DNSSEC protects DNS answers from forgery, but a badly run DNSSEC deployment takes a whole domain offline for every validating resolver on the internet. Most DNSSEC outages are not attacks: they are expired signatures, a DS record left at the parent after a key change, or a provider migration done in the wrong order. This guide covers the operational side in depth: choosing algorithms and denial-of-existence settings, signing models, key rollovers and their timing, automating the parent DS record with CDS and CDNSKEY, turning on validation in enterprise resolvers, and diagnosing failures with Extended DNS Errors. It is for DNS engineers, network teams and platform owners who run authoritative zones or recursive resolvers. For the wider DNS threat picture, see the DNS Security Guide.
Key takeaways
- Use algorithm 13 or 15 for new signing: ECDSAP256SHA256 (13) and ED25519 (15) are RECOMMENDED for signing, RSASHA1 is NOT RECOMMENDED, and SHA-1 DS digests MUST NOT be used for delegations, with SHA-256 (2) recommended.
- Prefer NSEC, or NSEC3 with zero iterations and no salt: RFC 9276 (BCP 236) says an iterations count of 0 must be used and validators may treat higher counts as insecure or fail them.
- Rollovers fail on timing, not cryptography: every step of a key change has to wait for TTLs and propagation, as RFC 7583 sets out.
- Automate the parent link: CDS and CDNSKEY (RFC 7344) let the parent update DS records from signed data in your zone, and RFC 9615 adds authenticated bootstrapping for the first DS.
- Validation errors are now explainable: Extended DNS Errors (RFC 8914) tell you whether a failure is an expired signature, a missing DNSKEY or an unsupported algorithm.
What DNSSEC does and does not do
DNSSEC adds digital signatures to DNS data so that a validating resolver can confirm an answer came from the zone owner and was not changed in transit or in a cache. The core is defined in RFC 4033, 4034 and 4035, updated by RFC 6840, and RFC 9364 (BCP 237, February 2023) is the current pointer to the full set. A chain of trust runs from the root zone trust anchor, through DS records held in each parent zone, to the DNSKEY records in the child zone, which sign every RRset with RRSIG records. Authenticated denial of existence (NSEC or NSEC3) proves that a name or type does not exist.
- It protects against: cache poisoning and on-path forgery of DNS answers (ATT&CK T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle and T1565.002 Transmitted Data Manipulation where DNS is the channel).
- It does not protect against: a hijacked registrar or DNS hosting account, because the attacker can then change records and have them signed, or remove the DS record. See the Authoritative DNS and Registrar Account Security Guide.
- It does not encrypt: queries remain visible unless you also use DoT or DoH. See the Encrypted DNS Enterprise Guide.
- It enables more: DANE for SMTP and other TLS uses depends on a signed zone.
Algorithm and parameter choices
RFC 9904 (November 2025, Standards Track) obsoleted RFC 8624 and moved the canonical list of algorithm requirements into the IANA registries, with separate "use" and "implement" columns for signing and validation. It did not change the recommendation levels it inherited. Check the IANA DNS Security Algorithm Numbers and Digest Algorithms registries before a new deployment, because future updates will appear there rather than in a new RFC.
| Number | Algorithm | Use for signing | Use for validation | Deployment note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | RSASHA256 | MUST implement (RFC 8624) | MUST | Widely deployed; larger keys and responses than ECDSA |
| 13 | ECDSAP256SHA256 | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | Default choice for new zones: small signatures, universal validator support |
| 15 | ED25519 | RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | Good choice where your signer and registrar support it |
| 14 | ECDSAP384SHA384 | MAY (RFC 8624) | RECOMMENDED (RFC 8624) | Rarely needed |
| 5 and 7 | RSASHA1, RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 | NOT RECOMMENDED | RECOMMENDED | Migrate away with an algorithm rollover |
| 1, 3, 6 | RSAMD5, DSA, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 | MUST NOT | MUST NOT | Never use |
| DS digest type | Use for delegation | Note |
|---|---|---|
| 1 SHA-1 | MUST NOT | Validators still handle it; remove from parents |
| 2 SHA-256 | RECOMMENDED | Default |
| 4 SHA-384 | MAY (RFC 8624) | Optional |
| 0 NULL | CDS only | Signals the parent to remove the DS (RFC 8078) |
Denial of existence: RFC 9276 advises using NSEC unless you need NSEC3's features. If you use NSEC3, publish NSEC3PARAM 1 0 0 -: SHA-1 hash, zero additional iterations, empty salt. Salts do not meaningfully slow zone walking and re-salting means rebuilding the whole chain. Opt-out is only appropriate for very large, sparsely signed delegation-heavy zones. Validating resolvers may treat zones with iterations above 0 as insecure or return SERVFAIL, attaching Extended DNS Error 27, so legacy settings such as 10 or 100 iterations are now an availability risk.
Signing models
| Model | How it works | Choose it when | Watch out for |
|---|---|---|---|
| Managed signing by DNS host | The provider holds keys, signs and rolls ZSKs automatically | Most organisations; zones hosted with one provider | Provider migration requires a planned key and DS transition |
| Inline or bump-in-the-wire signer | Your hidden primary sends unsigned zone to a signer that serves signed zone to secondaries | You keep zone data in-house or in IPAM | Signer becomes a critical, monitored service |
| Offline KSK, online ZSK | KSK in an HSM or offline store signs the DNSKEY RRset; ZSK signs everything else | High-value zones with strict key custody | Manual ceremony steps; KSK rollovers are rare and easily forgotten |
| Combined Signing Key (CSK) | One key signs everything | Simpler automation, managed signers | Every key change touches the parent DS |
| Multi-signer (RFC 8901) | Two providers sign the same zone with coordinated keys | Dual-provider resilience | Each provider must publish the other's keys; complex to operate |
Signing keys are cryptographic secrets like any other, and whoever can reach the signer or the DNS host's API can change what your domain resolves to. Treat signer service accounts and DNS API tokens as privileged non-human identities with narrow scope and rotation. See the Secrets Management Guide.
Key rollovers and their timing
RFC 7583 (Informational, October 2015) is the reference on rollover timing. Its rule of thumb: never remove anything a resolver may still have cached, and never rely on anything a resolver may not yet have seen. The parameters that matter are propagation delay to all secondaries (Dprp), the time to re-sign the zone (Dsgn), the parent registration delay (Dreg), and the TTLs of DNSKEY, RRSIG and DS records.
| Key | Method | Sequence | Trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZSK | Pre-publication | Publish new key, wait, switch signing to it, wait for old signatures to expire from caches, remove old key | Small responses, slowest |
| ZSK | Double-signature | Sign with both keys, wait, remove old key and signatures | Fast and simple, larger zone and responses |
| KSK | Double-KSK | Add new KSK and sign DNSKEY RRset with both, change DS at parent, remove old KSK | One parent interaction |
| KSK | Double-DS | Publish new DS at parent first, switch KSK, remove old DS | Small DNSKEY RRset, two parent interactions |
| KSK | Double-RRset | Publish new DNSKEY and DS together, remove old ones later | Fastest, combines both drawbacks |
RFC 7583 tracks each key through the states Generated, Published, Ready, Active, Retired, Dead and Removed (plus Revoked for RFC 5011 trust anchors). Two derived intervals do most of the work: the publication safety interval, roughly propagation delay plus the DNSKEY TTL, and the retire safety interval, roughly signing time plus propagation plus the signature TTL. RFC 9904 adds one ordering rule for algorithm changes: upgrade the DS digest algorithm before rolling to a new KSK, or validation can fail.
Algorithm rollovers (for example RSASHA1 to ECDSAP256SHA256) are a special case. Validators expect every algorithm listed in the DS set to sign the zone, so the new algorithm must sign all RRsets before its DS is published, and the old algorithm's signatures must stay until its DS has gone and caches have expired.
The root trust anchor also changes. ICANN reports that KSK-2024 (key tag 38696) began signing the root zone on 11 October 2026 at 14:00 UTC, with no indications of widespread operational disruption. Resolvers that track trust anchors automatically under RFC 5011, or that ship current trust anchors with their software, needed no action; resolvers with a hard-coded trust anchor from before KSK-2024 was published will fail every validation. Check that yours carry the current key.
Automating the parent: CDS, CDNSKEY and bootstrapping
- CDS and CDNSKEY (RFC 7344): the child publishes the DS it wants at the parent. A parental agent that polls must fetch them through a validating resolver, accept them only if signed by a key present in both the current DNSKEY and DS sets, never apply a change that breaks the delegation, and do nothing if the records are absent. RFC 7344 says this SHOULD NOT be used for initial enrolment.
- Removal: a CDS with digest type 0 asks the parent to delete the DS, which is how you go insecure cleanly before a provider change that cannot carry keys across (RFC 8078).
- Authenticated bootstrapping (RFC 9615, July 2024, Standards Track): the DNS operator copies the child's CDS and CDNSKEY to signalling names such as
_dsboot.example.co.uk._signal.ns1.example.netin its own signed nameserver zones, so the parent can validate the first DS through the operator's chain of trust. It does not work for fully in-domain delegations, and it is not meant for updating an existing DS set. - Registrars: support for CDS scanning varies by registry and registrar. Where it is absent, DS changes go through the registrar portal or API, which then becomes a step with a human, a credential and a delay in your rollover plan.
Turning on validation in enterprise resolvers
- Inventory resolvers: list every recursive resolver, forwarder and protective DNS service clients actually use, including cloud VPC resolvers and branch appliances.
- Confirm trust anchor management: automatic RFC 5011 updates or vendor-managed anchors, and confirm the current root KSK is present.
- Enable validation on a pilot resolver: point a small user group at it for two to four weeks and log SERVFAIL responses with their Extended DNS Error codes.
- Triage failures: for each failing domain, decide whether it is the remote operator's fault (most cases) or a local issue such as split-horizon internal zones that are signed publicly but not internally.
- Handle internal namespaces: configure negative trust anchors or explicit insecure delegations for internal zones that shadow public names, and document each one with an owner and expiry.
- Roll out by ring: extend validation resolver by resolver, keeping the ability to disable validation per resolver for rollback.
- Check clock sync: signature validity is time-based, so NTP failure on a resolver produces Signature Not Yet Valid or Signature Expired errors for everything.
Rolling out signing on your zones
- Prepare: confirm the DNS host or signer supports algorithm 13 or 15, NSEC or NSEC3 with zero iterations, CDS publication and automatic ZSK rollover. Confirm the registrar accepts DS for your TLDs and digest type 2.
- Lower TTLs: a day or more ahead, reduce DNSKEY and DS related TTLs so mistakes clear quickly.
- Sign without DS: sign the zone and leave it unpublished at the parent for at least one DNSKEY TTL. Validate the signed zone with a test tool that checks the chain from a simulated DS.
- Publish DS: add the DS through the registrar or CDS. The zone becomes secure as caches pick it up.
- Monitor: watch signature expiry, validation from several public resolvers and Extended DNS Errors for at least one ZSK cycle.
- Roll back: remove the DS at the parent, then wait at least the DS TTL before unsigning. Unsigning first, with the DS still present, is the classic self-inflicted outage.
Diagnosing validation failures
| EDE code | Meaning (RFC 8914) | Usual root cause |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Unsupported DNSKEY Algorithm | Only unsupported algorithms in the DNSKEY set | Old resolver, or a deprecated algorithm |
| 2 Unsupported DS Digest Type | Only unsupported digests in the DS set | Parent still holds only a deprecated digest |
| 6 DNSSEC Bogus | Validation ended Bogus | Signatures do not match keys, often after a provider change |
| 7 Signature Expired | No valid signatures, some expired | Signer stopped re-signing; hidden primary down |
| 8 Signature Not Yet Valid | Signatures start in the future | Clock skew on signer or resolver |
| 9 DNSKEY Missing | DS at parent, no matching DNSKEY in child | KSK removed before DS was updated |
| 10 RRSIGs Missing | RRset that should be signed is not | Partial signing, secondary serving stale unsigned copy |
| 12 NSEC Missing | No covering NSEC or NSEC3 provided | Broken denial chain or middlebox stripping records |
| 27 (RFC 9276) | Unsupported NSEC3 iteration count | Legacy NSEC3 parameters |
Detection and measurement
- Signature headroom: minimum time to RRSIG expiry across all zones; alert well before the shortest re-sign interval is exceeded.
- DS and DNSKEY consistency: continuous check that every DS at the parent matches an active KSK or CSK.
- Validation SERVFAIL rate: share of resolver responses that fail validation, broken down by EDE code and domain.
- Coverage: share of externally facing zones signed with a current algorithm and SHA-256 DS.
- Change watch: alerts on unexpected DS removal or change at the registrar, which is also an early sign of account takeover (ATT&CK T1584.002 DNS Server, in the sense of attacker-controlled infrastructure). See the DNS Hijack Playbook.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | DNSSEC relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SC-20 | Secure name/address resolution service (authoritative source): signing zones |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SC-21 | Secure name/address resolution service (recursive or caching resolver): validation |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SC-22, SC-12 | Resilient DNS architecture; key establishment and management for signing keys |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.DS-02, PR.PS-01, DE.CM-01 | Integrity of data in transit; configuration management; monitoring network services |
| MITRE ATT&CK v20 | T1557, T1565.002, T1584.002 | Forged answers, manipulated data in transit, attacker-controlled DNS infrastructure |
For the federal deployment profile, see the NIST SP 800-81 Rev. 3 Secure DNS Deployment Guide.
Common failure patterns
- Provider migration without key transition: moving a signed zone to a new host that signs with new keys while the old DS stays at the parent makes the domain Bogus. Either go insecure first with a CDS delete, or run a multi-signer transition.
- Dead signer: an inline signer or hidden primary fails quietly and signatures expire days later.
- KSK removed before the DS: the DNSKEY Missing failure, usually from a manual rollover that skipped the parent wait.
- Legacy NSEC3 settings: non-zero iterations inherited from old defaults now cause insecure treatment or SERVFAIL on modern validators.
- Stale trust anchors: appliances with a fixed root trust anchor fail after a root KSK rollover.
- Registrar credentials as the weak link: a DNSSEC-signed zone is still lost if the registrar account has no MFA or the DNS API token is over-scoped.
Practitioner checklist
- Sign every external zone with algorithm 13 or 15 and publish SHA-256 DS records only.
- Use NSEC, or NSEC3 with
1 0 0 -, and remove any non-zero iterations or salts. - Write a rollover runbook with RFC 7583 timing, including parent DS steps and the rollback order.
- Enable CDS and CDNSKEY publication and use registries' CDS scanning where available.
- Enable validation on all enterprise recursive resolvers, by ring, with EDE logging.
- Confirm every resolver carries the current root trust anchor after the 2026 root KSK rollover.
- Monitor signature expiry headroom and DS to DNSKEY consistency continuously.
- Protect registrar and DNS host accounts with phishing-resistant MFA and scoped API tokens.
- Rehearse a provider migration and a DS removal in a test domain before doing it for real.
Standards and references
- IETF: RFC 9364 DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), BCP 237
- IETF: RFC 9904 DNSSEC Cryptographic Algorithm Recommendation Update Process
- IETF: RFC 8624 Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC
- IETF: RFC 9276 Guidance for NSEC3 Parameter Settings
- IETF: RFC 7583 DNSSEC Key Rollover Timing Considerations
- IETF: RFC 7344 Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance
- IETF: RFC 9615 Automatic DNSSEC Bootstrapping Using Authenticated Signals from the Zone's Operator
- ICANN: Root Zone KSK Rollover
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: DNS Security Guide · Authoritative DNS and Registrar Account Security Guide · NIST SP 800-81 Rev. 3 Secure DNS Deployment Guide · DNS Hijack Playbook