A Common Criteria certificate says that a specific configuration of a product met a specific set of security requirements at a specific assurance level, and buyers routinely read far more into it than that. Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408, with the evaluation methodology in ISO/IEC 18045) is the international basis for security evaluation of products such as firewalls, smart cards, hardware security modules and operating systems. It underpins government procurement rules in many countries and, since February 2025, the EU's EUCC certification scheme. This guide explains the concepts (TOE, Protection Profile, Security Target, conformance), the assurance levels, how an evaluation runs, how certificates are recognised across borders, and how to read a certificate before you rely on it. It is for product security teams preparing for evaluation and for buyers, architects and assessors who use certificates in procurement.
Key takeaways
- The scope is the Target of Evaluation, not the product name. Read the Security Target to see exactly which version, configuration and functions were evaluated.
- Assurance level and requirements are separate. An EAL says how rigorously claims were checked; the Security Target or Protection Profile says what was claimed.
- Recognition has limits. The CCRA mutually recognises evaluations against collaborative Protection Profiles or up to EAL2 plus ALC_FLR; higher levels depend on national or regional arrangements such as EUCC.
- CC:2022 is the current version. It replaced CC v3.1 Revision 5, split the standard into five parts and introduced exact conformance, which collaborative Protection Profiles rely on.
- Certificates age. EUCC certificates last at most five years, and vulnerabilities found after certification have to be handled under the scheme's rules.
What Common Criteria is and its current versions
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation is maintained by the Common Criteria Maintenance Board and published both on the Common Criteria Portal and as the ISO/IEC 15408 series. The current portal version is CC:2022 Revision 1 (November 2022), with the companion Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM). ISO published the 2022 edition of ISO/IEC 15408-1 on 9 August 2022; the ISO catalogue now lists it as withdrawn from 19 May 2026 and replaced by ISO/IEC 15408-1:2026, so check which edition a scheme references.
| Part | ISO/IEC 15408 title | What it contains |
|---|---|---|
| Part 1 | Introduction and general model | Concepts: TOE, PP, ST, packages, conformance types, composition |
| Part 2 | Security functional components | Catalogue of functional requirements, grouped in classes such as identification and authentication (FIA) and cryptographic support (FCS) |
| Part 3 | Security assurance components | Assurance classes ADV development, AGD guidance, ALC life-cycle support, ASE Security Target evaluation, ATE tests and AVA vulnerability assessment |
| Part 4 | Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities | New in CC:2022: how PPs can specify their own evaluation activities |
| Part 5 | Pre-defined packages of security requirements | New in CC:2022: the EALs and composed assurance packages |
| ISO/IEC 18045 (CEM) | Methodology for IT security evaluation | The work units evaluators follow |
CC:2022 Part 1 lists the main changes from CC v3.1 Revision 5 (2017): restructuring into five parts, updated terminology, new functional and assurance requirements, exact conformance, removal of low-assurance PPs in favour of direct rationale PPs, and multi-assurance evaluation and composition of assurance.
Core concepts
- Target of Evaluation (TOE): the set of software, firmware and hardware, possibly with guidance, that is evaluated. It may be a whole product, part of one or several products.
- Protection Profile (PP): an implementation-independent statement of security needs for a type of TOE, such as a network device or a smart card. Written by user communities, governments or technical communities.
- PP-Module and PP-Configuration: a PP-Module adds requirements to one or more base PPs, often for a specific technology; a PP-Configuration combines a base PP with modules into one specification.
- Security Target (ST): the implementation-dependent statement for a specific TOE: the security problem definition, objectives, functional requirements, assurance requirements and the TOE summary specification. The public ST is the most important document for a buyer.
- Packages: reusable named sets of functional or assurance requirements; the EALs are assurance packages.
Conformance types
| Type | Meaning | Typical use |
|---|---|---|
| Strict | All PP requirements appear in the ST; the ST may add more | Government PPs where extra claims are acceptable |
| Demonstrable | The ST provides an equivalent or more restrictive solution to the same generic problem | Flexible PPs, such as some smart card profiles |
| Exact | The ST draws only from the PP or PP-Configuration and cannot go beyond it | Collaborative PPs, so results are comparable between products and schemes |
Assurance levels
CC:2022 Part 5 defines seven Evaluation Assurance Levels. Each adds rigour in design evidence, testing and vulnerability analysis; the vulnerability analysis component (AVA_VAN) is the clearest indicator of the attacker strength considered.
| EAL | Name (CC:2022 Part 5) | AVA_VAN | EUCC assurance level |
|---|---|---|---|
| EAL1 | Functionally tested | AVA_VAN.1 | Substantial |
| EAL2 | Structurally tested | AVA_VAN.2 | Substantial |
| EAL3 | Methodically tested and checked | AVA_VAN.2 | Substantial |
| EAL4 | Methodically designed, tested and reviewed | AVA_VAN.3 | High |
| EAL5 | Semi-formally designed and tested | AVA_VAN.4 | High |
| EAL6 | Semi-formally verified design and tested | AVA_VAN.5 | High |
| EAL7 | Formally verified design and tested | AVA_VAN.5 | High |
The EUCC column follows Article 4 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482, which maps assurance level "substantial" to AVA_VAN.1 or 2 and "high" to AVA_VAN.3, 4 or 5, so EUCC level depends on the vulnerability analysis component, not the EAL number. Evaluations are often augmented, written for example as "EAL4+" or "EAL4 augmented with ALC_FLR.2 and AVA_VAN.5". ALC_FLR (flaw remediation) is in no EAL and is the most common augmentation, because it shows the developer has a process for fixing reported flaws. Part 5 also defines composed assurance packages CAP-A, CAP-B and CAP-C, which use ACO_VUL rather than AVA_VAN, for products built from already evaluated components.
How an evaluation runs
- Choose the scheme and the requirements: select a national or regional certification scheme and either a Protection Profile (required in some markets) or an EAL with augmentations. In US federal procurement, SP 800-53 control SA-4(7) limits information assurance products to those evaluated against a NIAP-approved Protection Profile where one exists.
- Define the TOE and write the Security Target: decide the evaluated configuration, boundaries and operational environment assumptions. Scope decisions here drive cost and usefulness.
- Prepare evidence: design documentation (ADV), guidance (AGD), life-cycle and configuration management evidence (ALC), developer tests (ATE). Higher EALs need much more design detail.
- Evaluation by an accredited laboratory: the evaluation facility checks the ST (ASE), assesses evidence using the CEM work units, repeats tests and performs vulnerability analysis and penetration testing to the AVA_VAN level claimed.
- Certification: the certification body reviews the evaluation technical report, issues the certificate and certification report, and lists the product with its public ST.
- Maintain: handle new versions through the scheme's assurance continuity process, and vulnerabilities through its vulnerability handling rules, or the certificate drifts away from the product actually shipped.
Testing before committing: run a gap assessment against the chosen PP and a mock ST review with the laboratory before formal start; it is the cheapest way to find scope problems. If the evaluation stalls, reduce the TOE scope or drop an augmentation rather than abandoning the evaluation.
Recognition: CCRA, EUCC and national schemes
| Arrangement | What is recognised | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| CCRA (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, 2 July 2014) | Certificates against collaborative PPs (assurance activities up to EAL4 and ALC_FLR, developed by International Technical Communities), or EAL1 to EAL2 plus ALC_FLR.2 | Participants are certificate-authorising (they run certification bodies) or certificate-consuming |
| EUCC (Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482) | EU-wide certificates at substantial or high, based on ISO/IEC 15408 and 18045, applying from 27 February 2025 | Built on the earlier SOG-IS framework; national schemes covered by EUCC stopped producing effects 12 months after entry into force; amended in December 2024 and December 2025 |
| National schemes | Certificates issued under each country's scheme, at any level the scheme supports | Acceptance above CCRA scope depends on the buyer's government |
Collaborative Protection Profiles
Collaborative PPs (cPPs) are the route most commercial IT products take for international recognition. Under Annex K of the CCRA they are developed by International Technical Communities endorsed by the CCRA Management Committee, bringing together schemes, laboratories and vendors for a technology type. Annex K notes that cPPs generally include assurance components only up to EAL2, unless the technical community shows that activities up to EAL4 can be reproduced across schemes. What makes cPP results comparable is that they specify their own evaluation activities (the approach CC:2022 Part 4 formalises) and use exact conformance, so two products evaluated against the same cPP have been tested against the same claims in the same way.
The practical consequence for buyers is that a cPP certificate tells you more about comparability than an EAL claim does: you know which tests were run, and the PP's own documents describe the threats it addresses. For vendors, cPPs reduce the scope negotiation that drives cost in EAL-based evaluations, but leave little room to claim product-specific features, which have to be covered by PP-Modules or not at all.
EUCC adds obligations beyond classic CC practice: certificates are valid for a maximum of five years (Article 12, with exceptions approved by the national authority), the certification body sets remedial deadlines of no more than 30 days when a vulnerability affects compliance, and suspensions last at most 42 days. ENISA publishes state-of-the-art documents (for example for smart cards and hardware devices with security boxes) that define how evaluations in those domains must be done. For the EU scheme in detail, see the EU Cybersecurity Certification EUCC Guide; for the wider EU framework, see the EU Cybersecurity Act and EUCS Guide.
Reading a certificate as a buyer
| Question | Where to find the answer | Red flag |
|---|---|---|
| Which version and configuration were evaluated? | ST TOE description and certification report | Your deployed version or mode is not the evaluated one |
| Which security functions were in scope? | ST security functional requirements and TOE summary specification | The function you care about (for example the admin interface or key storage) is in the environment, not the TOE |
| What did the environment have to provide? | ST assumptions and objectives for the operational environment | Assumptions you cannot meet, such as a physically protected location |
| What assurance level, and what AVA_VAN? | Certificate and ST assurance requirements | A high EAL with low AVA_VAN, or no ALC_FLR |
| Was it a PP evaluation? | ST conformance claims | No PP claim where a relevant PP exists |
| Is it current? | Certificate date, scheme status, maintenance reports | Expired, archived or several major versions old |
Decision guidance: use CC certification as a hard requirement where regulation or a buyer's government demands it (national security procurement, qualified signature devices, EUCC-mandated contexts) and as one input elsewhere. For general enterprise purchasing, a current PP-based certificate is good evidence about the evaluated functions; it does not replace your own testing of the deployed configuration, secure development evidence or vulnerability response track record. Small vendors should target a single collaborative PP for their product type, which keeps cost bounded and gains CCRA recognition; large vendors selling to governments often maintain several schemes and PPs and need an assurance continuity process built into release management.
Where identity fits
Many evaluated products exist to protect identities and keys: smart cards and secure elements, PIV and qualified signature devices, HSMs, network devices with administrative authentication, and operating systems. For these, check the identification and authentication (FIA) and cryptographic support (FCS) requirements in the ST, how administrator and service credentials are protected, and whether key generation and storage were in the TOE. Validation of the cryptographic module itself is a separate programme in many markets: see the FIPS 140-3 and Cryptographic Module Validation Guide, the HSM Deployment and Operations Guide and the Smart Card and PIV/CAC Authentication Guide.
Measuring a certification programme
- Certificate currency: percentage of shipped product versions covered by a current certificate or maintenance report.
- Time to certificate: months from evaluation start to certificate, tracked per evaluation.
- Vulnerability response: days from a reported vulnerability affecting a certified product to remediation, against scheme deadlines such as EUCC's 30-day maximum.
- Procurement coverage (buyers): percentage of products in regulated categories with a relevant current certificate.
- Configuration match (buyers): percentage of deployments running the evaluated configuration.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | SA-4 Acquisition Process; SA-4(7) NIAP-approved Protection Profiles; SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation; SR-5 Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods | Requiring evaluated products and developer evidence in acquisition |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | GV.SC-05 supply chain requirements in contracts; ID.RA-09 authenticity and integrity of hardware and software assessed before acquisition | Certification as supplier and product assurance evidence |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Annex A 5.20 Addressing information security within supplier agreements; 8.29 Security testing in development and acceptance | Specifying and accepting evaluated products |
| EU law | Cybersecurity Act certification framework; EUCC Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 | EU-wide product certification. See the EU Cyber Resilience Act Guide for product obligations that may draw on certification |
Common failure patterns
- Buying the name, not the TOE: the certified scope excludes the feature or mode in use, so the certificate says nothing about it.
- Treating EAL as strength of security: a high EAL against a weak Security Target can claim less than a lower EAL against a demanding Protection Profile.
- Ignoring the operational environment: ST assumptions (trusted administrators, physical protection, network separation) are not met in deployment.
- Stale certificates: products are bought years after certification, with no maintenance reports for current versions.
- Developer underestimating evidence: design and life-cycle documentation is written after the fact, causing long delays at the laboratory.
- No flaw remediation process: evaluations without ALC_FLR, and vendors without a working PSIRT, cannot meet EUCC vulnerability handling deadlines. See the PSIRT Guide.
Practitioner checklist
- Read the public Security Target and certification report, not just the certificate, before relying on it.
- Confirm the deployed version and configuration match the evaluated TOE.
- Check the AVA_VAN component and any ALC_FLR augmentation, not only the EAL.
- Prefer evaluations against a relevant Protection Profile where one exists.
- Verify certificate status and maintenance reports with the issuing scheme.
- Confirm you can meet the ST's operational environment assumptions.
- For vendors: run a gap assessment against the target PP and agree the TOE scope with the laboratory first.
- For vendors: build assurance continuity and vulnerability handling into release and PSIRT processes.
- For EU markets: plan for EUCC's five-year validity and vulnerability deadlines.
Standards and references
- Common Criteria: CC:2022 Revision 1 Part 1 Introduction and general model
- Common Criteria: CC:2022 Revision 1 Part 5 Pre-defined packages of security requirements
- ISO: ISO/IEC 15408-1 Evaluation criteria for IT security, Part 1
- Common Criteria: Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates
- EUR-Lex: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/482 (EUCC)
- ENISA: EUCC Certification Scheme
- NIST: SP 800-53 Rev. 5
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: EU Cybersecurity Certification EUCC Guide · EU Cybersecurity Act and EUCS Guide · FIPS 140-3 and Cryptographic Module Validation Guide · Product Security Laws Map