In October 2026 an attacker used a credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup, the Microsoft 365 backup service formerly sold as SkyKick, to sign in to customer tenants as the backup application itself. Huntress, which first reported the activity on 16 October 2026, counted 162 tenants with confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in its own customer base on 15 October. Because these were application sign-ins with no user involved, multi-factor authentication never applied. In about 50 tenants, related ConnectWise Cloud Management service principals gave themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator, and in one tenant an app added itself to Global Administrator and planted new secrets on other applications. ConnectWise says it spotted the issue on 14 October, disabled seven application identities on 17 October and suspended Cloud Backup for all users. It has not said how the credential was exposed. Todyl reports that Microsoft has linked the activity to Storm-0940, a China-aligned actor.
Key takeaways
- Huntress found 162 Microsoft 365 tenants with confirmed unauthorised sign-ins by the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application on 15 October 2026, and close to 1,000 Entra tenants with sign-ins from the attacker's address, over 300 of them successful.
- Todyl says the attacker presented the backup app's own credential through the OAuth client credentials flow, so no user was phished and MFA played no part. The app already held tenant-wide read and write access to mail, files and Teams chats.
- Huntress saw Cloud Management service principals assign themselves directory roles in about 50 tenants, and in one tenant add themselves to Global Administrator and add client secrets to two other applications for persistence.
- ConnectWise disabled seven application identities and revoked certificates on 17 October 2026, which stopped Cloud Backup for every customer. It says it has "no indicators to date" that backup data was compromised, and the exposure mechanism is still under analysis.
- The identity lesson: a vendor's multi-tenant app secret is a skeleton key to every tenant that consented to it, and nothing on the customer side stops it from signing in.
At a glance
| Organisations | ConnectWise (Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, and Cloud Management); managed service providers and their Microsoft 365 customer tenants, including law firms and organisations in policy, national security, trade and critical minerals sectors (per Huntress) |
|---|---|
| When | Password spraying from 10 to 14 October 2026; application sign-ins and role changes on 15 October 2026; first public report by Huntress on 16 October 2026; ConnectWise disabled the apps on 17 October 2026 |
| Attacker | Not named by ConnectWise. Todyl reports that Microsoft attributed the activity on 21 October 2026 to Storm-0940, a China-state aligned actor; we have not read Microsoft's statement directly |
| Entry point | A stolen credential for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup multi-tenant Entra ID application, used to request tokens for customer tenants; how it was obtained has not been disclosed |
| Identities abused | The Cloud Backup service principal and its client credential; ConnectWise Cloud Management service principals (Teams, Exchange Online, Graph and others); client secrets added to an MSP management app and a Huntress application |
| Impact | 162 tenants with confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in Huntress's base; directory roles self-assigned in about 50 tenants; Global Administrator in one tenant; Cloud Backup suspended for all customers; no confirmed compromise of backup archives according to ConnectWise |
| Category | NHI. Incident class: confirmed NHI breach (stolen vendor app secret used to sign in to customer Microsoft 365 tenants) |
What happened
ConnectWise Cloud Backup protects Microsoft 365 mail, OneDrive, SharePoint and Teams data for managed service providers and their clients. Like most SaaS backup tools it works through a multi-tenant application in Microsoft Entra ID: each customer consents once, and the vendor's service principal then reads and restores data across the whole tenant without any user signing in. Todyl lists the permissions behind that consent as read and write access to mail and attachments, including full mailbox access through Exchange Web Services, read and write access to OneDrive and SharePoint files and to Teams chats, and the ability to restore data into the tenant. BleepingComputer reports that Microsoft Threat Intelligence assessed the attacker likely abused existing permissions including Directory.ReadWrite.All.
Huntress analyst Jonathan Semon published the first account on 16 October 2026. Between 13 and 14 October an address at 144.172.64.128 password-sprayed four law firm tenants without success. On 15 October the same address began acquiring tokens as the Cloud Backup application. Todyl, which saw one automated sign-in per tenant between 07:11 and 08:47 UTC, says the actor "presented the app's client secret" using the client credentials flow. "One stolen vendor credential reached thousands of tenants without phishing a single user or touching a single endpoint," Todyl wrote. By 19:00 UTC on 16 October Huntress had confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 162 tenants, and found close to 1,000 Entra tenants across its review with sign-ins from that address, more than 300 of them successful.
The attacker did not stop at the backup app. From 01:58 UTC on 15 October Huntress saw ConnectWise Cloud Management service principals assign themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator, in about 50 tenants. In one tenant the Cloud Management Teams app added itself to Global Administrator, and a script then added client secrets, valid until 2028, to an MSP management application and to Huntress's own application. Huntress later removed the unauthorised credential from its app. It also describes a targeted sweep later on 15 October against 16 tenants in policy, national security, trade and critical minerals.
ConnectWise says it identified the issue through its own monitoring on 14 October and disabled seven application identities at 07:00 UTC on 17 October, revoking the certificates used for the affected connections. As quoted by The Hacker News, it warned that "Previously issued access tokens may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated," and that "the exact credential-exposure mechanism is the subject of an ongoing analysis." BleepingComputer quotes the company as saying "We have no indicators to date that Cloud Backup partner backup data has been compromised." Scheduled backups, archive access and restores were unavailable while the apps stayed off. Todyl's updated post says Microsoft, on 21 October, linked the activity to Storm-0940 and saw spraying against more than 2,250 tenants from the same range, and in some environments new app credentials, privileged role changes and reads of Azure Key Vault secrets.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 10 October 2026 | Password spraying from the 144.172.64.0 range begins, according to Huntress and to Microsoft as reported by Todyl. |
| 13 October 2026 | Huntress sees scripted password spraying against four law firm tenants from 144.172.64.128, continuing into 14 October. |
| 14 October 2026 | ConnectWise says its security monitoring identified the issue. |
| 15 October 2026 | Cloud Management service principals self-assign directory roles in about 50 tenants from 01:58 UTC; Global Administrator added in one tenant; Cloud Backup app sign-ins across many tenants in the morning; targeted sweep of 16 tenants until about 14:20 UTC. |
| 16 October 2026 | Huntress publishes the first public report and confirms 162 tenants with unauthorised sign-ins; Todyl publishes its investigation. |
| 17 October 2026 | ConnectWise disables seven application identities at 07:00 UTC and suspends Cloud Backup; BleepingComputer reports the attack. |
| 18 October 2026 | ConnectWise says backups are not running and archives remain encrypted and isolated; The Hacker News reports the suspension. |
| 21 October 2026 | Microsoft attributes the activity to Storm-0940, according to Todyl's updated post. |
How it happened: the identity attack path
- Vendor credential obtained. The attacker obtained a credential for the Cloud Backup multi-tenant application. ConnectWise has not said how; its analysis was still open at the time of writing.
- Sign in as the application. Using the OAuth client credentials flow, the attacker requested tokens for each customer tenant that had consented to the app. No user, password or MFA prompt was involved, so user-focused controls saw nothing.
- Use inherited consent. The tokens carried the permissions customers had already granted: tenant-wide mail, file and Teams access, plus directory write rights, according to Todyl and Microsoft as reported by BleepingComputer.
- Escalate through sibling apps. ConnectWise Cloud Management service principals assigned themselves Exchange Administrator in about 50 tenants and Global Administrator in one, per Huntress.
- Plant persistence on other apps. In that tenant, new client secrets were added to an MSP management app and a security vendor's app, giving the attacker credentials that would survive the ConnectWise apps being disabled.
- Targeted collection. A smaller set of high-value tenants was then swept through Graph, Exchange Online, SharePoint and Teams.
Impact
- Confirmed: 162 tenants with unauthorised Cloud Backup sign-ins in Huntress's customer base; self-assigned directory roles in about 50 tenants; Global Administrator and new app secrets in one tenant (Huntress). Huntress's 19 October update confirmed post-compromise activity in two tenants.
- Service impact: Cloud Backup suspended for all customers from 17 October 2026, with no scheduled backups, archive access or restores while the apps were disabled. ConnectWise also took SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline temporarily, according to The Hacker News.
- Not confirmed: ConnectWise says it has no indicators that backup archives were compromised. How much mailbox or file data was read across all tenants has not been disclosed; Todyl found no mailbox or file read records in the tenants it examined.
- Wider: Every tenant that consented to the affected apps had to hunt for added credentials and roles and go without backups while the vendor rotated credentials. Microsoft's wider findings, including Key Vault secret reads, reach us only through Todyl's summary.
What this means for NHI governance
This is an NHI breach from start to finish. The attacker never needed a human account in any victim tenant. A single vendor-held app credential turned into hundreds of authenticated sessions, and the escalation that followed was done by other service principals granting themselves roles. It sits alongside the Commvault Metallic app secret breach and the Mimecast certificate compromise, where a backup or email security vendor's credential gave access to customers' Microsoft 365 tenants.
The lesson for customers is that consenting to a multi-tenant app means trusting how the vendor stores and rotates its secret, and that disabling the app is only half the response. Huntress points out that disabling does not remove credentials the attacker added to other apps, and both Huntress and Todyl ask defenders to hunt for persistence, not just sign-ins. Our Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide and Third-Party Access Guide cover how to scope and review these grants. The same pattern of a vendor holding customer keys appears in the UpdraftCentral key theft from the same week.
Recommendations
- Disable the affected apps, do not delete them. Huntress and Todyl both advise disabling the ConnectWise and SkyKick enterprise apps (Cloud Backup app ID 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae) so they can be re-enabled without new consent once ConnectWise confirms credentials are reset. Export the granted permissions first. See our Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide.
- Hunt for persistence on every application. Review client secrets and certificates on all enterprise apps and app registrations for anything added since 13 October 2026, and remove directory roles held by vendor apps that you did not grant on purpose. See our OAuth Token Theft Incident Playbook.
- Look in service principal sign-in logs. Application sign-ins do not appear in user sign-in logs. Search service principal sign-ins and directory audit logs, and export them now if you are on Entra ID Free, where Todyl notes retention is seven days. See our ITDR Guide.
- Apply Conditional Access to workload identities. Restricting where a vendor's service principal can sign in from would have blocked sign-ins from an unexpected address. Review any Conditional Access exclusions that cover vendor apps.
- Cut standing permissions on multi-tenant apps. Remove unused vendor apps, challenge grants such as Directory.ReadWrite.All, and limit who holds Application Administrator and Cloud Application Administrator roles. See our Third-Party Access Guide.
- Ask vendors how they protect their app credentials. Contracts and reviews should cover whether the vendor uses certificates or federated credentials rather than static secrets, how often they rotate, and how fast they will tell you about exposure. MSPs should also review delegated admin access; see our Compromised MSP Playbook.
Frequently asked questions
What happened in the ConnectWise Cloud Backup breach?
In October 2026 an attacker used a stolen credential for the ConnectWise Cloud Backup Microsoft 365 application to sign in to customer tenants as the app. Huntress confirmed unauthorised sign-ins in 162 tenants it monitors, and related ConnectWise service principals gave themselves admin roles in about 50 tenants. ConnectWise disabled seven application identities on 17 October 2026 and suspended the service.
Why did MFA not stop the ConnectWise attack?
MFA protects people, not applications. The attacker authenticated as the backup app using the OAuth client credentials flow, which takes only the app's ID and its credential. No user signed in, so there was nothing to prompt. Controls that apply to workload identities, such as Conditional Access for service principals and monitoring of service principal sign-ins, are what would have helped.
Was ConnectWise Cloud Backup data stolen?
ConnectWise says it has no indicators to date that partner backup data was compromised and that archives remain encrypted and isolated. That statement covers the backup archives, not the customer tenants. The app's access gave the attacker the technical ability to read mail, files and Teams chats inside tenants, and ConnectWise said its finding does not establish the status of downstream customer environments.
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources
Commvault Metallic app secret breach 2025 · UpdraftCentral key theft 2026 · Mimecast certificate compromise 2021 · Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide · Service Account Security Guide
How NHI Mgmt Group can help
Most organisations can name the people with Global Administrator in their tenant. Far fewer can list every vendor application that holds tenant-wide permissions, what credential it uses and who would notice if it signed in from somewhere new. Our training helps identity, cloud and security teams build that inventory, set ownership and review for third-party service principals, and run an incident playbook that hunts for persistence rather than stopping at the first disabled app. See our NHI and AI agent security training.
References
- Huntress: ConnectWise (SkyKick) Vendor Credentials Abused in M365 Attacks (16 October 2026)
- Todyl: Investigation: Unauthorized Access Through the ConnectWise Cloud Backup Microsoft 365 App (16 October 2026)
- BleepingComputer: Hackers breach Microsoft 365 tenants via ConnectWise supply-chain attack (17 October 2026)
- The Hacker News: ConnectWise Suspends Cloud Backup After Attackers Compromise Microsoft 365 Tenants (18 October 2026)