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How to deploy device certificates with Intune: Choose, configure and renew SCEP, PKCS and Cloud PKI

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By NHI Mgmt Group, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda Updated 18 November 2026 15 min read
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Device certificates deployed through Microsoft Intune let laptops and phones prove who they are to Wi-Fi, VPN, email and web services without passwords, but only if issuance, mapping and renewal are set up correctly. Intune can deliver certificates in three main ways: SCEP profiles, PKCS profiles and Microsoft Cloud PKI, which itself issues through SCEP. Each method places the private key in a different place, depends on different infrastructure and fails in different ways. This guide explains how each one works, how to choose, how to configure the profiles safely and how to keep certificates renewing once they are in the field.

Each device certificate is a non-human identity. It has a private key, an issuer, an expiry date and a set of systems that trust it. Treating it that way, with an owner, an inventory and a renewal plan, avoids the common outcome where a fleet of certificates quietly reaches expiry at once. For the protocol background, see the IoT and Device Certificate Provisioning (EST, SCEP) Guide; for Intune administration and access in general, see the Microsoft Intune Guide.

This is an independent guide from NHI Mgmt Group, based on Microsoft's public documentation as of November 2026. It is not sponsored or reviewed by Microsoft. Product features change, so confirm settings against Microsoft's current documentation.

Key takeaways

  • Deploy a trusted certificate profile for your root (and, where needed, issuing) CA first, and assign it to the same groups as the SCEP or PKCS profile that depends on it.
  • With SCEP, including Cloud PKI, the device generates its own key and the key stays on the device. With PKCS, Microsoft documents that the key is generated on the Certificate Connector server and delivered to the device in a PFX.
  • For certificate-based authentication to Active Directory, include the SID in the certificate for strong mapping. Without it, certificates that do not meet the strong mapping requirement are denied authentication after full enforcement.
  • Set a renewal threshold and validity period together, and remember that renewal on Apple platforms has conditions that can leave an expired certificate in place.
  • Treat the NDES server, the Certificate Connector and its service account as privileged non-human identities. They can request certificates for any user or device the template allows.
  • Cloud PKI removes on-premises NDES and connectors, but the CA hierarchy, revocation and RBAC still need design and review.

How Intune delivers certificates

Microsoft documents four certificate profile types in Intune:

  • Trusted certificate: installs the root or intermediate CA certificate so the device trusts certificates issued under it. Other certificate profiles require it.
  • SCEP: each certificate is unique to the request and tied to the user or device. Microsoft notes it works for devices without user affinity, including kiosk and userless devices.
  • PKCS: a user or device certificate issued through the Certificate Connector. User-type certificates need user affinity; device-type certificates do not.
  • PKCS imported: an existing PFX, exported from the CA and imported into Intune, deployed to the user. Microsoft describes this as suited to S/MIME scenarios.

Microsoft Cloud PKI is a separate service that provides the CA and the SCEP registration authority in the cloud, and devices receive its certificates through the SCEP profile. Each certificate profile supports one platform only, so a fleet of Windows, macOS, iOS/iPadOS and Android devices needs a profile set per platform.

The infrastructure each method needs, as documented by Microsoft:

MethodWith a Microsoft CA (AD CS)With a third-party CAWhere the private key is generated
SCEPNDES server plus the Certificate ConnectorNo connector; integrate a supported partner CA and create a Microsoft Entra ID app for challenge validationOn the device
PKCSCertificate Connector on a domain-joined server, with an Enterprise CASupported only with one named partner platformOn the Certificate Connector server, delivered as PFX
PKCS importedCertificate Connector; certificates exported from the CA and importedCertificate Connector requiredAt the CA or wherever the PFX was created
Cloud PKI (SCEP)No on-premises CA, NDES or connector; optionally anchored to your own private CAOn the device

Choosing between SCEP, PKCS and Cloud PKI

The choice comes down to where you want the key, what infrastructure you already run and what the certificate is for.

Choose SCEP with your own CA when

  • You already run AD CS or a supported third-party CA and want the device to generate and keep its own key.
  • You need certificates on devices without user affinity, such as shared or kiosk devices.
  • You can operate NDES and the Certificate Connector securely and with redundancy.

Choose PKCS when

  • You need the same certificate model across platforms without running NDES, and accept that the private key is created on the connector server and transported to the device.
  • You have an Enterprise CA. Microsoft states that a Standalone CA is not supported.

Choose PKCS imported when

  • A user needs the same certificate on several devices, typically for S/MIME decryption of existing mail. This is a special case and should not be used for authentication certificates.

Choose Cloud PKI when

  • You want to issue certificates to Intune-managed devices without running an on-premises CA, NDES or connector.
  • Your devices are enrolled in Intune on a platform that supports the SCEP profile. Microsoft lists Android, iOS/iPadOS, macOS and Windows.
  • You hold the required licence. Microsoft states that Cloud PKI requires a subscription in addition to Intune Plan 1 or Plan 2, through the Intune Suite or as a standalone capability.

From an identity security view, SCEP and Cloud PKI keep the private key on the device, which avoids a central point where keys exist in exportable form. That is the main reason to prefer them for authentication certificates where they meet your requirements.

Step 1: Prepare the trust chain

Every certificate profile depends on the device trusting the issuing chain. Microsoft states that the trusted certificate profile must be deployed before SCEP or PKCS profiles and must target the same devices and users.

  1. Export the root CA certificate. For an Enterprise CA, Microsoft documents certutil -ca.cert ca_name.cer. For Cloud PKI, download the root and issuing CA certificates from the Intune admin center.
  2. Create one trusted certificate profile per platform for the root CA, and add profiles for intermediate CAs where the platform needs them.
  3. Assign the trusted profile and the dependent certificate profile to the same groups. Microsoft notes that assigning to user groups publishes certificates faster than device groups, which need full device registration first.
  4. Check platform limits. Microsoft notes that from Android 11, trusted certificate profiles cannot install the root on Android device administrator devices, except Samsung Knox, and that device administrator management is deprecated on devices with Google Mobile Services.

The CA certificates themselves have expiry dates. Microsoft states that the device certificate validity must be less than the remaining validity of the issuing CA certificate, so track CA expiry in the same inventory as leaf certificates. The Enterprise PKI Design and CA Hierarchy Guide covers hierarchy design.

Step 2: Configure SCEP profiles

The SCEP profile defines what the device asks for and where it sends the request. The settings that matter most for security:

  • Certificate type. User certificates can contain user and device attributes; device certificates contain only device attributes. On Windows, device certificates go to the Local Computer store.
  • Subject name and SAN. Build these from Intune variables such as {{UserPrincipalName}}, {{AAD_Device_ID}} or {{DeviceName}}. Microsoft warns that IMEI, serial number and fully qualified domain name values can be spoofed by someone with device access, so do not rely on them alone for authorisation decisions. It also advises avoiding {{DeviceId}} in the subject on Windows because it can cause sync failures.
  • Key storage provider (Windows). Choose "TPM KSP, otherwise fail" for authentication certificates on hardware that supports it, so the key is hardware-protected. Microsoft notes that 4096-bit keys on Windows work only with the Software KSP, not the TPM or Windows Hello for Business, so 2048-bit keys in the TPM are the usual choice.
  • Extended key usage. Usually client authentication only. Add other usages only when a named use case needs them.
  • Validity and renewal threshold. Microsoft states the validity period must be lower than the CA template's and no more than 24 months. A renewal threshold of 20 means renewal is attempted when the certificate is 80 per cent through its lifetime, and renewal creates a new key pair.
  • SCEP server URLs. List the NDES URLs. Microsoft notes that devices make three calls to the NDES server and all three must reach the same server, so load balancing in front of NDES needs session persistence.

Microsoft also warns about escaped special characters in the subject, which cause a mismatch between the request and the challenge, and about subject names longer than 64 characters, which may need configuration changes on the internal CA. Test profiles with a pilot group first.

Step 3: Configure PKCS profiles and the connector

For PKCS with AD CS, Microsoft documents these prerequisites: all servers joined to the Active Directory domain, an Enterprise CA, and the Certificate Connector for Microsoft Intune installed on a domain-joined Windows server.

The certificate template is the main control point:

  • Duplicate the User template and set compatibility, a display name without spaces and "Supply in the request" for the subject name.
  • Select Allow private key to be exported, which PKCS requires so the connector can export a PFX for the device. After installation, Microsoft states, the private key on the device is marked not exportable.
  • Set a minimum key size of 2048 bits.
  • On the Security tab, grant the connector server's computer account Read and Enroll, and remove Domain Users. On the CA, grant the connector account Issue and Manage Certificates and Request Certificates.

Because the template allows the subject to be supplied in the request and the key to be exported, it is a sensitive template. Restrict enrolment to the connector account only, and review it alongside other AD CS templates using the AD CS Security Guide. Microsoft recommends a renewal threshold of 20 per cent for PKCS and a validity period between 5 days and 24 months.

Step 4: Add strong mapping for Active Directory

Domain controllers now require certificates used for Kerberos authentication to be strongly mapped to an account. Microsoft's Intune documentation, referencing KB5014754, states that the certificate must include a SID extension that matches the user or device SID.

  • SCEP: add a URI subject alternative name with the value {{OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier}}. Intune appends it as tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-14:sid:<value>. Microsoft lists user certificates on macOS, iOS and Windows as supported, and device certificates only for Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices. Users and devices must be synchronised from Active Directory to Microsoft Entra ID.
  • PKCS: upgrade the Certificate Connector to version 6.2406.0.1001 or later, set the registry value EnableSidSecurityExtension to 1 under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\MicrosoftIntune\PFXCertificateConnector, and restart the connector services. This applies to new and renewed PKCS certificates.

Test every system that relies on certificate authentication, such as network access control, VPN and Wi-Fi, after adding the SID. The Kerberos PKINIT and Certificate Mapping Guide explains the mapping model in more depth.

Step 5: Deploy Microsoft Cloud PKI

Microsoft describes Cloud PKI as a cloud service that issues, renews and revokes certificates for Intune-managed devices, with no on-premises servers, connectors or hardware. Key points from the documentation:

  • Hierarchy. You can create a two-tier hierarchy with a Cloud PKI root CA and an issuing CA, or use bring your own CA (BYOCA) to anchor an Intune issuing CA to your existing private CA, such as AD CS. A tenant can hold up to three CAs in total, counting root, issuing and BYOCA issuing CAs.
  • Keys. Production CAs use HSM-backed keys provisioned through Azure Managed HSM. Trial CAs use software-backed keys that cannot be converted after licensing, so do not promote a trial hierarchy to production.
  • Algorithms. RSA 2048, 3072 and 4096-bit keys, with SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512.
  • Issuance. The registration authority supports SCEP for user and device leaf certificates. The device generates its key locally and the key never leaves the device.
  • Revocation. Intune hosts the CRL distribution point for each CA. The CRL is valid for seven days, refreshed every 3.5 days and updated with every revocation. Intune also hosts the AIA endpoint for each issuing CA.
  • Administration. RBAC permissions cover reading CAs, creating CAs and revoking issued leaf certificates, and scope tags can be applied. Reporting shows active, expired and revoked certificates and updates every 24 hours, and admin actions such as create, revoke and search are audited.

Plan the hierarchy before creating anything, because the three-CA limit leaves little room for experiments in a production tenant. Make sure every relying party, such as RADIUS servers and VPN gateways, can reach the hosted CRL and AIA endpoints. For a wider view of hosted versus self-run CAs, see Cloud PKI vs On-Premises PKI.

Securing the connector and NDES

The Certificate Connector and NDES server can request certificates on behalf of every user and device in scope, which makes them high-value non-human identities. Microsoft documents that the connector's service account handles all interactions with the CA, including issuance, revocation and renewal, and that it can run as the server's SYSTEM account or a domain account.

  • Harden the servers as tier 0 adjacent systems, with limited administrators and no other workloads. Microsoft advises not installing the Certificate Connector on the same server as the Intune Connector for Active Directory.
  • Run more than one connector. Microsoft supports up to 100 connector instances per tenant, each on a separate server, with requests routed to any available connector. Each PKCS-capable connector needs the same CA permissions.
  • Keep connectors current. Microsoft states each release is supported for six months, and out-of-support versions may stop communicating with Intune 18 months after a newer version is released. Allow automatic updates where policy permits; they need outbound port 443 to autoupdate.msappproxy.net.
  • Scope the template permissions to the connector account only, and alert on any change to those templates or to the CA security settings.
  • Log and monitor issuance on the CA, and compare issued certificates with Intune-managed devices to catch requests that did not come through Intune.

Renewal, revocation and monitoring

Renewal is where Intune certificate deployments most often fail quietly. Microsoft notes that on iOS/iPadOS and macOS, SCEP renewal happens only during the renewal threshold window and the device must be unlocked during sync. If renewal fails, the expired certificate stays and Intune will not retry; affected devices must be temporarily excluded from the profile to receive a new certificate. Build that recovery into your runbook before you need it.

Other points to plan for:

  • Profile edits reissue certificates. Microsoft warns that editing an existing profile can reissue certificates to every assigned device. Schedule changes and check any per-certificate CA costs.
  • Revocation needs a working path. With Cloud PKI, admins with the right permission can revoke leaf certificates. With your own CA, revocation runs through the connector or the CA. Microsoft notes that for Android device owner profiles, Intune cannot revoke certificates, so revocation must happen at the CA.
  • Retire devices cleanly. When a device is wiped or retired, revoke its certificates so that a lost device cannot keep authenticating. The Certificate Revocation Guide covers CRL and OCSP design.
  • Watch the numbers. Track issued, expiring and failed certificates per platform, and alert when the count of certificates near expiry rises faster than renewals.

Common failure patterns

  • Trusted profile and certificate profile assigned to different groups, so devices receive a certificate they cannot chain, or none at all.
  • Validity longer than the template or CA allows, which causes issuance failures or certificates that outlive their issuer.
  • NDES behind a load balancer without persistence, so the three SCEP calls reach different servers and requests fail.
  • No SID in the certificate, so Kerberos-based authentication stops working after strong mapping enforcement.
  • Over-permissive PKCS template that lets accounts other than the connector enrol with a supplied subject and exportable key.
  • Out-of-date connector that stops talking to Intune and halts issuance and revocation.
  • Apple renewal failure left unnoticed, leaving expired certificates on devices with no automatic retry.
  • Trial Cloud PKI CAs used in production, leaving software-backed keys in the hierarchy.
  • Spoofable attributes trusted for access, such as serial number or IMEI in the subject used as the only device check.

Practitioner checklist

  • Choose SCEP, PKCS or Cloud PKI per use case, and document where the private key is generated for each.
  • Deploy trusted certificate profiles for the full chain before dependent profiles, assigned to the same groups.
  • Use TPM-backed key storage on Windows for authentication certificates where hardware allows.
  • Set validity below the template and CA limits, and a renewal threshold around 20 per cent.
  • Add the SID for strong mapping on SCEP and PKCS certificates used with Active Directory, and test every relying system.
  • Restrict PKCS and SCEP templates to the connector or NDES account, and remove Domain Users.
  • Run at least two current connectors, harden their servers and monitor their service accounts.
  • For Cloud PKI, plan the hierarchy within the three-CA limit, use licensed HSM-backed CAs and confirm CRL and AIA reachability.
  • Write and test a runbook for failed Apple renewals and for revoking certificates on retired devices.
  • Record every device certificate profile, CA and connector in the certificate inventory with an owner.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: IoT and Device Certificate Provisioning (EST, SCEP) Guide · Microsoft Intune Guide · 802.1X and EAP-TLS Enterprise Wi-Fi Guide · AD CS Security Guide

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