This Docker security checklist is a printable, tick-box review of one Docker host or fleet, covering the host and daemon, the API socket, images and builds, runtime flags, registries, secrets and logging, with an evidence column for every check. It is designed for platform engineers, security reviewers and auditors who need a repeatable record rather than a tutorial. The reasoning behind each control is covered in the Docker and Docker Compose Security Guide; this page is the list you work through and sign.
Checks are based on Docker's public Engine security documentation as of November 2026, plus NHI Mgmt Group recommendations where marked. Docker features change between releases, so confirm settings against Docker's current documentation for the version you run.
Key takeaways
- Treat access to the Docker daemon as root access to the host. Docker's own documentation says the
dockergroup grants root-level privileges. - Never expose the API without mutual TLS or SSH. Docker states that exposing the daemon API over HTTP without TLS is not permitted, and the daemon fails at startup in that configuration.
- Rootless mode is the strongest single host control, because the daemon and containers run without root inside a user namespace.
- Most runtime risk comes from a handful of flags:
--privileged, added capabilities, host mounts, host networking and running as root. - Secrets and registry credentials are non-human identities. Inventory them, scope them and rotate them like any other credential.
- A checklist is only useful with evidence. Record the command, output or screenshot for every tick.
How to use this template
- Copy the tables into your review document or ticket. Complete one copy per host class (for example build hosts, production hosts, developer workstations) rather than one per machine.
- For each check, mark Pass, Fail, N/A or Exception, and record the evidence. An exception needs an owner, a reason and an expiry date.
- Rate each fail as High, Medium or Low using the suggested rating in the table, adjusted for exposure. An internet-facing host raises every rating by one level.
- Carry fails into the findings log in section 9 and agree remediation dates.
- Repeat the review at least every six months, after a major Docker Engine upgrade, and after any incident involving a container host. These intervals are NHI Mgmt Group recommendations.
Kubernetes clusters need their own review; use the Kubernetes Security Checklist for orchestration controls and keep this list for the Docker Engine layer.
1. Review record
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Host class or fleet name | |
| Docker Engine version and install method | |
| Host operating system and kernel version | |
| Rootful or rootless | |
| Workload owner | |
| Reviewer and date | |
| Scope exclusions | |
| Previous review reference |
2. Host and daemon
| # | Check | How to verify | Rating if failed | Result and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.1 | The host runs only container workloads and the tools needed to manage them | Review installed packages and listening services | Medium | |
| 2.2 | Docker Engine and the host kernel are on supported, patched versions | docker version, uname -r, compare with vendor support policy | High | |
| 2.3 | Membership of the docker group is limited to named administrators and reviewed, because the group grants root-level privileges | getent group docker; compare with approved list | High | |
| 2.4 | Rootless mode is used where the workload allows it, or the reason for rootful mode is recorded | Check the daemon runs under a non-root user; confirm the system-wide daemon is disabled | Medium | |
| 2.5 | If rootless mode is used, the system-wide rootful daemon is not also running | systemctl status docker for the system service | Medium | |
| 2.6 | Where rootful mode is required, user namespace remapping is considered and the decision recorded | Review daemon.json for userns-remap | Low | |
| 2.7 | The daemon configuration file is owned by root and not writable by other users | ls -l /etc/docker/daemon.json | Medium | |
| 2.8 | A mandatory access control system (AppArmor or SELinux) is enabled on the host | docker info security options; aa-status or getenforce | Medium | |
| 2.9 | Docker data directories sit on a dedicated volume or partition so a full disk cannot take down the host | df -h for the Docker root directory | Low |
Docker's rootless documentation explains that in user namespace remapping mode the daemon itself still runs with root privileges, while in rootless mode both the daemon and containers run without root. That is why 2.4 is preferred over 2.6 where workloads allow it. Rootless mode also needs newuidmap and newgidmap and at least 65,536 subordinate IDs in /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid.
3. Daemon socket and remote API
| # | Check | How to verify | Rating if failed | Result and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | The daemon listens only on the local Unix socket unless remote access is approved | Inspect daemon.json hosts and service unit flags; ss -lntp | High | |
| 3.2 | Where remote access is needed, it uses SSH or mutual TLS with tlsverify and a trusted CA | Review daemon flags and certificate configuration | High | |
| 3.3 | TLS server certificates match the hostnames and IPs clients use, and client certificates are issued per person or per system | Inspect certificates; compare with issuance records | Medium | |
| 3.4 | Client certificates and SSH keys used for Docker access are inventoried with owners and expiry | Credential inventory record | Medium | |
| 3.5 | The Docker socket is not mounted into containers, or each exception is documented and restricted | Search running containers for /var/run/docker.sock mounts | High | |
| 3.6 | Network firewall rules block the Docker API ports from untrusted networks | Firewall or security group review | High | |
| 3.7 | An authorisation plugin or access proxy is considered for shared hosts that need finer control | Design record | Low |
Docker notes that by default it runs through a non-networked Unix socket and that remote access should use SSH or a TLS socket. Mounting the socket into a container hands that container full control of the daemon, which is why 3.5 is rated High. Teams often find socket mounts in monitoring agents, CI runners and reverse proxies.
4. Images and builds
| # | Check | How to verify | Rating if failed | Result and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1 | Base images come from an approved list of trusted publishers or an internal mirror | Review FROM lines against the approved list | Medium | |
| 4.2 | Images are referenced by digest or by a pinned version tag, not latest | Search Dockerfiles and Compose files | Medium | |
| 4.3 | Images are scanned for known vulnerabilities in the build pipeline and before deployment, with a blocking policy for critical findings | Pipeline configuration and recent results | High | |
| 4.4 | Images are scanned for hard-coded secrets, and any finding triggers rotation, not just a rebuild | Secret scan results; rotation tickets | High | |
| 4.5 | Dockerfiles set a non-root USER | Review Dockerfiles; docker inspect Config.User | Medium | |
| 4.6 | Images are minimal: no compilers, shells or package managers in production images unless needed | Image contents review | Low | |
| 4.7 | Build secrets use build secret mounts, not ARG, ENV or copied files | Dockerfile review; docker history | High | |
| 4.8 | Images are signed and signatures are verified before deployment | Signing and verification configuration | Medium | |
| 4.9 | A software bill of materials is produced and stored for each released image | SBOM artefacts in the registry or pipeline | Low |
Secrets baked into image layers are one of the most common container findings, because deleting a file in a later layer does not remove it from earlier ones. See Secrets in Container Images and Build Artefacts Guide for the clean-up process.
5. Container runtime flags
| # | Check | How to verify | Rating if failed | Result and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | No production container runs with --privileged without a documented exception | docker inspect --format '{{.HostConfig.Privileged}}' for each container | High | |
| 5.2 | Containers drop all capabilities and add back only those required | Inspect CapDrop and CapAdd | Medium | |
| 5.3 | No container adds SYS_ADMIN or other broad capabilities without an exception | Inspect CapAdd | High | |
| 5.4 | Containers run as a non-root user (--user or image USER) | Inspect Config.User; docker exec id | Medium | |
| 5.5 | The default seccomp profile is in place; no container runs with seccomp unconfined | Inspect SecurityOpt | High | |
| 5.6 | The no-new-privileges security option is set (NHI Mgmt Group recommendation) | Inspect SecurityOpt | Medium | |
| 5.7 | Root filesystems are read-only where the application allows, with writable paths as named volumes or tmpfs (NHI Mgmt Group recommendation) | Inspect ReadonlyRootfs | Low | |
| 5.8 | Host paths are not bind-mounted, especially /, /etc, /proc or /var/run; any needed mount is read-only and narrow | Inspect Mounts | High | |
| 5.9 | Host network, PID and IPC namespaces are not shared without an exception | Inspect NetworkMode, PidMode, IpcMode | High | |
| 5.10 | Memory, CPU and process limits are set for each container | Inspect Memory, NanoCpus, PidsLimit | Medium | |
| 5.11 | --oom-kill-disable is never used without a memory limit | Inspect OomKillDisable and Memory | Medium | |
| 5.12 | Published ports bind to specific interfaces, not all addresses, unless the service is meant to be public | Inspect PortBindings | Medium | |
| 5.13 | Devices are not passed through except where required and documented | Inspect Devices | Medium |
Docker's run reference states that --privileged gives all capabilities to the container, along with access to all host devices and loosened AppArmor or SELinux confinement, and that the default user in a container is root. The seccomp documentation describes the default profile as an allowlist that disables around 44 system calls out of more than 300 and advises against changing it. Docker also warns that disabling the out-of-memory killer without a memory limit can exhaust host memory. Container escape maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1611 Escape to Host, and most escape paths start with one of the flags in this table.
6. Registry and pulls
| # | Check | How to verify | Rating if failed | Result and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.1 | Hosts pull only from approved registries | Daemon and pipeline configuration; network egress rules | Medium | |
| 6.2 | Registry connections use TLS; no insecure registries are configured | docker info insecure registries; daemon.json | High | |
| 6.3 | Pull credentials are read-only and scoped to the repositories each host needs | Registry token or role configuration | Medium | |
| 6.4 | Push credentials exist only in the build pipeline, not on runtime hosts or developer laptops | Credential inventory; search ~/.docker/config.json on hosts | High | |
| 6.5 | Registry access tokens have owners, expiry dates and a rotation record | Token inventory | Medium | |
| 6.6 | Credential helpers are used instead of plain-text auth entries in config.json | Inspect config.json for auths entries with stored values | Medium | |
| 6.7 | Private repositories are private; public repositories are reviewed for accidental secrets | Registry visibility settings; secret scan | High |
Registry tokens are a frequent source of leaks. The Docker Hub Tokens Security Guide and Container Registry Security Guide cover scoping and rotation in depth.
7. Secrets and identity
| # | Check | How to verify | Rating if failed | Result and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.1 | Application secrets are not passed as plain environment variables in Compose files or run commands checked into source control | Search repositories and docker inspect Config.Env | High | |
| 7.2 | Secrets are delivered at runtime from a secrets manager or as mounted secret files with restricted permissions | Deployment configuration | Medium | |
| 7.3 | Each container workload has its own credentials, not a shared credential across services | Credential inventory | Medium | |
| 7.4 | Cloud credentials used by containers are short-lived (workload identity or instance roles), not long-lived keys | Credential type review | High | |
| 7.5 | Containers cannot reach the cloud instance metadata service unless they need it | Network policy or host firewall test | Medium | |
| 7.6 | Every secret found in this review has an owner and a rotation date | Findings log | Medium |
Each container that calls an API or a database is a non-human identity. A compromised container inherits whatever its credentials can do, which is why scope and lifetime matter more than where the secret is stored.
8. Logging and monitoring
| # | Check | How to verify | Rating if failed | Result and evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8.1 | Daemon logs are forwarded to central logging | Log pipeline configuration; sample events | Medium | |
| 8.2 | Container logs use a driver with size limits or central forwarding so disks do not fill | docker info logging driver; log-opts | Low | |
| 8.3 | Host audit rules cover the Docker binary, daemon configuration, socket and data directory | Audit rule listing | Medium | |
| 8.4 | Alerts exist for privileged container starts, socket mounts and new containers from unapproved images | Detection rule list | Medium | |
| 8.5 | Alerts exist for exec into production containers | Detection rule list | Low | |
| 8.6 | A runtime security tool or host EDR covers container processes | Agent deployment record | Medium |
Attackers who reach the API often start new containers, which maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1610 Deploy Container. Detection for this needs daemon events, not just container logs. The Container Runtime Security Guide covers runtime monitoring options.
9. Findings and sign-off
| Check # | Finding | Rating | Owner | Remediation | Due date | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Suggested remediation windows (NHI Mgmt Group recommendation): High within 14 days, Medium within 60 days, Low at the next planned change. Sign-off requires the reviewer, the workload owner and the platform lead to confirm the record.
| Role | Name | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Reviewer | ||
| Workload owner | ||
| Platform lead |
Common failure patterns
- Docker group as a convenience. Developers are added to the
dockergroup to avoid typingsudo, which hands them root on the host. - Socket mounted for monitoring. A dashboard or CI runner gets
/var/run/docker.sock, and a compromise of that tool becomes control of every container. - Privileged as a fix.
--privilegedis added to make a failing container work and never removed. - Rootless installed alongside rootful. Rootless mode is set up but the system daemon keeps running, so the host is still rootful.
- Secrets in image history. An
ARGor copied file leaks a token into a layer, and the image is pushed to a shared registry. - Push tokens everywhere. The same registry token with push rights sits on build hosts, runtime hosts and laptops.
- Ticks without evidence. The checklist is marked complete from memory, and the next incident shows half the passes were wrong.
Practitioner checklist
- List every member of the
dockergroup on each host and remove anyone who does not need root. - Confirm the daemon listens only on the Unix socket, or on SSH or mutual TLS where remote access is approved.
- Search all running containers for Docker socket mounts and privileged mode, and raise exceptions or fixes.
- Move suitable hosts to rootless mode and disable the system daemon on them.
- Enforce non-root users, dropped capabilities, the default seccomp profile and resource limits in deployment templates.
- Scan images for vulnerabilities and secrets in the pipeline, and rotate any secret found.
- Restrict push credentials to the build pipeline and give runtime hosts read-only pull tokens.
- Forward daemon events to central logging and alert on privileged starts and socket mounts.
- Record evidence for every check and repeat the review every six months.
Standards and references
- Docker: Docker Engine security
- Docker: Rootless mode
- Docker: Protect the Docker daemon socket
- Docker: Seccomp security profiles for Docker
- Docker: Running containers
- Docker: Linux post-installation steps for Docker Engine
- NIST: SP 800-190 Application Container Security Guide
- CIS: CIS Benchmarks
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Docker and Docker Compose Security Guide · Container Runtime Security Guide · Docker Hub Tokens Security Guide · Kubernetes Security Checklist