM to owners.
  • Test the boundary from out-of-scope networks and accounts, including VDI data transfer paths.
  • Keep the SSP, inventory and scope diagram consistent and update them on every significant change.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: NIST SP 800-171 and CMMC 2.0 Guide · CMMC 2.0 Level 2 Assessment Guide · NIST SP 800-171A Rev 3 Assessment Guide · System Security Plan Template and Guide · Defence Industrial Base Identity Security Guide. This guide summarises the CMMC scoping rules in 32 CFR Part 170 and is not legal advice.

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org