Many organisations first learn of a data theft when a journalist, customer or threat intelligence feed tells them they have been named on a ransomware leak site, with no alert, no ransom note and no idea what was taken. A listing may be true and recent, true but about a supplier's systems, a repackaging of old breach data, or a false claim made for publicity. Each needs a different response, and all of them need one fast. This playbook template gives [Organisation] a structured way to verify a listing, find where the data came from, scope it, contain any live intrusion, and communicate without making the situation worse. It is for incident leads, threat intelligence, legal, privacy and communications teams. It complements the Extortion Email Playbook, which covers direct demands, and the Ransomware Leak Sites and Victim Shaming Guide, which explains how leak sites work.
How to use this template
- Adopt it as a sub-playbook of [Organisation]'s incident response plan. See the Incident Response Plan Template.
- Decide in advance who may visit leak sites. Only the threat intelligence provider or a named analyst on an isolated, non-attributable research environment, under a written procedure approved by legal. Staff must never browse to the listing from corporate devices or download sample files.
- Use the four source hypotheses in section 3: H1 intrusion at [Organisation], H2 compromise at a supplier or software platform, H3 recycled or old data, H4 false claim. Keep all four open until the evidence closes them.
- Fill in every [placeholder], including external counsel, insurer hotline and threat intelligence provider, and exercise the playbook once a year.
1. Scope and triggers
1.1 This playbook applies when [Organisation], a subsidiary, a brand or a domain is named, or credibly reported as named, on a ransomware or data extortion leak site, forum or channel, with or without a direct demand.
1.2 Context. The NCSC's paper on ransomware, extortion and the cyber crime ecosystem says ransomware groups use leak sites to publish stolen data as extra pressure on victims to pay, and notes that some groups steal data and extort without deploying ransomware at all. See the Data Extortion Without Encryption Guide.
1.3 Triggers: an alert from dark web or leak site monitoring; a journalist, researcher or customer enquiry; a listing reported by a supplier or industry ISAC; a published sample containing [Organisation] data; an extortion email that references a listing.
1.4 Techniques to record if the listing is confirmed: T1657 Financial Theft (extortion), plus the collection and exfiltration techniques found, for example T1530 Data from Cloud Storage, T1213.006 Databases or T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage.
2. Roles and contacts
| Role | Named lead | Responsibilities |
|---|---|---|
| Incident lead | [Name, phone] | Declares the incident, owns hypotheses and the decision log |
| Threat intelligence analyst or provider | [Name or firm] | Captures the listing safely, assesses the group, compares with known data sets |
| External counsel | [Firm] | Directs the investigation where privilege matters, advises on contact with the group. See the Legal Privilege in Incident Response Guide |
| Privacy lead | [Name] | Breach risk assessment, regulator and individual notification |
| Third-party risk lead | [Name] | Contacts suppliers whose systems may hold the data |
| Communications lead | [Name] | Holding statements, media, staff and customer messages |
| Executive sponsor | [Name] | Approves public statements and any decision on contact with the group |
3. Detection and triage
3.1 Capture the listing through the approved researcher: screenshots, the listing text, claimed volume, file tree, sample file names and hashes, deadline and group name. Record the capture time; listings change and disappear.
3.2 Test the hypotheses.
| Hypothesis | Evidence for | Evidence against | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| H1 Intrusion at [Organisation] | Sample files match internal paths, file servers or recent documents; anomalies in egress, VPN or cloud logs | No match to any internal system | Incident lead and SOC |
| H2 Supplier or platform compromise | Data matches what a supplier or SaaS platform holds; the group is running a mass exploitation campaign; other victims share the supplier | Data includes items no supplier ever held | Third-party risk lead |
| H3 Recycled or old data | Samples match a previously disclosed breach or public data; file dates are old | Recent file dates, current employees or customers | Threat intelligence |
| H4 False claim | No samples, generic samples, group with a record of inflated claims | Any verifiable internal data | Threat intelligence |
3.3 Check mass exploitation first. Groups often list many victims after exploiting one product. In the Oracle E-Business Suite exploitation by Cl0p, the earliest known exploitation was about seven weeks before extortion emails began, and victims were named on the leak site before most had confirmed a breach. Check whether [Organisation] runs the product the group is exploiting and whether CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue lists it. See the Cl0p Threat Actor Profile.
3.4 Look for the intrusion even if H2 to H4 look likely: unusual outbound volumes, new remote access tools, new accounts, access to file shares and cloud storage outside normal patterns, and activity on any internet-facing file transfer or ERP system, for the [90] days before the listing.
3.5 Decision (incident lead): confirmed, likely, unlikely or disproved, per hypothesis. A listing with verified internal data is treated as a confirmed incident even if the entry point is not yet found.
4. Containment
4.1 If H1 is confirmed or likely, follow the main incident response plan for the intrusion: isolate affected systems, remove attacker access and preserve evidence. The CISA #StopRansomware Guide advises out-of-band communication so the attacker does not learn they have been detected, and disconnecting rather than powering down systems to keep memory evidence.
4.2 If H2, require the supplier to confirm scope, containment and the data involved, in writing, and suspend integrations and credentials they hold until that confirmation arrives. See the Vendor SaaS Breach Response Playbook.
4.3 Rotate credentials, API keys and tokens that appear in the samples or that the affected systems held. Leaked data often contains configuration files and passwords that enable a second attack.
4.4 Decision (executive sponsor on advice from counsel): whether anyone will contact the group. Any contact goes through counsel and specialists; staff must not reply to the group or post on the site. Payment questions follow the Ransomware Payments and Sanctions Guide; the ICO does not regard paying a ransom as an appropriate measure to protect personal data.
5. Eradication
5.1 Close the entry point found: patch the exploited product, remove persistence, disable the compromised accounts.
5.2 If the data was taken from a supplier, confirm that the supplier has closed its entry point and that [Organisation]'s data has been removed from any system that no longer needs it.
5.3 Retire or reduce stores of old data found in the samples that had no business need. Data that is not held cannot be listed.
6. Recovery
6.1 Monitor the leak site through the provider for updates, deadlines and publication. If data is published, the threat intelligence provider downloads it into an isolated environment for scoping; nobody opens it on the corporate network.
6.2 Scope the published or sampled data: data categories, number of individuals, special category or financial data, credentials. Compare with section 3 findings and update the notification population.
6.3 Support affected people with password resets, fraud alerts or monitoring where appropriate, and watch for phishing that uses the leaked data.
7. Communication and notification
| Audience | Owner | When |
|---|---|---|
| Media and public | Communications lead | Holding statement ready within [2] hours of the first enquiry: aware of the claim, investigating, no confirmation until evidence supports it |
| Data protection regulator | Privacy lead | Once a personal data breach is established; UK ICO without undue delay and within 72 hours of becoming aware, unless unlikely to result in risk; record the assessment either way |
| Affected individuals | Privacy lead | Without undue delay where the risk is high |
| Law enforcement and national CSIRT | Incident lead | At confirmation (UK: report.ncsc.gov.uk) |
| Customers, partners and suppliers | Account owners and third-party risk lead | Where their data is named, or contracts require notice |
| Insurer | Finance | At declaration, before engaging paid responders if the policy requires it |
| Staff | Communications lead | Same day: do not visit the site, do not comment publicly, report contact attempts |
7.1 The ICO expects evidence for the exfiltration assessment, and notes that without adequate logs you may struggle to justify your decision. Write down why each hypothesis was accepted or rejected.
8. Post-incident review
8.1 Record the timeline: data theft (if found), listing, first awareness, verification, containment, notifications.
8.2 Root cause questions: Why did [Organisation] learn of the theft from the listing? Which egress, file transfer or cloud logs were missing? Was the exploited product on the asset inventory and patched?
8.3 Metrics: time from listing to verification decision; time from listing to awareness; percentage of internet-facing file transfer and ERP systems with egress monitoring; share of supplier contracts with breach notice clauses; number of listings later disproved.
Implementation guidance
- Monitor before you are named. Leak site monitoring by a provider shortens the time from listing to awareness. See the Dark Web Monitoring Guide.
- Prepare the holding statement now. A pre-approved line ("we are aware of the claim and are investigating") avoids both denial that later proves false and confirmation before facts are known.
- Do not count on payment ending it. The NCSC paper warns that a victim can still be liable for failing to protect the data whether or not it is published on the leak site.
- Avoid the common mistakes. Denying the claim publicly before section 3 is complete; letting staff download samples onto corporate laptops; closing the case as a false claim because no intrusion was found, without checking suppliers; and starting the 72 hour clock discussion only after the data is published, when awareness may have begun with the listing itself.
- Map where your data lives outside your estate. Testing H2 quickly needs a list of which suppliers and platforms hold which data sets, kept by the third-party risk team.
- Size by organisation. A small organisation relies on its insurer's panel for intelligence, counsel and forensics; the key preparation is knowing the hotline number. A large organisation needs a contracted intelligence provider, pre-agreed research procedures and supplier data maps to test H2 quickly.
| Playbook section | NIST CSF 2.0 | NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A |
|---|---|---|---|
| Threat intelligence and monitoring | ID.RA-03 | SI-4 | A.5.7 |
| 3. Detection and triage | RS.AN-03 | IR-4 | A.5.25 |
| Supplier involvement | GV.SC-08 | IR-4 | A.5.21 |
| Evidence and decision records | RS.AN-06 | IR-4 | A.5.28 |
| 7. Communication | RS.CO-02, RS.CO-03 | IR-6 | A.5.26 |
References: NIST: SP 800-61 Rev. 3 Incident Response Recommendations · NCSC: Ransomware, extortion and the cyber crime ecosystem · CISA, MS-ISAC, NSA and FBI: #StopRansomware Guide · ICO: Ransomware and data protection compliance · CISA: Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
This template is provided for guidance and must be adapted to your organisation; it is not legal advice. Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Extortion Email Playbook · Ransomware Leak Sites and Victim Shaming Guide · Ransomware Negotiation Guide · Dark Web Monitoring Guide