Printers, meeting room systems, digital signage, conference cameras and smart displays sit on the corporate network with full network access, yet most IT security teams do not patch, monitor or even inventory them. These devices run full operating systems, store documents and credentials, accept connections on many ports and are often managed by facilities, AV integrators or a print vendor rather than IT. CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog includes actively exploited flaws in presentation systems, PTZ conference cameras and print services, so the risk is not theoretical. This guide sets out how to build an enterprise IoT programme for office devices: ownership, inventory, procurement requirements, configuration baselines, segmentation, identity and credentials, monitoring and end-of-life. It is written for IT security managers, infrastructure teams and workplace technology owners; general IoT principles are in the IoT Security Guide.
Key takeaways
- Ownership comes first. Office IoT falls between IT, facilities, AV and procurement; without a named owner per device class nothing else in the programme sticks.
- Treat each device as a computer. Multifunction printers and meeting room systems run Linux, Android or Windows, hold credentials and need the same baseline, patching and monitoring as any server.
- Default credentials are the main way in. Change or remove factory admin accounts at installation, and require products without universal default passwords at purchase.
- Segment by device class. Put printers, room systems, signage and building devices in their own network segments with allow-listed flows, so a compromised display cannot reach file servers or domain controllers.
- Plan for the end of support. These devices outlive their firmware updates; record support end dates at purchase and isolate or replace unsupported devices.
The enterprise IoT estate and its risks
| Device class | Typical platform | What it holds or reaches | Common weaknesses |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multifunction printers (MFPs) | Embedded Linux or vendor OS, web admin, internal storage | Scanned and printed documents, address books, LDAP, SMTP and scan-to-folder credentials | Default admin passwords, legacy protocols (raw port 9100, LPD 515, Telnet, FTP), SNMP communities, unencrypted storage |
| Print servers | Windows Print Spooler or cloud print service | Domain trust, driver installation | Spooler flaws such as CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare), which CISA lists as known exploited with known ransomware use |
| Meeting room systems | Windows or Android appliances, room controllers | Calendar access via a resource account, cameras and microphones | Default local admin, resource accounts excluded from MFA, unmanaged updates |
| Conference cameras and AV control | Embedded Linux web interfaces, control processors | Video and audio of meetings, control of room equipment | Authentication bypass and command injection, for example CVE-2024-8956 (PTZ cameras) and CVE-2019-3929 (Crestron presentation products), both in CISA KEV |
| Digital signage and smart displays | Android, Tizen, webOS or Windows players | Content management system credentials, sometimes internet-facing | Exposed management interfaces, unattended USB ports, abandoned CMS accounts |
| Visitor kiosks, badge readers, lockers | Tablets and embedded controllers | Visitor personal data, door control integration | Kiosk escape, shared admin PINs, flat network placement |
The relevant ATT&CK techniques are Default Accounts (T1078.001), Network Service Discovery (T1046), Exploit Public-Facing Application (T1190), Exploitation of Remote Services (T1210) and Network Sniffing (T1040). Office IoT is also a favoured place for persistence, because it is rarely examined during incident response. Botnets have long recruited exactly these devices; see the Mirai and IoT Botnet Families Guide.
Ownership and governance
- Device class owners: assign an accountable owner for each class (print, meeting rooms, signage, building and access devices). The owner may be in facilities, but security requirements are set by IT security.
- Policy: a short enterprise IoT standard that every connected device must meet before it joins the network: registered in the inventory, default credentials changed, supported firmware, assigned network segment, named owner.
- Third parties: managed print services and AV integrators often hold admin access to the whole fleet. Put patching, credential handling and remote access requirements in their contracts. See the Third-Party Risk Management Guide.
- Exceptions: devices that cannot meet the standard get a documented exception with compensating controls and a review date.
Inventory and classification
NIST SP 800-213 places IoT device security within organisational and system risk management and helps organisations define what they need from a device and from its manufacturer. That starts with knowing what is on the network.
- Discover: combine DHCP and switch MAC tables, NAC profiling, passive traffic analysis and vendor fleet consoles. Printers and displays often appear only in the vendor's portal or the facilities asset register.
- Classify: record class, make and model, firmware, owner, location, network segment, management method and support end date.
- Reconcile: compare discovered devices with purchase records monthly; unknown devices are either quarantined or registered.
- Connect to vulnerability data: map models and firmware versions to vendor advisories and CISA KEV so known exploited flaws are prioritised.
See the Network Access Control (NAC) Guide for profiling and quarantine.
Procurement and configuration baselines
Buy secure devices
- No universal default passwords: CISA's Secure by Design pledge defines default passwords as universally shared passwords present by default across a product, and asks manufacturers to reduce them. Make unique per-device credentials or forced change at first use a purchase requirement, consistent with ETSI EN 303 645 and NIST IR 8259A. See the NIST IR 8259 IoT Device Cybersecurity Baseline Guide.
- Published support period: NCSC advises checking support lifetimes before choosing hardware. Require a stated security update end date.
- Central management: fleet management with configuration policies, update control and logging export (syslog or API).
- Modern protocols: TLS for management, IPP over HTTPS (the ipps scheme in RFC 7472, which requires TLS 1.2 or later and uses port 631 by default), SNMPv3, 802.1X support for network access.
- Storage protection: encrypted internal storage and a documented secure erase function for printers and room systems.
Baseline configuration by class
| Setting | Printers and MFPs | Meeting room systems | Signage and displays |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admin credentials | Unique per device, stored in a vault, managed by fleet tool | Change the default local admin immediately; Microsoft recommends this for Teams Rooms and supports LAPS | Unique per player; CMS accounts with MFA |
| Services | Disable Telnet, FTP, LPD and raw 9100 where not needed; enable IPPS | Kiosk mode only; no additional software | Disable remote debugging and unused services |
| Management access | HTTPS only, from admin segment only | Managed through MDM or Intune and the vendor portal | From CMS servers only |
| Data | Encrypt storage, auto-delete jobs, pull printing for sensitive output | No local storage of recordings unless required | No sensitive content on public screens |
| Physical | Lock storage and ports where available | Secure mounting and lock slot; UEFI access requires physical keyboard | Cover or disable USB and HDMI inputs in public areas |
| Updates | Fleet-managed firmware updates monthly | Vendor-managed updates (Teams Rooms on Windows installs updates nightly between 2:00 and 3:00) | Player and CMS updates on a schedule |
Network segmentation and access
- Segments per class: printers, room systems, signage and building devices each in their own VLAN or virtual network, with firewall rules allowing only required flows (print servers to printers, room systems to the internet services they need, CMS to players).
- Block lateral access: IoT segments must not reach domain controllers, file servers or user subnets except for specific, documented flows.
- Room systems: Microsoft recommends wired connections and suggests an isolated segment with direct internet access for Teams Rooms, with media traffic bypassing proxies. Isolate them from the office LAN rather than inspecting their media.
- Network admission: 802.1X with certificates where devices support it, otherwise MAC authentication bypass combined with NAC profiling and a restricted VLAN. See the 802.1X and EAP-TLS Enterprise Wi-Fi Guide.
- No internet exposure: management interfaces of printers, cameras and signage must never be reachable from the internet. Check external attack surface scans for them.
See the Network Segmentation Guide.
Decision guidance
| Decision | Option A | Option B | When to choose which |
|---|---|---|---|
| Print architecture | On-premises print servers | Cloud print service with direct-to-printer connectors | Cloud print removes the Windows spooler attack surface from your servers but moves trust to the provider's connector and identity integration; keep on-premises only where offline printing is essential |
| Fleet management | Vendor cloud portal | Self-hosted management server | Cloud portals patch themselves and scale, but need MFA, named accounts and audit logs; self-hosted suits restricted networks that cannot reach the internet |
| Meeting room platform | Windows-based room systems | Android or appliance-based room systems | Windows systems fit existing endpoint tooling and LAPS; appliances have a smaller surface but depend entirely on vendor updates and device management |
| Network admission | 802.1X with certificates | MAC authentication with NAC profiling | Use 802.1X wherever the device supports it; MAC-based admission is spoofable, so pair it with a restricted VLAN and behaviour monitoring |
| Unsupported devices | Isolate and keep | Replace | NCSC's view is that stopping use is the only fully effective option; keep only with a time-limited exception, an isolated segment and monitoring |
Where identity fits
Enterprise IoT is full of non-human identities that nobody reviews.
- Service credentials in printers: LDAP bind accounts, SMTP relay accounts and scan-to-folder accounts are often domain accounts with passwords that never change. Give each a dedicated, least-privileged account, rotate it and restrict where it can log on. A printer's LDAP settings can be abused to capture those credentials if an attacker gains admin access to the web interface.
- Meeting room resource accounts: they cannot use interactive MFA without breaking automatic sign-in, so Microsoft points to Conditional Access and Intune compliance to control them instead. Restrict them to compliant devices and trusted locations, and keep them cloud-only where possible.
- Vendor and integrator access: named accounts, MFA on fleet portals and removal at contract end.
- Device identity: certificates for 802.1X and management TLS, issued and renewed through your PKI. See the IoT and Device Certificate Provisioning (EST, SCEP) Guide and the Device and IoT Identity Guide.
Rolling out the programme
- Discover and assign owners: one month to build the first inventory and name device class owners.
- Fix the worst exposures: internet-exposed interfaces, default admin credentials and KEV-listed firmware first.
- Pilot segmentation: move one floor or one device class into its segment, with firewall rules first in log-only mode, then enforcing. Keep the old VLAN assignment ready to restore if printing or meetings break.
- Apply baselines: push configuration through fleet tools, starting with a pilot group.
- Bring in procurement: add the requirements above to purchasing and the managed service contracts.
- Monitor and review: forward logs, track metrics and review exceptions quarterly.
- Retire safely: erase storage and remove certificates and credentials before devices leave the estate. NCSC notes that simply deleting files is often not enough to prevent recovery.
- Small organisations: a single IoT VLAN with default-deny to the office network, changed default passwords, and printers and room devices on vendor-managed updates cover most of the risk.
- Large organisations: per-class segments across sites, NAC enforcement, fleet tools integrated with the CMDB, and contract-level requirements for managed print and AV providers.
Detection and measurement
- What to log: admin logins and configuration changes on fleet consoles, device syslog where available, firewall logs for IoT segments, NAC events for new or changed devices, and sign-ins of resource and service accounts in the identity provider.
- What to alert on: IoT devices connecting to servers outside allow-listed flows, scanning from an IoT segment, new admin accounts on devices, resource accounts signing in from unexpected devices or locations, and firmware downgrades.
Metrics
- Inventory coverage: percentage of discovered IoT devices with a registered owner and class.
- Default credential removal: percentage of devices with factory admin credentials changed or disabled.
- Segmentation: percentage of IoT devices in their designated segment.
- Patch currency: percentage of devices on supported firmware, and days to remediate KEV-listed flaws.
- Unsupported devices: count of devices past their support end date, each with an exception or replacement date.
- Service account hygiene: printer and room service accounts with an owner and a rotation date within policy.
Framework mapping
| Programme area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | Other |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inventory and ownership | CM-8 | ID.AM-01, ID.AM-08 | CIS Controls v8.1 Control 1 |
| Configuration baselines | CM-2, CM-6, CM-7 | PR.PS-01 | CIS Controls v8.1 Control 4 |
| Default and service credentials | IA-5, AC-2 | PR.AA-01 | ETSI EN 303 645 provision 5.1 |
| Device authentication to the network | IA-3 | PR.AA-03 | IEEE 802.1X |
| Segmentation | SC-7 | PR.IR-01 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.8.22 |
| Vulnerability and firmware management | RA-5, SI-2, SA-22 | ID.RA-01, PR.PS-02 | CISA KEV |
| Disposal and sanitisation | MP-6 | PR.PS-03 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 A.7.14 |
| Supplier requirements | SR-3 | GV.SC-05 | NIST SP 800-213 |
Common failure patterns
- Nobody owns the fleet: facilities buys the screens, a vendor manages the printers and IT assumes both are someone else's problem.
- Default admin passwords left in place: printers and cameras with factory credentials reachable from every user subnet.
- Domain admin in a printer: scan-to-folder or LDAP configured with a highly privileged account whose password is visible to anyone with printer admin access.
- Flat networks: room systems and signage on the user VLAN, so one exploited device can scan and attack servers.
- Print servers left unpatched: Print Spooler flaws such as PrintNightmare have been exploited in ransomware intrusions; disable the spooler where printing is not needed.
- Signage CMS accounts left behind: content management accounts created by an installer or agency years ago, shared between staff and never disabled, so anyone with the old password can put content on public screens or reach the players' management interface.
- Disposal without erasure: leased printers returned with stored scans and address books on their internal drives.
Practitioner checklist
- Name an owner for each enterprise IoT device class and publish a short connection standard.
- Build and reconcile an inventory with model, firmware, segment and support end date.
- Change or disable every default admin credential and store device credentials in a vault.
- Replace privileged service accounts in printers with dedicated least-privilege accounts and rotate them.
- Put printers, room systems and signage in separate segments with allow-listed flows.
- Disable legacy print and management protocols and enable IPPS, HTTPS and SNMPv3.
- Control meeting room resource accounts with Conditional Access and device compliance.
- Prioritise KEV-listed firmware flaws and patch print servers promptly.
- Add security requirements to IoT purchases and managed service contracts.
- Erase storage and revoke credentials before devices are returned or disposed of.
Standards and references
- NIST: SP 800-213 IoT Device Cybersecurity Guidance for the Federal Government
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
- CISA: Secure by Design Pledge
- Microsoft Learn: Microsoft Teams Rooms on Windows and Teams Android Device Security
- IETF: RFC 7472 IPP over HTTPS Transport Binding and the ipps URI Scheme
- NCSC: Device Security Guidance, Obsolete Products
- NCSC: Device Security Guidance, Erasing Devices
- MITRE ATT&CK: Valid Accounts, Default Accounts
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: IoT Security Guide · Network Access Control (NAC) Guide · Device and IoT Identity Guide · IoT Security Buyer's Guide · Identity for IoT Fleets Guide