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Cross-Account and Cross-Tenant Access Guide: Sharing Resources and Trust Safely Across Clouds

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 8 November 2026 13 min read
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Every cross-account role, shared resource and cross-tenant setting is a trust path, and attackers who compromise one side inherit whatever the other side granted. Multi-account AWS organisations, multi-tenant Microsoft estates and multi-project Google Cloud environments all depend on these paths for centralised logging, security tooling, managed service providers and partner data exchange. The mechanisms differ: IAM role trust policies, resource-based policies and AWS Resource Access Manager on AWS; Entra ID cross-tenant access settings, cross-tenant synchronisation and Azure Lighthouse on Microsoft; cross-project IAM bindings and service account attachment on Google Cloud. This guide explains how each mechanism works, which settings to restrict, how to log and detect abuse, and what a hardened baseline looks like. It is for cloud platform, identity and security architecture teams. The attacker view of these paths is covered in the MITRE ATT&CK T1199 Trusted Relationship Guide; guest governance in Entra ID is covered in the Entra ID Cross-Tenant Access and B2B Guest Governance Guide.

Key takeaways

  • Two models, one risk: access crosses a boundary either because an identity in one account is allowed to act in another (role assumption, delegation, guest accounts) or because a resource is shared outward (resource policies, RAM shares, IAM bindings). Inventory both.
  • Third-party roles need an external ID: AWS requires the provider-controlled sts:ExternalId in trust policies for third parties to stop confused deputy attacks; service principals need aws:SourceArn, aws:SourceAccount or aws:SourceOrgID.
  • Default Microsoft settings are open: B2B collaboration is enabled for all internal users with any external organisation by default; tighten with organisational settings and only trust MFA and device claims from tenants you have assessed.
  • Delegation has guard rails worth using: Azure Lighthouse delegations exclude Owner and roles with DataActions, but supported roles can still expose data through actions such as listKeys. Review delegated roles, not just the fact of delegation.
  • Analysers find what reviews miss: IAM Access Analyzer external access findings, Entra audit logs in category CrossTenantAccessSettings, and Google Cloud IAM policy audit logs give continuous evidence of who can cross the boundary.

How identity and access work across AWS accounts, Microsoft tenants and Google Cloud projects

MechanismProviderDirectionWhat controls it
Cross-account IAM roleAWSIdentity in account A assumes role in account BRole trust policy (sts:AssumeRole) in B and an identity policy in A; both must allow
Resource-based policyAWSResource in B grants a principal in ABucket, key, queue, secret or function policy naming the external principal
AWS Resource Access Manager (RAM)AWSResource in B shared to accounts, OUs or the organisationResource share with a managed permission that caps allowed actions; outside the organisation requires an invitation
B2B collaborationMicrosoft Entra IDExternal user gets a guest or member object in your tenantCross-tenant access settings (inbound and outbound), external collaboration settings
B2B direct connectMicrosoft Entra IDExternal user accesses shared channels without an object in your tenantCross-tenant access settings; blocked by default; requires Entra ID P1 in both tenants
Cross-tenant synchronisationMicrosoft Entra IDSource tenant pushes users and groups into target tenantSource configures scope and mappings; target must allow user or group synchronisation inbound
Azure LighthouseAzureManaging tenant operates on delegated subscriptions or resource groupsCustomer-deployed delegation listing principals and built-in roles
Multitenant applicationMicrosoft Entra IDApp registered in vendor tenant gets a service principal in yoursConsent and permissions granted to the service principal
Cross-project IAM bindingGoogle CloudPrincipal from another project or organisation granted a roleSetIamPolicy on the resource, project or folder; domain restricted sharing constraints
Cross-project service account attachmentGoogle CloudResource in project B runs as a service account from project Aiam.disableCrossProjectServiceAccountUsage (enforced by default) and iam.serviceAccounts.actAs

AWS specifics

  • Two-sided allow: a cross-account role assumption succeeds only if the trust policy in the target account and an identity policy in the source account both allow it, and no SCP or RCP denies it. RCPs apply to STS, so an organisation-wide RCP can block role assumption by principals outside the organisation.
  • RAM within the organisation: once sharing with AWS Organizations is turned on, shares to accounts or OUs in the organisation need no invitation. Shares outside it start an invitation the recipient must accept. Resources shared through RAM remain subject to the consuming account's IAM and SCPs.
  • Global resources can be shared through RAM only from the US East (N. Virginia) Region.

Microsoft specifics

  • Default posture: B2B collaboration enabled for all internal users, MFA and device claims not trusted, B2B direct connect blocked, no users synchronised in.
  • Trust settings: inbound settings can trust MFA, compliant device and Entra hybrid joined device claims from a named partner, which changes how your Conditional Access policies evaluate their users.
  • Automatic redemption suppresses the consent prompt only when enabled outbound in the source and inbound in the target tenant.
  • Cross-tenant synchronisation is a push from the source tenant. The source becomes source of authority for all synced attributes, synced users are created as external members by default, and Microsoft positions it for tenants within one organisation; for cross-organisation access it recommends entitlement management.

Google Cloud specifics

  • Bindings are the boundary: any principal in any organisation can be granted a role unless domain restricted sharing (iam.allowedPolicyMemberDomains or iam.managed.allowedPolicyMembers) restricts it. Organisations created on or after 3 May 2024 have the legacy constraint enforced by default.
  • Service account attachment across projects needs the constraint relaxed on the project holding the service account, which adds a project lien. Google recommends enforcing iam.restrictCrossProjectServiceAccountLienRemoval.

Admin roles and privileged access

  • AWS: limit who can edit role trust policies (iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy), resource policies and RAM shares. Protect the organisation's security tooling and log archive roles with SCPs so only the security account can assume them. Never grant AdministratorAccess through a role whose trust policy includes a third-party account.
  • Entra ID: cross-tenant access settings require Security Administrator or a custom role. Protect changes to them with Conditional Access protected actions. Treat the role that manages cross-tenant synchronisation as privileged: in the source tenant it decides which identities appear in the target.
  • Azure Lighthouse: delegations use roles other than Owner, roles with DataActions and roles that include Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/write. Use User Access Administrator only to assign roles to managed identities. Include the Managed Services Registration Assignment Delete Role so the provider can remove its own access, and remember that the customer can always remove a delegation.
  • Google Cloud: restrict roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin and folder IAM admin roles; grants of roles/iam.serviceAccountUser and roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator across projects are effectively delegations of every permission the service account holds.

Cross-boundary privileged access should be just in time where the platform supports it, and owned by a named person on both sides. See the AWS IAM Policies and Roles Guide and the Azure RBAC and Service Principals Guide.

Integrations, API tokens and service accounts

Most cross-account and cross-tenant trust exists for machines: security scanners, backup services, SIEM collectors, CI pipelines and SaaS vendors. These are non-human identities with standing access into your environment, and they are where trust paths get abused.

Integration patternPreferred mechanismControls that matter
SaaS vendor reading your AWS accountCross-account role assumed by the vendor's accountsts:ExternalId generated by the vendor and unique per customer; read-only scoped policy; no long-lived access keys
AWS service writing to your bucket (logs, inventory)Service principal in resource policyaws:SourceAccount, aws:SourceArn or aws:SourceOrgID; enforce at scale with an RCP
Vendor app reading Microsoft 365 or AzureMultitenant app with admin consentLeast privilege application permissions; owner and review date; monitor the service principal's sign-ins
Managed service provider operating AzureAzure Lighthouse delegationBuilt-in roles only, eligible (just in time) assignments where offered, delegation scoped to resource groups
Workload in one Google project using another project's dataGrant the workload's service account a role on the target resourceAvoid cross-project attachment unless needed; domain restriction; audit actAs
CI pipeline deploying into many accountsFederated workload identity assuming a deployment role per accountTrust conditions on repository and branch claims; no stored keys

Multitenant SaaS applications that authenticate into customer tenants with client secrets act with whatever permissions each customer granted, so review those grants and prefer federated credentials. See the Workload Identity Federation Guide and the Entra ID Applications and Consent Guide.

Choosing the mechanism

  • Role assumption or resource policy (AWS): choose a cross-account role when the caller needs several actions across several resources and you want one place to audit; choose a resource policy when one external principal needs narrow access to one resource, such as a partner writing to a single bucket prefix.
  • RAM or resource policy (AWS): use RAM for infrastructure that cannot carry a resource policy (subnets, Transit Gateways, resolver rules) and for organisation-wide sharing without invitations; its managed permission gives you a cap the consuming account cannot exceed.
  • B2B collaboration, cross-tenant synchronisation or Lighthouse (Microsoft): B2B for people from other organisations; cross-tenant synchronisation for automatic provisioning between tenants your organisation owns; Lighthouse for a provider operating Azure resources, where no guest accounts are needed at all.
  • Small and large estates: a small organisation with a handful of accounts and one MSP can manage trust paths in a spreadsheet reviewed quarterly; a large one needs the analysers above feeding a central register and policy guardrails that make unapproved paths impossible to create.

Logging and detection

  • AWS CloudTrail: AssumeRole events where the caller's account differs from the role's account (userIdentity.type AWSAccount or a foreign accountId); UpdateAssumeRolePolicy; RAM CreateResourceShare, AssociateResourceShare and AcceptResourceShareInvitation; resource policy writes such as PutBucketPolicy and PutKeyPolicy.
  • IAM Access Analyzer: an external access analyzer with the organisation as zone of trust reports resources shared outside it, across S3, IAM roles, KMS keys, Lambda, SQS, Secrets Manager, SNS, EBS and RDS snapshots, ECR, EFS and DynamoDB. Analysis is per Region, so enable an analyzer in each Region you use. Unused access analysis flags dormant roles, including cross-account roles nobody assumes. See the IAM Access Analyzer Guide.
  • Entra ID: audit logs filtered by category CrossTenantAccessSettings for configuration changes; sign-in logs showing cross-tenant access type; the cross-tenant access activity workbook. Sign-in logs may be retained for only 30 days, so export them to your SIEM.
  • Azure Activity Log: Lighthouse registration definitions and assignments (Microsoft.ManagedServices operations) in delegated subscriptions.
  • Google Cloud: Admin Activity audit logs for SetIamPolicy adding principals from other organisations; actAs use, which Google records with the principal and attached service account; organisation policy changes to the constraints above.
MetricTarget
Cross-boundary trust paths with a named owner and review date100%
Third-party AWS roles requiring sts:ExternalId100%
Active Access Analyzer external access findings older than 30 daysZero unarchived without a documented reason
Partner tenants with organisation-specific inbound settingsAll tenants with regular access
Cross-account roles unused for 90 daysRemoved or justified

Hardening baseline

  1. Inventory trust paths: export role trust policies, resource policies, RAM shares, Entra cross-tenant organisational settings, multitenant service principals, Lighthouse delegations and cross-organisation IAM bindings. Record owner and purpose for each.
  2. Set the organisation boundary in policy: AWS RCPs enforcing aws:PrincipalOrgID with explicit partner exceptions; Google domain restricted sharing; Entra default inbound settings restricted, with named partners added as organisational settings.
  3. Fix third-party trust: require sts:ExternalId for every vendor role; add aws:SourceOrgID or aws:SourceAccount to service principal grants, centrally through an RCP where possible.
  4. Restrict RAM: keep allowExternalPrincipals off for shares that should stay inside the organisation and prefer customer managed permissions over broad AWS managed ones where the default grants more than needed.
  5. Tighten Microsoft trust: trust MFA and device claims only from assessed partner tenants; enable tenant restrictions v2 on managed devices to stop users signing in to unknown tenants; scope cross-tenant synchronisation to the groups that need it.
  6. Review delegated roles: in Lighthouse and Google cross-project grants, check what the role can reach through key listing or impersonation, not only its name.
  7. Test before enforcing: review sign-in activity before blocking Entra defaults (Microsoft warns blocking can break business-critical access); deploy RCPs to a test OU first; roll back by detaching the policy or restoring the previous setting from exported configuration.
  8. Review quarterly: remove unused roles, expired partner settings and dormant delegations.

Common misconfigurations

  • Trust policy naming an account root without conditions: "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::111122223333:root"} lets any principal in that account the other side permits assume the role. Add sts:ExternalId for vendors or aws:PrincipalArn conditions for your own accounts.
  • Service principal grants without source conditions: a bucket that trusts a service principal without aws:SourceAccount can be written by that service on behalf of any account that knows its name.
  • Test and legacy tenants with a path into production: a test tenant account without MFA can lead to a legacy OAuth application with elevated access to the corporate environment.
  • Trusting every partner's MFA: enabling inbound MFA trust in default settings extends your Conditional Access to whatever each external tenant accepts as MFA.
  • Cross-tenant synchronisation used across organisations: the source becomes source of authority for every synced attribute, which Microsoft does not intend between separate companies.
  • Forgotten delegations: Lighthouse delegations and vendor roles left in place after a contract ends, with nobody watching their activity.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5AC-20 Use of External Systems; AC-21 Information Sharing; CA-3 Information Exchange; SA-9 External System Services; AC-6 Least PrivilegeGoverning and limiting cross-boundary access
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-01; PR.AA-05; GV.SC-07; DE.CM-06Identity management, least privilege, third-party risk, monitoring provider activity
CIS Controls v8.1Control 6 Access Control Management; Control 15 Service Provider ManagementAccess grants and provider oversight
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A5.19 Information security in supplier relationships; 5.15 Access control; 5.18 Access rightsSupplier access and access rights reviews
MITRE ATT&CK v20T1199 Trusted Relationship; T1078.004 Cloud Accounts; T1098.003 Additional Cloud Roles; T1484.002 Trust ModificationAbuse of trust paths and their modification

Practitioner checklist

  • Maintain an inventory of every cross-account, cross-tenant and cross-organisation trust path with owner and purpose.
  • Require sts:ExternalId on all third-party AWS roles and source conditions on all service principal grants.
  • Enforce the organisation boundary with RCPs on AWS and domain restricted sharing on Google Cloud.
  • Restrict Entra ID default cross-tenant settings and configure named partners as organisational settings.
  • Trust external MFA and device claims only for assessed partners.
  • Use Azure Lighthouse with built-in, least privilege roles and include the delegation delete role.
  • Run IAM Access Analyzer external access in every Region with the organisation as zone of trust.
  • Alert on trust policy, resource share, cross-tenant setting and cross-organisation IAM binding changes.
  • Remove unused cross-boundary roles and delegations every quarter.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: MITRE ATT&CK T1199 Trusted Relationship Guide · Entra ID Cross-Tenant Access and B2B Guest Governance Guide · AWS Resource Control Policies and Data Perimeter Guide · Cloud Data Perimeter Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 8 November 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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