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FIDO Credential Exchange Passkey Portability Guide: CXP, CXF and Export Policy

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 13 min read
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Passkeys stored in a credential manager can now be moved to another credential manager, which solves lock-in for users and creates a new export path that security teams have to govern. The FIDO Alliance Credential Exchange specifications define a common data format (CXF) and a protocol (CXP) for transferring passkeys, passwords, TOTP seeds, SSH keys, API keys and other items between providers, and Apple has shipped operating system support built on them. For enterprises the question is no longer whether synced passkeys can leave a managed vault, but under what conditions you allow it. This guide explains what the specifications contain and their exact status, how an exchange works, what it means for relying parties, and how to set export policy for workforce and customer passkeys. It is for identity architects, IAM engineers and security reviewers who already run or plan passkeys; see the Passkey Rollout Guide for deployment basics.

Key takeaways

  • Two documents, two maturity levels. The Credential Exchange Format (CXF) 1.0 is a FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard (errata version dated 9 March 2026), while the Credential Exchange Protocol (CXP) published copy is still a Working Draft dated 3 October 2024 (both checked 27 October 2026).
  • Exported passkeys are private keys. CXF carries the passkey private key as a PKCS#8 structure, so an export is the most sensitive operation a credential manager performs.
  • Syncable means exportable. NIST SP 800-63B-4 states that syncing authentication keys inherently means the key can be exported, which is why synced passkeys are limited to AAL2.
  • Relying parties barely notice a move. Credential ID, RP ID and user handle are preserved, so the passkey keeps working; signature counters are reset, and the CXF rules exclude passkeys that use a non-zero counter.
  • Enterprise control sits at registration and on devices. Use device-bound passkeys with enforced attestation where export must be impossible, and managed devices and provider policy where synced passkeys are acceptable.

What the Credential Exchange specifications are

DocumentStatus (as published by FIDO Alliance)What it defines
Credential Exchange Format (CXF) 1.0Proposed Standard; first published 14 August 2025, errata version 9 March 2026Normative data structures for credentials passed between applications, independent of transport
Credential Exchange Protocol (CXP) 1.0Working Draft, 3 October 2024; the draft itself says it is not intended as a basis for implementationsHow an importer requests, and an exporter encrypts and returns, a CXF payload

The FIDO Alliance download page also describes both documents as being in early review, so treat details as subject to change, particularly anything in CXP. The format is the stable part today; platform vendors can move CXF payloads over their own trusted channels while the protocol matures.

The CXF data model

  • Header: format version, exporterRpId, exporterDisplayName, timestamp and a list of accounts.
  • Account: the credential owner's account in the exporting provider, with id, username, email, collections and items.
  • Item: a vault entry with title, scope (URLs and Android apps), tags and one or more credentials.
  • Collection: folder-like grouping that references items.
  • Credential types: passkey, basic-auth, totp, api-key, ssh-key, generated-password, credit-card, note, file, address, identity-document, passport, drivers-license, person-name, custom-fields, item-reference, and a Wi-Fi passphrase type.

The presence of api-key and ssh-key matters for security teams: a personal credential manager export can contain non-human credentials that engineers stored alongside their passwords. See the API Key Management Guide.

The passkey record

CXF fieldMeaningSecurity note
credentialIdWebAuthn credential ID, must match the registration rawIdPreserved, so the relying party sees the same credential
rpIdRelying party identifierThe passkey must not be used outside this scope; importers must keep the binding
username, userDisplayNameHuman-readable account labelsThe only user-editable passkey fields
userHandleUser handle from registrationLinks the passkey to the RP account
keyPrivate key, PKCS#8 DER, Base64url encodedMust match the registered public key; protect as the most sensitive field in the file
fido2ExtensionsOptional hmacCredentials, credBlob, largeBlob, paymentshmac-secret material can protect data at rest elsewhere; losing it breaks those uses

The CXF text states: "Passkeys using a non-zero signature counter MUST be excluded from the export." Importers must set the counter of imported passkeys to zero and must not increment it later. This keeps cloned-authenticator detection meaningful: a credential whose relying party relies on a counter is not silently duplicated.

How an exchange works

CXF names four roles: the exporting provider, the importing provider, an optional orchestrating party such as the operating system, and the credential owner who authorises the move. CXF requires the exporting provider to ensure the data is transferred securely, either by encrypting it itself or by relying on the orchestrator's guarantees.

  1. Request: in the CXP draft, the importer sends an Export Request with a challenge, a preference-ordered list of HPKE parameters (RFC 9180 modes base, psk, auth or auth-psk), an archive algorithm, a response mode and its own identity as a WebAuthn RP ID, optionally narrowing the credential types.
  2. Approval: the credential owner, or an authorising party for organisational vaults, approves the export in the exporter.
  3. Encryption: the exporter builds a CXF archive, encrypts each file as JWE using the negotiated HPKE parameters, and signs the importer's challenge.
  4. Delivery: in direct mode over a platform interface, in indirect mode as a file the owner carries, or in self mode when importer and exporter are the same provider.
  5. Import: the importer validates the challenge, decrypts, checks file integrity hashes and stores the credentials.

The CXP draft has gaps that matter to a reviewer: its implementation requirements section is empty (no mandatory algorithms), and its security considerations cover only key compromise. Until a later draft fills these, rely on platform-mediated transfers rather than ad hoc file-based exchanges.

Platform support: Apple as a worked example

Apple documents ASCredentialExportManager and ASCredentialImportManager in AuthenticationServices for iOS, iPadOS, macOS and visionOS 26.0 and later. A credential provider extension opts in with the SupportsCredentialExchange key and declares SupportedCredentialExchangeVersions (currently only 1.0). Calling requestExport(for:) brings up out-of-process system UI that explains the risks and lets the person choose the destination app; Apple states the operating system establishes the identities of the apps involved and that the process does not write data to the file system. That design removes the most dangerous legacy pattern: plaintext CSV exports left in a downloads folder.

What changes for relying parties

  • Nothing breaks by design: credential ID, RP ID, user handle and key are preserved, so sign-in continues after a move without re-registration.
  • Backup flags: W3C Web Authentication Level 3 (a W3C Recommendation dated 25 August 2026) defines Backup Eligibility (BE), set at creation and permanent, and Backup State (BS), which can change. A backup-eligible credential is a multi-device credential, and the specification lists manual export as one way it can be backed up. Store backupEligible and the latest backupState per credential.
  • Counters: do not treat a zero counter as an error for multi-device credentials; if your risk model depends on counters, CXF already excludes such passkeys from export.
  • Attestation: synced passkeys generally do not carry attestation; Microsoft states plainly that synced passkeys do not support attestation in Entra ID. If you need to know a key cannot move, you have to require attestation from a device-bound authenticator at registration.
  • Provider change detection: the authenticator model identifier (AAGUID) seen at registration may not reflect where a passkey lives after an import. Do not build policy that assumes the provider never changes.

Threat model for a credential exchange

An exchange concentrates every secret a user holds into one payload at one moment. Review it the way you would review a key ceremony.

ThreatWhere it happensMitigation in the specifications or platformsResidual risk you own
Malicious or impersonated importerOwner is tricked into exporting to an attacker-controlled appImporter identified by RP ID and challenge in CXP; on Apple platforms the OS establishes app identities and shows a risk warningUsers can still choose a bad destination; restrict which providers are allowed on managed devices
Payload interceptionFile-based (indirect) transfer or a compromised channelPer-file JWE encryption with HPKE; CXF requires secure transferFiles at rest on endpoints and cloud drives; CXP mandatory algorithms not yet defined
Session hijack of the exporterAttacker with a live vault session starts an exportProvider re-authentication before export (provider dependent)Verify your provider requires fresh user verification for export
Over-broad exportWhole vault, including shared and team items, leaves at onceCredential type filtering in the Export Request; optional authorising partyOrganisational vault rules must forbid personal export of shared items
Clone detection lossSame passkey active in two providersCounter-based passkeys excluded; imported counters set to zeroOld copy remains in the exporter unless the user deletes it
Metadata leakageIdentifiers visible in clear during transferCXF limits identifiers to 64 bytes and says they should not contain personal dataItem titles and URLs are still sensitive inside the payload

The last row on clone detection deserves emphasis: an export copies, it does not move. Unless the exporting provider deletes its copy, the same private key now lives in two places, and the relying party has no protocol signal that this has happened.

Setting export policy

NIST SP 800-63B-4 Appendix B, which is normative, permits syncable authenticators at AAL2 but not AAL3, requires sync fabric keys of at least 112 bits and access protected by AAL2-equivalent multi-factor authentication, and for federal enterprise use requires managed devices that prevent syncing to unauthorised devices or fabrics and access through agency-managed accounts. Those conditions are a reasonable template for any enterprise.

Population and assurance needRecommended passkey typeExport stanceMain control
Administrators, privileged and AAL3 useDevice-bound (security key, platform key with attestation)Not exportable by designEnforce attestation and AAGUID allow list at registration
General workforce, AAL2Synced passkeys in an organisation-managed providerAllowed only between managed providers on managed devicesProvider admin policy, device management, managed accounts
Contractors and BYODDevice-bound or managed-provider passkeysTreat personal-provider passkeys as outside your controlRegistration policy and conditional access by authentication strength
Customers (consumer apps)Whatever the user's provider offersUser choice; portability is a usability benefitAccept BE and BS; do not block on BS per NIST guidance for public-facing apps
  • Microsoft Entra ID example: passkey profiles (up to three, and opting in cannot be reversed) let you choose Device-bound and or Synced passkey types per group, Enforce attestation, and Enforce key restrictions with an AAGUID allow or block list. Microsoft notes that with attestation off, AAGUID lists are a policy guide rather than a strict security control. See the FIDO2 and WebAuthn Internals Guide.
  • Organisational vaults: where your password manager holds shared or team credentials, decide who may export a vault (owners only, with approval) and whether export is disabled entirely. CXP's optional authorising party exists for this case, but check what your provider actually implements.
  • Small organisations: picking one managed provider and disabling personal-provider registration for work accounts gives most of the benefit with little effort.
  • Large organisations: separate the privileged tier (device-bound, attested) from the workforce tier (managed sync), and document the residual risk that a synced passkey can be exported by its owner.

Implementation approach

  1. Inventory: list where workforce passkeys live today (platform providers, password managers, security keys) using registration data and AAGUIDs.
  2. Classify accounts by assurance: mark accounts that must be AAL3 or non-exportable, typically administrators and break-glass accounts.
  3. Set registration policy: for the non-exportable tier, require attestation and allow only device-bound authenticator models; test in a pilot group first, because removing an allowed AAGUID stops existing users signing in with that method.
  4. Set provider policy: in your managed credential manager, restrict export to administrators or disable it, and require re-authentication for any export.
  5. Update relying party code: store BE, BS and counters correctly, and stop treating zero counters as failures for multi-device credentials.
  6. Communicate: tell users which transfers are allowed and that plaintext CSV export is prohibited.
  7. Roll back safely: if a restriction locks out users, revert the profile or key restriction for the pilot group and give affected users a temporary access pass while they re-register.

Detection and measurement

  • Export events: collect credential manager admin logs for vault or credential export, and alert on exports from privileged users and on bulk exports.
  • Registration drift: alert on new passkey registrations with AAGUIDs outside the allow list, and on synced passkeys appearing for accounts in the device-bound tier.
  • Credential theft techniques: map monitoring to MITRE ATT&CK T1555.005 Password Managers and T1555 Credentials from Password Stores, which include theft of exported or decrypted vault contents.
MetricTarget direction
Privileged accounts with only attested device-bound passkeys100%
Vault export events by non-administrators (where export is restricted)Zero; each one investigated
Workforce passkeys held in unmanaged personal providersDecreasing
Plaintext credential export files found by endpoint or DLP scansZero
Relying parties storing BE and BS flags per credentialAll in-house applications

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-63B-4Appendix B Syncable AuthenticatorsAAL2 permitted, AAL3 excluded; sync fabric and enterprise conditions
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5IA-5 Authenticator Management; IA-2(8) Access to Accounts: Replay ResistantManaging passkey life cycle, including export and re-import
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest; AC-20 Use of External SystemsProtecting export payloads; personal providers as external systems
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-01, PR.AA-03, PR.DS-01Credential management, authentication, data-at-rest protection
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A5.17 Authentication information; 8.5 Secure authenticationRules for handling and transferring authentication secrets
MITRE ATT&CKT1555, T1555.005Theft of credential stores and exports

Common failure patterns

  • Assuming passkeys cannot leave the device: synced passkeys are exportable by definition; policies written for hardware keys do not hold for them.
  • Legacy plaintext exports: CSV or unencrypted JSON exports used for migration persist on laptops and in cloud drives long after the move.
  • Treating a vault backup as safe because it is encrypted: the LastPass Breach 2022 showed that copied vault data leaves users exposed to offline attack, and that unencrypted fields such as URLs still leak. Exported archives deserve at least the same protection as the vault.
  • AAGUID lists without attestation: restrictions that look strict but are self-asserted by the authenticator.
  • Engineers' API keys in personal vaults: a CXF export moves api-key and ssh-key items to wherever the user chooses.
  • Building on draft details: integrations hard-coded to CXP Working Draft messages may break as the protocol changes.

Practitioner checklist

  • Record the current status of CXF and CXP from the FIDO Alliance download page in your design documents, with the date checked.
  • Classify accounts into non-exportable (device-bound, attested) and managed-sync tiers.
  • Enforce attestation and AAGUID allow lists for the non-exportable tier.
  • Configure your managed credential manager to restrict or disable vault export.
  • Prohibit plaintext credential exports and scan endpoints for them.
  • Update relying parties to store BE, BS and counter values correctly.
  • Collect and alert on export and registration events.
  • Move API keys and SSH keys out of personal vaults into a secrets manager.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Passkey Rollout Guide · Passwordless and Passkeys Guide · FIDO2 and WebAuthn Internals Guide · Password Manager Buyer's Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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