Encrypted traffic and backups captured today can be decrypted later, once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists, so data that must stay secret for a decade is already exposed. NIST IR 8547 (initial public draft) names this "harvest now, decrypt later" threat as a main reason the post-quantum transition is urgent, and frames prioritisation with Mosca's theorem. This template gives you a repeatable way to run that assessment: scope it, assign owners, score each data flow by confidentiality lifetime, decide what to protect first and record the decision. It is written for security architects, CISOs and privacy leads who need a defensible ranking, not a crypto research project. The broader migration plan sits in the Q-Day Planning Guide; this page is the risk assessment that feeds it.
How to use this template
- Copy and adapt: replace every [Organisation], [Owner] and [Date] placeholder. Keep the numbered sections so audit evidence lines up year to year.
- Treat it as a standing assessment, not a one-off: the sections follow an incident-style flow (scope, roles, triage, containment, remediation, recovery, communication, review) because harvested ciphertext is effectively a slow-burning exposure that you contain by changing cryptography before the data loses its value.
- Use Mosca's inequality as the scoring rule: if X (years the data must stay confidential) plus Y (years you need to migrate the system) is greater than Z (years until a quantum computer could break the algorithm), the data is at risk now. NIST IR 8547 defines X and Y this way; Z is an estimate your organisation must set and document, not a fact.
- Focus on confidentiality: NIST IR 8547 notes that signatures and authentication are not exposed to harvesting in the same way, because a forged signature only matters once a quantum computer exists. Key establishment (TLS, IKE, SSH key exchange) and encrypted data at rest under quantum-vulnerable key wrapping are the targets here.
- Review annually and whenever a regulator, NIST or the NCSC changes its timeline.
1. Scope and triggers
1.1 Purpose. [Organisation] assesses which information assets are exposed to collection now and decryption later, and sets protection priorities so that data with long confidentiality requirements is moved to quantum-resistant key establishment first.
1.2 In scope.
- Data in transit over public or third-party networks: TLS, IPsec/IKE VPNs, SSH, email in transit, API traffic, machine-to-machine links.
- Data at rest whose encryption keys are wrapped or exchanged with RSA, finite field Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve algorithms (for example key escrow, encrypted archives, S/MIME and OpenPGP mail).
- Backups, archives and replicas held by third parties or in cloud storage.
- Long-lived devices and embedded systems with fixed cryptography.
1.3 Out of scope. Symmetric-only encryption with 256-bit keys where the key is never transported under a quantum-vulnerable scheme (record the rationale). Data with a confidentiality lifetime shorter than the agreed Z value.
1.4 Triggers for a reassessment.
- Annual review date: [Date].
- A change to the official timelines (NIST IR 8547 final, NCSC migration timelines, sector regulator guidance).
- A new system, supplier or data category with a confidentiality lifetime above 5 years.
- Evidence of bulk interception or theft of encrypted data affecting [Organisation] or its suppliers.
2. Roles and contacts
| Role | Responsibility in this assessment | Named person |
|---|---|---|
| Assessment owner (CISO or delegate) | Approves the Z value, the scoring and the priority list; reports to the risk committee | [Name] |
| Data owners | Set X (confidentiality lifetime) for each data category, citing legal, contractual or business reasons | [Names per business unit] |
| System owners and architects | Estimate Y (migration time) per system, including supplier dependencies and hardware refresh cycles | [Names] |
| Cryptography or PKI lead | Maintains the cryptographic inventory and records algorithm, key size and protocol per flow | [Name] |
| Privacy officer / DPO | Confirms retention and lifetime for personal and special category data | [Name] |
| Procurement / third-party risk | Collects supplier PQC roadmaps and contract commitments | [Name] |
| Risk committee | Accepts residual risk where migration cannot meet the Mosca threshold | [Chair] |
3. Detection and triage
Here "detection" means finding exposed data flows, and "triage" means scoring them.
3.1 Build the inventory. For each system, record the fields below. The NCSC migration timelines ask organisations to keep "a record of the data you hold (including its expected lifetime and its value to an adversary)", and CISA's quantum readiness recommendations include inventorying and determining the lifecycle of organisational data and finding applications that use public-key cryptography.
| Field | Example entry |
|---|---|
| Asset / data flow ID | DF-014 Customer health records replication to DR site |
| Data category and classification | Special category personal data, Confidential |
| Protocol and algorithm | TLS 1.2, ECDHE P-256 key exchange, AES-256-GCM |
| Exposure path | Leased line via carrier; ciphertext observable by third party |
| X: confidentiality lifetime (years) | 25 (statutory retention plus patient lifetime sensitivity) |
| Y: migration time (years) | 3 (appliance refresh plus supplier firmware) |
| Z: organisational threat estimate (years) | [Set by assessment owner, e.g. 10] |
| Mosca result (X + Y versus Z) | 28 > 10: at risk now |
| Owner and evidence | [Data owner], retention schedule ref. [ID] |
3.2 Set X with evidence, not guesswork. Typical inputs: statutory retention periods, contract terms, trade secret life, intelligence value of personal data (health, biometrics, government identifiers), and the life of credentials or keys that travel inside the traffic.
3.3 Score and band.
| Band | Rule | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | X + Y exceeds Z by 5 years or more, and ciphertext crosses networks you do not control | Hybrid post-quantum key establishment in the next planning cycle |
| High | X + Y exceeds Z | Include in the first migration wave; apply interim containment |
| Medium | X + Y within 3 years of Z | Schedule with the normal refresh; confirm supplier roadmap |
| Low | X + Y well below Z, or symmetric-only protection | Record and review annually |
4. Containment
Containment reduces how much harvestable ciphertext exists while migration is under way.
- Minimise what travels: stop replicating long-lifetime data to locations that do not need it; tokenise or remove fields before transfer.
- Shorten retention: data that is deleted cannot be decrypted later in any useful sense if the stored ciphertext is also gone. Align with the retention schedule.
- Keep traffic on controlled paths: prefer private links for the highest bands, recognising that this reduces, not removes, interception exposure.
- Add a symmetric layer where practical: pre-shared symmetric keys distributed out of band, for example in IKEv2 with post-quantum preshared keys, can protect a small number of high-value links. Record the key management burden.
- Check where keys are wrapped: encrypted archives and backups often use AES for data but RSA to wrap the data key. Note these as exposed if the wrapped keys are stored with the data.
5. Eradication
Eradication here means removing quantum-vulnerable key establishment from in-scope flows.
- TLS first: NIST IR 8547 expects quantum-resistant key establishment in TLS and IKE to be prioritised. The IETF hybrid groups for TLS 1.3 include X25519MLKEM768 (listed as Recommended), SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024; the IETF datatracker showed this work as an RFC on the standards track when checked on 27 October 2026.
- Use the NIST standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment; FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for signatures when you migrate authentication later.
- Prefer hybrid during transition: combine a classical and a post-quantum exchange so a flaw in either does not expose traffic.
- Re-encrypt stored data whose keys were wrapped with RSA or ECC under a quantum-resistant or symmetric-only scheme, and destroy the old wrapped keys.
- Update supplier contracts with PQC roadmap commitments and dates for each Critical or High flow.
6. Recovery
- Validate: capture handshakes in a test environment and confirm the negotiated group is a hybrid post-quantum group, not a fallback to classical ECDHE.
- Monitor for downgrade: log negotiated key exchange groups at load balancers and gateways; alert where Critical flows negotiate classical groups.
- Performance and compatibility: ML-KEM key shares are larger than X25519 key shares; test middleboxes and older clients for handshake failures before broad rollout.
- Rollback: keep the classical group enabled as a secondary option during pilots so a client failure does not cause an outage, and record the exception.
7. Communication and notification
- Risk committee: report the count of flows by band, the residual risk accepted and the migration dates. Use the template wording: "[N] data flows protecting data with confidentiality lifetimes above [Z] years remain on quantum-vulnerable key establishment. Planned completion: [Date]."
- Suppliers: the NCSC timeline asks organisations to tell suppliers what they need; send your requirements with a response date.
- Regulators and customers: there is no general duty to notify harvesting risk. Record whether any sector regulator or contract requires PQC planning evidence, and who owns that response.
8. Post-incident review
- Record decisions, the Z value used and why, and every risk acceptance with an expiry date.
- Compare progress against external milestones. The NCSC sets 2028 for discovery, assessment and an initial plan, 2031 for the highest-priority migrations, and 2035 for completing migration. NIST IR 8547 (draft) proposes deprecating 112-bit RSA and elliptic curve algorithms after 2030 and disallowing quantum-vulnerable algorithms after 2035.
- Feed lessons into procurement standards and the cryptographic inventory.
Implementation guidance
Rollout sequence.
- Agree the Z value and banding rules with the risk committee (one meeting, documented).
- Pilot the inventory on three systems with known long-lived data, for example HR, health or legal archives.
- Extend to all externally facing TLS endpoints using scanner output and load balancer configuration exports.
- Score, band and publish the priority list; start hybrid TLS pilots on Critical flows.
- Re-run annually and on every trigger in section 1.4.
Small versus large organisations. A small organisation may only control a handful of flows: the main lever is supplier choice and configuration of cloud load balancers and VPNs. A large organisation needs automated cryptographic discovery and should link this template to its cryptographic bill of materials.
Metrics.
- Percentage of in-scope flows with X and Y recorded and evidenced.
- Number of Critical and High flows still on classical key establishment.
- Percentage of external TLS endpoints negotiating a hybrid post-quantum group.
- Percentage of Critical suppliers with a dated PQC roadmap in contract.
- Number of open risk acceptances past their expiry date.
Where identity fits. Harvested sessions often carry credentials, tokens and API keys. Most are short-lived and lose value quickly, but long-lived service account secrets and private keys sent inside encrypted channels raise X. See the Post-Quantum Migration for NHIs Guide.
Framework mapping.
| Template section | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 |
|---|---|---|
| 3. Inventory of data and lifetimes | ID.AM-07, ID.AM-08 | RA-3 |
| 4-5. Protecting data in transit and at rest | PR.DS-01, PR.DS-02 | SC-8, SC-12, SC-13, SC-28 |
| 5. Supplier commitments | GV.SC-05 | PM-30 |
Common mistakes. Scoring signatures as harvest-exposed and spending the first wave on PKI; setting X from IT retention defaults instead of asking data owners; ignoring backups held by third parties; treating Z as a fact rather than a documented assumption; and testing hybrid TLS only on modern browsers while machine-to-machine clients silently fall back.
Standards and references.
- NIST: IR 8547 Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (initial public draft)
- NIST: FIPS 203, 204 and 205 approved
- NCSC: Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography
- NIST NCCoE: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography project
- CISA: Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative
- IETF: Post-quantum hybrid ECDHE-MLKEM key agreement for TLS 1.3
- European Commission: Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to PQC
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Q-Day Planning Guide · Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration Guide · Post-Quantum Migration for NHIs Guide · QKD vs Post-Quantum Cryptography Guide