NHI Forum
Read full article here: https://www.unosecur.com/blog/exposed-cloud-keys-and-tokens-what-tata-motors-data-exposure-teaches-about-secrets-management/?utm_source=nhimg
In 2023, several public-facing digital assets tied to Tata Motors inadvertently exposed sensitive cloud credentials. AWS access keys and third-party API tokens were embedded in client-side code, providing access to:
- Hundreds of S3 buckets
- A Tableau analytics instance
- A fleet-management integration
Altogether, this exposure amounted to over 70 TB of sensitive data.
Examples of misconfigurations included:
- E-Dukaan marketplace website: AWS keys directly in frontend JavaScript.
- FleetEdge fleet-management product: “Client-side encrypted” keys with decryption logic included in the same script.
- Tableau integration: “Trusted tokens” issued using only username and site name, without a password, allowing account impersonation.
- Test-drive tracking portal: Exposed a valid Azuga API key, giving programmatic access to vehicle and fleet data.
All credentials were reportedly rotated after coordinated disclosure via CERT IN, but the incident illustrates how ordinary configuration mistakes can escalate into full-scale identity exposures in the cloud.
Why the Issue Matters
Credential compromise is now the leading cause of cloud incidents. Research shows that over one-third of cloud breaches start with valid keys rather than malware. Unlike traditional attacks, these intrusions bypass network controls because activity originates from seemingly authorized users or applications.
Impacts observed in this case included:
- Broad exposure of internal and customer data, including invoices with PANs and fleet telemetry.
- Write access to production systems via mis-scoped or client-side keys.
- Reputational damage and regulatory risk for a high-profile enterprise.
The root cause? Unmanaged secrets and slow remediation, not sophisticated hacking.
How the Exposure Happened
Multiple weak points across Tata Motors’ digital ecosystem contributed:
- E-Dukaan portal: AWS keys in JavaScript allowed anyone to enumerate or modify S3 data.
- FleetEdge product: Client-side “encrypted” keys were trivially retrievable, exposing decades of fleet telemetry (70+ TB).
- Tableau integration: Front-end code could issue admin-level tokens with no password verification.
- Test-drive portal: Azuga API key exposed sensitive fleet information.
Common thread: secrets were pushed to the client layer instead of being secured within a controlled identity fabric.
Signals to Track
Organizations can detect similar exposures proactively by monitoring:
- AWS Access Key IDs appearing in public repositories or web bundles.
- Unusual AWS API calls like GetCallerIdentity or ListBucket from unfamiliar IPs.
- Token-generation events without multi-factor authentication or password verification.
- Credentials older than 90 days or previously unused suddenly becoming active.
- Unexpected cross-account role assumptions or automated API calls from unknown origins.
These subtle signals often surface days before the visible impact, offering a critical window for containment.
Actionable Recommendations
To strengthen cloud credential hygiene and prevent similar incidents:
- Remove all secrets from public assets, never embed credentials in client-side code or repositories.
- Rotate credentials regularly, ideally every 90 days, with automated expiry policies.
- Apply the principle of least privilege: replace static keys with short-lived, role-based credentials.
- Enforce multi-factor authentication and strict token scoping for administrative and integration accounts.
- Continuous scanning within CI/CD pipelines to detect exposed credentials before deployment.
- Implement automated response workflows to revoke and rotate compromised keys immediately.
- Review third-party integrations to ensure partner APIs meet the same standards for rotation, logging, and access scoping.
Conclusion & Key Takeaways
The Tata Motors exposure underscores that credential hygiene is as critical as perimeter defense. Even a single leaked key can expose decades of operational data.
Key lessons:
- Never embed credentials in client-facing code.
- Enforce least privilege with temporary roles.
- Monitor identity usage continuously across cloud, SaaS, and hybrid environments.
Platforms like Unosecur operationalize these principles by correlating identity signals in real time, detecting exposed or misused credentials, and automating remediation—shortening the gap between exposure and containment from days to minutes.