Flax Typhoon is a China-based state-linked group that hides inside networks with legitimate software and, according to the FBI, sits behind a botnet of more than 200,000 hijacked routers, cameras and storage devices. Microsoft named the group in 2023 after intrusions into Taiwanese organisations that relied on web shells, a VPN client and built-in Windows tools rather than custom malware. In September 2024 the FBI, NSA and partners linked a large Mirai-based botnet, which Lumen calls Raptor Train, to a Beijing company, Integrity Technology Group, and disrupted it under court authority. This profile is for SOC analysts, network and edge device owners and threat intelligence teams. It covers names and attribution as each source states it, targeting, ATT&CK techniques, the credential and identity abuse pattern, notable events and a detection and hardening plan. General botnet defence is in the Botnets Guide; this page covers what is specific to this actor.
Key takeaways
- Two faces, one operator. Microsoft tracks hands-on intrusions as Flax Typhoon; the FBI assesses that Integrity Technology Group both ran the botnet and carries out the intrusions attributed to Flax Typhoon.
- Your edge devices may be its infrastructure. The joint advisory counted more than 260,000 infected devices in June 2024, almost half in the United States, built from SOHO routers, firewalls, NAS, IP cameras and DVRs.
- Little custom malware on hosts. Inside networks the group used China Chopper, Juicy Potato and BadPotato, Mimikatz, a renamed SoftEther VPN bridge and tools such as certutil, bitsadmin, WinRM and WMIC.
- Persistence lives in the registry. Disabling RDP Network Level Authentication and setting Task Manager as the debugger for sethc.exe gives SYSTEM access from the sign-in screen without a password.
- Patch, reboot, replace. The botnet implant runs in memory, so rebooting clears it, but only patching, removing default credentials and replacing end-of-life devices stops reinfection.
Who they are (names and aliases)
Flax Typhoon is not a group entry in MITRE ATT&CK v20, so this page relies on government and vendor reporting. Microsoft describes Flax Typhoon as a nation-state actor based out of China, active since mid-2021, and says it overlaps with ETHEREAL PANDA. The joint advisory of 18 September 2024 states that Integrity Technology Group, a PRC-based company with reported links to the PRC government, controlled and managed the botnet, and that the FBI found activity consistent with Flax Typhoon, RedJuliett and Ethereal Panda, while noting that vendor naming may not map one to one to US government attribution. The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Integrity Technology Group on 3 January 2025 for its role in intrusions publicly attributed to Flax Typhoon, which it calls a Chinese state-sponsored cyber group.
| Name | Used by | What it refers to |
|---|---|---|
| Flax Typhoon | Microsoft; adopted by FBI, DOJ and Treasury in public statements | Intrusion activity, first reported against Taiwan in August 2023 |
| Ethereal Panda | Another vendor name cited by Microsoft and the advisory | Overlapping activity |
| RedJuliett | Another vendor name cited by the advisory | Overlapping activity |
| Integrity Technology Group (Integrity Tech) | FBI, DOJ, Treasury OFAC | Beijing company that, per the FBI, controlled the botnet and runs Flax Typhoon intrusions |
| KRLab | DOJ | A public brand of Integrity Tech used to label the botnet control application |
| Raptor Train | Lumen Black Lotus Labs | The botnet, which Lumen assesses is likely operated by Flax Typhoon |
For how this group fits alongside other PRC actors such as Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon and Silk Typhoon, see the China State Cyber Operations Guide and the Salt Typhoon Threat Actor Profile.
Targeting and motivation
- Taiwan first: Microsoft observed Flax Typhoon targeting government agencies, education, critical manufacturing and information technology organisations in Taiwan, with some victims in Southeast Asia, North America and Africa.
- United States and Europe: Treasury states that between summer 2022 and fall 2023 the group accessed hosts linked to US and European entities using VPN software and remote desktop, often targets US critical infrastructure, and in summer 2023 compromised servers and workstations at a California-based entity.
- Motivation: Microsoft describes an actor focused on persistence and long-term, quiet access, consistent with espionage. The botnet adds a commercial dimension: DOJ describes a control application that let customers task infected devices.
- Botnet geography (June 2024): United States 126,000 devices (47.9%), then Vietnam, Germany, Romania, Hong Kong, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom, per the advisory.
Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)
Because ATT&CK has no Flax Typhoon group page, NHI Mgmt Group mapped the behaviours in the Microsoft report and the joint advisory to ATT&CK v20 techniques. Treat this as an analyst mapping, not MITRE's.
| Tactic | Technique | Observed behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| Resource development | T1584.005 Botnet; T1584.008 Network Devices | Mirai-based implant on SOHO routers, cameras, DVRs and NAS used as Raptor Train Tier 1 nodes |
| Resource development | T1588.005 Exploits | 66 CVEs listed in the advisory, from Fortinet, Zyxel, Ivanti, Confluence, Citrix and many IoT vendors |
| Initial access | T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application | Known flaws in VPN, web, Java and SQL servers |
| Persistence | T1505.003 Web Shell | China Chopper on exploited web servers |
| Privilege escalation | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Juicy Potato and BadPotato when the web shell lacks local admin rights |
| Persistence | T1546.008 Accessibility Features; T1112 Modify Registry | sethc.exe debugger set to Task Manager; RDP NLA disabled via registry |
| Execution | T1059.001 PowerShell; T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation | Hands-on-keyboard work with PowerShell, WMIC and WinRM |
| Command and control | T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1197 BITS Jobs | SoftEther downloaded with Invoke-WebRequest, certutil or bitsadmin |
| Persistence, stealth | T1543.003 Windows Service; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location | SoftEther installed as an auto-start service; vpnbridge.exe renamed conhost.exe or dllhost.exe |
| Command and control | T1572 Protocol Tunneling | VPN over HTTPS on TCP 443 for lateral movement and scanning |
| Credential access | T1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.002 Security Account Manager | Mimikatz against LSASS and the SAM hive |
| Lateral movement | T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol | RDP using stolen credentials or the sticky keys backdoor |
| Impact | T1498 Network Denial of Service | DDoS tasks in the Sparrow application; a DDoS against FBI infrastructure during the takedown |
How they abuse identities and credentials
The Flax Typhoon pattern is about holding access with as few artefacts as possible. Each step relies on a credential or an authentication setting that the defender controls.
| Step | What the actor does | Control that breaks it |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Edge foothold | Exploits a public-facing server or device; on IoT, default or weak credentials and unpatched firmware | Patch internet-facing systems first; remove default passwords; disable remote management, UPnP and file sharing on devices |
| 2. Elevate | Web shell running as a service account escalates with Potato tools, which abuse token impersonation | Run web application pools with minimal rights; remove SeImpersonatePrivilege where possible; EDR rules for Potato tools |
| 3. Sign-in screen backdoor | Sets sethc.exe debugger and disables NLA, so anyone reaching RDP gets a SYSTEM shell without a password | Enforce NLA by policy; alert on Image File Execution Options changes for accessibility binaries; never expose RDP directly |
| 4. Harvest | Dumps LSASS and SAM with Mimikatz | LSASS as a protected process (RunAsPPL), Credential Guard, WDigest UseLogonCredential set to 0, unique local admin passwords with Windows LAPS |
| 5. Reuse | Moves with valid accounts over RDP and through the SoftEther tunnel | MFA for remote access, tiered admin accounts, disable unused accounts, rotate every credential found on a compromised host |
- Service and local accounts matter most: the web shell runs as the application pool or service identity, and the local administrator hash in SAM unlocks every host that shares it. See the Edge Device Security Guide for credentials held on appliances.
- Device credentials are identities too: default passwords on cameras and routers are the botnet's entry point. Treat each device as a managed identity with an owner, as the Device and IoT Identity Guide describes.
- Rotate after eviction: Microsoft advises closing or changing compromised credentials and isolating affected systems, because removing the VPN service alone leaves harvested passwords valid.
Notable incidents
| Date | Event | Source |
|---|---|---|
| May 2020 onward | Raptor Train botnet forms; campaigns Lumen names Crossbill, Finch, Canary and Oriole; more than 60,000 active nodes at the June 2023 peak | Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 18 September 2024 |
| Mid-2021 onward | Intrusions into Taiwanese government, education, manufacturing and IT organisations | Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 24 August 2023 |
| Summer 2022 to fall 2023 | Access to hosts of US and European entities; compromise of a California-based entity in summer 2023 | US Treasury, 3 January 2025 |
| 18 September 2024 | Joint advisory JCSA-20240918-001; court-authorised FBI operation sends disabling commands to infected devices; operators attempt a DDoS against FBI infrastructure | FBI, NSA, CNMF and partners; DOJ |
| 3 January 2025 | OFAC sanctions Integrity Technology Group | US Treasury |
Detection and defence
Detection signals
| Signal | Where to look | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Changes under Image File Execution Options for sethc.exe, utilman.exe and other accessibility binaries | Sysmon Event ID 13, EDR registry telemetry | Any Debugger value here is almost never legitimate |
| RDP UserAuthentication (NLA) set to 0 | Registry auditing, configuration management drift reports | Microsoft calls out NLA and sethc changes specifically |
| conhost.exe or dllhost.exe running from an unusual path, installed as a service, with outbound 443 | Event ID 7045 (new service), process path baselines | Signature of the renamed SoftEther vpnbridge.exe |
| certutil, bitsadmin or Invoke-WebRequest pulling executables from the internet on servers | PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104), process creation (4688 or Sysmon 1) | See the Living off the Land Guide |
| w3wp.exe or other web server process spawning cmd.exe or PowerShell | EDR parent and child process rules | Classic web shell behaviour; Defender detects Backdoor:ASP/Chopper |
| LSASS access by non-system processes; Mimikatz detections | EDR, Sysmon Event ID 10 | Defender alert "Suspicious access to LSASS service" |
| Routers or cameras opening TLS to w8510.com subdomains, TCP 34125, or querying c.speedtest.net | Firewall, DNS and NetFlow logs | Indicators from the advisory appendix; expect infrastructure to change |
| IoT segment traffic above baseline or new outbound destinations | NetFlow, IDS | The advisory recommends defining baselines in advance |
Hardening plan
- Week 1: inventory every internet-facing server and edge device, compare against the advisory's CVE list and CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, and patch or isolate matches. Sweep for the sethc.exe debugger and disabled NLA on all Windows hosts.
- Weeks 2 to 4: remove default credentials and disable UPnP, remote management and file sharing on routers, cameras, DVRs and NAS; move them to a segmented network with only the egress they need. Test segmentation on a pilot site first, and keep the previous firewall rule set for rollback.
- Weeks 4 to 8: enable LSASS protection and Credential Guard in audit mode, then enforce; deploy Windows LAPS; turn on attack surface reduction rules for credential stealing from LSASS and process creation from PsExec and WMI, starting in audit mode.
- Quarter 1: replace end-of-life devices; put RDP behind a gateway with MFA; add file integrity monitoring and a web application firewall on public web servers.
- Ongoing: schedule device reboots, which clear the in-memory implant, and confirm firmware is current after each reboot.
Metrics
- Internet-facing assets with a KEV-listed vulnerability unpatched past due date: target zero.
- Edge and IoT devices with default or shared credentials: target zero.
- End-of-life network devices still in service: trending down each quarter.
- Windows hosts with LSASS protection and NLA enforced: above 98%.
- Time from web shell alert to host isolation: under one hour.
Framework mapping
| Framework | Reference | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SI-2 Flaw Remediation, CM-7 Least Functionality, CM-8 System Component Inventory | Patching, disabling unused device services, knowing what is exposed |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | IA-5 Authenticator Management, AC-17 Remote Access | Default passwords, RDP and VPN controls |
| NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | SC-7 Boundary Protection, SI-4 System Monitoring | IoT segmentation and traffic baselines |
| NIST CSF 2.0 | PR.PS-02, PR.IR-01, DE.CM-01 | Software maintained or replaced, network protection, network monitoring |
| MITRE D3FEND | D3-NTA Network Traffic Analysis | Spotting botnet C2 from device segments |
Practitioner checklist
- Check internet-facing assets against the CVEs in Appendix B of the joint advisory and the KEV catalogue.
- Hunt for Debugger values on accessibility binaries and for disabled RDP NLA across the Windows estate.
- Search for services running conhost.exe or dllhost.exe from non-system paths and for SoftEther binaries.
- Block the advisory's network indicators and alert on IoT devices contacting new destinations.
- Change default passwords and disable UPnP and remote management on every router, camera, DVR and NAS.
- Replace end-of-life edge devices and schedule reboots for the rest.
- Enable LSASS protection, Credential Guard and Windows LAPS; set WDigest UseLogonCredential to 0.
- After any confirmed intrusion, rotate every credential used on affected hosts, not only the admin accounts.
Standards and references
- FBI, NSA and CNMF: People's Republic of China-Linked Actors Compromise Routers and IoT Devices for Botnet Operations
- US Department of Justice: Court-Authorized Operation Disrupts Worldwide Botnet Used by People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Hackers
- US Department of the Treasury: Treasury Sanctions Technology Company for Support to Malicious Cyber Group
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence: Flax Typhoon using legitimate software to quietly access Taiwanese organizations
- Lumen Black Lotus Labs: Derailing the Raptor Train
- MITRE ATT&CK: Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features
- MITRE ATT&CK: Compromise Infrastructure: Botnet
- CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Botnets Guide · China State Cyber Operations Guide · Edge Device Exploitation by Threat Actors Guide · SOHO and SMB Router Hardening Guide · Threat Actor Groups Guide