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Flax Typhoon Threat Actor Profile Guide: Raptor Train botnet, web shells and defences

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 27 October 2026 12 min read
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Flax Typhoon is a China-based state-linked group that hides inside networks with legitimate software and, according to the FBI, sits behind a botnet of more than 200,000 hijacked routers, cameras and storage devices. Microsoft named the group in 2023 after intrusions into Taiwanese organisations that relied on web shells, a VPN client and built-in Windows tools rather than custom malware. In September 2024 the FBI, NSA and partners linked a large Mirai-based botnet, which Lumen calls Raptor Train, to a Beijing company, Integrity Technology Group, and disrupted it under court authority. This profile is for SOC analysts, network and edge device owners and threat intelligence teams. It covers names and attribution as each source states it, targeting, ATT&CK techniques, the credential and identity abuse pattern, notable events and a detection and hardening plan. General botnet defence is in the Botnets Guide; this page covers what is specific to this actor.

Key takeaways

  • Two faces, one operator. Microsoft tracks hands-on intrusions as Flax Typhoon; the FBI assesses that Integrity Technology Group both ran the botnet and carries out the intrusions attributed to Flax Typhoon.
  • Your edge devices may be its infrastructure. The joint advisory counted more than 260,000 infected devices in June 2024, almost half in the United States, built from SOHO routers, firewalls, NAS, IP cameras and DVRs.
  • Little custom malware on hosts. Inside networks the group used China Chopper, Juicy Potato and BadPotato, Mimikatz, a renamed SoftEther VPN bridge and tools such as certutil, bitsadmin, WinRM and WMIC.
  • Persistence lives in the registry. Disabling RDP Network Level Authentication and setting Task Manager as the debugger for sethc.exe gives SYSTEM access from the sign-in screen without a password.
  • Patch, reboot, replace. The botnet implant runs in memory, so rebooting clears it, but only patching, removing default credentials and replacing end-of-life devices stops reinfection.

Who they are (names and aliases)

Flax Typhoon is not a group entry in MITRE ATT&CK v20, so this page relies on government and vendor reporting. Microsoft describes Flax Typhoon as a nation-state actor based out of China, active since mid-2021, and says it overlaps with ETHEREAL PANDA. The joint advisory of 18 September 2024 states that Integrity Technology Group, a PRC-based company with reported links to the PRC government, controlled and managed the botnet, and that the FBI found activity consistent with Flax Typhoon, RedJuliett and Ethereal Panda, while noting that vendor naming may not map one to one to US government attribution. The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Integrity Technology Group on 3 January 2025 for its role in intrusions publicly attributed to Flax Typhoon, which it calls a Chinese state-sponsored cyber group.

NameUsed byWhat it refers to
Flax TyphoonMicrosoft; adopted by FBI, DOJ and Treasury in public statementsIntrusion activity, first reported against Taiwan in August 2023
Ethereal PandaAnother vendor name cited by Microsoft and the advisoryOverlapping activity
RedJuliettAnother vendor name cited by the advisoryOverlapping activity
Integrity Technology Group (Integrity Tech)FBI, DOJ, Treasury OFACBeijing company that, per the FBI, controlled the botnet and runs Flax Typhoon intrusions
KRLabDOJA public brand of Integrity Tech used to label the botnet control application
Raptor TrainLumen Black Lotus LabsThe botnet, which Lumen assesses is likely operated by Flax Typhoon

For how this group fits alongside other PRC actors such as Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon and Silk Typhoon, see the China State Cyber Operations Guide and the Salt Typhoon Threat Actor Profile.

Targeting and motivation

  • Taiwan first: Microsoft observed Flax Typhoon targeting government agencies, education, critical manufacturing and information technology organisations in Taiwan, with some victims in Southeast Asia, North America and Africa.
  • United States and Europe: Treasury states that between summer 2022 and fall 2023 the group accessed hosts linked to US and European entities using VPN software and remote desktop, often targets US critical infrastructure, and in summer 2023 compromised servers and workstations at a California-based entity.
  • Motivation: Microsoft describes an actor focused on persistence and long-term, quiet access, consistent with espionage. The botnet adds a commercial dimension: DOJ describes a control application that let customers task infected devices.
  • Botnet geography (June 2024): United States 126,000 devices (47.9%), then Vietnam, Germany, Romania, Hong Kong, Canada, South Africa and the United Kingdom, per the advisory.

Tactics and techniques (MITRE ATT&CK)

Because ATT&CK has no Flax Typhoon group page, NHI Mgmt Group mapped the behaviours in the Microsoft report and the joint advisory to ATT&CK v20 techniques. Treat this as an analyst mapping, not MITRE's.

TacticTechniqueObserved behaviour
Resource developmentT1584.005 Botnet; T1584.008 Network DevicesMirai-based implant on SOHO routers, cameras, DVRs and NAS used as Raptor Train Tier 1 nodes
Resource developmentT1588.005 Exploits66 CVEs listed in the advisory, from Fortinet, Zyxel, Ivanti, Confluence, Citrix and many IoT vendors
Initial accessT1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationKnown flaws in VPN, web, Java and SQL servers
PersistenceT1505.003 Web ShellChina Chopper on exploited web servers
Privilege escalationT1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationJuicy Potato and BadPotato when the web shell lacks local admin rights
PersistenceT1546.008 Accessibility Features; T1112 Modify Registrysethc.exe debugger set to Task Manager; RDP NLA disabled via registry
ExecutionT1059.001 PowerShell; T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationHands-on-keyboard work with PowerShell, WMIC and WinRM
Command and controlT1105 Ingress Tool Transfer; T1197 BITS JobsSoftEther downloaded with Invoke-WebRequest, certutil or bitsadmin
Persistence, stealthT1543.003 Windows Service; T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSoftEther installed as an auto-start service; vpnbridge.exe renamed conhost.exe or dllhost.exe
Command and controlT1572 Protocol TunnelingVPN over HTTPS on TCP 443 for lateral movement and scanning
Credential accessT1003.001 LSASS Memory; T1003.002 Security Account ManagerMimikatz against LSASS and the SAM hive
Lateral movementT1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolRDP using stolen credentials or the sticky keys backdoor
ImpactT1498 Network Denial of ServiceDDoS tasks in the Sparrow application; a DDoS against FBI infrastructure during the takedown

How they abuse identities and credentials

The Flax Typhoon pattern is about holding access with as few artefacts as possible. Each step relies on a credential or an authentication setting that the defender controls.

StepWhat the actor doesControl that breaks it
1. Edge footholdExploits a public-facing server or device; on IoT, default or weak credentials and unpatched firmwarePatch internet-facing systems first; remove default passwords; disable remote management, UPnP and file sharing on devices
2. ElevateWeb shell running as a service account escalates with Potato tools, which abuse token impersonationRun web application pools with minimal rights; remove SeImpersonatePrivilege where possible; EDR rules for Potato tools
3. Sign-in screen backdoorSets sethc.exe debugger and disables NLA, so anyone reaching RDP gets a SYSTEM shell without a passwordEnforce NLA by policy; alert on Image File Execution Options changes for accessibility binaries; never expose RDP directly
4. HarvestDumps LSASS and SAM with MimikatzLSASS as a protected process (RunAsPPL), Credential Guard, WDigest UseLogonCredential set to 0, unique local admin passwords with Windows LAPS
5. ReuseMoves with valid accounts over RDP and through the SoftEther tunnelMFA for remote access, tiered admin accounts, disable unused accounts, rotate every credential found on a compromised host
  • Service and local accounts matter most: the web shell runs as the application pool or service identity, and the local administrator hash in SAM unlocks every host that shares it. See the Edge Device Security Guide for credentials held on appliances.
  • Device credentials are identities too: default passwords on cameras and routers are the botnet's entry point. Treat each device as a managed identity with an owner, as the Device and IoT Identity Guide describes.
  • Rotate after eviction: Microsoft advises closing or changing compromised credentials and isolating affected systems, because removing the VPN service alone leaves harvested passwords valid.

Notable incidents

DateEventSource
May 2020 onwardRaptor Train botnet forms; campaigns Lumen names Crossbill, Finch, Canary and Oriole; more than 60,000 active nodes at the June 2023 peakLumen Black Lotus Labs, 18 September 2024
Mid-2021 onwardIntrusions into Taiwanese government, education, manufacturing and IT organisationsMicrosoft Threat Intelligence, 24 August 2023
Summer 2022 to fall 2023Access to hosts of US and European entities; compromise of a California-based entity in summer 2023US Treasury, 3 January 2025
18 September 2024Joint advisory JCSA-20240918-001; court-authorised FBI operation sends disabling commands to infected devices; operators attempt a DDoS against FBI infrastructureFBI, NSA, CNMF and partners; DOJ
3 January 2025OFAC sanctions Integrity Technology GroupUS Treasury

Detection and defence

Detection signals

SignalWhere to lookNotes
Changes under Image File Execution Options for sethc.exe, utilman.exe and other accessibility binariesSysmon Event ID 13, EDR registry telemetryAny Debugger value here is almost never legitimate
RDP UserAuthentication (NLA) set to 0Registry auditing, configuration management drift reportsMicrosoft calls out NLA and sethc changes specifically
conhost.exe or dllhost.exe running from an unusual path, installed as a service, with outbound 443Event ID 7045 (new service), process path baselinesSignature of the renamed SoftEther vpnbridge.exe
certutil, bitsadmin or Invoke-WebRequest pulling executables from the internet on serversPowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104), process creation (4688 or Sysmon 1)See the Living off the Land Guide
w3wp.exe or other web server process spawning cmd.exe or PowerShellEDR parent and child process rulesClassic web shell behaviour; Defender detects Backdoor:ASP/Chopper
LSASS access by non-system processes; Mimikatz detectionsEDR, Sysmon Event ID 10Defender alert "Suspicious access to LSASS service"
Routers or cameras opening TLS to w8510.com subdomains, TCP 34125, or querying c.speedtest.netFirewall, DNS and NetFlow logsIndicators from the advisory appendix; expect infrastructure to change
IoT segment traffic above baseline or new outbound destinationsNetFlow, IDSThe advisory recommends defining baselines in advance

Hardening plan

  1. Week 1: inventory every internet-facing server and edge device, compare against the advisory's CVE list and CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue, and patch or isolate matches. Sweep for the sethc.exe debugger and disabled NLA on all Windows hosts.
  2. Weeks 2 to 4: remove default credentials and disable UPnP, remote management and file sharing on routers, cameras, DVRs and NAS; move them to a segmented network with only the egress they need. Test segmentation on a pilot site first, and keep the previous firewall rule set for rollback.
  3. Weeks 4 to 8: enable LSASS protection and Credential Guard in audit mode, then enforce; deploy Windows LAPS; turn on attack surface reduction rules for credential stealing from LSASS and process creation from PsExec and WMI, starting in audit mode.
  4. Quarter 1: replace end-of-life devices; put RDP behind a gateway with MFA; add file integrity monitoring and a web application firewall on public web servers.
  5. Ongoing: schedule device reboots, which clear the in-memory implant, and confirm firmware is current after each reboot.

Metrics

  • Internet-facing assets with a KEV-listed vulnerability unpatched past due date: target zero.
  • Edge and IoT devices with default or shared credentials: target zero.
  • End-of-life network devices still in service: trending down each quarter.
  • Windows hosts with LSASS protection and NLA enforced: above 98%.
  • Time from web shell alert to host isolation: under one hour.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SI-2 Flaw Remediation, CM-7 Least Functionality, CM-8 System Component InventoryPatching, disabling unused device services, knowing what is exposed
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5IA-5 Authenticator Management, AC-17 Remote AccessDefault passwords, RDP and VPN controls
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5SC-7 Boundary Protection, SI-4 System MonitoringIoT segmentation and traffic baselines
NIST CSF 2.0PR.PS-02, PR.IR-01, DE.CM-01Software maintained or replaced, network protection, network monitoring
MITRE D3FENDD3-NTA Network Traffic AnalysisSpotting botnet C2 from device segments

Practitioner checklist

  • Check internet-facing assets against the CVEs in Appendix B of the joint advisory and the KEV catalogue.
  • Hunt for Debugger values on accessibility binaries and for disabled RDP NLA across the Windows estate.
  • Search for services running conhost.exe or dllhost.exe from non-system paths and for SoftEther binaries.
  • Block the advisory's network indicators and alert on IoT devices contacting new destinations.
  • Change default passwords and disable UPnP and remote management on every router, camera, DVR and NAS.
  • Replace end-of-life edge devices and schedule reboots for the rest.
  • Enable LSASS protection, Credential Guard and Windows LAPS; set WDigest UseLogonCredential to 0.
  • After any confirmed intrusion, rotate every credential used on affected hosts, not only the admin accounts.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Botnets Guide · China State Cyber Operations Guide · Edge Device Exploitation by Threat Actors Guide · SOHO and SMB Router Hardening Guide · Threat Actor Groups Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 27 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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