Threat intelligence that never becomes a detection, a hunt or a documented gap is reading material, not defence. Most SOCs receive reports, advisories and feed items every day but cannot show which ones changed what they detect. This template gives a traceable chain for each intelligence item: the behaviours it describes, the MITRE ATT&CK v20 techniques they map to, the data components and log sources needed to see them, and a detection backlog entry with an owner, status and validation evidence. It is written for CTI analysts, detection engineers and SOC managers. Technique-level coverage scoring is covered in the MITRE ATT&CK Coverage Mapping Guide and log source mapping in the Log Source Coverage Matrix Template; this page is the workflow that connects them to incoming intelligence.
How to use this template
- Replace placeholders: every [Organisation], [Role], [tool] and bracketed value. Keep the section numbers so backlog records can refer to them.
- One register, four linked tables: intelligence items (section 3), behaviour mappings (section 4), data checks (section 5) and the detection backlog (section 6). Keep them in one spreadsheet, ticketing project or detection-as-code repository, joined by IDs.
- Use ATT&CK v20 as the reference: record the version in the register header. Since v18 ATT&CK expresses detection guidance as detection strategies (IDs such as DET0455) made of platform-specific analytics (IDs such as AN1252) that name data components (IDs such as DC0032). Data source objects are deprecated.
- Tie items to requirements: every item should answer a priority intelligence requirement from your Intelligence Requirements Template. Items that answer none are logged and closed.
- Start small: run the process for your top three PIRs for one quarter before extending it.
1. Purpose and scope
1.1 Purpose. This procedure ensures that intelligence received by [Organisation] about adversary behaviour is assessed, mapped to ATT&CK, checked against available telemetry and turned into detections, hunts or accepted gaps, with a named owner and evidence at each step.
1.2 Scope. All intelligence items relevant to [Organisation] PIRs, including vendor and government advisories, ISAC reports, internal incident findings, red and purple team results and feed items that describe behaviour.
1.3 Out of scope. Pure indicator feeds (hashes, IP addresses, domains) that are loaded directly into blocking or matching controls. Record these in [TIP] and handle them through the indicator management process; bring them into this register only where they reveal a behaviour.
1.4 Triggers. A new item is opened when: an item is assessed as relevant to a PIR; an incident or exercise reveals a missed behaviour; a new ATT&CK version changes a mapped technique; or a detection in the register fails validation.
2. Roles and responsibilities
| Role | Responsibility | Holder |
|---|---|---|
| CTI analyst | Assesses relevance, extracts behaviours, proposes ATT&CK mappings with confidence | [CTI team] |
| Mapping reviewer | Peer-reviews mappings before they enter the backlog | [Second CTI analyst or detection engineer] |
| Detection engineer | Checks data availability, builds, tests and releases detections | [Detection engineering] |
| Log source owner | Enables or fixes telemetry when a data gap is raised | [Platform owner] |
| Threat hunter | Runs hunts where a detection is not yet feasible | [Hunt team] |
| SOC manager | Prioritises the backlog, accepts residual gaps up to [risk level] | [Name] |
| Risk owner | Signs off gaps above [risk level] | [CISO or delegate] |
3. Intelligence intake register
3.1 Each item receives an ID and the fields below. Handle each item according to its Traffic Light Protocol label (TLP 2.0: CLEAR, GREEN, AMBER, RED); do not copy TLP:RED content into shared tickets.
| Field | Content | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Item ID | Unique reference | INT-[YYYY]-[0001] |
| Source and date | Publisher, report title, publication date, URL or TIP reference | [Government advisory, date] |
| TLP | Label as received | TLP:AMBER |
| PIR answered | PIR ID from the requirements register | PIR-03 identity provider compromise |
| Relevance | High, medium or low, with one sentence on why (sector, technology, actor targeting) | High: targets our identity provider and sector |
| Source reliability and confidence | Your grading scheme | [B2] |
| Status | New, Mapping, Mapped, Closed (no action), Closed (actioned) | Mapping |
| Analyst and due date | Owner and target date by relevance | [Name], [5] working days |
3.2 Service levels. High relevance items are mapped within [5] working days, medium within [15], low reviewed monthly in a batch.
4. Behaviour to ATT&CK mapping
4.1 Method. Analysts follow CISA's Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping for finished reports: find the behaviour, research it, translate it into a tactic, identify the technique, identify the sub-technique, and compare results with another analyst.
4.2 Record one row per behaviour, not per report.
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Mapping ID and item ID | MAP-[0001], linked to INT ID |
| Behaviour as reported | A short paraphrase of the procedure, with the report section |
| Tactic, technique, sub-technique | ATT&CK v20 IDs and names, for example T1059.001 PowerShell |
| Platform | Windows, Linux, macOS, identity provider, IaaS, SaaS, containers, ESXi or other |
| Mapping confidence | High (explicit procedure), medium (inferred from described effect), low (tool name only) |
| Reviewer | Name and date of peer review |
| Detection strategy | The ATT&CK detection strategy for the technique, for example DET0455 Abuse of PowerShell for Arbitrary Execution |
4.3 Quality rules. Reviewers check for the mapping mistakes CISA names (leaping to conclusions, missed opportunities, miscategorisation) and for analytical biases (novelty, visibility, producer, victim and availability bias). A tool name alone is not a behaviour: map what the tool did. When a report is ambiguous, map to the technique, not a guessed sub-technique.
5. Data source and telemetry check
5.1 For each mapping, the detection engineer reads the analytics in the ATT&CK detection strategy for the relevant platform and records the data components and log sources required, then checks them against the log source coverage matrix.
| Technique (example) | Detection strategy | Analytic and platform | Data components and log sources named by ATT&CK |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1059.001 PowerShell | DET0455 | AN1252 Windows | DC0032 Process Creation (Sysmon event 1); DC0064 Command Execution (PowerShell events 4103 to 4106); DC0034 Process Metadata (PowerShell events 400, 403) |
| T1003.001 LSASS Memory | DET0363 | AN1030 Windows | DC0035 Process Access (Sysmon event 10); DC0032 Process Creation; DC0039 File Creation (Sysmon event 11) |
| T1078.004 Cloud Accounts | DET0546 | AN1503 Identity Provider; AN1504 IaaS | DC0002 User Account Authentication (azure:signinlogs; AWS:CloudTrail ConsoleLogin, AssumeRole); DC0088 Logon Session Metadata |
| T1566.002 Spearphishing Link | DET0107 | AN0298 Windows | DC0038 Application Log Content (m365:unified); DC0032 Process Creation; DC0082 Network Connection Creation (Sysmon events 3, 22) |
| T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact | DET0215 | AN0605 ESXi | DC0061 File Modification (esxi:vmkernel); DC0064 Command Execution (esxi:shell) |
5.2 Data status values. Available (collected, parsed, retained for at least [90] days); Partial (collected but missing fields, event codes or platforms); Missing (not collected); Not applicable (platform not in use). Partial and Missing open a data gap ticket to the log source owner with a target date.
6. Detection backlog
6.1 Each mapping with Available or Partial data produces a backlog entry. Each entry with Missing data produces either a hunt using other evidence or a documented gap.
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| Backlog ID and links | DET-[0001], linked to MAP and INT IDs |
| Outcome type | New detection, tune existing detection, hunt, data gap, accepted gap |
| Priority | P1 to P4 from relevance, mapping confidence, asset criticality and existing coverage |
| Owner | Named detection engineer or hunter |
| Status | Backlog, In development, In test, Released, Blocked (data), Accepted gap, Retired |
| Rule reference | Repository path and rule ID; for Sigma (specification 2.1.0), the rule id (UUID v4), status, level, references linking the intelligence item, and tags such as attack.t1059.001 |
| Validation evidence | Test method, date, result and link to evidence |
| Target and actual dates | By priority: P1 [10] working days, P2 [30], P3 [60], P4 next quarter |
6.2 Documentation. Every released detection carries the sections of Palantir's Alerting and Detection Strategy framework: goal, categorisation, strategy abstract, technical context, blind spots and assumptions, false positives, validation, priority and response. The blind spots section must name what the intelligence described that the rule does not catch.
7. Build, validate and release
- Build: write the rule in [Sigma or platform query language] in the detection repository, referencing the backlog ID. See the Detection as Code Guide.
- Test against data: run the rule over [30] days of historical data to measure volume and false positives before enabling alerts.
- Validate the behaviour: reproduce the mapped technique in an authorised test environment through [purple team or BAS tooling] and confirm the rule fires. Record the result in the validation evidence field.
- Release in stages: set the Sigma status to
testor run in log-only mode for [14] days, then promote tostablewith alerting and a response playbook. - Roll back: if alert volume exceeds [threshold] or the rule disrupts the SIEM, return it to log-only, record the reason and reopen the backlog entry.
8. Feedback, reporting and review
8.1 Feedback to CTI. When an entry is released, blocked or accepted as a gap, the detection engineer updates the intelligence item so CTI can tell stakeholders what changed.
8.2 Monthly report. The SOC manager reports the metrics in the implementation guidance and the open accepted gaps to [governance forum].
8.3 Quarterly review. Re-test a sample of released detections, retire rules whose technique or telemetry has changed, update mappings after any ATT&CK release within [60] days, and refresh the ATT&CK Navigator layer used for coverage reporting.
Implementation guidance
- Phase 1, weeks 1 to 4: set up the register, agree status values and SLAs, and back-fill the last [10] high relevance items. Pilot with one PIR.
- Phase 2, months 2 to 3: connect the register to the log source coverage matrix and the detection repository so IDs link automatically; start peer review of every mapping.
- Phase 3, quarter 2 onward: add validation through purple team exercises and report coverage changes per PIR. See the Purple Team Exercise Plan Template.
- Metrics: median days from high relevance item to released detection or accepted gap; percentage of mapped behaviours with a validated detection; percentage of backlog entries blocked by missing data; mapping peer-review rate; accepted gaps older than [180] days.
- Common failure patterns: mapping whole reports to long technique lists that no one can action; treating a technique as covered because one rule carries its tag; leaving data gaps without an owner; and never retiring detections when the intelligence ages out.
- Identity behaviours: many current reports describe abuse of valid cloud accounts, OAuth applications and service principals. Map these to T1078.004 and related techniques and make sure identity provider and cloud control plane logs are in the coverage matrix. See the Detection Engineering for Non-Human Identities Guide.
- Framework fit: the process supports NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA-02 (threat intelligence received), ID.RA-03 (threats identified and recorded), DE.AE-02 (adverse events analysed) and ID.IM-01 (improvements from evaluations), and NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 PM-16 Threat Awareness Program, SI-4 System Monitoring and RA-10 Threat Hunting.
- Small versus large teams: a team of two can run this in a shared spreadsheet with weekly triage. Larger SOCs should hold it in the ticketing or detection-as-code platform with automated links to ATT&CK STIX data and the TIP.
Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Detection Engineering Guide · ATT&CK Detection Strategies and Analytics Guide · Sigma Rules Guide · Threat Intelligence Guide