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MITRE ATT&CK T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification Guide: Detecting Domain and Tenant Policy Changes

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By NHI Mgmt Group, edited by Lalit Choda Updated 26 October 2026 13 min read
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An attacker who can change one Group Policy Object, domain trust or federation setting can change the security of every device and account that setting governs, in one move. MITRE ATT&CK tracks this as T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification, which sits in both Defense Impairment (TA0112) and Privilege Escalation (TA0004) and applies to Windows and identity provider platforms. Ransomware crews use it to push encryptors domain-wide; others add a federation trust to sign in as anyone. This guide covers how the technique works, where it appears, how to detect changes in Active Directory, Entra ID, Okta and AWS, and how to make those changes hard to make and quick to spot. It is for identity platform owners, detection engineers and incident responders.

Key takeaways

  • Central policy is a force multiplier for both sides. ATT&CK notes that because domain and tenant settings apply to large numbers of identities, the potential malicious outcomes are very broad.
  • Two sub-techniques, two control planes. T1484.001 Group Policy Modification abuses AD Group Policy; T1484.002 Trust Modification adds or alters domain trusts, federated domains and external identity providers.
  • A rogue trust beats MFA. A federated domain or identity provider the attacker controls lets them mint accepted tokens for any user, as Storm-0501 and Scattered Spider did.
  • Change is the signal. Legitimate trust and federation changes are rare, so every one should alert; GPO changes are frequent, so tie them to change records and watch the dangerous settings.
  • Attackers revert. ATT&CK warns adversaries may make a change, act, and then restore the original setting, so point-in-time configuration checks miss it; event logs and version history do not.

How the attack works

ATT&CK v20 (T1484 version 4.0, last modified 12 May 2026) defines the technique as modifying the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defences or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. It requires sufficient permissions first, so T1484 almost always follows privileged account compromise or a delegation weakness.

Sub-techniqueWhat is changedEffect for the attackerExamples recorded in ATT&CK v20
T1484.001 Group Policy ModificationGPO objects in AD and their files under the domain's SYSVOL Policies folder, such as scheduled task preferences and security templates (GptTmpl.inf)Run code on every computer the GPO applies to, disable or modify security tools, grant user rights such as SeEnableDelegationPrivilegeStorm-0501, LockBit 2.0 and 3.0, Qilin, APT41, Indrik Spider, Cinnamon Tempest, HermeticWiper, Prestige, SharePoint ToolShell exploitation (Storm-2603)
T1484.002 Trust ModificationAD domain trusts, federation settings for a domain, external identity providers in a tenant (Entra ID, Okta, AWS IAM Identity Center or AWS IAM)Forge SAML tokens without stealing the signing key; sign in as any user; federate into every AWS account in an organisationStorm-0501, Scattered Spider, APT29 in the SolarWinds compromise, AADInternals tool

ATT&CK lists outcomes that show the range: a GPO pushing a malicious T1053.005 Scheduled Task domain-wide; a trust modified to include an adversary-controlled domain so its forged tokens are accepted; configuration changed to support a T1207 Rogue Domain Controller; and a new adversary-controlled federated identity provider added to a tenant. For trust modification, the attacker can add their own signing certificate instead of stealing yours, then issue T1606.002 SAML Tokens, or convert a managed domain to federated and control claim issuance. GPO abuse is often the delivery mechanism for T1685 Disable or Modify Tools.

Where it shows up

  • Active Directory Group Policy: anyone with edit rights on a GPO linked to many computers, or link rights on a high-level OU or the domain, effectively has code execution there. Delegated GPO edit rights given to helpdesk or deployment groups are the common path. See the Group Policy Security Guide.
  • AD domain and forest trusts: trust objects carry attributes such as direction, type and trust attributes; changes alter which external principals your domain accepts. See the Federation and Trust Relationships Guide.
  • Entra ID federated domains: converting a domain to federated, or adding a new federated domain, points authentication for those users at an identity provider whose tokens Entra ID will trust. See the Entra ID Security Guide.
  • Okta and other SSO tenants: CISA reported Scattered Spider adding a federated identity provider to the victim's SSO tenant and activating automatic account linking, which let them sign in to any account with a matching attribute value they chose. See the Okta Security Hardening Guide.
  • AWS: ATT&CK notes that a new identity provider created for an AWS Organization allows federation into all member accounts without creating identities in each.
  • Hybrid sync infrastructure: the servers and service accounts that connect on-premises AD to the cloud tenant are a bridge into tenant-level privilege. See the Microsoft Entra Connect and Cloud Sync Hardening Guide.

Impact

  • Domain-wide execution: one GPO change can deploy ransomware or wipers to every machine in scope at the next policy refresh, which is why ransomware families build it in.
  • Defences switched off at scale: GPO settings can disable endpoint protection, logging and firewall rules across thousands of hosts.
  • Durable, MFA-proof persistence: a rogue federation trust survives password resets and MFA re-registration, because it is not tied to any user credential.
  • Cross-environment reach: a tenant or AWS Organization identity provider extends access to every connected application or account, and recovery means finding every policy and trust change, not just compromised accounts. See the Identity Recovery Guide.

Detection

ATT&CK v20 detection strategies DET0270 (T1484), DET0305 (Group Policy) and DET0458 (trusts) name the telemetry below. Trust and federation changes are rare enough that every event should page someone. GPO changes need context.

ChangeLog source and eventAlert logic
GPO object modified or createdWindows Security 5136 (directory service object modified) and 5137 (created) on domain controllers, with Audit Directory Service Changes enabled and SACLs on the Policies containerChanges to groupPolicyContainer objects or gPLink on OUs and the domain outside an approved change window or by accounts not in the GPO admin group
GPO files changed in SYSVOLSecurity 4663, 4670, 4656 (object access) and Sysmon 11 (file create)Writes to ScheduledTasks.xml, GptTmpl.inf, scripts folders or new executables under Policies
User rights changed by policySecurity 4704 (user right assigned)Assignment of SeEnableDelegationPrivilege or other sensitive rights
AD trust created or modifiedSecurity 5136 and 5137 on trustedDomain objects (trustDirection, trustType, trustAttributes); Sysmon 1 for trust management toolsAny change; correlate with change records
Entra ID federation changesEntra audit log, Core Directory, DirectoryManagement: "Set domain authentication", "Set federation settings on domain", "Add unverified domain", "Verify domain"Alert on every occurrence, and on a domain moving from managed to federated
Entra cross-tenant and policy changesEntra audit log: "Add a partner to cross-tenant access setting", "Update a partner cross-tenant access setting", "Update Conditional Access policy"Alert on changes by non-PIM-activated roles or outside change windows
Okta identity provider addedOkta System Log; Microsoft Defender for Identity alert "Secondary identity provider added in Okta" (mapped to T1484.002 and T1556)Alert on every new IdP and on routing rule or account linking changes
AWS identity provider changesCloudTrail IAM calls such as CreateSAMLProvider and CreateOpenIDConnectProvider, and IAM Identity Center configuration changesAlert on any call outside the identity team's automation

Detection engineering notes

  1. Turn the auditing on first. Microsoft documents that Audit Directory Service Changes logs only on domain controllers and only for objects with a matching SACL. Without SACLs on the Policies container and trust objects, 5136 never fires for them.
  2. Record old and new values. 5136 shows which object, attribute and account changed; retain these events for your full investigation window.
  3. Catch the revert. Alert on the change event itself, not only on a drifted end state, and compare GPO version history so a change that was rolled back still surfaces.
  4. Use the vendor and hunting content. Microsoft's Storm-0501 report includes an advanced hunting query for "Set federation settings on domain." in CloudAppEvents and Defender for Cloud Apps alerts for backdoor creation with AADInternals; Defender for Identity also alerts on suspicious credential changes to an Entra Connect Sync application.

Metrics that show it is working

  • Audit coverage: percentage of domain controllers with Directory Service Changes auditing and SACLs on GPO and trust objects, verified quarterly.
  • Change reconciliation rate: percentage of GPO, trust and federation changes matched to an approved change record within one business day.
  • Privileged edit surface: number of principals able to edit or link GPOs at domain or high OU level, and number able to change federation or add identity providers, trending down.
  • Federated domain count: federated domains and external IdPs per tenant compared with the approved list, with zero unexplained entries.

Prevention and hardening

Shrink who can change policy

  • Audit GPO permissions: ATT&CK M1047 recommends identifying GPO modification privileges with attack path tooling such as BloodHound. Remove edit and link rights from broad groups and from service accounts. See the BloodHound and Active Directory Attack Path Guide.
  • Treat policy as Tier 0: M1026 calls for least privilege and protected administrative access to domain controllers and AD FS servers, and says not to create service accounts with administrative privileges. Domain controllers, AD FS, Entra Connect servers and GPO management hosts belong in the same tier. See the Active Directory and Entra ID Hardening Guide.
  • Narrow GPO scope: M1018 suggests WMI and security filtering so each GPO applies only to the users and computers that need it, which limits blast radius if one is abused.
  • Restrict identity provider creation in cloud: ATT&CK suggests AWS service control policies that limit CreateSAMLProvider and CreateOpenIDConnectProvider to the accounts that need them. In Entra ID, keep the roles that can manage domains and federation in PIM with approval.

Reduce what a trust change can do

  • Cloud-only admins: Microsoft advises using cloud-only accounts for Entra ID and Microsoft 365 privileged roles, so that on-premises compromise cannot reach them. See the Break-Glass Account Guide for emergency accounts.
  • Remove federation you do not need: Microsoft recommends disabling federation trust relationships for Microsoft 365 authentication when possible and moving to Entra cloud authentication; a compromised token-signing certificate lets anyone holding it impersonate any user.
  • Validate federated tokens: Microsoft's Storm-0501 guidance recommends setting the validatingDomains property of federatedTokenValidationPolicy so SAML sign-ins are rejected where the federated account's root domain does not match the Entra account's root domain.
  • Protect signing keys: Microsoft recommends a hardware security module for AD FS token-signing certificates, and administrators can compare signing certificate thumbprints with Get-EntraFederationProperty and list federated domains with Get-EntraDomain.
  • Constrain AD trusts: M1015 Active Directory Configuration includes SID filtering on trusts; review trust direction and transitivity against business need.

Implementation sequence

  1. Baseline: export every GPO with its links, permissions and version, every AD trust, every federated domain and external identity provider in each tenant, and every AWS identity provider. This is your known-good list.
  2. Enable telemetry: Directory Service Changes auditing with SACLs, SYSVOL file auditing, Entra audit log export, Okta System Log and CloudTrail into the SIEM.
  3. Alert on trust and federation changes: deploy the rare-event alerts first; they are low volume and high value.
  4. Reduce rights: remove excess GPO edit and link permissions in stages, testing with the GPO owners; keep a record of removed delegations so they can be restored if a legitimate process breaks.
  5. Move to approved change: route GPO and federation changes through change control, ideally with staged GPOs tested on a pilot OU before linking widely, and keep GPO backups so a malicious change can be reversed quickly. See the Change Management Policy Template.

Decision guidance

  • Cloud-first organisations: focus on tenant-level controls: PIM for domain and IdP management roles, alerts on every federation and IdP change, and managed (cloud) authentication instead of federation where possible.
  • Hybrid organisations: the riskiest path is on-premises compromise reaching the tenant. Protect sync servers and AD FS as Tier 0, keep privileged cloud roles cloud-only, and alert on sync account misuse.
  • Large AD estates: GPO change volume is high, so invest in change reconciliation and focused alerts on dangerous settings rather than alerting on every 5136. Small estates can simply review every GPO and federation change weekly.

Framework mapping

FrameworkReferenceRelevance to T1484
MITRE ATT&CK mitigationsM1047 Audit; M1026 Privileged Account Management; M1018 User Account Management; M1015 Active Directory ConfigurationFind and remove edit rights, protect DCs and AD FS, scope GPOs, filter trusts
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5CM-3 Configuration Change Control; CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change; AC-6 Least Privilege; AU-6 Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting; SI-4 System MonitoringControl and restrict who can change policy, and review the changes
NIST CSF 2.0PR.PS-01; PR.AA-05; DE.CM-09; DE.AE-02Configuration management, least privilege, monitoring and analysis of adverse events

Lessons from incidents

  • Both sub-techniques in one intrusion: in the Storm-0501 hybrid cloud attacks, Microsoft reported the group pushing Embargo ransomware through a Group Policy scheduled task named SysUpdate and using Group Policy to tamper with security products, while in the cloud it used Global Administrator access and AADInternals to add a federated domain as a persistent backdoor that could impersonate users and bypass MFA. Alerting on "Set federation settings on domain" and protecting the Entra Connect Sync accounts would have cut both paths.
  • Help desk to IdP backdoor: CISA's advisory on Scattered Spider describes adding a federated identity provider with automatic account linking after compromising a user, giving logins that survived password changes. See the Scattered Spider Threat Actor Profile.
  • GPO as ransomware launcher: ATT&CK records many ransomware families with built-in GPO propagation, so a sudden new immediate scheduled task in a domain-linked GPO should be treated as an incident until proven otherwise.

Practitioner checklist

  • Export and store a baseline of GPOs, links, permissions, AD trusts, federated domains and external identity providers.
  • Enable Audit Directory Service Changes on all domain controllers and add SACLs to the Policies container and trust objects.
  • Alert on every Entra "Set domain authentication" and "Set federation settings on domain" event, every new Okta identity provider and every AWS identity provider creation.
  • Remove GPO edit and link rights from broad groups and service accounts, verified with attack path analysis.
  • Keep Entra privileged roles cloud-only, phishing-resistant and activated through PIM.
  • Protect domain controllers, AD FS and Entra Connect servers as Tier 0 and alert on sync account sign-ins from elsewhere.
  • Configure federated token validation and remove federation that is no longer needed.
  • Restrict identity provider creation in AWS with service control policies.
  • Reconcile every policy and trust change with a change record and track the reconciliation rate.

Standards and references

Related NHI Mgmt Group resources: Group Policy Security Guide · Federation and Trust Relationships Guide · Microsoft Entra Connect and Cloud Sync Hardening Guide · MITRE ATT&CK T1606 Forge Web Credentials Guide · ITDR Guide

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NHIMG Editorial Note
Researched and written by the NHI Mgmt Group editorial team using AI tools, under the editorial direction of Lalit Choda. Facts are drawn from the sources listed on this page and checked by our automated quality process. Last updated 26 October 2026. Spotted an error? Use our contact page.
NHI Mgmt Group, the independent authority on Non-Human Identity, IAM and Agentic AI security. nhimg.org

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