The electronic health record is the single system where clinical access, integration credentials and administrative power all meet, so a loose security template, a forgotten system account or an over-scoped app registration exposes every patient record at once. This guide covers the customer-side controls for two of the most widely deployed EHR platforms, Epic and Oracle Health (formerly Cerner Millennium): how user access is built and provisioned, how integrations and apps authenticate, who holds administrative power, and how to audit all three. It is written for EHR security analysts, identity teams, integration engineers and privacy officers. Platforms are listed alphabetically; order is never a ranking. It goes deeper than our overview pages and links them rather than repeating them: clinical identity in general sits in the Healthcare Identity Security Guide, and patient privacy monitoring in the EHR Access Monitoring and Patient Privacy Guide.
This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Epic's public documentation and Oracle Health's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Epic or Oracle. Product features change, so confirm settings against each vendor's current documentation.
Key takeaways
- Each customer controls its own instance. On both platforms the healthcare organisation decides which apps connect, which accounts exist and what each one can reach; these are customer-side settings under shared responsibility.
- Role design is the main access control. Epic builds user access from security templates and sub-templates; Oracle Health builds it from positions, organisations and patient provider relationships. Keep the catalogue small and owned.
- Integration identities need the same rigour as admins. Backend apps, system accounts and interface users read data at scale without a human session, so register keys, scope them to named resources and rotate them.
- Provision from HR, not by ticket. Both platforms expose provisioning interfaces that identity governance tools use to create, change and disable users; automated leaver disablement closes the biggest gap.
- Audit trails only help if someone reads them. Send login, break-the-glass, app authorisation and admin change events to privacy monitoring and the SIEM, and measure review coverage.
Shared responsibility on a hosted EHR
Many organisations run Epic or Oracle Health in a vendor-hosted model, but hosting does not move access decisions to the vendor. The split matters because most EHR access risk sits on the customer side of the line.
- Epic: Epic describes a federated model in which each customer runs its own instance and decides which apps can connect; there is no central Epic endpoint. Customers sync an app's client ID to their instance and enable any implementation-specific keys before go-live, which makes the customer the approval point for every integration.
- Oracle Health: Oracle's published Oracle Health and AI security programme states that Oracle runs cyber security and incident management for hosting operations, while the customer manages end-user access, custom extensions and integrations, lawful data processing and any system modifications it makes. Customers enable client apps for their own domain and can terminate an app's access at any time, which revokes its refresh tokens.
In practice this means four customer-owned control areas on either platform: the user role catalogue, the provisioning pipeline, integration and app credentials, and audit review. The sections below take them in turn.
User access models: templates and positions
Both platforms grant clinical and business access through reusable role objects rather than per-user permission lists. Good security comes from a role catalogue that is small, documented and owned, with exceptions logged.
| Concept | Epic | Oracle Health |
|---|---|---|
| User record | User (EMP) record, one per login | User (personnel) record with begin and end effective dates and an inactive flag |
| Primary role object | Linkable security template (one per user) | Position, carried on the user and on role profiles |
| Supplementary access | Sub-templates added to a user to extend access | Role profiles, organisation groups and personal groups |
| Scope of patients and locations | Login departments and the departments a user can access | Organisations, organisation groups and patient provider relationship (PPR) access |
| Identifiers and credentials | Linked provider records for clinicians | Personal aliases (for example a licence or staff number) and taxonomies |
Epic: identity governance connectors document that an Epic user carries a single linkable template plus any number of sub-templates, and that the Epic security team supplies the template list as a file with its ID, description and type. Treat that list as the role catalogue of record: give each template an owner in the clinical or business area, a written purpose, and a review date. Sub-templates are where access creeps, because they are added for one-off needs and rarely removed; report users with more than a set number of sub-templates and review them first.
Oracle Health: Oracle's Access Governance integration reference lists the entities managed for Oracle Health EHR users: the user, organisations, organisation groups, personal groups, personal aliases, PPR access, taxonomies and role profiles, with position held as an attribute. Treat positions as the role catalogue: each one should map to a job family, with an owner and a review date. PPR access and organisation membership decide which patients a user can see, so review them alongside positions, not separately.
Decision guidance: a smaller organisation with one or two hospitals can manage the catalogue in a spreadsheet owned by the EHR security analyst, provided every change is ticketed. A large multi-entity system should hold the catalogue in its identity governance tool, model templates or positions as entitlements, and require role owner approval for every new role object. In both cases resist cloning a user as the way to grant access; it copies every exception the original user ever collected.
Provisioning, joiners, movers and leavers
Manual account creation from tickets produces orphaned accounts and slow leaver disablement. Both platforms publish interfaces for automated provisioning.
- Epic: Epic's open.epic site describes a Personnel Management web services suite that creates, updates and deletes user records and manages user groups, login departments and accessible departments. It also lists an incoming Personnel Management HL7 v2 interface that can build the shell of a user record, and notes that many user settings cannot be controlled by an external system, so full automation is not the aim: automate creation, template assignment and disablement, and leave clinical preferences to the build team. Connector documentation notes that the web services route requires Epic's Interconnect web services to be licensed and enabled by the Epic administrator.
- Oracle Health: the Access Governance integration reference lists create, update, enable, disable and password change operations, plus add and remove for organisations, organisation groups, personal aliases, personal groups, PPR access, taxonomies and role profiles, over a SOAP connection. The Millennium Platform administrator also grants REST API access to user accounts, so include that grant in the same approval flow.
Movers and leavers: map HR events to platform actions. A leaver disables the account (Epic) or sets the inactive flag and end effective date (Oracle Health) within the same day. A mover replaces the template or position rather than adding to it, then removes old sub-templates or organisation memberships. Agency, locum and student accounts should carry an end date at creation. See the Access Reviews Guide for running the periodic certification that catches what the pipeline misses.
Integration and app identities
EHR integrations are non-human identities with broad read and write reach: interface engines, revenue cycle bots, analytics extracts, patient apps and clinical decision tools. Both platforms implement SMART on FHIR for apps, which the HL7 SMART App Launch specification (STU 2.2, checked November 2026) defines; the protocol detail is in the SMART on FHIR Security Guide, and HL7 v2 feeds are covered in the HL7 v2 and Clinical Interface Engine Security Guide. This section covers the platform-specific registration and credential settings.
| Setting | Epic | Oracle Health |
|---|---|---|
| Where apps are registered | Epic on FHIR or Vendor Services; customers download the app to their instance using its client ID | Code Console with a CernerCare account; customers enable the app for their domain |
| User types or app types | Backend Systems; Clinicians, Staff or Administrative Users; Patients | Provider, patient and system personas; public and confidential client privacy settings |
| System-to-system authentication | Client credentials grant with a signed JWT assertion; public key supplied as a JWKS URL (recommended for easier rotation) or a PEM RSA key | Client credentials with a system account secret, or signed JWTs with a JWKS preregistered in Cerner Central for bulk data |
| Assertion and token rules | JWT iss and sub are the client ID, jti is unique per request, exp no more than 5 minutes ahead | Access tokens last 570 seconds; system/ scopes only with client credentials; no wildcard scopes |
| Where credentials are managed | The app's registration and the customer's download of it | Cerner Central System Account Management, where secrets are rotated |
- Epic: include only the APIs the app will use in production; Epic's guide says this lets customers assess the security, privacy and licensing implications. Prefer a JWKS URL over a static key so rotation does not need a registration change. For patient apps that hold refresh tokens, note that refresh token life depends on the app's configured lifetime and the persistent access the patient chooses at authorisation. Test only in the open.epic sandbox with synthetic data.
- Oracle Health: the
audparameter is mandatory and must be the FHIR base URL; requests without it are rejected. Discover endpoints from/.well-known/smart-configurationper tenant rather than hard-coding them. Offline refresh tokens stay valid until revoked, access ends or they go unused for more than three months, so revoke them when an app is retired. Oracle advises never posting or emailing client secrets and rotating a compromised secret in Cerner Central.
Where identity fits: every backend client, system account and interface user should sit in the NHI inventory with an owner, a business purpose, the scopes or APIs granted, the credential type and a rotation date. See the Machine Identity in Healthcare guide and the Authorisation Code vs Client Credentials Flow guide for the design choice between user-delegated and system access.
Administrative roles and privileged access
EHR administrators can change who sees what for the whole patient population. Treat these roles as privileged access, whatever the platform calls them.
- Epic: the people who build and assign security templates and sub-templates, administer Interconnect web services, approve app downloads in Vendor Services and manage client keys hold privileged power. Restrict template build to the security team, separate template design from template assignment where staffing allows, and log both.
- Oracle Health: the Millennium Platform administrator grants REST API access to user accounts, customer administrators can revoke app grants and terminate app access, and Cerner Central holds system account secrets and JWKS registrations. Restrict each of these to named individuals and record grants in the change system.
On both platforms apply the same pattern: named admin accounts separate from the clinician login, phishing-resistant MFA at the identity provider in front of the admin path, quarterly review of every admin and integration grant, and an emergency access procedure that is tested. See the Break-Glass Account Guide for the emergency account pattern, which is distinct from clinical break-the-glass on a restricted patient record.
Access auditing and monitoring
The HIPAA Security Rule requires audit controls that record and examine activity in systems holding electronic protected health information (45 CFR 164.312(b)), and both platforms keep access audit trails that privacy teams already use. The security task is to widen that use to identity and integration events.
| Event family | Why it matters | Where to send it |
|---|---|---|
| Successful and failed logins, including remote and VPN-preceded logins | Credential stuffing, shared accounts, logins from unexpected locations | SIEM, identity threat detection |
| Break-the-glass on restricted records | Snooping and inappropriate access to VIP or staff records | Privacy monitoring, with the reason text |
| Display or print of masked sensitive data | Bulk exfiltration by a legitimate user | Privacy monitoring |
| Template, sub-template, position or PPR changes | Privilege escalation through role assignment | SIEM and the identity governance tool |
| App authorisations, client registrations and key or secret changes | New data paths and token theft (ATT&CK T1528 Steal Application Access Token) | SIEM, NHI inventory |
| System account and backend client API volume | Use of valid integration credentials by an attacker (T1078 Valid Accounts) | SIEM baseline and anomaly rules |
- Epic: published SIEM content for Epic Hyperspace reports on break-the-glass successes and failures, display and print of unmasked sensitive data, successful and unsuccessful logins across login types, and logins preceded by a VPN connection. Confirm with your Epic team which of these your instance exports and at what latency.
- Oracle Health: Oracle Access Governance documents access certifications and visibility of who has access to what for Oracle Health EHR users, and the token endpoint and refresh behaviour give clear signals: a refresh token unused for three months expires, and refresh attempts less than a minute apart may be throttled, so repeated throttling is worth an alert.
Drug diversion and snooping analytics belong to the privacy programme; see the EHR Access Monitoring and Patient Privacy Guide.
Implementing the programme: a phased approach
- Inventory (weeks 1 to 4): export the role catalogue (Epic templates and sub-templates, or Oracle Health positions and role profiles), every admin holder, and every app, backend client, system account and interface user. Give each an owner.
- Quick wins (weeks 3 to 8): disable accounts with no login in 90 days after owner confirmation, retire unused app registrations and revoke their tokens, and rotate any secret older than your policy allows. Keep a list of everything changed so it can be re-enabled within the day if a clinical workflow breaks.
- Automate provisioning (months 2 to 6): connect the identity governance tool through the platform's provisioning interface. Pilot on one department or entity in a non-production environment, then run in report-only mode against production before switching on automatic disablement.
- Harden integrations (months 3 to 6): move backend clients to asymmetric JWT authentication with JWKS where the platform supports it, trim scopes to named resources and document each client in the NHI inventory.
- Wire up monitoring (months 4 to 8): forward the event families above to the SIEM, build baselines for system account volume, and agree response playbooks with privacy and the Healthcare Incident Response Guide owners.
- Review and certify (ongoing): quarterly certification of admins and integrations, semi-annual review of the role catalogue, and annual testing of emergency access, aligned with Clinical Downtime and EHR Downtime Procedures Guide exercises.
Rollback rule: every automated disablement should be reversible by the EHR security team in minutes, and clinical leadership should agree in advance which roles are excluded from automatic action during the pilot.
Detection and measurement
- Leaver disablement time: median hours from HR termination to EHR account disabled; target same day.
- Role catalogue ownership: percentage of templates, sub-templates or positions with a named owner and a review in the last 12 months.
- Exception density: users with sub-templates or extra role profiles above the agreed threshold, trending down.
- Integration hygiene: percentage of backend clients and system accounts with an owner, documented scopes and a credential rotated within policy.
- Dormant credentials: count of system accounts, client registrations or refresh tokens unused for 90 days.
- Audit review coverage: percentage of break-the-glass events reviewed within the agreed window.
Framework mapping
| Control area | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 | NIST CSF 2.0 | HIPAA Security Rule |
|---|---|---|---|
| Role catalogue and least privilege | AC-6 Least Privilege | PR.AA | 164.308(a)(4) information access management |
| Provisioning and leaver disablement | AC-2 Account Management, AC-2(3) Disable Accounts | PR.AA | 164.308(a)(3) workforce security |
| Integration credentials and keys | IA-5 Authenticator Management | PR.AA | 164.312(d) person or entity authentication |
| Audit logging and review | AU-2 Event Logging, AU-6 Audit Record Review | DE.CM | 164.312(b) audit controls |
| Hosted platform oversight | SA-9 External System Services | GV.SC | 164.308(b) business associate contracts |
Common failure patterns
- Cloning users to grant access: new starters inherit every sub-template or organisation membership the template user collected. Assign from the role catalogue instead.
- Leavers left active for days: account disablement waits for a ticket queue, so a former employee or agency worker keeps EHR access. Automate disablement from HR on both platforms.
- Integration credentials without owners: a backend client or system account outlives the project that created it, still holding broad scopes. Inventory and certify every one.
- Static secrets shared by email: Oracle's own guidance warns against posting or emailing client secrets, and the same applies to Epic client keys. Use JWKS and a secrets manager.
- Over-broad API lists at registration: apps request every API in case it is useful later. Register only production APIs and review scopes when the app is renewed.
- Audit data that only privacy sees: login and role change events stay in privacy reports and never reach the SOC. Forward them to the SIEM as well.
Practitioner checklist
- Export the role catalogue and give every template, sub-template, position and role profile a named owner.
- Stop granting access by cloning users; assign from the catalogue.
- Connect identity governance to the platform's provisioning interface and automate same-day leaver disablement.
- Put every backend client, system account and interface user in the NHI inventory with owner, scopes and rotation date.
- Prefer asymmetric JWT client authentication with a JWKS URL for system-to-system access.
- Register only the APIs and scopes an app uses in production, and revoke tokens when an app is retired.
- Treat template build, API access grants and app approvals as privileged roles with named accounts and MFA.
- Forward logins, break-the-glass, role changes and app authorisation events to the SIEM.
- Certify admins and integrations quarterly and review the role catalogue twice a year.
- Apply vendor security updates promptly and follow each vendor's security advisories.
Standards and references
- Epic: open.epic Interoperability Guide
- Epic: Epic on FHIR OAuth 2.0 documentation
- Epic: open.epic Personnel Management
- Oracle: Oracle Health Millennium Platform FHIR Authorization Framework
- Oracle: Access Governance Oracle Health EHR Integration Reference
- Oracle: Oracle Health and AI Security Program
- HL7: SMART App Launch Backend Services
- OpenText NetIQ: Identity Manager Driver for Epic
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Healthcare Identity Security Guide · HL7 v2 and Clinical Interface Engine Security Guide · SMART on FHIR Security Guide · EHR Access Monitoring and Patient Privacy Guide · Machine Identity in Healthcare