Lessons Learned from Red Hat GitLab Breach: How Embedded Credentials Can Compromise Security

Read full article here: https://aembit.io/blog/red-hats-gitlab-breach-and-the-cost-of-embedded-credentials/?utm_source=nhimg.org

Open-source software leader Red Hat recently confirmed a breach of one of its GitLab instances dedicated to consulting engagements. The attackers, known as “Crimson Collective,” reportedly exfiltrated nearly 28,000 private repositories and approximately 800 Customer Engagement Reports (CERs). CERs often contain highly sensitive information, including network diagrams, configuration details, authentication tokens, and database URIs—effectively combining context with credentials and creating a high-value target for attackers.

The exposed client roster spans major banks, telecom companies, and U.S. government entities. Although Red Hat emphasized the breach impacts only its consulting division, the incident highlights the risks of supply-chain exposure when static credentials and architectural details are shared with third parties. Consulting repositories often serve as both operational documentation and credential stores, making them potential launchpads for lateral movement into customer environments.

Historical patterns show that long-lived credentials in GitLab and GitHub repositories have repeatedly resulted in data breaches. Recent incidents at Pearson, the Internet Archive, and Salesforce demonstrate that static tokens, OAuth keys, and cloud service credentials are prime targets. With agentic AI workloads increasingly interacting with traditional CI/CD pipelines, the proliferation of non-human identities in repositories and pipelines is creating an expanding attack surface.

Key takeaways for security teams include:

• Codebases are not neutral storage: Repositories often contain embedded secrets, environment variables, and configuration files that act as de facto credential vaults.

• Third-party deliverables carry hidden risk: Even carefully prepared consulting outputs can embed more operational data than intended, blurring the line between vendor and customer environments.

• Autonomous AI agents inherit static secrets: Without identity-based access, AI agents reuse credentials across contexts, potentially propagating risk directly into production systems.

Recommended Actions

1. Immediate Credential Rotation: Any token, key, or service account used in Red Hat engagements should be considered compromised and rotated immediately.
2. Assume Secondary Exposure: Audit downstream providers and partners that may have accessed your environment using Red Hat-managed credentials.
3. Repository Secret Audits: Scan codebases systematically for embedded tokens, environment variables, and configuration files. GitHub alone reported over 39 million leaked secrets in 2024.
4. Revisit Consulting Practices: Avoid embedding live credentials or full connection strings in deliverables; use ephemeral, policy-scoped credentials.
5. Adopt Secretless Access: Implement workload identity federation and just-in-time, identity-based credentials for CI/CD platforms and AI agents to eliminate static token accumulation.

The broader lesson is clear: static credentials spread across repositories and third-party deliverables erode trust and magnify supply-chain risks. Attackers exploit these artifacts as both a map and a key to enterprise environments. Until organizations adopt secretless, identity-first access for non-human identities, breaches like Red Hat’s will remain inevitable.